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Abstract 
Despite being contemporaries and both deeply concerned about 
the proclamation of the Church, there are deep dlf~erences between Barth 
arii T1llich in their understanding both o~ the task and nature of 
proclamation and of the theological method which in~orms it. 
The differences in their understanding of proclamation may be 
traced to the very dif~erent situations in vmidl their early and ~ormati ve 
years were spent. Thus Barth displays a preoccupation Vw'i th the problems 
of the sermon, while Tillich is concerned with those o~ the alienation 
fiom the Church of the 1ntelligentsia and the working classes, the 
disintegration o~ the 1ntellectual world and the isolation of theology. 
Strongly i~luenced by Schelling, Tillich wished to ~~eat not 
simply a synthesis o~ philosophy and theology, but a reintegration of 
the whole systEm o~ sciences which, with its ontological foundation, 
would provide an important place ~or theology. The premises worked out 
in this ear~ period i~orrn much of his later work. However, as a 
reSJ.lt of the impact on him o~ existentialist thinking, he works with not 
one but two di~~erent conceptions o~ the relationship between philosophy 
and theology. His c~sion at this key point produces a ~urther 
confusion in his exposition of the method of correlation. Yet despite 
this confusion and his tendency to exploit the ambiguity of words there 
is a ~undamental consistency in his method which we characterise as 
a posteriori. 
Like Tillich, Barth reacted strongly against liberal theology, 
but unlike Ti11idh, rejected an ontological solution to the problems 
of' theology. His early attanpts to allow the Bible to speak to his 
own generation by-passed the dogmatic discipline and came under severe 
criticism. Nevertheless, the conviction that the concept of the 
Word of God ~s basic to preaching and theology rema~ned fundamental 
in his thinking. Althou,gj:l his approach and enphases registered 
changes, his basic method, formed ~n the 1920s as he recognised the 
importance of dogmatics, did not alter substantially. 
Whereas Tillich thinks of iheology as seeking to translate 
the kerygma for the "situation••, Barth looks upon it as a devotional 
engagement in faith and obedience as the believer seeks to understand 
his faith. He is conmitted, moreover, to the vulnerability of a 
revelation mediated through historical events. Nevertheless, at the 
heart of his understan~ng of revelation is the indissoluble 
subjectivity of God. Theology under the impact of divine revelation 
has no option but to develop an ~Fiori method whieh in Barth's 
hands has strong simlari ties with linguistic analysis. 
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PART I 
CF..AP.l'ER ONE 
ThE :PROCLAM.A1'ION OF THE CHURCH 
1 • Common Ground 
The most cursory examJ.nEtJ.on of' -che major vvorks of Earth and 
TJ.llich reveals a common concern abcut the t:lessage of the church. Both 
have a clear vis1on of the re s}?onsJ.bJ.li ty of the Churc..}]. to make known its 
message, and of the fact that tlns task J.ays upon theology certain oblig-
ations. Theology 1s 1n essence the handmaid of tre church and should 
ass1st the Church to fulfil 1ts task of proclamation. The ~res sage, 
therefore, is normative for theology 1n the sense that 1 t sets certain 
lim1ts Vflthin vvh1ch theology must "\York. At the po1nt at wrnch theology 
ceases to serve the proclamatlun of the Church 1t ceases, str1ctly 
speak:mg, to be theology. 
Consequently, both Bartl1 and 'r1ll1ch w1sh to be taken as Church 
"'Lheolo[,J.ans, (1) whJch 1s to say that they both oel1eve thewselves to be 
corrun1 tted to Lhe Church ancl to 1 ts message. They do not iTJ..Si' to conduct 
a cr1 t1q_ue of the C'hurch 1 s message from a pos1 t1on outs1de the Church, 
but to serve 1 t from the lDSJ.de, relat1ng themselves to the messa2,e of the 
Church as based on Scr1pture. Yilien vre speak of them as Church theolog-
ians, we ma" be clear thatqy 11 Church11 we mean the Chr1stian Church. 
Nevertheless, 1t l'ewains true that Barth and Tlllich d1.f'fer widely 
m theJ.r views; thel!' pos1 t1ons nave been contrasted not only by the1r 
cr1t1cs but also by the,aselves to suct1 an extent, however, that 1t 1s 
not necessary to emphasise here fue dlfferences between them. It is 
(1) Certa1n as the point lS vntn refe:rence to Barth, 1t appears that 1t 
1s suffic1ently uncerta1n of T~llich for DaVJ.d Kelsey to find it 
necessary to draw attent1on to 1 t (The B'abric of PauJ. TJ.l.!:!;cl:1 1 s 
Theology, p. 3) 
-1-
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our 1ntent1on to examJ.ne theJ.r corrmon J.nterests and the way J.n which they 
d1 verge J.n thelr LrilCl"st2:1dn1;; of those J.nt;erests, in order to hJ.ghlJ.ght 
the differences that are to be found in theJ.r oethodology as well as the 
slrmlarJ. tJ.es. It 1 s tne intentlon of this 1Jresen t chapter to examine them 
in thelr hJ.s"corJ.cal contexts ln order to undlerstond the dormnant motifs 
in thelr interpre-cations of the ta~k and the message of the CrJUl'Ch. 
2. Barth 
Barth has SlVen Val'lous accounts of lus theologJ.cal rnlgrJ.mage, 
but the:r are for the most part sketcny, and• Torrance's own account of 
the :·erlod up to 1915 lS only a sh§J.tly exp:1nded versJ.on of Barth's 
account at the 500th centenary celebrat1ons of the :;:~ounding of Basel 
( 1) 
UmversJ.ty. It a.f-pears, houever, thet Barth's fatter, Fritz Barth, who 
lectured at Bern, sought to encourage h1s son to follow a path s1milar 
to lus own, vrlnch was of a conservatJ.ve nature, and countered Karl's 
de sJ.re to study at Mar burg under W1lnelm HeiTmann, an exponent of Kant, 
with the su£:gestion that he should go to Berl1n to study under Harnack .. 
Barth, however, eventuall,)' d1d reach Marburg, haVJ.Dg first spent a pericd 
under Schlatter in Tfibingen. He l1stened vil th enthusiasm to Herrmann, 
whose influence on hlm was by hJ.s o\vn adrmssJ.on both ab1ding and deep. ( 2) 
Despite his commJ.tment to liberal theology, he was not WJ.thout 
reservations about it: J.n partlcular he felt uneasy about the philosophy 
of relJ.gJ.on of Ernst Troeltsch,, whJ.ch was a product of the Ritschlian 
(1) Translated in SJT, vol. 14 (1961), pp.225ff, 
Barth: An IntroductJ.on to H1s Early Theolog 
IntroJuction pp.15ff 
(2) of. Theology and Church (hereafter T.c.), pp.238:tr, of also 
T.B.L.Parker, 12rl Barth, pp.12ff 
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school~ 1 ) That, however, d~d not prevent ~m :fr av'teing a d1sciplc of' 
Herrmann, vrho lumsel:f rejected 'Iroel tsch' s theory of knowledge w:i tt respect 
to rehgion. ( 2) There was rruch indeed ~n Herrmann 1 s att~ tude to the 
theology of the preceding century that Barth shared, and cont~nued to 
, 
share, throughout h~s l~e. Dogmat~cs, he agreed, cannot be based on 
rehgion if rel1g~on ~s conceived as a human emotion or convict~on and 
~s reduc~ble to s omethin.e; else v1h~ch can be expla~ned by rea son. 'Jhere 
is no rat~onal demonstrat1on of rehgion or of Goa; dogmatics can only 
work on the basls of the exper1ence of the reality of God. Hence both 
the way of the ph~losophy of relig~on and of Schleiermacher's descript~on 
of the feel~ng of absolute dependence are barred to the theolog~an, for 
theology ~s not concerned with a rat1onalisat~on of tl-le subject~ve - any 
more th.an 1t 2s concerned 1rith a rahonalisation of the object~ve. ( 3 ) 
Barth never forgot tlns lesson, that theology and proclam.at~on are 
concerned uit11 an encounter with the real1 ty of God. 
And yet, as Barth h~mself observes, he found h~mself compelled to 
undeTstand Eerrmann ~n a manner vrholly d~fferent £'-.rom the vray ~n wn~ch 
Herrmann understood h~rnself. Why should this be so? Barth, in 1925, 
believed that 1t vms because vrhat HerrFtann lmew to be true was d~fferent 
from the du·ect~on that he took. Herrmann knew, so Barth avers, that 
theology starts vatll the encounter nith G,::Jd, with the 11 Deus d~nt", rather 
than attempting to attain to that by starting as a "mere reflect1on of 
fa~th on tt.e surnlllt of an alleged 'experience"'·(~) 
(1) 11 0n SvstPmAtH' Theology", §.:2!, val. 14 (1961), p.225 
(2) T.C.,p.244 
(3) T.C., pp.238ff 
(4) ~, p.258 
However, he m~ht not have made such a reappraisal without the influence 
of three important factors, namely (a) The outbreak of tne f1rst World 
1/ar, (b) h1s pastorate at Safemvil, (c) his reading of Fauerbach, Overbeck 
and Kierkegaard. 
(a) The First World flar 
Barth describes the day in August 1914 when ninety-three German 
intellectuals declared theu· support for the war policy of Ka1ser Wilhelm 
II. It was not the trere question of so many intellectuals endorsing 
ag,:sression that horrified Barth, but the fact that among them were nearly 
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all of h1s theological teachers, includ1ng B8rnack, Schlatter and Herrmann. ( 1 ) 
If he had to reject the1r support of the Kaiser, Barth felt he must also 
their 
rejec-t/ theology, including the1..r eth1cs, the1r dogmat1cs, theu under-
standlng of the B1ble and their unc1ersta.1d1ng of lustory. ( 2) At the same 
time, however, it must be s:nd that sucl1 a reaction seems somewhat extreme~ 
to reject a man, or a group wholly on the basis of a d1sagreement •7ith 
one dec1sion appears excess1ve. A man may draw the wrong poll t1cal conclus-
1ons even wtule ne holds £'ast to correct lnS1ghts at other points. Was it 
really necessary for Barth to reJect not only h::Ls teachers' polit1cs, but 
the1r vrhol e thought? Barth, unfortunately, does not g1 ve further e:xplan-
ations of his volte face, and a complete answer is, in any case, we bel1eve, 
out of the question in a matter 1nvclV1ng a var·J.ety of mot::Lves. However, 
Y"e may suggest some elements 1n the mot1vat1on Vllnch produced such an 
important change of 90s1t1on. In the £'1rst place, V\B rrust recall the 
unease 
in the 
vth::.ch Barth tells us he felt about the outcome of liberal theology 
ph1losophy of rel1g1on of Ernst Troeltsch, as eorly as 1910. ( 3) 
(1) The fumanity of God (hereafter Buman1ty), p.14; Parker, £I:•£!:.!• p.16, 
Torrance, Introduct1on, p.38 
(2) Human1ty, p.14 
(3) S.Yl', Vol.14 (1961), p.225f; cf also T.c., p.60f, 11If I am not mJ.staken, 
Troeltsch's thesJ.s of the tffi1porary social s1gnlficance of the church and 
his d1smal p1cture of the coming 1ce ages 1n wnich th1s socJ.al signifJ.c-
ance would be ended, consh tuted the last unportant stages which (the] 
discussion (of the posJ. tion of Chr1shan1 ty in h1story) reached before 
(cont1nued at the foot of the next page) 
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and 
At the time he saw no al ternat:I.ve to the l~beral school,ji t seems l~kely 
that the a~pearance of an alternat~ve coupled with a sufflc~ent impetus, 
would have induced Barth to abandon the l1Iarburg theology. In 1914 
Troeltsch moved to the faculty of pmlosophy at Heidelberg, having given 
up the cha~r of theology and we may believe that for Barth the move was 
ind~catlve of a generel tendency of hberal theology, narnely, to seek to 
come to terms vr.i th current pbilosopb.ical opin~on, so th..at it ceased to 
reta~n its du,ticti ve character as theology. Barth was deeply a~ssatisfled 
with the attempt of liberal theology w w~n the 11 Gent~le s" for the 
Chrlstlan cause by first acce_9hng the "Gentile" point of new,(1 ) for 
theology was deprived of any gtnding pr:mclple, reduced to i:he h~story 
of rellg~on, an object~~slng of subjective responses unrelated to the~r 
ground. 
"The ChrlStlan was condemned to uncr~ tlcal and ~rresponsible sub-
sermence to the patterns, forces, and mov<;;rrents af human mstory 
and clvilisation. M8n's ~ner exper~ence did not promde a f~rm 
enough ground for res~stance to these phenoiTena. Deprived of a 
guiding pr~nclple man could turn anyvvhere. It was fatal for the 
evangelical Church and for ChrJ.stlanity ~n the 19th century that 
theology in the last analysJ.s had nmth~ng mor·e to offer than the 
'human', the 1 relJ.g~ous', mystery and its noncommlttal 'statements', 
leaving the fei thful to whatever impressions and influences from 
outside proved strongest. tt (2) 
In thJ.s passege :Oarth looks bec:t from 1957 and l t may be that 
it contains en element of reeding back J.nto the situation of 1914 of ms 
later understend~ng. It J.s doubtful whether he could have anelysed the 
sJ.tuetJ.on as closely et the tJ.me. S~milerly, We do not knOW Vlhether 
Barth saw the sJ.~nificance of Troeltsch's move in the same terms as he 
later ~ewed l t. 
(contJ.nued from ~he pre~ous page) 
the war. I hs tened to mm, in Aarau J.n 1910, wi tn the derk fore-
l)oding that J.t had become impossible to advance any further in the 
dead-end street where we were strolling ~n relative comfort. 11 
( 1) HumanJ. ty, P• 23 
(2) ~' p.27 
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These i71i/O inc~dents, whatever their actual signif~cance, came as 
a climax to Barth's d~ssatisfaction w~th liberal theology and prov~ded the 
impetus for him to make a decisive break wJ.. th the contemporary trend. 
Yet it may seem strange that the pol~t~cal act~on of the German intellec-
uals should have had such radical consequences for Barth 1 s theology, 
unless we recall Barth 1 s own deep cornmi tment to politics, a rrl, moreover, 
to the politics of Svri.ss neutrality. He does not tell us precisely what 
it was a boo. t the declaration that offended h~m, but we may suppose that it 
was the apparent theolog~cal support offered to nat~onalistic aggress~on. 
It may be going too far to suggest vr~th T.H.L.Parker that ~n this act 
German neo-Protestantism declared ~ tself 11a rel~ion sprung from culture 
and bound to a culture 11'; ( 1 ) we do not know how Barth interpreted the 
act~on at the time, only that he declared himself unable to identify h~mself 
any longer vfi th a theology vmch could offer support to the Kaiser 1 s war 
policies. Fbr Barth, it seems, disapproval of the war automatlcally 
involved rejection of h~s teachers' theology. 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
So in September 1914, Barth wrote to h~s f'riend :&luard Thurneysen 
11 The sp~ri tual condi t~on of our German friends is now more 
comurehens~ble to me even if ~t ~s not more congenial. I have 
iss~ed a deta~led, c~refully ed~ted man~festo against this 
condition to Rade. (2) He seems to be so na~ve as to think 
that we rrust va thout quest~on be pro-German (and not neutral) 
in our attitude. As Ragaz would say, it lS of symptomatic 
s~gnJ..f~cance that a man such as Rsde can lose his head so completely 
in this s~tuation. The unconditional truths of the gospel are 
simply suspended for the time being and in the mean-time a German 
wa;r-theology is put to vvork, its Christian trimming consistir;g in 
a lot of talk about sacr~fice and the like. Here ~ s suff~c~ent 
proof that the 1 truths 1 were nothing more than a surface varnish 
and not an inmost possess~on of tlus 'Christliche Welt' 0hristia~ty. 
It is truly sad~ Marburg and German Cl vilisation have lost someth~ng 
in rey eyes by th~s breakdown, and indeed for ever •• ,.It (3) 
£E_. cit. p. 16f 
Editor of 1Die Christliche Welt nr, who, VI'J.. th others had published a 
statement asse-rt~ng the righteousness of the German cause in the war. 
Revolutionary Theology ~n the Maku1g (hereafter Rev. Theol), p. 26 
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Finally, it may be that the shattering ef'f'ect of the outbreak of 
the war on the easy and somewhat shallow optimism that tended to charact-
erise l1beralism's outlook on humanity and human nature, was a f'urther 
impulse to set Barth on the search for a new foundation f'or his theology. 
Nothing of th1s kind, however, is mentioned by Barth, except perhaps in 
a ver;}T oblique :fas:b.i.on in the passage quoted above. 
(b) The Pastorate at Safenwil. 
·' 
In 1909 Barth was appointed Vikar of the German sr:eaking congreg-
ation 1n Geneva,and then uv~ years later moved to the small town of 
Safenwil Vlhere ne stayed until 1921. Dur1ng that time he f'ound himself 
increas1ngly burdened vii th the problemat1c of preach1ng. 7Jhat was he to 
preach? Haw could he preach at all? He pa1nts a vivid p1cture of the 
preacher Is dilenma in "The Need ana ::tromise of Christian Preaching". ( 1 ) 
Spealang of' the congregat1on which comes to clurch, he observes: 
"They want to find out~horoughly understand: they do not want 
to hear mere assertions and observations, however f'ervent and 
e~thus1astic they may be. And they want to f'ind out and thoroughly 
understand the anffiver to th1s one question, Is it true? - and not 
some other answer winch beats about the bush. Let us not be 
surpr1sed that this want of thell's seldom or never meets us openly 
with such urgency as I hDve 1ndicated. People naturally do not 
shout it out, and least of all into the ears of us mlnisters. 
But let us not be t1ece1ved by th£1r silence." 
"There 1s no Wlsdom in stopping at the next-to-the-last and the 
next-te-the-next-to-the-last want of the people; and they will 
not thank us for doing so. They e}\p ect us to understand them 
better than they understand themselves. We are unfeeling, not 
when we probe deeply into the wound wh1ch they carry vrhen they 
come to us for healing, but rather when vre pass over 1 t as if we 
md not know why they had come. We are rnisled not when we assume 
that they are brought to us by the last and profounder questlons, 
but rather vihen vre th1nk that when they come to us they may really 
be put off vri th next-to-the-last and less profound ans-vVers. 11' ( 2) 
(1) The v7ord of C-od and the Word of 1&m (hereafter Vl.G.YT.M.), pp.103-12 
(2) Ib1d, p.108f 
-8-
The problem finds repeated mention in the correspondence of Barth 
va th Thurneysen dur1.ng 11ls :pastorateo Barth felt unable to :produce the 
ansvrers requ1red by h1s congregat1on on the bas1s of the theology he had 
learned until then. To some extent, a question of technique was .Lnvolved, 
but the more 1ns1stent question than the hovr? -vras -the vrhat? ( 1 ) Each 
&lnday he had to preach, but the production of a sermon was no mere 
mechanical process ( 2 ); he was faced w1. th the same problem eac.h week -
what to say. He longed to be able to 't"bl07r some trumyet or other, to 
jo1n somewhere ln the jubilant cry: Thls is 1t 11·, but lnstead of that 
"the desl.I'e keeps rumbling about vn thln one to demonstrate to hl!'1Self 
and others what is essential and l t does not even leave one with 
sufficient nalvete to build a stlt'nng sermonette or lecture."' (3) 
The ansvrer to tr.e !J.UestJOD "~'/hat an I to do?" eluded him. 
Impressed as he Yrcs by vYhat ]:le read of tne :;lder Blumhardt, he was no 
Blurnll.ardt l'limselr~. (L;.) Imitatlon would be useless, as -aould be recourse 
to the k1nd of pietistic 11hot-go::::;pelllng11 , demonstrated by the evangeh::;t 
Vetter, vrho VJ.sl ted Safemnl durl[)J; 1Jovember 1914. To Barth it seernE:d 
thet Vetter substltuted for the gospel a "quit~ bad form of religious 
mecl1anlcs 11 • (S) The letters of tlns perlod pvrtray Barth as a man 
frustrated on the one har..d by not bmng able to du tre one tn1ng he felt 
necessary, but on the other nand, uncertaln ebout the prec1se ident1ty 
of that one trung. (6) 
He found some help :f'nom Hermann Kutter end Leonhard Ragaz, both 
of whom "Fere deeply 1r..volved .Ln the rel1g1ous socJ.alJ.St rovement, and 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
m 
VTe mav detect th1s even in a letter wr1ttm in January 1916: "I have 
the f~eling that we dare not evade the question: Vlhat irnpress1on do ''iB 
make? ••• Of course, 1t may be that vre shouJd let ourselves go a b1t 
jus1: 11ow and that the co prehensl ve orderlrlf', and dispo:;u::in::> of ut 1' 
kerygma 1n a natural-dlvi?ely-:permitt~d w::;y w:J-1 not be possible. for 
twenty to thirty years. vVhat I have lD nund 1s slrnply_ how, for 1nstance 
in Blumhardt 1 s preachlng ..• -~r.Lth all its fullness, each sermon has such 
a def.1n1te poin1 and colour ..... " Rev.Theol, p.35f. 
Thld __ , p. 29 
.IQ..;J.Q, p.28f 
Ibid, pp.)0,35f. 
Thld, p.40 
e.g. Ib1d, p.36 
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displayed a ~gorous polJt~cal or1entation 1n the1r teaching. Barth 
lumself was 1nvolved ~n the local industr1al disputes of Safemnl: 
i:1deed, Ius acti Vl t1es earned h1m the nick-name of 11the red pastor". In 
1915 he became a member, although a not uncri t1cal one, of the Social 
Democrat1c Party, and commented at the time: 
"Just because I se"t such emphasis Sunday by Sunday upon the last 
tl11ngs, it vras no longer possible for me personnlly to remain 
suspended in the clouds above the present evil world but rather 
it had to be demonstrated here and naN· that f a1 th in the Greatest 
does not exclude but rathe:vincludes vntmn it work and suff'ering 
in the realm of the it.aperfect. 11 ( 1) 
He :b...ad great sympathy with Ragaz and Kutter, because fuey shared 
hls social concern. He found lll Kutter a more d1st1nctly theolog1cal 
emphas1s, but no clear attempt to apply the pr1nc1ples he expounded. 
Ragaz, on the other hand, soug11t to express h:Ls pr1nciples more clearly 
in a ?rogromme of action. Nevertheless, in a letter in which be 
descr ·bes the dif'ferences between the two on the b a:ns of a lecture he 
had attended, g1ven by Hans Bader, a founder of therehg1ous-soc1alist 
movement, Barth makes tbis surpr1sing observation: 
"Conclusion: The rel1g1ous-social1st 1 concern 1 1S finished, 
the taking of God in earnest 1s at its beginning. 11' ( 2) 
The remark 1s surpr1sing because 1t 1s out of key with the 
generally enthusiastlc tone of the letter. It seems to betray a certain 
confus1on in Barth's mllld, the reE•son for wh1ch is not difficult to f1nd. 
He felt the pressing vreight of the problem of what he should preach, and 
also felt the urge and need to take a pos1t1 ve stand in matters of social 
concern. Lack of clarity about the flrst led to a corres~onding uncert-
ainty about the second. Because rellgious-soclalism had its roots Jn 
the ver.;- theology he had alreadyrejected, with 1ts emphasis on the 
(1) Ibid, p.28 
(2) Ibld, p.31 
e:xpenence of God and on the essent1al achievabili ty of' the K:mgdom 0 _r 
God in the hem and now, he felt bound to reject rel1g1ous soc1al1sm 
itself, 
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The conference at rhich Bader gave his lec-l::ure did have a positive 
outcome, however. Bader himself had suggested that the clergy should 
meet fortnightly instead of quarterly, for the ex-press purpose of Bible 
study and Barth took up the suggestionmadily, for it seemed to offer 
a way to progress 1n the search for clarity. 
He was aware that h1s decision to take God in earnest was reflected 
by a different note 1n his sermons, Some noticed it, although he felt 
it could not get through to his congregation because he was as yet not 
certain what vras happening mmself. He was only just beginning to 
discover hls message and still felt a certain lack of drJ.ving power: 
"If only we vrere filled and dr1 ven, our sermons should 
appear simpler, 11' ( 1) 
As he sought to come to grips with the Bible, he began to discover 
what he descr1bed in a lecture 1n 1916 as a "strange nevr world", for, 
111. contrast to all the vvays in wlnch l1beral tJl.eology had n~de use of the 
Bible, he found 1-L to be, not a source book for the h1story of relJ.gJ.ous, 
nor a text book for theological, liturgical or moral instruction, but a 
record of the actJ.vity of God and, supremely of the Word of God to man. 
"It 1s not the r1:;:;ht human thoughts about God vrmch form the content 
of the B1ble, but the right d1vine thoughts about men, The Bible 
tells us not how vre should talk with God but v1hat h~ says to us; 
not how ,,re find the vray to h1m, but how he has sougnt and fcund 
the vray to us; not the r1ght rela tJ.on in wluch we rrust place 
ourselves to hJ.m, but the covenant ',vhich he has made -:nith all who 
are Abraham 1 s spirJ. tua l chJ.ld:;.."en ancl wh1ch he has sealed once and 
for all in Jesus Chr1st, It 1s tlus -~.nuch J.S >'r:L th1n 'che B1ble. 
The word of God is va th1n tll.e Bible. 11 (2) 
ThJ.s appears to have been one of the earlJ. est occa~ons on wluch 
BaTth spoke of the Word of God, but 1t became a phrase and a not1on of 
(1) ~' p.32 
(2) W.G.W,M,, p.43 
-11-
of central lnportance, for thJ.s was i'lhat he sought in contrast to a 
theology of reb.gious e:;.p erJ..ence, namely a theolo?.}r of the Word of G0 a 
spoken decisively to man. Consequently, we find him engaged on a 
careful study of the Epistle to the Romans from 1916 on,,rards, -~rhJ.ch was 
to lead to tne pubhcatJ.on of -chefu:st edJ. tion of lns commentory - the 
bombshell nhich landed J n the theologians J.Jlayground, as Karl Adam 
descrJ.bed it. ( 1) 
In addition, in order to l/lden t.1.e area on whJ.ch he drew for 
"inner concentration and strengthening" he rene-Ned his lllU versJ. ty stuJJ.es, 
in partJ.cular, by taking up I\Bn t sgain. He felt both the need for a solid 
foundatJ.On for the posi tJ..on he was adopting ancl for a -.'!lcle l:novrledge on 
V!hJ.ch to dr avr vrhen spe al:ing. ( 2) 
He dJ.d not \'ll c;hdTaYr conpletely from the field of socJ..al concern: 
J..ndeed, in September 1917 he sought to mediate during a chspute at a local 
factory. But J.t seems that he felt a need f1rst to obtain a grasp of 
the essence of the message of the BJ.ble concern1n..g God, in order, as it 
were, to reconstruct the found.?tions of lns preaching. Upon those found-
ations a more secure structure could be built, but in the meantime he mlJSt 
suffer the tension of not being sure of lns foundation ull.lle yet belng 
unable to vrJ.thdra\Y entirel;r f'ro1,1 all actJ.VJ.ty J.n oTder to dJ.scover the 
founoBtion.C 3 ) 
In the t~achJ.ng not only of the elder and the younger Blumhardt, 
but also in Ragaz and Kutter, he had fcund an emphasis on the Kingdom 
of God. He wished to begJ.n again vri th thls concept, but he could not 
adopt vrhat he called the 11 fo1·eground VJ.ew 11 of the elder Blumhardt, or the 
J.dentlfJ.cation by the others of the OhristJ.an e:xp ectatJ.on of the Ei.ngdom 
of God wJ.th the socialJ.st expectatJ.on of the futute. 
(1) OJ.ted by Torrance, Introduction, p.17 
(2) Rev.Theol, p.37 
(3) of. Rev.Theol, p.27 
Rather, 
11We felt compelled to press •.• to til.e vic'W of' a pure and absolute 
futurity of God and Jesus C0~1st as the limit and fulf1lment of 
all t1me. 11 (1) 
Barth's understanding of the task of the Church :in proclamation 
was talo..ng shape as a declaratlon of the Word of Goa, enhrely d.Lfferent 
from all that was proclauned by liberal theology and by secular or 
rel1gious sociallsm. It had to come, first, as a '1No'" to all thst had 
been accepted, and fund amen tally as the "No 11 of the Word of God, God 's 
message to man. Thus the publication of the commentsry on the epistle 
to the Romans llJ 1919 came as a cll!Tl8X to the campaign he had conducted 
against l1beral theology. 
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His oo ncept of the proclarnat1on of the Church revolved now around 
the concept of the Wo:-d of God, 11Deus du1 t 11 , as the word spoken by the 
author1 ty of God, to 1118n, for all time. Proclamation and theology must, 
therefore, concern themselves vn.th the Word of Goa, not with the e:Jq?er1ence 
of fal th, or r el1gion, the expresslon of tne human response to the Word 
of God. In other vrords, Barth requued 1n theology and proclamation a 
shift in emphas1s from the subject1ve to the objective. 
It should cause llttle surpr1se, then, that the ~istle to the 
Romans had the effect that 1t hsd, for 1t treated the Epistle in a manner 
altogether dlfferent from the majority of the current commentar1es. In 
the 1ntroduction, he stated boldly h1s conVlction that the letter was not 
to be viev.red simply as a document of first-century Christiamty, but as 
one 1n which the author speaks 
11
••• as a prophet and apostle of the Kingdom of God to men in 
all ages. 11 (2) 
It 1s of importance for an understand1ng of Barth's view of both 
proclamation and theology, that we recognise his conVlction that GOO has 
( 1) 
(2) 
Church DogmatlCS (hereafter c.D.), II : 1 : 634 
Der R8merbr1ef (hereafter 1R), p.v. (E.T. in The ~pistle to the Romans 
2nd edition Thereafter 2R), p.1 
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spoken and still speaks. If God has not spoken, there is no task for 
proclamation and no datum for theology. He did not vdsh to sweep aside 
liberal theology as haV1.ng aclueved nothing at all, nor did he wish to deny 
the relevance of lustor~cal and textual crit~c~sm, but he d~d vash to 
~ntroduce a change of perspective wh~ch would relegate lustorical and 
tex~ual cr~t1c~sm to a subord1nate pos~tion, where they m~ght serve the 
real task of theology ~ich ~s to ascertain what 1t ~s that God says to 
man. If he had to choose between the lustorical-cri heal method and the 
doctrine of ins-pirat~on, he would u:n_hesi tatingly choose the latter because 
of the teddency of the forrrer to ~gnore the Bible as the record of the 
rrord of God. He did not believe, however, that any such choice was nee-
essary, ~f every branch of theological research would acknowledge ~ ts 
pr~mary res9ons~bility to serve the Church.( 1) 
Barth bel~eved that God's message stands for all t1me, and that 
the d~fferences be"br7een the f~rst and the tv1entieth centuries are of no 
major sign~f~cance. 
"Our questlons, lf we understand ourselves ar~ght, are the 
quest1ons of Paul~ and Paul's answers, if the1r llght illumines 
us, rrust be our answers." (2) 
We have sa~d that Barth1 s concept of proclamat~on revolves around 
the concent of the Word of Goa. 
J;; 
It should be added that neither ed1 tion 
of Romans g~ ves prominence to tne phrase, but it ~s undemable that it 
is a recurrent motif ~n the wr~ tu1gs of the period and can also be shown 
to be the concept m<lch is decisive of the sigmficance of lomans 
because ~t is as such that he treats Scripture. 
( 1) Ibid. 
(2) Ibid 
Barth d~scussed the matter ~n greater detail ~n the second 
edition and -,le shall also h8ve cause to examrne the matter 
in greater detail. 
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(c) Feuerbach, Overbeck and Kierkegaard 
To th~s hst we might have added the name of Dostoyevsky, for ~n 
t11e second ed~ hon of Romans Barth makes more frequeDt reference to him 
thaD to any other s~ngle au thor. However, there is good evidence to 
suggest that h~s knowledge of Dostoyevsky was largely, ~ not ent~rely 
second hand, mediated by EDuard Thurneyson. 'l'hus, although the alleged 
~nf'luence of Dostoyevsky, may be s~gnif'~cant, ~t ~s d~f::Lcult to establish 
whether ~t was formative of Barth 1 s pos~ tion or vvhether it merely played 
what might be described as a supporting role; ( 1 ) we are here concerned 
vri th format~ve mfluences. 
There ~s very little evidence to prov~de us vath any precise 
mformat~on concerning Barth 1s read~ng. He tells us, however, that he 
possessed a copy of ~erkegaard 1 s The Instant as early as 1909, but 
he adds: 
11 I assume that I also read it at that time. But it cannot have 
made a deep impress~on mn me then as I was very much occupied 
and energetically set on the theology of Harnack, Herrmann and 
the Christliche \Velt. u' (2) 
Moreover, we know that betvreen the flrst and second e d~ t~ons of 
Romans, Barth resd Kierkegaard more ser~ously: the second edition of 
Romans makes frequent reference to Kierkegaard, and, in the for~nord, 
the one 11 systematlc pr::!.J1clple11 to whi.ch he adu1~ ts lS the "inflnite 
quali tail ve dlshnctio:d1 betvreen man and God on winch Kierkegaard ins~sted. (J) 
( 1 ) Thurne-"sen's monograph on Dostoyevsky appeared ln 1921. Barth observed 
in a letter (.Aug.3rd 1921) that ~t tJDd provided him vTlth 11steam for the 
-,.rhole section as well as a quotatlon11 • (Rev.Theol,p.59) • .Although Barth 
uses illustrations from Crime & Pu~shment, The ld~ot and ~he Brothers 
Karamazov,he never quotes a~rectly, ,rrereas he does quote from KJ.erkegaard 
Feuerbach and Overbeck. .A iloser exanunation suggests that Barth could 
have learDed all he knew of Dostoyevsky from Thurneysen. Both focus 
attention on the Grand Inq~nsi tor and Barth refers to the very novels to 
vrmch Thurneysen pays most a ttent~on. 
(2) Fragments Grave and Gay, p.97 
(3) 2R,p.10. For conf~rmation of lus reading of Y~erkegaard, but Wl thout 
spec~fic references, see Fragments Grave and Gay,p.97, Rev.Theol,p.51 
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As r or Overbeck, Bartll vTl'ote a lectu::e J.n 1920, followJ.ng tne pub-
lJ.catJ.on of lus papers under tile t1tle ChrJ.stentum und Kultur in 1919. 
ThJ.s lecture (1t also d1.splays a knowledge of another of Overbeck's worhs, 
Die Ci:rrJ.sthctikel. t der h1eut1.gen Theolog1e, but ·we are unfortunately 
g1 ven no 1nd1.ca tJ.on of Hi1en he read 1. t. 
Finally, Barth lectu::cc::d on Feuarbach, at Tiillnster in the sumr.1er 
of 1920, end drew, f'or his mate!'lal, on at least three of Feuerbach's 
boo~cs. ( 2 ) 
~~t f1.rst sis,ht, IU.erkegaard, Feuerbach and Overbeck can scarcely 
be thougpt to have nuch J.n corrlP1on. Kl.erkegaard to the end rema 1.ne d a 
fa1.thful church member and can w1th some just1.ce be called a theolog1.an, 
even lf he lurnself vou ld vigorously )-ave dem.ed the t1. tle. Overbeck 
::'8f'13ined a tneologian 1.n sp1.te of lnr1sel:f, C!es:p.Lte hl.s claim. that he was 
i'il.tllu\.Jt [h1j ~·clc. t,_Lon to Cnr.Lstlam ty of any kl.JJ.d, that he r..ad flO rellgl.OUS 
m1.ss1.on and that he d1.d not count h1.mself among its belJ.evers. ( 3 ) 
Feuerbach was one step more rad1cal than Overbeck: he d1cJ not even hold 
a theolog1.cal post, but u:::-ged "anti-theolo&v11 on hJ.s hsteners w1th all 
the vigour he could sumnon, det'landing that theolog'' should be what 1 t 
ou2;11t to be, natnely anthropology. But for all LheJ.r d1versity, the ihree 
authors had one po1.nt 1.n co·'ffion, namely, that theJ.r vrork consisted of an 
attack on theology. Each 1.n h1s oYm vay furmshed mater1al for Barth's 
attack on liberal theology. ( 4) 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
''Unsettled Ques"t1ons for 'rheology 7oday11 , T. C., lJP• 55-73, or1.ginally 
publ1shed ap..oarently urn er the tl tle, "Zur innern Geisteslage des 
Chr1.stentums 11 (Rev.Theol, :pp.21, 50) 
i.e. Das Wesen des ChrJ.stentums; Eh1losophie der Zukunft; 
Das Wesen Cler Reh~ion (see T.c, p.218) 
T.c .. p.64 
Barth also read Nietzsche about this tJ.me (June 1920) but seel!1ed 
to find him l~ss satJ.sfactory (Rev.Tbeol, p.151) 
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(i) Barth used Ffuerbach in a nust oblique fashion, for the1r respective 
purposes had little in common. It was Feuerbach 's 1ntention to d1rect 
theolibgy not to the old ways of the Reformat1on, but to what he saw as 
a genmnely modern v1ay. He ad1rntted that theology is concerned with God, 
and, mdeed, witr~ a personal God, but he went on ""::o assert that God is, 
in fact, none other than ~n h1mself, or rather, the fulfilment of man's 
longings or tGe project1on of his ideals. The attr1butes of God ~re, 
1nd1 Vldually, projections of human 1deals, arrl God h1mself no 1r1ore than 
the aggregate of tbose ideals, without independent or objective being. 
Christ becomes the embod1ment of the personal God for he alone meets the 
longing for a personal God. ( 1 ) Feuerbach 1s quite willJng to assert 
the predicates of God, but only at the expense of the removal of tGeir 
subject 1f tr1e J.r subject lS God concelved as a suJ?ernatural being. 
Theology 1s about man, Qis feelings and desires: 1t is, in snort, noth1ng 
other than anthropology. The only dlshnch on between philosophy and 
rel1gion 1s tl1at rel1gion, as an objectificatlon of man's pr1mitive essent1al 
needs, takes the objective illl8ges constructed by man as though they were 
not 1mages nhile philosophy recognises them for what they are. ( 2) 
Religion is based on feeling - so far he could agree w1th Schleiermacher -
but he cri t1cised Schleiermacher for not go1ng far enough,. fb r failing to 
recognise that God 1s in fact nothlng but the esseGce of feeling. 
Theolog1cal prejud1ce, he Jnalntaired, had prevented Schleiermacher from 
necessary conclusions from hls standpoint.(3) drawing the 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The Essence of Chr1stian1 ty, trans. :Marlon Evans, (London, John Chapman 
1854), pp. 14, 20, 139ff. On God as the projection of human ideals, 
Karl Britton expresses a view similar to Feuerbach (Philosophy and 
the Iviean1ng of Life, Cambridge Univers1ty Press, 1969, p.191ff.) 
of. K.U:Wri th, rrom Hegel to Nietsche, trans. David E. Green (London, 
Constable, 1956), p.337 
Ibid, p. 336; The Essence of Christ1an1ty, pp. 9ff 
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Contemporary Protestant theology came under part1cularly heavy 
attack from Feuerbach on account of its adoption of Hegelian philosophy, 
a move which he saw as parallel to the adophon by Catholic theologians 
of Aristotelianism lll order to combat Protestant1sm. Protestantism 
adopted Hegelian1sm as a last refuge, the final rat1onalistic supyort 
of tu.eology im the fi&;'lt ar;ainst atheism. 
'~iegelian philospphy 1s the last amb1guous attempt to re-establish 
lost, defeated Christianity by means of philosophy, b~ follovv:i:ng, 
the un1versal modern procedure and ldentlfJlng the negat1on of 
ChrlStlan1 ty vn th Clu'1stiani ty 1tself. The much-lauded speculatlve 
ldentity of sp1r1t and mater1al, inf':Ln1te and f1nite, d1vine and human, 
lS nothing more than the accursed paradox of the modern age: tl1e 
1dent1 ty of belief am unbelief, theology and philosophy, rel1gion 
and atheism, Christunn ty and pagamsm, at the v-c;ry sumffil t, the 
summ1t of metaphysics. Hegel conceals th1s contrad1ction by 
making of athe1sm~he negatlon, an object1ve component of God -
God as process, snd athe1sm as one corrponent of thls .Process. 11' ( 1) 
In lns lecture on Feuerbach, Barth deta1led b t some lengt.l-J. the 
results of Feuerbach' s e::p lanatlons of Christian doctrines on the basis 
of fecl111g and the human desire to be everything thst the human race is 
not} 2~nd observes 
11For anyone who lHl~J.stened, two llnpre3Gl011S nJill obVloUsly contend 
for prior1 ty. One 1s that we have heard something extremely, 
almost offens-Lvely tnVlal; tLe other that thJ.s tr1 viali ty 
really propounds a question which could justifiabl:r be directed 
to the theology with which l•'euerbach was surrounded."· (3) 
It was the second 1mpress1on which Barth proposed to amplify, for he saw 
that Feuerbach asle a the questlon whlch vvas posed by tt1e theology of 
Schleiermacher: should not theolotjy become unashamedly anthropology? 
( 1) Uber den .Anf'ang de;P Plulosophie, ~ m thche ,.,'erke vol .. II, P• 264i' 
c1 ted by L8vn th op. c1 t p. 77 
(2) Or 1s only 1n part. Resl1rrectlon 1s the symbol of man's desu·e 
to be released from bondage to mortality. God 1s conceived of as 
love because man loves - but" God loves 11 1s the 1deal W'Fardw vrhlch 
1nan strives. However, God lS good because man is essentially ~SDod. 
cf. The Essence of Chl"lstlanlty, pp. 18 ff, 27 
(3) 1'.0. Po 227 
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Barth felt ecutely the ewbarrassment caused by Feuerbach's drJ..ving to 
J..ts logJ..cal conclusJ..on of Schleiermacher's methodology, andb-,- the 
failu:!"e of lJ..beral theolo£-Y to amrvrer the question posed to l t. Fbr 
Barth, theology ana preacl1ing must speaf: of God as dJ..stinct from, arrl 
not as J..dentical Wl th, man. 
(ii) Overbeck dJ..d nothJ..ng to dispel fue anxiety engendered by 
?euerbach' s crl tJ..clsm, rather he lll.ade it more acute because he di:,_'ected 
h lS c rJ.. tique at anothsr pomt of the totc;ering edifJ..ce of lJ.. beralJ..sm, 
namely at its uneschatalogJ..cal character. ( 1 ) Overbeck maintained that 
eschatology was of the vary essence. of ChrJ..stJ..anJ..ty, and hence that 
r.o.sto"\':'J..Cal Cll-r::_stlanJ.. ty - thEJt is, the progress of the history of the 
Church- has absolutel,y nothi0_g to do vri-'cll prlmtive ChrlstJ..anity whlch 
J..s Urgeschl.chte, primal l:ustory. Chrls cla!U ty J..S supposed to hove ushered 
in a nevi- era, but the reali i:y J..s entJ..rely laclcmg; l t is a fJ..;;ment of the 
imagJ..nation. The most slgnif'lcant fact about ChrJ..stJ..anJ..ty is J..ts 
powerlessness, its inability to rule the "JO.r'ld. It strives to ally 
itself viith Somalism, to use the d;ynamic of Socialism to achieve the 
new age: but J.. t can the11 by no means be said that Christianity has 
brought the eschatalogical n2vr age "vhiC:.:. has replaced the old. Nor 
is CrrrJ..stJ..alllty any defence against natlonalJ..sm. ( 2 ) 
The burden of Overbeck's critlcJ..sm, which Barth accepted, WaE 
the imposslbility of identJ..fying Christlanity and culture, and so of treatJ..ng 
culture as though J..t \vere a revelatJ..on of God. 'l'heology mgst think 
again •!That J..t should proclaim, a rrl face the meaning of J..ts esch8tology, 
( 1) 
(2) 
of. T.C., pp. 55-73, L&nth op cit, PP• 377-88 
Barth vms, of course, partJ..cularly aware of thJ..s, 1.-ith the outbreak 
of the first dorld War. 
-19-
and 1ts applicability to l1fe. Without such a reconsideration, it could 
not call J.tself Chr1stian theology. Schweitzer's ansvrer to the redis-
covery of eschatology was not a hve option at all ~ 1t was not possible 
to 1gnore 1t, as a bee J.n the bonnet of a religious teacher named Jesus, 
and, at the same time, to clair:1 to be pursu1ng Christian theology. 
Theology Tust eJ. t:b..er redlSCO"er prirni ti ve Chrlstianity or cease to claim 
an:' co nne chon with Chrishani ty at all. 
If th1s att.ack ach1eved noth1ng else, it caused Barth to stop 
and think. Liberal theology treated God as though it was able to "put 
God da1ly 1nto 1 ts bag 11 ( 1 ) and the reason lay in the fact, wb.J.ch 
Feuerbach had made plain, that it ch.d not deal w1 th Goa at all, but 
with man. 
Feuerbach had concluded that Christiam ty should be swept out of 
the way altogether, Overbeck f1n1shed with a perplexing and amb1guous 
question, but K1erkegaard, the third assailant of Christi am ty, produced 
a pos1 ti ve answer, an anS\'ler wb.J.ch a t'Ounted to a demand that Goa should 
be allavved to occupy h1s rightful pJa ce. Attent1on has already been 
drrvm to the inconclusive eVJ.dence of the extent and depth of Barth 1 s 
. (2) 
read1ng of Kierkegaard. ' Nevertheless, the 1nfluence of Kierkegaard 
1s unnustakable and e;l(en tl:.ough the1r 1nterests d1fier, they do at 
times say sJ.nu.lar things. Barth was not so much concerned with the 
quest1on of the Church-State relationship, and t11.e compromise involved 
in an established church of the Danish tYJ?e, but he was as concerned as 
Kierkegaard "rith tre theology which d1d noth1ng to corribat the abuses of 
the Church. Kierkegaard as much as Feuerbach rejected the appropr1at1on 
of HegelianJ.sm by theology and the confusion of philosophy with 
( 1) 
(2) 
T.C. p.70: the remark 1s Overbeck's 
The second e d1 t1on of Romans contains some ver-::r. clear references to 
K:ierkegaard's Work:; of Love (2R,p.495f, passim) J.Heywood Thomas tra~fi~ 
(cont1nued at the foot of the next page) 
theology. In partJ.cular Barth learned from Kierkegaard the notion of 
the J.nfinite q~itative dJ.stinctions beuNeen time and eternity(1), which 
made the buildJ.ng of a theology on the baslS of an Hegehan, imnanental 
dialectJ.c qulte J.mpossible. The dialectlc of tine and eterm ty is not 
a dialectic of J.denti ty but of opposi tim\r) God stands over against man 
and the world in judgement on all attempts to uivi.nise nature. 
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Kierkegaard attacked the "9:'2ests who had taken an oath bindJ.ng them to the 
New Testament but in practlce dJ.sregarded it, whJ.le he who had taken no such 
oath, nevertheless did feel bound to J.t. ( 3 ) Barth likewise felt h:unself 
bound to the New Testament and to exanune it J.n order to rediscover the 
content of the Church's proclamation. 
In some respects even these th!ee authors served more as a support 
to sharpen BaTth' s own attack, than as ilirtwtive influences. fie adopted 
various aspects of each, but as early as 1916 i'Te find him sapng some of 
the thJ.ngs vrhich he later found supported by Feuerback, Overbeck and 
Kierkegaard, as for eY~mple, in hls attack on the tmvers of Babel constructed 
by human righteousness- 1110ralJ.ty, culture, the state, rellgion- none 
of whlch have ushered J.n the radJ.cally new age and swept away the glaring 
faults of the old. Ee appealed too, for a read2ness to lJ.sten for God to 
speak. It is true that he expected Goa to s-c:leak J.n the conscJ.ence, but 
he was also aware of "Jhat he called the "strange new v10rld 11 of the BJ.ble, 
ond the word of God. (4) with its talk of the acts 
(contJ.nued from preVJ.ous page) 
influence of Concluding Unscientlflc Postscnpt, Pbilosor)hlcal Fragments 
and Training J.n ChrlS tlanl ty on the ChrJ.stology of 2R ("The Christo logy 
of s¢ren Kierkegaard &Karl Barth", HJ.bbert Journal, vol. 53 
( 1951,.-55), pp. 280-88) 
(1) cf. 2R, p. 10 
(2) of. J. Taubes "Dialectic and .Analogy", Journal of Religion, vol. 34 (1954) 
(3) 
(4) 
pp. 111- 19 
S.Kierkegaard: The .Attack upon 
University Press 1944), pp.21, 
Vl. G. vr .M. ch.1 and 2. 
Christendom, trans. VT. Lowrie (Princeton 
96 passim .. 
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It seems certain thet Feuerbach played a signif1cant role in helping 
Barth to focus h1s cr1tique of liberal theology in general and of Schleier-
r~cher 1n particular. We may, fof example, compare Feuerbach 1 s claim that 
when Schleiermacher thinks he J..S speaking of God, he is 1n fact speaking 
s1mply of man, vri. th Barth 1 s rejection of Schleiermacher 1n the followmg 
terrn.s :-
11 
.... one can not speak of God simply by speaking of man in a 
loud voice. 11- ( 1) 
Barth 1 s ins1stence that theolo,g:jr (and so also the pastor) rmst speak 
solely of God was the outcome of the pressure put upon him by h1s own 
pastoral situat1on. Yet at the same time he was pauli'ully aware of the 
im,ppss1bihty of such 3n undertak1ng. The consequent tension is vividly 
illustrated by two of his addresses,( 2 ) which leave us J..n no doub;t that 
the prJmary area of hls concern at that t1me vras the serrmn. The pa stor 1 s 
dllemma is that -w1nle he 1s _pa1d to speak of God, arrl vlhile he is eJ[> ected 
to do so by lns congregation, he is incapable of fulfilling the task because 
he, like they, is human. He cannot speak of God any rmre than they~3 ) 
Th1s need to speak of God led him to the notion of God as the God 
vmo speaks, and so eventually to a closer study of the B1ble and, in 
part1cular, of the Epistle to the Romans, He claimed that his work was 
i.atended to act as a correctl ve, drawing theology back to its proper task, 
namely, to an 1nteY9ret~tlon and understand1ng of the Word of Goa. He 
exT:>ressed the desire to summon theology to a new cons1derat1on of' the 
scripture pr1nciple, a l'r1nc1ple w1ncl1 requ1red, in l:ns v1ew, that the Bible 
T (4) 
should be treated as the .iord of' God. Furthermore he vnshed to 
(1) ~, p. 196 
(2) "The Need and Prom1se :Jf Cln'J..stlan Preaching" (1922)~ 
"The Word of God and the Task of' t.l1e l'b.nJ..stry"· ( 1922) 
(3) ','l.G.W.M. :ep.100, 186£'£' 
(L~) roid, pp.102f', 242-49 
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summon theology and preaching to recoe;nise thEJt the sole basis on v1luch it 
may speak of anvtln.ng, 8no p8rtlcularly of ethics, J..s the new reality 
1.ni tia ted by the re surrectwn. ( 1 ) 
In soHle respects, an J_nfluence even more JJnportant than that of 
Overbeck, Feuerbach and Eierkegaard, waa that of the elder Blumhardt, for 
he spoke to Barth 1.n a more posi tJ.. ve tt~anner, actually present1.ng him with 
an example. The 1.mpression on Barth macle by Blumhardt J..s best gauged by 
the follo-vd.ng COltMen t:-
"· •• Blumhardt and Overbeck st!'lnd close together; back to back, 
if you like, and very dii'ferent J..n disposition, in termmology, 
in the1.r mental worlds, in their ex-pen1.ence, but essentiall~r 
together. Blumt.ardt stocx:l as a forward look1.ng ard hopeful 
Overbeck; Overbeck as a back.vard looking cri heal Blumhardt". (2) 
If Blumhardt coulr3 not be teken alone, but needed the cr1. ileal 
acuteness of Overbeck, nevertheless, Overbeck alone was not enough. II" 
Overbeck '"las the much needed "No! 11 to stop theology 1.n J.. ts track3, 
Blumhardt was the new "Y~s" to set it go1.ng again. However povrerfully 
Barth proclaimed the 11 No 11 1.t was the 11Yes 11 that vras hJ..s real goal. If 
Overbeck drew attentJ..on to the eschatoloc,J..cal nattrce of early Cbr1.st.tanJ.. ty 
in order to attack theology, Blumhardt dJ..d so as a re-assertion of the 
"Easter faJ.. thu. Above all 
11
.Aga1.nst the greater keenness of observatJ..on and thought on the 
side of Overbeck J..s to be set the greater love, the enthuslasm 
and the joy J..n ·witnessing on the sloe of Blumhardt. 11 (3) 
In summary, then, we way say that Barth 1 s conception of the 
proclamation of the church was spec.tfJ..cally concerned vvith the questJ..on 
(21) Ibid,pp.90ff 
( ) T.C.p.56 Johann Christoph Blurrhardt (1805-80) ~eca!"'le pastor at 
M8ttlingen vhere 11is vrork attracted much attentJ..on largely through 
the physJ..cal cures by whlch J.. t -.ws sometimes accom:9amed. From 1852 
he worked at Bad Boll, wh1.ch became a centre of 1.nflu-:;ntial l.nter-
natJ..onal missionary -.mrk.. At his death, his wo;ik was taken over by lns 
son Clll'J..sit:oph F-.ciedrich ("the younger Blumhardt"). 
(3) •r.c.p.68icf PP• 73,23?- The impressJ..on m'3de on Barth by Blumhardt 
through ZUndel's biography is witnessed by a letterto Thurneysen. 
(Rev. Theol. p. 3o) 
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of' the sermon in church, and the intention there to speak God 1 s Iiford, to 
repeat God's message. 'lhe prlmary reference of the 'tvVord of God 11 at th.ts 
stage of lns career, was to a message; l twas not concerned prlmarlly with 
( 1) 
Chrlstology. It was clearly Barth's convlction that lt must be possible 
to speak of God, and dlrectly so, rather than by means of circumlocutions, 
or by resort to speculative philosophy or to 1religlous exper1ence 1 • 
The sermon ln church lS addressed to those who come to church -
e;en if the congregation consists of only one old lady - but wh8t relations 
does the serm:m have to the needs and questions of those who come? Can 
Barth be accused of answering questions that no-one has asked? 
The major dlfflculty ln answenng this probleiP lS to determine 
the meaning of 11 asking 11 a question, a difficulty hlghllghted by Tilllch1 s 
insistence on speaklng of' a questlmn being implied by various aspects of 
man 1 s exlstence. A ~estion, it appears, does not h~ to be verbalised 
to be aske a. But we are then faced WJ. th the problew of lmO\'nng ~ow to 
deternune what q1.1e stlons are being asked. '.lhen again, e~n if a question 
comes to us ln verbal form,we cannot be sure that the verbal form has ln 
fact put to us the actual question intended. 
B.arth' s reply is that the serm:m must deal with the listeners 1 
deepest question and deepest need. The question lS the question put 
to the assertion "God is plt'esent 11 - is it true? It lS lnseparably bound 
up witu the questlon of the meaning of' life, its origin and goal, and it 
is asked because of the remoteness of Goa. (2) Barth is then, ~peaklng 
to the kind of person who comes to church and asks in doing so, about God. 
(1) Indeed, at thls stage Christology was hardly considered, but he does 
show some awareness of the question in another letter to Thurneysen 
{Rev. Theol. p.105.) 
(2) W.G;rr.M., pp.107ff, 117)cfp186 ff 
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In speaking to him, he makes the a emand that the h.stener thould be 
prepared to listen to the BJ.ble, for the ffilD~ster is the ffilllJ.ster of tl~ 
Bible. E-ven those vho do not come to church a slc the same questlon, and 
so the minJ.ster must speal<: to them too, but again, as the ffilnlster of 
the Bible. 
11 
••• as the minister of t£1...e Bible he must be the first to be 
prepared to subffil t to God 1 s g_uestlon by asklng the question 
about God, •7itho1Jt whJ.ch Gocl 1 s answer cannot be gl ven. If 
he anffivers the people's q1estion but anmrers it as a man who has 
hlmself been questioned by God, then he speaks - the word of God. " ( 1) 
In essence the sermon lS an exp osl tion of what the minister has hl!Ilself 
heard when he hes hstened to the BJ.ble in the be lief thet God has somethlng 
to say through l t. 'rhe rrunister rust follow Calvin's metnod: having 
11first established vihat stands J.n the text" he must 11 set hllnself to 
rethlnk t..h.e ~rhole material and to ·wrestle •'litn J.t 11 until the walls 
separating the present from the flrst century are transpa:>:>ent end Paul, 
or an:r other BJ.blJ.cal author, can speak to the _present age. (2 ) 
In the Church Dogma tJ.cs, Barth maintaJ.ns the notJ.on that pro clam-
ation consJ.sts prllP..arily 1.n preechlng, and :;JreachJ.ng consists prJ.marily 
It J.S not a matter of preachJ.ng on rellgious 
topics - as Wi~1elm Pauck described ~eaching in America 
"It J.S J.m.t?ortant to rewer1ber ••• that il1e dJ.fference between modern 
preachlng in Amerlca and Protestant Europe J.S fundamental. n~ 
.Arner .Lean ser.110n J.s s eldor.'l BJ.bhcal o:c.· exposJ. tory. Its reference 
to the Scriptu:.."e J.s in the li1ajori ty of cases causal or superfJ.cJ.al. 
It deals g'3nerally wJ. th 11 religious 11 topics. The European 
?rotestant, hONe'Vllr, follows the old tradJ. tJ.on of preaclnng the 
'Word' whethe:c he J.s offJ.lJ.ated vii t.1 lJ.beral or orthodox theology." (3) 
Barth comments: 
nrr wha·c concer11s America is _9retty generally correct, e~n the 
actual confront8tion of the CllUrch vri th the BJ.ble here presupposed 
is there no longer or scarcely any longer an event. In that 
(1) ~, p.122 f 
(2) Porevord to 2R, P• 7 
(3) Pauck: Karl B3rth: Prophet of a New ChrJ.stiBD.ity (1931), p.99 
case naturally the problem based on thlS co11frontat1on lJ.keiivise 
does not arise. In that case I may expect a rmng the successors 
of the P1lgnm Fathers neJ. ther interest nor underst&nduJg for 
what follows and at the same time for the whole of tln.s dogmat1cs. 
But perhaps even there is at least a dim recollection thDt the 
preadung of the Church might stand in some sort of distmct 
CO[Hlection with the Bibl8.--1\nd even there 1 t vnll surely 
happen some dA 'l th1:1 t 1 rel1giou s topics' get fol' some so stupid 
and stale tJ1at from that dun recollect1on a clear one tnav arise 
once agaJ.n.n (1) 
ProclarrotJ.on 1s, then, _9rJ.rnar1ly a matter of preachmg, and 
preaching a matter of expound1ng the B1blical text in o:rder to confront 
the listener vnth a God vrho speaks and has spoken decis1vely. It 
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confronts man again yfi th the revelatlon of God vh1ct:: renders all argument 
about the e:x::Lstence of God superfluous. It is, 1n short, intended not 
to answer the questJ.on 11What do vre mean when vre say 1 God 1? 11 but the questJ.on 
"What has God to say? 11 Barth refuses to accept the proposJ.tion that it 
J.S not possible to speak of God ..,,'i thout fJ.rst explainJ.ng what ls meant by 
"God 11 , and in thJ.s way seems to sweep a s1de 1n a sorrewhat cavalier fashion 
the posslbllity or genuine ignorance or genUJ.ne sceptlcism. Similarly, 
he refuses tb accept that J.t Might be necessary to substitute for the 
name 11 God 11 some circumlocutJ.on such as, for example, T1llich's "the 
UncondJ.tional". ( 2) 
It is largely J.n his early vrorks that Barth discusses the task 
of proclamation, a rrl 1n them 1 t 1s conceived exclusively in terms of 
preaching. He carries over th1s view into the Churdh Dbgmatics, without 
any extensive re-examination of the question. HaNeve~ in the Dogmatics 
his concern J.S not so much with the actual style of proclamation as vrith 
its primar1ly verbal form. 
(1) CD,I:1 : 291f; cf I:2 : 743ff 
(2) See for example ti:1.e debate betvreen Barth and Tillich in 1923. 
(Tillich, Gesamnelte Werk~~ VII, pp.216-43. E.T. in fue Begll;mngs 
of llialectic Theology (hereafter Beginnings), ed. James M. Rob1nson, 
Vol. I, pp.133-58 
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Barth's argument amounts to a defence of verbal proclamation 
aga~nst those who, in ms v"2ew devalue ~ t, or seek to place ~ t ~n a sub-
ordinate role to that of the liturgy or the sacraments, or to replace it 
with some other form of non-verbal comnunicat~on. Thus he J.nsists that 
preaching is not ~ntended to be 11moral exhortation" or religious instruction'1 ) 
but human lang1..1age 11in and through wluch God Himself speaks" ( 2) He treats 
the sacraments, at fJ.rst, as a form of proclamation, but rather in a 
supportJ.ve role to preaching, underlining the preaching J.n the form of 
visible sacred signs appointed by God to convey better to man the prom1se 
of the Gos:[helf3) Hm7ever, in h~s later work he becomes very cautious about 
' 
the use of the word 11 sacrament 11 ( 4) and although there is no evidence that 
he ceased to regard baptlsm and the Lord's Supper as providing some kind 
of visible illustration of the divine promises, he nevertheless appears 
to ignore entirely thelr function in Church proclamation. 
That proclamation is essentially verbal lll form ~s witnessed by 
.> 
the New Testament usage of the words 'l<.f'\~"''6)-'0l and oL:"Tt"ocr-ro>-os 
·with their cognates. The preacher is sent as a herald to announce the 
klng's (God's) message. Thus proclamation is based on mission, and 
consists essentially in s~eaking, because 
"The decisJ.ve prerequisJ.te for the office (of l<.t'W\)~ ) was the ( 5 ) 
ability and readiness to gJ. ve the message exactly as commissioned. 11 
In hJ.s ear1y works Barth views the idea of the Word of God 
primarily in terms of a message mediated through the Bible, but in later 
years he comes increasingly to find the controlling meaning of the concept 
in the incarnation and, indeed, tends more and more to the opinion that the 
term sacrament, at least in any prJ.Jnarjr sense, should be reserved for the 
incarnation. ( 6) Nevertheless, J.t remall1S true that the most inportant 
(1) ,912,It1 : 71ff 
(2) ~ p. 57; of. also ~I: 2 : 778 
(3) CD,I!1:62; of. SQ.,I:2~228 ff 
(4) CD,IV: ~:xi; .IVa4 
(5) 
(6) 
CD,IV:2:201f; c~ also 
--CD,II:2:251ff 
£Q,IV:2:54ff, 107 
-27-
s1ngle element 1n the concept of the Word of God 1 sits verbal nature, 
that 1 t 1s language addressed by God to man. Proclamation, thererore, 
takes as J.ts pr1mary cl18racteristic, a verbal form, vrhich Barth conceives 
largely in terms of the sermon. In short, proclPtmtion has an unashamedly 
eccles1astical air about it, in a very trad1 tional sense, which marks off 
the Church as the group of believers from the rest of culture. 
3. Tillich 
When vre cons1der that the forma tJ. ve period for Tillich 1 s thinking 
co1ncided vn th Barth's, 1t may at first seem strange that they produced 
such dlfferent resuJt s. But a ga1nst this, it must be said that whereas 
Tillich lived and ·worked 1n Gerl!lany, embroiled both in the disastrous war 
of 1914-1918 and the no less disastrous per1od that followed, Barth spent 
the vrhole of the wartime 1n a v1llage par1sh 1n neutral Switzerland. 
Tillich had little exper1ence of parish life and consequently shows little 
direct interest in the problems or the Sunday sermon. Indeed, he shows 
very little concern with the question of preaching at all. Rather, he is 
conce1•ned w1th a dialogue with a humanist1c culture moving away from the 
churches and out of sympathy vri th them. He does not speak of the 11iVord 
of God 11 , nor does he address himself to the J.dea of God as spealGng to man. 
'l'he relationship of the Chrlstian Church to humanistic culture 
remains a central 1ssue throughout ills vrork. ( 1) and most of the other 
questions relating to t..'le pro clama t1on of the Church are closely connected 
vn th tms theme. It 1s diff1cult, towever, to untangle the strands 
( 1) See for example, "Lessing una die Idee einer Erziehung des 
:Menschengeschlechts 11 ·, (1929) in Gesamnelte Werlre (hereafter §!), 
XII, PP• 97-111 
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vrluch constitute the fabrJ..c of Ins a~Jproach. In the following exposJ.. tion, 
therefore, We sho 11 divide the dJ..SCUSSJ..Ol1 of lhe rna jo:c deteriDJ..nU1g factors 
in his mew of proclama tJ..on into three sections: (a) the pre-war years, 
(b) 1914-1918, (c) the post-war years. 
(a) The _pre-war years 
Tillich hJ..mself, in hJ..S V;>rious autobiographical reflections, 
offers extensive J..rli'or,n.atJ..on on 1US early years and the tens1ons which 
he J'el t durJ..ng them. Even dur1ng his schooldays, he says, he felt lumself 
to be on the boundary between the rigid au thorJ.. tarJ..ani sm of lns father's 
Prussinn natw."e and the more RomantJ..c nature of hJ..s mother, cempered -rrl th 
a CalVJ..nJ..stJ..c moralJ..sm} 16n the other between the tradJ tior1al pJ..ety of the 
I.ut11eran church, a:rrl the humanistlc cultw."e of tre Gymnasium vrlnch he 
attended fJ..rst J..n K8nigsbeTg (now Kaliningrad) ond later in Berl:in. ( 2 ', 
FU.rther, he felt hJ..mself on the boundary bet~een the socJ..al classes, Lor 
lns father, as a clergyH1..2n, '.Yas also a state official, and hence a mewber 
of the upper cla:.:;s, -vrhile Tillich felt greater affirn ty with the bourgeoJ..s 
pupils of lns ~JUblJ..c school, ( 3 ) vrho vrere cri tJ..cal of the upper class. 
But he dJ..d not feel himself to be thoroughly bourgeois el. ther and came 
to have a "deep seated aversion'' agaJ..nst a distJnctly bourgeoJ..s hfe. ( 4 ) 
Tbe mos-c J..T:rportant, nowever, of these va:c·J..ous tensions V'ras thC""t 
vil:'nch was represented by lns e::IucatJ..on and lns religJ..ous background, or 
more accurately, bet-w·een tile re ligJ..ous anu the humanistJ..c elements 111 h1s 
education, sJ..nce lJoti1 eleme11ts vrere present not only in }ns formal 
educ&tJ..on but J..n hJ..s home. 
( 1) On the Boundary (hereafter BoundEJry) pp.13-15, 11 .Au tobJ..ographJ..cal 
ReflectJ..ons 11 , The Theology of Paul TJ..llich (hereafter ~·) ed 
c. ':f.:K..egley and H. ::r.Bretall, p. 8 
(2) Boundary, pp. 19f:f; 1'•P.T., P•9 
(.;) i.e. in the American sense, memnng state school. 
(4) Boundary, p.22 
"While we '"ere J..ntroduced into chssjcal antiquity in forwl class 
meetin2,s a-bout ten hours a vrec::k for about e J,ght years, vre 
encountered tile ChnstuHl traddi tJ..on at 110me, J..n the church, in 
directly rehgious J..nstructions (sic) in school and outs.Lde the 
school, an:! in indrrect r el.Lgiousmfortnation J..n history, 
h terature and p}:-J.ilosophy. 11 ( 1) 
"In the tradltion of' classical orthodoxy, my father loved and 
used phllosophy, convmced that there can be no conflJ..ct between 
a true phllosoph;',' and revealed truth. 11 ' (2) 
Even J..f lns father was unaviare of any tensJ..on, TJ..llJ..ch hunself was• 
11 The result of ttns tensJ..on was ei the1· a decJ..sion against the 
one or the other side, or a general skeptlcism or a sph t-
consciousness 7/hJ..ch drove one to attemot to overcome the 
conf'lJ..ct constructively. 11' (3) -
He determined to attempt the last path, seeking a synthesis of the two 
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ele111ents m order to achJ..eve a sense of a unifJ..ed culture. The desire 
to achieve a synthesJ..S became a consunung passion Vllnch lies at the 
:'oundo tJ..on of' all hls work. 
His keen awareness of class dJ..fferences, even while he was at 
school, induced a sense of socJ..al guJlt th8t was to play an ur~ortant 
role later J..n 11lS lJ..fe, arousing bis interest J..n socialJ..sm. A mel!lber 
of the upj?er classes by Vll'tue of hJ..S father 1 s status, by inclination more 
sympathetlc to the lower classes, he was, .nevertheless, cri t2cal of all 
classes and vronted to bring them closer together. In the perJ..od after 
the Great War he found lnmself particularly concerned by the rift between 
the churches and the ~orking classes. 
During hls last years at school, and hJ..s tire at um versJ.. ty, he 
found himself deeply interested in ph2losophy and particularly dral'ffi to 
Schelling, niht only on account of lns philosophy of nature, but because 
(4) 
he had tneu to produce a synthesis of philosophy and theology. 
(1) T.P.T., p.9f 
(2) Ibid, p. 8 
( 3) Ibid ..t. p • 1 0 
(4) BoundaE,Z, p.17, 47ff. We shall return later to the J..tnportance 
of Schelling for Tillich 
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Indeed, so great vras the attrachon that both of the dissertations ·winch 
he wrote - for lns doctorate and for h:ts l:tcentiate :tn theology = were on 
Schelling. H:ts work made him deeply conscious of the rift betneen 
philosophy and theology. H:ts consequent desire to aChieve a s:nthesis, 
h~ maintains, led him to a new attitude tcwrards the :tnterpretation of 
church history and towards the problem of histor:tcal crit:tc:tsm. He 
aimed to g:tve greater substance to theology than l:tberal:tsm had allowed 
1 t, and to reveal the common ground vifi th philosophy vrh1ch would facilitate 
the synthesis. 
(b) The years 1914--1918 
Tillich was ordained in 1912, but, after t~·ro years of parish work 
in the Lutheran Church :tn the province of Brandenburg, became a mi.l:t tary 
chaplai.'1 on the Western front. He tells us nothing in his autobiographical 
reflections about h:ts par:tsh war'-": and little of his e:;v er:tence during the 
war, except for one im.J:?ortant inc:tdent "'JVh1.ch was to play a s:tgn:tficant part 
in his view of revelation. He records that, ''lhile on leave m Berlin, 
tcw1ards the end of the war, he saw a pa:tnting by Bot:tcelli wh:tch, for h:tm, 
ammunted almost to a revelat:ton. It v-ras an experience that was part of a 
study of art on '·vf1~ch he had engaged as a conscious react:ton to the war. 
From tlus study he developed the fundamental categories of his view of 
rel:tgion and culture, namely, form and substance. As substance breaks 
throu~h artistic form, so the Uncond:ttional breaks through the condlt:toned 
form of f:tnite being. ( 1 ) 
The wer not only provoked h:im to the study of art, but elso serveEl 
to heighten his poh tical awareness. Al thou gil he had felt a sense of 
social gujlt even et school, it had not issued in pohhcal activi"bJ. 
But the sense of guiJ t vras now sharpened by the ·war to a deeper apprec:tation 
of the poli t:tcal s:t tuDtion and a desire for action. So he obse:.."ved: 
( 1) Ibid, P• 27f' 
"It Vias du.:rlng tne collapse of' imperial Germany and the revolutlon 
of' the bst yeers of World War I thet I began to unaerstend such 
lSsues as the pohhcel background of' tne war, the inter-reletlon 
of' cepi tellsm and lmperJ.alism, the crlsls of' bourgeois socJ.ety, 
and the schisms betvreen classes. u ( 1) 
As a result he lent ms supr:ort to the rellgious socialist movement 
immecha tely after the war, out he was not lnvolv ed in any du'ect 
poll tical actlVl ty. 
Ee rega:."ded relJ_gJ.ous socla lism as e -tool to brlng together the 
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churches and t11e ''to:dang classes in a common purpose a11d so to brlnge the 
i·rmense gap between therfl. The rJ.f't vvas :::artl;v due, in Tilllch's vievr, 
to the ::~urely transcendent vif1'.'T of tl1e K:m.;dom of God :mherited from Luther 
and current m the Lutheran church, wlnch led to a tendency to support the 
social and political status quo. ( 2) He was not entlrely un.realistJ.c, 
however, about the ~)rospects for co-operatlon betvieen the churches and the 
labour movement, because he recognlsed that J.i' the labour movement did accept 
the support of the churche9, it would inevitably mean some sacrifice of 
J.ts Utopian ldeals. Hevertheless he still belleved that the comnon r;round 
vms sui'flclent to just.tfy the belief thet rellgious socJ.allsm could 
demonstrate that behlnd the C'nristian humanism of the labour novement and 
the en1.il·ely dlfferent sacramental forms of the Churci1 the same substance 
could be found. (3) 
With tills J.n mind Tillich developed the concept of 11kail"os" to 
denote the demand to fulfil a partlcular task, namely, the creation of a 
nevr soclal order, whld1, though part of the ''JOl'k of the Church, was not to 
be viewed as a reahsation of the fulness of the ICingdom of God. (4) 
(1) ~' p.32f 
(2) Ibid, p. 76£'; The Protestant Era (hereafter Era;, p.xlii; 
urr-imate Concern, p.129 
( 3) Bound a q, p .6 3 
(4) ~' p.78f 
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(c) The post-war years 
The _t)erlod up to and J..ncludlng the F':!.rst vVorld War lald the 
found2 'clons for most of Tilll ch 1 s J nt ere st s, but l t was m the p:3riod 
aft.c;r the war that ne attempted ln lus wrlhng to produce answers to the 
problems vnth WfllCh he foLmd r1imself engaged. 
three areas of concern 
(i) the rift betwe:::n the churches and the 
(il) the rif't bet\'reen the churches and the 
There were, ln particular, 
proletariat 
intelligentsia 
(ill) the gen0ral dlslntegratlon of the lntellectual vTorla. 
It lS our hope that by means of a brief examlnatlon of each of these we 
shall be able to dlscover some of the lffi)ortant elements ln Tlllich 1 s 
concept of Jroclamatlon. 
(l) the churches and the J?roletarH>t 
We have:: aJr eady dlscussed at some length TlllJ ch 1 s sense of soclal guilt 
and rus ~arly lnvol vement ln the rellgious soclallst movement and l ts 
attempts to establish relatlons Vfl th, and to exercise lnfluence on, the 
Labour ~,fair ement. The taslr was not assisted by the long and deeply felt 
suspiclon of the Labour o1ovement towards the churches. It was feared that 
rellgious socialism would bring 11the masses" under the Church's lnfluence 
end thus allel18te them from the struggle to achleve a soclalist government. 
If the religious soclelists were to have any influence "lith the masses, 
they had to align themselves with the J.deals of the masses or seek to 
persuade the,n of a better way. Tlllich's development of the notion of 
11kairos"was an attEmpt to create a theological reconciliation between 
the goal of the Church and the goal of the Labour movement, by means of 
an elaboration of the speclfic task of the lliurcll. at a certain moment 
WJ.. thin the overall task of the Church of dlY·ecting lt self towards tl->e 
fulfilment of the Kmgdom of Gcd. 
However, it wqs not sufficient to declare an ldentlty of pur!Jo se, 
since the hlstorlcal posltlon of the Lutheran church was set against the 
socia b.st convlctions of tm s group. 'I'he Church, as we 11ave aJr eady 
noted, was dlrected towards the lTlaintenance of the status quo of the 
soclal structuTe and, in partlrular, tended to uphold the posJtlon of 
the upper clB sses ln government, thus precluding the possibility of a 
socialist government~ 1 ) 
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Any attempt to draw the Labour lTlovement and the Churches togeuner 
had to take accoun~ of ihe antagonism felt towards the churches in its 
apologetic, and Tlllich belleved that such an apologetic ccnuld be mounted 
on the basis of the ~resence, albeit obsdured, of a Chrlstlan substance, 
in the humalllsm of tt1e soclalists. 
"My oontact with the Labor Movement, v.ri tn the so-called de-
chrlstlanlsed masses, showed me clearly that 1.ere too, Wl tlun 
a humanistlc framework, tl1e C~lstian substance was llldden, 
even though thls humanism looked hke a rna te-r J,alistic philosophy 
that h2Cl long sJ..nce been dlscredi ted by art and science. 11 (2) 
"The Church's attempt to frame an apologetic message Wlthout 
considerlng the class struggle was doomed to failure at the 
outset. Defend1ng Chrlstlanity in tl1is sltuatlO~ requJ..red 
achve partlcJ..pation in the class struggle. Only rehgious 
social1sm could carry the apologetic message to the 
p-roletarian rna sses. 11' (3) 
Only through active involvement, a rrl an apologetic based on the 
Christlan substance of socialism could a kind of maieutlc be developed to 
prepere for the tre ssage of the Church. But Tillich vvas convinced that 
such a maieutlc was possJ..ble. 
Howeve~ the resuats of the efforts of the rellglOUS sociallsts 
vvere slender and very fer from v1hat they had hoped, due not least to i:he 
gravity of the s·Ltua tlon, wluch they had miscalculated. The war had 
brought about the collapse of 11bourgeo1s ClVllJ..setion 11 , apparently creating 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
of. The RelJ..§lous S1 tuatlon, p.41+: "The Reformed Prote~tant1s1~ of England, 
.America, Holland and ','{estern Germany entered mto all:l.ance w1 th the 
econorrllc ethics of cap1 telism at an early date. Lutberalllsm stood and 
still stands eloof from it but by a roundabout way through state 
ecclesiasticism and the sanct1ficat1on of the natlOnal will-to-pauer 
it became posslbly even more dependent on capitalism then Cal vin1sm 
had become. 11 
Bounda£l, p.62; cf also p.63 
~' p.62 
thereby the cond1 tlo11S necessary for an apologetic appro3ch by the 
Churches to the proletariat, but 
"· •• 1t was too late for such an attempt to be successful at that 
time. It proved 1mpossible to break dovm the seculs r ideology 
and the rrechanistlc ••• mater1.alism of the labor partJ..e::. The 
Old Guard prevailed against us a a1 against the youth of their 
own movement."' ( 1 ) 
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Nevertheless, Tlllich rernalned convinced both of the need for soclal act1on, 
vrlnch was closely connected -vi th the 1nfluence on him of the prophetic 
crlticlsm of soclal injustice in the Old Testament, and of the valldity 
of the basls of lus apologetic. 
"We understood sociallsrn as a problem not of wages, but of a new 
theonomy, in wtuch the questlon of wages, of social secur1 ty, 
is treated in unl ty with the quest-ton of truth, of spiritual 
security. 11 ( 2) 
The ba-sically Chrlstian humanism of the contem-porary s oclety was swaJITped 
by "neo-pagan" tendencles (by wtuch we assume, Tillich means the 1mech2nls·dc 
materJal1sm1 prevlously refer~ed to) ( 3) as it d1sintegrated, and in the 
actempt to combat these tendenc1es the church appeared even more anti-
humanist than ever before. Consequently 
"The proletar1at sank back into rellgious pasSl vi ty. 11 (4) 
(1i) The Churches and the intelligentsia 
Although, accord1ng to T1llich's account, the churches came to be adm1red 
by the intell1gentsia for the1r stand against the rising tide of "nation-
al1stic pagan1sm 11 , tne lntelligentsia were not drawn into the churches. 
They served as a useful tool against Naz1sm, and were admred r~or thelr 
oppos1 t 1on (inasmuch as tt1ey d1d oppose Nazism), but thelr message was no 
more acceptabJe than lt had bPen rreVlously. Th1s, then, was another 
(1)"Reliq:ion and SPr.ular CulttJre 11 , Journal of Religion (hereafter .TR), 
vo.L.,. 26 \1946), p. 79; cf'. Ult1mate Soncern, p.131 
(2) ~' p.xiv 
(3) };'rom v1lnch develo_ped the National Soc1alism of Hl tler 
(4) Boundary, p.64 
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area ~n vrhlch T~llich felt 1 t necessary to br1dge the r~ft by means of a 
new apolOgetic approach~ ~n order to strive towards the re-~ntegration 
of SOClety. 
"The dogma defended by the Church rhd not and could not appeal to 
(the intell1gentsia). In order to reach th1s group, the Church 
must proclaim the Gospel 1n a language that 1s co~rehensible to a 
non- eccle31ast1cal humanlsm. It -,-muld have to convince both 
the intellectuals and the masses t:O.at tt1e gospel lS of 8bsolute 
relevance for them. But tlns comJJction cannot be imparted by 
the polntedly anti-humanlst paradoxes that are used in confesslonal 
theology. The reallty Ylhlch -;ives r1se to such pal'adoxes must 
first be ~llumina ted. 11 ( 1) 
There was a spl1 t vnth tne intell1e:,entsia representing not only 
tne ernp~rJ.cal '3Cler.c es, but also with t:10se represent1ng the humam ti~s 
and~ in part1~1lar, philosophy. Cb the one hand, to ihose J.nvolved in 
th~ empi-rlcal scle!lces the message of tl:J.e churct.~: was not a product of 
sclentlfic research ano analySls. Theology was >!le'.'led, 1ndeed, as 
thou:·oughly unsc1entlfic and c;herefo:ce suspect. On the other hand, 
the vvar hod had a destruct1ve effect on the ~deallst synthes1s wh1ch had 
brought philosophy and theology Logether. Tillich "llshed to present an 
apologet~c to l:cth grouT's by attanptl-ng to snow ho-.v each dlsclpllne was 
related t.J others, 1Jut '-"'l thout p2rmttirl,f; arry one dlsc~pl~ne to exerc1se 
dominat1on ovsr t•le othc1·s e1 ther in respect of method or ln resp:;ct of 
its content. Tlns 1nt entJ.on _0rov1ded the 1not1 ,,ct::_on for the 'lr.f'l tu1g of 
Das SysterE_der Ylissen~chaften nach GegensUnden und Methoden ( 2 ~ wlnch 
v1as to be a klnd of preparator" apologet~c to secure a hear1ng _:'or the 
message of the church. Slde b7 s1cle vn t11 :::.. t was a further appeal to the 
Cl:.I.I'lst-u:m substance of the hutralllstlc culture "Thlch the lntelll~?,entsla 
sup1Jorted, winch led l'lll..Lc(~ -co ci -"velop Lls notlon of the latent church. 
"'l'he kuil of dlstlnctlon I su:;s~ ested 111 that essay seems t.o -be 
necessEJrV ln order to take 111to o ccount tll.e Clu'lstlan humanlsm 
whlch exlsts outslde the churches. it lS not 1Jermlsslble to 
(1) Boundary, p.64 
(2) Vie shall refer ln the text to the System of Sclences and ln the 
footnotes to G.W.I. (s d -cr) 
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desJ.gnate as "u:1churct1ed 11 those who have become alJ.enated frcm 
organlsed denonnnatlons and tradltlonal creeds. In llving 
among these g!'Oups for half a generatlon I learned hoTr nuch of 
the latent c.'l1urcl: -there J.s vii tmn them. 11 ( 1) 
(i~~) The general a "lsintegra tion of the intellectual VlQr] d. 
-lie have already mentJ.oned the J.sola hon of theology by the emplr~cal 
sc~ences on the one hand and by the humani tles on tue other, but that 
was not the sole f'eature of the sl tuatlon ~n t:13 J.ntellectual world 
of' ~mportance tu Till~cho TheL'e was a more general dJ.sinte;;ra:t;ion in 
t0..e whole f'~eld of study, due on the one lwrrl to the 11methodolog~cal 
~mper~al~sm" of the mat~J.etfl9t~cal physlcs, wmch rec;_uJ.red tiJ.at every 
d~sc~pline deslr~ns to be regarded as a sc~ence should be tested by the 
crl ter:wn of tne emplr~cal method, a rd on the oilier hana to tne general 
loss of a sense of meanJ..n; consequent U)On the destructlon by the war 
of' the national idealist prolosophy. In these circumstances, Tillicll 
S8VT J.t as part of' the task of' hJ.s §;y'_§tem of Sclences that ~t should seek 
to .celate tbe varJ.ous dJ.scipline s, both sc~entific and non-scientJ_fic 
(in a modern Englisi1 sense) to each other as parts of a coherent whole, and 
thereby to atte11 pt to reconstruct a sense of meaning, or at lesst to 
make l t poss~ble. 
Tillic:1 h~mself sa,•~s that J.n his Systew of' Sciences his ul bmate 
corr::ern "T8S vr~th the quest~ons: "How can theology be a science ~n the 
sense of w~ssenschaft?"' "How are its several d~sc~plines related to 
the other sc~ences? 11 , and "What is dlstJ.nct~ ve about ~ ts ,JlO"trlod?" He 
attempted to anS'Ner them 
"· ••• by class~fyJ.ng all of the methodological dlsciplines as sciences 
of thinking, being, and culture; by ma~ntauung that the foundatlon 
of the whole system of sciences is tne philosophy of meamng; by 
defJ.ning metaphyslcs as the attempt to ex:pres::. the Unconch tJ.oned ~n 
terms of ratJ.onal symbols, and by defin~ng theology as theonomous 
rnetaphyslCSo 11 (2) 
(1) Boundary, p.66f 
(2) Boundary, p. 55 
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In order -co mole o place for theology, Tillich closs~f~ea ~Las 
a cultural science, ':.11ere ~ t could plovv "' l-reJ" rol"" ~n .,_-h a t tl 
"' "' , - _ " e ravnng oge 1er 
of the whole s~rstem through the search for rreanlng. In this way he sousht 
to counter the loss of cred~ oil~ t.:l -r.tnch theology had suffered through its 
customory classif'lo&t~on w~ th the ernp~r~Lcal sciences (Seinswissenschaften). 
The ph~losophy of meanltlg vro s crucial for T~llich in. draw~ng 
t th ' ' l . ( 1 ) o.se cr tne -rrno e sys-cern, for not only dld lt proVlc1e a oasJ.s for the 
relntegrat~on of t:1e J.ntellectuEJl -,rof.' ld, but ~ t also prov-c_c1ed the ,)ossjb~li ty 
of a new emphasis on substance lnstead of mere form, ~n contrast to the 
~ncrea s~ngly ;>owerful ma terla l~sm of the sc~ences. In TJllich's own 
terPl~nology, he vas seek~ng to reJ.ns tate the Uncondrcioned -,a tlnn the 
=-· a (2) con'--UL~one • 
In h~s later wo•'k:s, the concept of lreanlng ~s replaced by the 
concept of being or :Oeirg-Itself, probably on account of t:1e impact of 
He~degger 1 s tlunkms, ,-vl:uch he heard expounded at I1Iarburg ~n 1925, and 
reinforced by h~s antipathy for the obsession, as he saw ~ t, of logical 
pos~ tiVlsm, with meam.ng. The concept of Being-Itself brin;s to the fore, 
±r.. B way i.'lh1.ci1 the concept of meanu1g does not, the on-cological structure 
wh~ch embraces the vh ole of hurna 1 activity, includ~ng the f~eld of knovrledge, 
and expresses the coherence Bnd the depth of all that is. 111-IIeaning 1' may 
appear to be something external, adc1ed as sn ahen ~ngred~ent, to that 
wluch ~s, to produce order from ·what ~s normolly chaotic. Bel!lg-Itself 
expresses the coherence whlch ~s inherent vn th~n the ontolog~cal structure 
and vrh2ch arises from ~ts unity. Ontology, therefore, seems to offer a 
vie~ of , 
mere pro~s~n.; foundat~on for a un~f~ed ; knowledge, tfl-8n the concept 
of meanlng. 
( 1) 'l'here has, however' been l~ttle recognl t~on of this fact except by 
J L Adams Paul Tillich 1 s Ih~loso hy of Culture Smence and Relig~on, 
(l~e~eafter J?.C.S.Il. , pp.56ff --
(2) For an expos~tion of the rar1ge of mean~ng of the conce-pt of the 
Unconditioned Ibid, pp.41ff 
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In our survey of the early pcrJ.od of Tillich 1 s work 1ve have high-
lighted his chief concerns, namely, the Labour movement, the intellJ.gentsu>, 
and the intellectual world as a vrhole. He saw the task of the Church as 
the drawing together of a socJ.ety ra:rndly dJ.sJ.ntegrating J.n the chaotJ.c 
sJ.t uation of the J.mtnediate post-·war years. The SJ.tuatJon had existed 
previously, but the war had had the e:t':f'ect not only of bringing J. t to a 
point of crisis, but also of J.mpressing on Tillich hJ.mself the need for 
aotJ.on. Thus the proclamation of t.h.e chu-rch he saw in terms of a proclamation 
of the fundamental UUJ.ty of socJ.ety and culture, in order that J.ts reality 
should be realised J.n the contffnporary situation. The paradigm of an 
integrated society he saw J.n what he described as the '1theonomous ''situation 
of the ~:riddle .Ages. Towards a new '1 theonomy 11 he noYr iVJ...sh:::d to dJ.rect the 
efforts of the church.(1) 
Hmvever, he was avmre of the rJ.fts that en sted between the 
churches on the one hand, and tl1e proletariat and intelligentsia on the 
other, and sought, therefore, to construct an apologet~c adequate for each 
situatJ.on, so that progress mJ.ght be made towards co-operation. The focal 
point of the apologetic in both areas was the ChrJ.stian substance of 
humanistic society, both J.n practice and J.n the ideals that were being 
debated. This ChrJ.stJ.an substance is identJ.fied with the substance 
v1hich he wished to emphasJ.se as the YJ. tal and unify:\. '1.~ elanent in the system 
of sciences. Hls apologetic was dJ.rected at drawing attention not to the 
differences between the churches and other groups hostile or indlfferent to 
them, but to the common ground bet1ieen them. In thJ.s way he hoped that 
l t would be possJ.ble for the church to be taken seriously, and J.ts 
rressage to be listened to • 
.An approach such as thJ.s, however, carries with it J. ts ovm problems. 
Common ground, no doubt, exJ.sted between tl1ose parts of the churches v1hich 
(1) cf "Rehgion and Secular Culture,tt JR, vol .. 26 (1946), p.80f. 
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concurred WJ. th the views of the rehgJ..ous sociall.sts and sone, ~f not all, 
of the members af the Labour movement. The common ground conslsted ~n 
the desire to rectify social injustice ancJ to establish a socialist govern-
rilent. There vras no guarantee, hmvever, that both sides would understand 
the ~dea of a soc~ali st government in the same way. 
It ~s more ~mportant, however, to note that, vrmle there may have 
been a measure of agreen1ent on t11e pract~cal aims of both groups, and 
while tlo..at r,ight have led to a more sympathetic understanding of the other 
by each, the differences betvreen thell1 vre1·e still considerable, not only in 
terms of thelr ultimate aims, but also ~n terms of the ideology -~rhlch 
informed them. Indeed it was their respecti~e ldeologies that gave them 
thelr dunferent d~rections. 'L'he presenc~f some cOIPJilOn ground is no reason 
for the adopti0n of the ideology of another group. :Moreover, vihen Tilhch 
sought to draw attention to the 110hr~stian substance" of humanistic society 
he was do~ag no more than pointlng to its cultural roots, not offerlng an 
argument for the relevance of the Church arrl of eccleslastl08l structures, 
or even of the message of the Church. Hua~nistlc society, as a product of 
tbe progress of thought from Christian roots, might consider l tself as 
having outgrovm any need for the Church. ( 1 ) 
Part of the d~fflculty surrounding the problem of establishing a 
rapprochement wlth groups estranged from the Church was, in Tlllich' s view, 
the dlfficulty of speaking about God. Bis acute awareness of thls ~ 
illustrated by h~s discussion with Barth in 1923 ln the pages of Theologlsche 
BlMfter (2) (continued on p.40) 
( 1) We may f :ind a more modern forw of the same argument e:xp resseEl: by 
P.L.Berger A Rumour of Angels (London, Penguin Books, 1970),p.35: 
"Why should' one buy psychotherapy or racial liberalism in a 'Christian 1 
package, Fben the same co1wnoditles are avaiJable under purely secular amd 
for that very reason even more modernistic labels? The preference for the 
former will probably be l~ml ted to peopJe with a sentimental nostDlgia 
for tradi tionad. symbols ••••• 11 
(2) G.W., VII,pp.216-~3 (E.T. in Beginning, vol. I, pp.133-58) 
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in which Barth took him to task for speaking of' "this :frosty m:mster", 
"the Uncond1 t1oned 11 , mstead of speaku1g directly of' "the dear God "• ( 1) 
Is not the latter way, Barth asked, 
"sa.f'er in the end against chalectic, in the face of' winch I do not 
regard 'the uncond1tio.ned 1 as weatherproo£' either?" (1) 
In lus VJ.ew, as many problems ·were posed by the use o:f Till1ch 1 s clrcw~ 
locution as by the use of' the term God. To th1s, Tilllch replied:-
"It lS impossible at present to speak as though the words 1n winch 
Scr1pture and church refer to the uncond1t1oned could directly 
aclneve that wnicl1 lS the1r essent1al mean1ng. Thjs 1s the fault 
of' t!le Grand Inq_uis1tor, of the la"r, of' heteronomy,and of' object-
lf'ication. And all of' us, theolog1ans and non-theologians alike, 
share th1s same fate. For example, 1 t 1 s irrpossible for the one 
who lS svvare of thl s Sl tuat1on to speak of God as 1f tl:ns VTord could 
directly convey to him its essent1al richness. Therefore we rrust 
speak of' the uncondl tioned. Not that this ~s a substl tute expression; 
it lS rather a key to- opan for oneself and for others the closed do or 
to t:-:.e holy of holies of the name 11 God "·· Then the key should be 
th..rown away. Precisely here 1 t seems to me tna t tne 1d ea of' any 
d1rect access to God a.nd the assumpt1on that one can obVlously 
s:9eak of Goa are :Borb1dden. 1r (2} 
The last sentence suz;>:,ests to us tl.wt to a certain ex:tent Barth 
aril Tlll..'.ch are talking at cross pu.rfloses, since Barth's pl~irf1?ry emphas1s 
is on a God who has come to man and confronted l-nm, a God who had 
confronted Ba~th pre-ellllnently l{l_ the Scriptures. But it 1s 1mportant to 
note that Till1ch spea~\:S of the term 11uncondi tioned 11' as a "key", rather than 
as a subst1tute for "Goa'•. .As such it :is 1ntended tc fulf1l an inter-
pretat1ve role, to unlock the richess of tlle concept of Goa. We may 
suggest, tentat~vely, that at this point Till1ch is inclined more towards 
ttle use of 11 God 11 as a s:nthetic, and Barth to•Yards 1 ts use as an anal::rtlc 
concept. By th1s v7e mean that Tillich uses 1t as a concept vrluch dravrs 
together a number of elements 1n relig1ous exper1ence, whereas Barth, on 
the other ~bnd, regards 1L as analyt1c of the m1rlst1an reveletion • 
( 1) It 1s qp1ty thot 1n the E.T.(Be6lnnin~s, vol.I,p.147) the German p?rase 
"SoJlte n~cht der al te schlichte hebe Gott ••. "(.G. W • , VIIsP• 231) lS 
translated "Is not the old s1mple vrord 1 God 1 ••• 11 ig11ori11[; the word 
"11ebe" anci so losing rruc11 of the force of Barth's quest1on. 
(2) c..w.,V1T,P.241 (E.T. Beginninm vol.I,p.156) 
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H01 ever, J.t r18y be 3rgL1 ed that a synthetJ.c concept does not reqUD'e 8 l:ey 
so .nuch as a patient e:JP l8natJ.on of the element of vr'_r11_c'n 1 t .lS d COfll.!)OSG • 
And, indeed, He fi11d that TillJ.ch appeal's unable to dispose of the keys 
' (1~ ' 
ne uses, ecause he treats theiil not as keys, that J_s to say, as apologetic 
devices, but as being lingmshcally appropr1ate Jl1 themselves, as descript-
J. ve of constJ. tuent parts of the s}rn th':!tJ.c concept. 
not to be throun avroy, ·nut defended vnth all the weapons of' a tradJ. tJ.ona 1 
The use or' these ukeys 11 laid Tilhch open to the charge of 
substJ. tutJ.ng the "God of t:.-1e "olnlosopllers 11 or a plulosoplncal concept 
J'or the Goa of the J:hble a11d of the Chl'J.stJ.an Church. ( 2) He was aware, 
hcr,rever, of the cri tlcJ.sm and J. ts irr19lications E'nd consequently devoted 
consJ.Clel'able effort to examuung the relatJ.onship between phJ_lo$oph:y and 
theology. To thJ.s subjectvre shall returr1 in a later chapter, but we 
should ndlte here that J.n 1925, when Tilhch >vas at 1.-Iarburg, he lleard 
HeJ.degser lectLU·e and concluded th2t HeJ.deg_er 1 s philosophy offered a tool 
of great apologetic value for the Cnu:._·ch' s approach to the intelligentsia. 
He gradually adopted the mode of speech of He1degs,er 1 s enstentJ.alJ.sm, 
seeking to correlate an a nalysJ.s of the human sJ. tuation with the 
Cb..l' J. stJ.an 111e ssage. (3) 
( 1) UntJ.l hJ.s rno·.:er to .AmerJ.ca, Tillich seems to have regarded "the Uncond-
itJ.onal" as a satJ.sfaci:ory key, but by 1940 he -.vas using the phrase "ult-
imate concern". No dou:Jt he found that 11 the UncondJ.tJ.onal 11' evoked lJ.ttle 
response from American audiences. Together with 11ul tiwate concern" hJ.s 
favourite 11key 11 seems to be "Grouril of BeJ.ng 11 • He vrould have ~~referr~ 
"Being-Itself"', esse ipsum, to the latter term lJut found J. t to be unaccept-
able (Ultirnate Concern, p.46). It is worth notJ.ng that "ultimate concern" 
is always interpreted by TJ.llich _in ontologJ.cal terms. cf "The Problem of 
TheologJ.cal Method", J.R., vol.27 (1947),p.18; S,xstematic Theology, I, 
pp.15ff. 
(2) cf Bibhcal Religion and the Search for Ultllilate RealJ.t (hereafter 
B.R.S.U.R. , p.85: "Against Pascal I say :The God of Abraham, Isaac, 
Jacob and the God of the philosophers is the same God. tt 
(3) "It took years before I became full;! aware of the J.Tnpact of tms 
encounter on my ovm tlnnkJ.ng. I resisted, I tried to learn, I accepted 
the nevv way of thinking more than the answers it gave." ~,p.14; cf also 
T.O'Meara, 11 Tillich and Heideg_;er: a Structural Relationship", Harvard 
Theological Review vol.61 (1968),pp.249-61; C.Rhein, Paul Tillich : 
Efiilosoph und Theoioge (Stuttgart, EvangelJ.scher Verlag, 1957), p.98; 
Boundary, p.56f; The Courage to Be, pp.145ff. 
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It is f'undamental to TillJ.ch 1 s VJ.ew of' proclamat1on that the society 
in vilnch the Church has to fulf1l 1 ts task, is seen as ahenated f'rom its 
O'rm roots, or 1n Tillich 1 s ovm wards, that 1t has substituted autonomy for 
theonomy. It 1s tnerefore the t asl~ of the CJ.mrch 1n 1 ts proclarn.ation 
to meke society aware of 1 ts own roots and having repa1red the alienation, to 
revitalise society. It vras for thls purpose that !1e made several attePlf!ts 
t.o elaborate a theolog:r of culture, that 1s, an attempt to reveal the theol-
og1cal, or rather, 11 rel1gious 11 roots of rulture. Proclamat1on, if vre lll.9Y 
use such a term, lS related w.ore to apologetics, or d1alogue, than to 
preaching, as the repet1tion of the Word of God previously heard. It lS 
an attempt to attract the attention of the listener ln order that he should 
heer the messaf;e of the ChLJrche But when we try to define what the message 
of the Church 1s, on the basis of Tillich 1 s eerly worl:s, i're are left in some 
doubt, for Tillich 1s wuch more concerned with •.vhat 1'18Y appear to be the 
prelinunar1es or the 111ethod of approach, thon vri th the contento 
It vrculil be ~;vrong, however, to suppose that Till1ch has no clear 
1dea of the u1essage vrluch lS to be proclaimed. He d1d not suffer the same 
doubts as Barth as to •Nhether the Church had url.Clerstood the message ar1ght. 
fus f1rm convict1on that he knew the message made a re-examination super-
fluous. The _9res::dng question for him vms the method of presenting it 1n 
a rap1dly d1s1ntegrating society. 
Eaually 1 t vrculd be vn"'ng to thHlk that Tillich speaks only o:f 
.. ' 
the 11 uncond1 tional" or of ''ultimate Concern" or the "Ground of Being"; 
a most cursory :;lance tlu:·ough Systemat1c Theologz shovs that he frequently 
speaks d1rectly of God, 1n a very trad::c tlonel 111anner. Nevertheless, it 
.cs gene·L·elly t:.:ue to sey tll!3t he tends tc use the te:mn "Goau as a synthetic 
retner than es en enalytic concept. 
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4. Co 1'}_1a::.·lsons arx:l Conclusions 
In our 1n1 tial ooservatJ.ons 17e reo1Drked that Barth and T1llich 
shared a comrnon com ern for ti1e rnessage of -the Church; Tillich - at 
least 111 1940 - saw i:1is approach 2 s based on the same kerygma as Barth 
iii shed to proclaim. ( 1 ) We have r:.oted tha-L the~? slJBred a dissat1sfaction 
Vl th the srtuation in Europe 1ml:leoL:d;el:y lela ted to tl"e eJ:-.aotic effects of' 
the frrst Norld ~Var. F".melly, "v'ie recalle3 th~t they both lllsh to be 
regarded e s C'1u.ccll theolos,ians. And yd OLU' a tblilyts to trace the 
development oi.' the 1r vie-..vs of proclamat1on, crucio l in itself' for then· views 
of theolog~r and theoloe2.cal method, have revealed ''llde diSfer::.nces of rr)p-
roach and result. 
(a) First, l"ie notJ.ced tnz 'c despl te thelr contemporaneJ ty and the IT 
coo1mon e:;verJ.ence of the d1sJ._.u_c-01£1g effecca ,'f -;:;he War, yet their actual 
s1 tuations 2nd -che1r appTaisal of the problems presented to the church 
differed considerably. It is 1mportant to koop 1n m1nd the fact -t:lvt 
Barth vms, througt10ut the •var, engEJged J..n a parochlal lY11n1stry 111 a 
neutral country, uhile Tillich, by contrast, was a chaplain on the battle-
front and not, apparently, irrmediately concerned vri tL" the ri;;h ts or wrongs 
of the vrar. At the outbreak of the i7ar, Barth's theolog1cal standpoint 
Vlas so severely shaken that he r eject~d t:,e theolog1cal liberalisn, of rj_s 
teachers and strove to found his th<3ology arr1 preaching on the 1'\Vord of God "• 
By contrast, no such change of position was registered b~r Tillich; he becarre 
pol1t1c~llly, more aware, and resolved to take a lTIOL'e active role in social 
aff:nrs, l:ut there ret•1air.ed a fundamental cont:muity 111 his theological 
t~nnking. 
( 1) Era, p. 83£' 
Other artlcles also lndJ.Cate commor.. ::;,round ':ath Barth, e.g. 
"WhElt 1s Yirong v.ritll the Dlalectic Theology", J.R., Vol. 5, 
( 1935J pp.127-}_! 5. 
Barth's prinl9ry concern, we noted, in keepJ.ng wJ. th his parochial 
position, Yras •n tL the -~'lee:cly se-rmon an:J its contents, a concern vrh:c.ch he 
earned over into lus academic career, vhile Tilhch, vii th little 
ex-perience of paroclual minJ.stry, 1:u t i'll th great concern both for the 
proletariat and the J.ntelligentsia, estranged 
pritnanly with tr..e approach to those grou:9s. 
f:::-om the church, Ym s concerned 
speaki.ng 
Tillich,/in dialogue, of the 
situation before oncJ ofter the Second World -.iar, has llJDde the following 
summary of tr1e sJ.tuation& 
"Karl Barth spoke in a very :9artJ.cular sJ. tuation to a very particular 
group of :9eople. He spoke to those who, in themselves, vrere attached 
to the church and vho stood, as theologJ.ans or laymen, on the boundary 
line of a liberolism ;;rhich nught fJ.nally have led to so-called 
C~rmanic ChrJ.stJ.anJ.ty. Ana he saved ChrJ.stJanJ.ty from this pitfall. 
Tlus J.S his achJ.evement .Ln church history an:l hJ.s greatness. I 
refer not only to German theolog;r but to the European churches who 
l1ad to flght against sinular atte<11!Jts during t..h.e Nazi perJ.ocJ, and 
Barth saved them. But then the people vrho fought under his 
leadership in the struggle against NazJ.sm, and often became martyrs 
in the fight, vrere victorious at the end of the war and became the 
leading persons J.n German and other Protest~t cJ:"l.urches •••• 
'~nd something happened. 'Ihe so-calJed intelligentsia - the people 
wt10 canoot escape the sad destiny of having to ihink - was left alone. 
These people were lef't in a desert, and they were conscious of this 
all t:1e ti.me. '.fue result ·was a cont.Lnuing secularisation which, 
after the lx:; at of the fight with Nazism, occurred again in Germany 
and in Europe. So we now have a large group of people wbom I 
vrould prefer to ca 11 the 11thinking and doubting people" in respect 
to the ChrJ.stian Tradition. There are thinking :9eople who do not 
doubt and even more of them Yi'D.o have doubted but do so no longer. 
They have simply rejected Christianity aD.d every other rellgion. 11' ( 1) 
'T presuppose in m;y theologJ..cal thinkiD.g the entire history of 
ChrlstJ.ans thou~ht up until nav, and I consider the attitude of 
tno se people v.ho are in doubt or estrangement or opposJ. tion to 
everything ecclesiastical and relJ.gJ.ous, including C~xistJ.anJ.ty. 
And I bave to speak to them. M:r >York J.S with those who ask 
questJ.ons, and for them I am here. For the others, who doubt, 
I have the gr$.at problerr: of tact. Of course, I cannot avoid 
speak1.ng to them because of a fear of beconung a s iumbli:1g block for 
primitive bellevers. \'Then I am preaching a sermon ••• I speak to 
people who are unshaken 1.n theJ.r be he fs and in their acceptance of 
symbols, in a laD.guage wh1.ch vJJ.ll not undemD.e theJ.r belief. And 
to those w·ho are actually J.n a situation of doubt and are even being 
torn to pieces by J.t, I hope to speak J.n SJ.ch a way that the reasons 
for their doubts and other stumbl1.ng blocks are taken away. On thJ.s 
basis I also speak to a third group, one vrhJ.ch has gone through these 
two stages and is now able again to hear the full povrer of the 
nessage freed from old difficulties. n (2) 
(1) Ultimate Concern p.189f 
(2) ~' p.191 
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.Although Barth and Tillich vrere contemporaries, Barth was seelnng 
to answer the church member shaken in h1.s faith by the events of thew <ll", 
who asked "Is it true?" of vrhot the :preacher - and t11e B1ble - proclaimed, 
wh1le T1ll1ch W&s seek1n:::; to approach t:J.ose v;l1o had ceased to ask th1s 
question. In spl te of the va:!:'lous dli"fer:;nt sl tuatlons 1n whic!1 they 
were placed thereafter, we bel1eve that the early perlOd, dur1ng 
and inunedlately after the first World War, was deterrrum tive fol' both in 
thell' attitude to the task of proclBHJ.DtJ.on. Of themselves, these two 
att1 tudes cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive. 
For Barth there was never any questlon as to v.hethe!r the congregat1on 
W'lshed to llsten; for Till1ch the f1rst problem was a matter of persuad1ng 
hls audience to l1sten, which 1nvol ved both the support of the ::?roletarian 
cau.c,e and the; use of language to ·::luch each would listen. Barth never sew 
the chsintegration of the 1ntellectual world as a part of his concern. 
(b) We have repeatedly refer1·ed to Barth's conVlctlon tnat proclamat1on 
lS concerned l·f.Lth the Word of God: that 1s to say, 'NJ..th vihat God has to say 
to man, about man's relationshlp w1th God. .As lS clear from l'oth the major 
ed1 tlons of Romans ( 1) and from the addresses of the !_)erlod pubhshed in 
The Word of God 3nd the \lord of r.Ian, the flrst component of t~1e message 
is a 11 No 1b set against <nan ancl the w:10le of humatl culture and soc1ety, a 
ttNo 11 whlch lS directed not only to secular culture, but also to tl1e C.1.urch 
end to t11e c;heologlcal endeavour of tne church, in particular to l1beral 
theology. Before any 11Yes 11- can be procla1med 1t tnust be precede:) by a 
"No 11 • The "No 11 hovever, 1s never alone, even thoug~ the r>redoffilnant mocd 
l.e. 1'he flrst and secom e dl tlons. Al "though the English transl1?"t.LOn 
is based on the s1xth ecll t1on, 1 t lS substant1ollv tne sa·:~e as the 
secon:3. 'Je refer here, to "the f1rst ed1t1on as 1R and the E.1'o of 
the s.txth as 2R. 
-4-6-
of :JBarth 1 s vr.nt~ngs of the perwd ap::~ears to be negat~ve: it lS alvmys 
ace on1pani<"d by the 11Ye s". But t,he 11 No 11 ~s the precond~ t~on; no new 
buildJ.ng can be erected unul the old one lS com_9letely demohshed. 
11J.1en are forg~ ven by Goll onl•7 11hen he conuemns them, li:fe only arlsc;s 
from death: the beglfL11 .. Lle': stan,i..., c G 'cC.S C!:cl, Ol1d ltyes 11 proceeds 
fr0111 11 No 11 • ( 1 ) 
The 11 No 11 ' and the 11 Yes 11 are closely related to the death and 
resurrectlon of Jesus, t'l.e death .representlng the 11l'Io 11 , the resurrect~on 
the 11 Yes 11 • The resurrectlon is the :;oal, but ~ t cannot be reached vn thout 
the p:- evenlent death. So ~f tnere ~s to be a resurrect~on for rMn, he 
nust first exper~ence the judgemcmt and death of everything huwan in his 
approach to God, and so peroot God 1 s a;?pl"'Oach to J:um. 
By contrast, Tllllch lays l~ ttle emphasls on the 11No 11 , al ti1ough 
he •vas no means unappreciBt~ ve of the lmportance of Barth 1 s sharp crl tlque. 
Ho"rever, he sought rather to e..:x;_oress the affirmation vrllld1 also l:ughlights 
that vrlucn J.S to be negated. He reverses, as ~ t were, the sequence of 
the ''yeM and the 1'1-l"o j' as is eVJ.denced by h1.s a:9IJroach to tile Labour Hovement 
declaring hls fundamental support for l ts eo,oals in order to influence ~ t 
by means of a~a lo2,ue ·wi. th ~ t. Indeed we rllght descr~be T~llich's view 
of proclamEJtion as dialogue rathel' than };X' eacl:ung. S~lar ly, he aims to 
establish a d~alo;;;ue vri th t11e ~ntell~gents~a, directed towards re-establish-
ing in lntellectual and cultural actlvi ty an element, or dil11enslon which 
had been ignored. Soclal~sm, society, and culture and tne lntellectual 
world are flrst aff~rmed and only then cr~ t~c~sed. 
fus defence of tins procedure ~s based on the thesls that every 
paradox wluch ~nvolves the d1.8lect~c c,f affn"ffiat~on and negation has1 as 
lts presuppos~tlon, a ::~osltive standpo~nt. Negation 111ust be preceded by 
(1) 2R , ... 112· cf .;b.;d p 111· also ',V.G.VT.M., p.59 passim _, .I:'• ' • _ ... _ ... _, • ' 
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affJ.rm2t1on, since, he argues, negatJ.on is logJ.cally irr;>ossi. ble unless 
somethJ.ng tw s yreviously been affirmed. In Barth 1 s opinlon, r1owever, 
TJ.llich has rmssed tl1e polnt altogether, substl tutJ.ng a loglcal process 
for the actuallty of the dJ.vine process. Consequently he rejects VJ.gorously 
vrhat he calls T1llJ.ch 1 s 11 contJ.nual, confJ.dent reversal of the concepts 
1 judgement and grace 111 • ( 1) 
There lS a clearly prophetic streak J.n Tillich 1 s work, which takes 
"fu. e forlll largely of a en tique of SOClal i.njustJ.Ce and of ecclesJ.astical 
comuvance or even support, but we do not f:ind in him any emphasis on the 
com ept of the Word of God spoken as a radJ.cal negatlon of all human 
activity. He is in oontJ.I1lllty with the traditJ.on of Schleiermacher, wislnng 
to restore socJ.ety to a 11 theonomous 11 orientatlon not by means of a radically 
new oeginnlilg but "by a process of reversing the trend towardn secularJ.satJ.on. 
(c) There ls, therefore, ln TJ.llich1 s VleJ.V, no fundamental dJ.scontinm ty 
between the Church and socJ.ety. The Jhurch, indeedJls a part of society, 
but while thJ.s means there lS no dlchotomy oetw·een the two, J t would be 
\vrong to thJ.nk that TJ.llich J.dentifJ.es the ChrJ.stJ.an message and its goals 
with those of a human1stJ.c socialJ.sm. How· ever, as we have seen, they 
share some common ground, so that 1 t may be saJ.d that the proclamatJ.on 
of the Iungdom of God does unply co-operation, J.n certain areas, WJ. th 
other groups outside the Church. 
It would be a caricature of Barth to suggest that he shows no 
interest in matters of 3D c::..21l and politJ.cal core ern. His break with 
the r ellgJ.ous soclallsts during hJ.s pastorate at Safemdl betokened not an 
abandoning of social concern, but of the theology whlch lnformed l'ellgious 
(1) G.W., VII, p.233 (E.T. Beginnings, Vol, I, p.149) 
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social~ sm. Nevertheless, ~ t ~s true that ~s early work d~splays a 
profound d~SJ..llus~onment Wl. th all attempts to prop U.fl cultural and pol~ t~cal 
structures c·rit.- theolOglCCJl Brgument. 
"(Let there be) civil referenda and chvil obed~ence but no comb~nation 
of throne and altar, no Chr~stJ..an patriot~sm and no atmosphere of 
a democrat~c crusade. {.Let there be] strikes and t,eneral str~lre s 
and even street fl,;ht~ng, if there must be, but no reli[',~ous 
just~f~cation for l t, nor glorlf'lcation of l t. """'[Let there be1 
militar.;r service as soldlers or off1cers, if there tnust, but in no 
circumstances as Brrqy chaplalns t 11 ( 1) 
Vlolent as }ns re8ction aprears, J.. t must be balarlced aga~nst ms VleW of 
the Church BS plaJ"lng an lmportant crl tlcal role J..n society: 
"The we8kness of modern Chrlst.Lanl ty lS revealed b:r its failure wl th 
respect to the soclal questJ..on, by its cor£used helplessness J..n the 
face of the war." (2) 
If Barth lS represented BS adoptJ.ng a wholly negatJ..ve attJ..tude 
towards culture, l t is .tJ2f'heps becBuse of the kind of opJ..nJ on expressed ln 
the fJ..rst of our tNo cpota tlons. It lS, therefore, Brgued that Barth 
shows no J..nteres t J..11 poll. tJ..cs except where the state trespasses on the 
r~reedom of -cne Church and of theology. This, however, J..S B gross over-
sJ..tTil.,?liflcGtJ..on, ..r: or Barth 1 s co!lCern u~th f!Oll t~cal arrl social J..ssues was 
very •tude. It ls hue,hovrever, trk1t J..t frequenr;ly focussed on the ~ssue 
of ths relatJ.onsh:.p between Churct1. and state. ( 3) Moreover, there is a 
conshwt tension J..n Barth's thln1ung: reforr.1 lS needed ~n society, but 
for the Cbr:.stl8n mess8ge, so0ial reform lS not sufflc~ent. It ought 
to svn .. ng from t~~e reco.=;n~ b. on of GW 1 s sovere~gnty over lns creatlon. (4) 
In short, the problem l'!nch faces both TJ..ll~ch and Barth i.s the 
fami.llar f>I'oolem, ··r:.-nch also faced Kierket;aara, and even Joaclu.m de Fiore, 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
1R ' .P• 390 
~' p.330 
cf "The Chrlsb.DD Cornmunl ty 11nd the OJ.. Vll Community~' .Agalnst the Str~~' 
pp.15-50 
'rillich and H.R.Niebuhr are, therefore unfaJ..r -vvh:~n they sut;gest th8t 
Barth ~s ~n danger of supporting the status quo not because lt J..S good 
but because all reforms are bad. (The Religious s~tuatlon, translator Is 
preface, p.22) 
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nar1ely, that of the re-introductJ.on of C:b..rJ stJ.anJ. ty into Chris tend om. Is 
the secularJ.satlon of soc1.ety to be regarded as a radlcCJl reversu.on to 
paganJ.sm or rr;erely a Sll!Tple deVJ.<J tlon and lS the ap_;roprJa te way to tackle 
the sltuatlon to begln agaJ.n or l!1erely to seek to reverse t.tle process that 
has taken place? :May we;, pernaps, go furthc:c stlll, and a.cgue that the 
teDSlon wlnch, apyarently lr1eVJ. tFJbly, arlses from the com-·rontatlon of a 
non-ChrJ.stum culture by the Chrlstlan message, precludes the poE>sJ.bJ..li ty 
of a Chrlstlan culture? In S:.;.ort, lS the very J.dea of a Chrlstlan 
culture a coDtrachctlon J.n terms? ( 1 ) 
Clearly, neJ. ther Barth nor Tillich belJ.eve that a Cbrlstlan 
culture ls such a contradJ.ctJ.on. Barth's posJ.tJ.on dJ.d, ho~evc~ change, 
and J.t rna~.- well a-Jpear mat lns early, strong emphasJ.s on the otherness of 
God, on the vholly eschatalogJ.cEJl Natu?"e of t~"e gospel Prrl on tl:e pure 
transceDdence of the KJ.ngdom of God make l t dJ.ff J..Cul t to understand how 
any ref!!- im_9act on human culture can oe made b,r the gospel .. Nevertheless, 
l t J. s lmportant to r ecogmse that at the tlrne of Romans he was more 
concerned to den.)' than to 8fflrm: to c1eny, in partlcular, tl1e casual 
ld entJ.fica tlon of Chr1s tlanl ty and culture. What was requ1.red vras not 
simply a ser1es of soclal reforms but 8 rad1cal reorlentatlon of man in 
hls entlrety towerds Goa. Thus ln 1925, we find hlm strH~ing a moTe 
pos1tive note, but 1n com:1lete consJ.stency 1rith Ro~, that culture is 
VTnat man lS intended to be. True culture occurs only 11iben man heers the 
Word of God. ( 2) :!Ja ter st.J..ll he argued the r:e ce ssJ. ty of ma:V,.ing war on 
Ihtler on the ground that the vrorld ls t11e ::_Jlace J n whlch the resurrectlon 
took place ana vrhich Goa hss therefore elaine a for lnmself. ( 3) Yet later 
( }.,_' 
he argued that the state ..Lb the product not of sin but of dlvine grace. ) 
(1) As is suggeste(!. for example by K.IllWJ.th, MeanuJg 111 F...lstory (Chicago, 
Un1versl ty of '1-ncago Press, Phoenix Books, 1949H p.153f. 
(2) 
(3) 
"Church and Culture" T.C., po.334-54 
-- ~ 
Eine Schweizer Stirrme ,p. 1 8 5 (E. T. !!A~L::..::e..:.t..::t.::;er=--t.:..o=--Gr_.::.;e:.:a:....;t:__B..;:n:;:·:....;t..;:a~i;;;..n_f_r_o_m 
Switzerland, p.9) 
(4) Against the Stream, pp.21, 33, 4~£f, 96r~ 
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Put t11roughout h.Ls work th:::re ls the J.nsJ.stent note that man hlmself' must 
uYJ.dergo a radJ.cal reorJ.entatlon to Goa so that culture may become the 
ex.:_:Jresslon of h~s having heard and responded to the Word of Goa. He WJ.ll 
only hear the ¥lord of God J.f the Church 5s faJ. thful in proclaiming it. 
Tilllch, in contrast, sees lnmself not as bringln;: a message to 
man from beyond culture, but rather as seeklng to dlsplay to cul tul'e its 
mm roots and thereby to reunite it vn th its roots to realise the "religious 
dJ.mensJ.on 11 in OJ lture - in hJs ovm words, to re-establish a theonomous 
culture. In this way, througi1 the dJ.alogue u:ri.l ertaken vri th humamstic 
society, he alms to reverse the process of secularisatlon, or, in hls own 
words again, to 11 deprofanise 11 soc1ety. 
The details of "the _9rocess of re-J.ntroducing Cb.r'l stiani ty J.nto 
ChrJ.stendot:l are a matter of rnuch greater import for TJ.lllch than they are 
for Barth, vrbo sho,r,rs a magnifJ.cent, almGlst reckless dJ.sregard for what ne 
views as the 
"idle <pest1on of how those who proclaim the v1ord should 1 approsch 1 
tlus or that modern man, or hovr they should 'bring home' the 1iord 
of God to hun. tt ( 1 ) 
~7e !lllst not, however, make the oostake of SJ.mply dJ.stinguishJ.ng T.LllJ.ch 
as a sup~orter of culture and Barth as an o:~;onent of J.t, despite the 
somevrr18t amb:t.guous positions adopted by the latter. We tLUst rather, 
seek to understand how each, respect:t. vely, viev.,rs the role of theology 
in relatJ.on to the task of tt1e Church. To thls q_uest1on we address 
ourselves 1n the followmg chapters. 
(1) Evangelical Theology (hereafter E'v. Theol), p.182; cf p.35 
P.ART II 
TILLICH 
CHAPTER TilO 
METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
1 • The Task of' Theolog_z 
(a) Introduction 
Tillich tells us "Ln his autobwgraphic al reflect~ons that desp~t e 
the debt th2t he ovred to l~beral theology, he found it ~mposs:ftble to r econc~le 
h~s thinking Yi~ th that of l~beral dogmatics on tvro cruc~al issues. Much 
as he sd:,1ll'ed the 11 h~stor~c2l accorrrpl~shments 11 of l~beral~sm, he could not 
accept the substl tuhon of the 11'hlS tor_wal Jesus" for "the cruclfled Christ" 
or its dissolutlon of' 11 the paradox of' justu~lcc,tion ~nto moral categories". (1 ) 
He was ln short, rejecting the lntruslon lnto theology of' Kant~anlsm and of' 
posi tl Vlstic nistor~ography. It Yras under the lffipact of' Kant~an philos!J9hY 
that theology llad become CDncerned cluefly vnth morals, and under the HI1pact 
of' posl tiv:Lshc his torlography that the "Quest for the H::..stonc~1l Jesus" 
had oeen unClert8ken ln the hope of furnlshlng a credlble picture of' .Jesus, 
''iho vvould then act as a foundatlon for l~beral eth~cs. Instead, Tilllch 
set lnmself' to ask now Clu lstian doctrlne miE,ht be understood 1tlf the non-
existence of th¢ustorlcal ,J c::sus uere to become b.is torlc8lly probab]e. 11 ( 2 ) 
Thls shift of _tntel'est away frow tl1e cone erns of' llberal theologv 
vras one decls~ve factor ln shaplng !us Vle'V of the task of theology. .A 
second factor, E•S ne h8ve Ellready seen, was l1is a•'lareness of the rlf'ts in 
soclety anc1 ln the lntelkctual vro:cld, vrhlch prompted lnm to VleW the 
procl2rrJ.8tion of the Church in terl1S of an attempt to reconcile the warrlng 
r?ther 
factlons and to re-estab1lsh harmon7; than ln terrns of' the declaratlon of 
the /ford of God to man. In keepl~ "~ th tlns, lus theology takes upon 
(1) Boundary, p.49 
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~tsclf the natur-::; of a d~ologue w~th the various factions, aimed at un-
covering the~r common cultural roots. 
T~llich calls thJ s k:;_nd of theology apologet~c, but he also adrm. ts 
that theology has not only an apologet~c but .slso a l~erygmat~c task. 
Eovrever, \;i.l.en v;e press him for CJ further e:xp lDnatlon of thJS second task, 
"'e fidd lns an;:;"\.rers evasi v~. For eY.2mple, he tells us, ln 3 lecture 
dellver2d ln 19~( 1 ) that keryg.:nntlc theoJogy seel-;s to reproduce the 
content of the Chrlstlan message ln an ordered end systematlc way vn thout 
reference to philosophy, wtule apologetlc theology seel:s to e:x::;:>la~n the 
contents of tne same l;:erygma 11in close mterrelation YTl ttl philosophy. 11 
No e:xp l:<natlon lS offered, however, of the dlfference between 11reproduclng11 
the messAge and II explalmng 11 l t, nor ls any e~-q:> lana tion offered of the ldea 
of 11plnlosophy 11 • A,;ain1 he sugr:,ests t}l...a t the dlfference l s to be fou::1d ln 
thelr duechon, the one toNards the } .c;rygma ln whlch C-od lS revealed and 
the othet towards man arrl the endeavour of human reason to recelve the 
( 2' 
.ness age, bJt falls to ampllfy h~s assert:Lons. ) 
:His meanlng lS made clearer ln an art~cle :;?Ublished seven years 
later, in Wlndl. he says that kerygmat~c theolos,y seeks to reproduce, interpret 
and orgalllS e the Chrlstian message el ther in "predominantly blblical terms" 
or ln terms 11 --caken from the cl8 ssicEll tradl tion 11 • Apologetlc theology, 
on the other hand relates the message to the pre-philosophica 1 a rrl philo so-
phlcal interpretations of reRllty. It begins to sound very much as though 
the difference viere largely a matter of language. But there lS more to l t 
than thls, for he adds tha:t an apology answers the quest.1.ons asked of, and 
the crl t~c~s1ns dlrected ae;ainst, theology, and lll doln.g so, presup:'_)oses the 
l t . ,. t h h f be made by both sldes(.
3) ldea of a llunl versa r evela ~on • o w, J.c. r e erence can -
(1) Era, pp.83-93 
(!) Ibid, P• 83f 
(3) "The Problem of Theological Mett10d 11 , JR, vol. 27 (1947), P.l?•16-26. 
Kerygmatic theoJ og_l 1s, in other words, very much what dogmatics 
has customar1l '' been: an atterrrpt to e::xp ound the doctr1nes o.f the J(B rygma 
for the b~nefit of the ChurCh. Apologetic theology, however, 1s st1ll 
somethuJg of on unlmown quan t1 ty, because "L t 1s not clear what 11ph1losophy 11 
means, ar:d vrhat 11 umversal revelation" can be appealed to by both sides 1n 
the conversat1on. That 1t 1s d1ret'Jted to those vrbo are outs1oe the church 
lS qu1 te clear, however. 
In the f1.rst volume of Systematic Theology, the emphasls changes. 
Whereas he had previouslv spoken of kerygmatic theology as complementary to 
apologet1c theology, he now speaks of it as necessary only inasrruch as it 
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stands as a warning to apologetic theology not to forget the Christian message 
by becorrung too 1mmersed Jn the s1tuDt1on. It must not .forget that 1t has 
to answer "b.'J.t; questlon as -,rell as to understand 1 t. Moreover, he now speaks 
of the necess1 ty for theology to "enter the s1 tuation11', if 1 t lS to be 
apologet1c. ( 1 ) But the concept of 11si tua tion 11 lS 1 tself curiously vague. 
Imtlally, it lS def1ned 1n the following way: 
"It refers to the sc1ent1fic and art1st1c, the economc, pol1t1cal and 
eth1cal forl"s 1n wh1ch the; e][} ress the1r 1n terpretat1on of existence. 'r. (2) 
The assert1on that apologet1c theology speaks to the si tuat1on 1s not to be 
1nterpreted in a pastoral sense, mean1ng that 1t is addressed to an 
ind1v1dual or to a ~roup. Rather, the s1 tush on is 
"'·.. Lhe creat1 ve 1nterpretation of enstence wh1c:-. 1s carried on 1n 
every period of hlstory under all hnds of psycholog1cal and soc:;_ological 
cond1 t1ons." ( 3) 
It 1s to the 1nterpretat10n of ex1stence that apologetic theology addresses 
1tself and 1t f1nds the 1nterpretat1on of existence of any fl9rt1cular per1od 
1n 1 ts cultural, poll t1cal, psycholo31cal and soc1olog1cal ex:press1ons or forms. 
CJe arly, T1ll1ch 1 s concephon of the task of theolo;::y ls r.ieeply 
influenced by ills awareness of cultural cond1 t1or1s, ( 4) s1nce apologetic 
(1) ST, I, pp.6ff 
(2) ~~ p.4 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) 11 Culture 11 Js to be understocd 
in the b1oadest _:?osslble sense. 
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theology lS deslgned to reet tl!e J.nterpretBtion of' human existence whJ.ch 
lS manlf'ested ln cultural forms. As yet, lt lS not clear how phllosophy 
and "the situBtior:." are related. Ne s ha 11, the ref' ore, be tul'rnng our 
attentlon to thls questlon as we exa~.rune TJ.ll1ch 1 s underst3ndlng of the 
Sl tuc'tlon ln Euro1-'e at the time of nls early 'VOrl:, and hls understandlng 
of' the relatlonshlp bet-vYeen Tlulosophy and theology. 
(b) Qultural lli.slntegratlon 
';{e have alreBdy d lscussed at some length the extent o.f Tlllich 1 s 
a1.vareness of' the cultural dis1ntegretlon of the earl~- years of the centUY'J, 
and have noticed th& t, eccord1ng to D..lS own test1momy, th..Ls awareness 
h_s 
stretched back: to the te-'lsl01lS experLenced HV cluldhood. In partJ.culBr 
vc-e observed :1is avvaren':!ss of dJ sintegrat1on 1n th::-ee areas: the L'lft betv1een 
the churches t:-Jnd the -proletarlCJt, that between tlle churches and the 
intellie;entsla and the gene:c"al chsir.tegratlon of the intellectual world, 
r:wrh~ d by a lc1nd of methodolo~;ical c..L Vll wer. In each esse, the ch..Lef 
sui'ferer was,on the fBce of' 1t, the church ::md theology, fa:· tne YWl'klng 
classes and the 1ntelllgents1e hod no time for the Church o-r 1 /el'e 11ot 
prepa1·ed to take 1 t s erlDusly ,wmle the methodolo;?,J.cal warfare of che 
intellectuel world pushed theolog~' 1nto J.ncreasJ.ng .Lsolotlon. Till1ch 
ho•7ever, belJ.eved th8t the real sufferers were those Yvho had neJ.ther a plece 
for the cl:urch nor for theolog:y, D nd t1e set ln_r,1self to rna lee l t pla 1n. 
However, to r•ccorn)llsn such a task lt was necessary to establish a(2;aJ.n the 
nature of theology. T1ll1ch had, ;:,s -de have sa1o, concluded tnat the 
lJ.beral reduetJ.on of -theology to morals and pos1 tl Vlstl.c lustor1ography 
aas to be rejected. He naa therefore to red1scover the f'orce vrluch had 
ma Cle theology ar1d culture t!1e co,. plernentory forces they had been in ttJ..e 
early :i'.1iddle Ages. Hls efforts to e chieve tl11s rediscovery may be traced 
m publJ..catlons such as Uoer die Idee cJ.ner 'r'neologie der Ifultur (1919) 
Das System der \'hssenscheften nach Gegenst.!lnden und Methoden ( 1923) ) 
ReligionsphilosopLrie (1925) and Dle P~ligl8se Lage der Gegen~art (1926) (1) 
'fue outllne o.f ~l'llllch 1 s dlr.: nosis of the problem and l ts solutlon 
II 
ls offered ln Uber dle Idee eliler Theologle der ~ltur: indeed, although 
l t requrres SU.Pi)lementDtlon and elucldatl.On throut,h the other FOl'ks we 
hii ve !Jl8Dtloned above, l t lS nevertheless, the foL'nda tlon for the ·,il.10le of 
Tlllich 1 s theologlcal pllt::,rlmace. It vms no accident that a coll ectlon 
of essays Vllltten oe"b.7een 1940 and 1956 vrere entltled Theolo8)': of qtJlture, 
echoing the title of hls earlier uork. ( 2 ) The work of 1919 is concerned 
rnainl:r v'll. tll the relstionslnp be-b,reen tneolog<; and cul tU"'-'e anCl -.-'l tn the 
attempt to reconclle them, ~::>ut it also polnts the vray forward to the 
System of Sclences. Indeed several of the points wluch he mal::es ln tlJ.e 
earlier work becooe clear o.nl,, ln tbe light of the late1·. For tr,is reason 
v1e shall turn f:Ll'st to the Systerr1 of Sclences, ln order to furnlsh the 
background .c'or t~le spcclflc questlons rnised Jn -che eal'llel' -;·,·ork. 
(i) The Systan of 3cle~ 
S t d a 1 ~llll·ch's The , ystem of Sciences was .Ln en e _2rlmarl y es res"9onse 
to the general dlslntegr::-tlon of tlJe J_ntellectual world. In J.t he sought 
not only to 6 rouf; t11e sclen.ces according to thelr method and ~JCcording to 
thelr obJect, but also to unoerglrd tne whoihe s)rstem and hold lt together 
( 1) 
(2) 
All but Das System der ¥hssenschaften have been trDnslated lnto Englisl.J.. 
Exceot for Dl~ Religi8se Lage der Gegenwart (:b:T. The Religious Situation) 
the translated -,·.orks are publl.shed in \Yhat lS Religi.on? In order to 
distlnguish the lnd::. '!lduai worl:s we shall cl te t..lJ.e Z.T • as W.R. adding 
in parentheses an abbre'llation of th~ tlt~e, as follows: On the Idea of a 
'.rheology ~f OJ.l ture = W.R. (~),The Conquest of the Concept of Rel~gl~n. 
in the :Philoso hy of Reli lOll= W.R.(Conquest), The Phllosophy of_Rell~lon 
= W.R. Rph. Simllarlywe shall clte the German edltlons as GWrr (ITK,, 
GW;r. (ttbervnndung) and GWJ (!92E.) 
cf.op.cit. (hereafter Theol.Cul), p.v 
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by rneans of a phllosophy of u-ean1ng. 
.A pu.rely descriptive arrangerrent 
uould, l1e belleved, do noth111g to corrbat the methodological lrnpcr1 ahsm that 
was rife. 
.A system that could bru•.g about a rewnf1cation of' the sciences 
would req_u:iire deeper found a t1ons. Such foundations, he believed, coull be 
sup1)lied by a plnlosophy of mean1ng. He d1d not, however, tlnnk: that b..e 
was constructing a system, so much as expound1ng the syster'l thet actunlly 
eXlsted and had been ignored. It vras iron1cal, trerefore, that the work 
should have attracted so little attent1on. The very auchence for which it 
was 1n~ended, 1t seemed, cou+d not understal1d 1t. 
It had been custoiTBry su1ce the middle of the 19th centur:r to 
distinguish between tvro groups of sc1ences, namely the natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften) and the cultural sc1ences (Kultur - or 
Geistesvnssenschaften). .Among the Geisteswlssenschaften (1 ) vvere included 
such subjects as h1story, phllology,,econotnlcs, soc1al anthropology, 
soclology, comparative jurlsprudence and comparative religion. 
Till1ch, however, adopted a scheme consistlng not of v.~ groups, 
but of' three, which he called ~nkwissenschaften, Seinsvnssenschaf'ten 
and Gei steswissenschaften. The sc1ence s of thought J ncl. ude logic :md 
mathernat1cs, the sc1ences of' b emg 1nclude the emJ?lrlcal sc1ences, and the 
cultural sc1ences 1nclude some of tne d1sc1plines customar1ly asslgned to 
this group. There are: 'nowev-:;r, s1gruf1cant dlfferences be-br~en T1ll1ch 1 s 
clasmf1cation and those that preceded J.t. Several of the trad1t1onal 
cul turel sc1ences are placed emong the sciences of b e1ng in company WJ.. th 
the empirical sciences, includ1ng psychology, sociology, hlstory, antl~o-
pology, linguishcs end phllology. Theology, on the other hend is 
classif1ed as a cultural sc1ence. 
( 1) The term Geistesw1ssenschaften was orig111ally used to translete 
J. s. Mill's 11moral sc1ences 11 • 
I'ID.ereas Rickert(1 ) had insisted that method should form the 
criterlon for classificatlon, Dilthe/ 2 ) had selected subject matte:r as 
being more fundamental. Tllllch, however, proposes to bulld l1ls system 
on the basls of both !Tlethod and object. It should be added, however, 
that the word science lS not used N1. tn the emplrlcal and posl tiVJ.stic 
connotatJ ons l t frequently carn.e s, but l'efers to the broad ldea of 
knowledge contalned c..n the etymological derivatlon bd>th of Wissenschaft 
(W2ssen) and of science (sclentia). 
The three groups lnto v,-luch the sclences are classlfied reflect 
and are based upon Tilllch 1 s conception of the .9rlnciples of knov1ledge, 
namely, thulli:ing, bel ng and spirl t, wtnch are connected, respectively Vll th 
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form, content and substance or import (Gehalt)( 3 ) Now, the act of knowing 
itself consists of two elements, nawely tJ.1e act l tself arlli that to >rlnc!:1 
lt 1s dn·ected, lmovm alternat1vely as the 1ntentlon arrl that wh1ch 1s 
lntended. (4) 'l'hese tvro elements Tillich calls thought or thinking (Denken) 
and being (Se1n). He goes on to say, however, that Denken does not s1gnify 
reilfcti.on (Nachdenken), the pS.ychologlCal process of th1.nklng about someth1ng, 
and that Se1n is not meant to s1gn1:fy an actually ex1stu1g ob!ject (ein 
seiendes Ding). What then are they? T1ll1ch answers that no further 
defin1 tion is possible except in an accru nt of thelr relat1onship. Thls 
account 11e offers on the for111 of three )roposi tions. 
''l\. Thought posits (or recognises) a-x:istence as that v.rh1ch lS grasped 
or conce1ved, as t..l-J.at Yrl-1icn deterllllnes or glves content to thlnking. 
2. Exlsteace lS strl ven for b3' thought as thot vvhlch lS allen, 
eluslve to intelJectual conception, resistant to thought. 
3. Tlnnklng becomes aware of Jtself in t:·1e act of tinnlung: lt lS fJIJ!) 
dlrected tovra:cds l tself and thus becotT.es a part of eXlstence. 11 'V 
- ----------------
(1) He1n:r1ch Puckert (1863-1936) 
schaftllchen Begri:ffsbildung 
(2) Wilhelm Dllthey (1833-1911) 
(5) Tllhch hlmself acl:nmvledges 
!!!,I (saw), p.12o 
1, 4) Ibid, p.117f 
(5) Ibid, p.118 
author of Dle Grenzen der Natu~·rlssen-
tile lnfluence of Fichte on hls arrangement 
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The three; pro_9os1 t1ons are o:mcerned respect1vely, vnth the 
relCJtionshlp bet-vreen thinking and being, lJei~:; and tlun.'k:ing nnd bet-1veen 
sp1r1 t and both th1nldng and being. He further abbreVJ.ates them to 11 the 
propos1tion of absolute thou,;ht 11 ( 11Belng 1s that wlnch determ1nes tlunklDg 11 ) 
the yropo sl t1on of o bsolu te bed ng ( 11Be1ng 1s til.e conh·adJ.ctlon of thought 11 ) 
and the propoSJtlon of spuit ( 11 Tmn1-dn? 1s J.tsclf being") ( 1 ) 
He appears to hove 1n mind tbe 3ttempt to gras•_l ~ reality b~r means 
of concepts, laYiS and assoc1Dt1ons YJ"lnch 1s olvrays res1sted by real1ty, 
so th." t 11 thou,;ht 11 never cun tro ls 1 t. T11ought (or ttnnkmg) cmd being 
thus ex13t -u1 a dynamo tens1un. 
1tself 1t becom:;s a rart of tne enstent.Lal world of reality (ein Stl!ck 
Ex:1.stenz) and so itself resistant to the controlling force of thought. 
"If 1're ask vrhe.ce tins exJ.sc111,"' ti1Jnla.ng 1s found, we can only a.ns,·rer: 
In the 'inner core' of t:"le con::;cl.::.us beuJg: .:cL' us, e.·o,r_ al.L 111 the 
cgltural hfe of huw.am_ty. 11 (2) 
At f1rst s:L2)lt, Till1ch c:ru2c;ears to be constructing a metaph-rsJ.cal 
foundot1on for !us sy&tem, but 1t ::; s not msta:phys1cal 111 tt1e tl'Odltlorwl 
sense of a belief ·1n tl1e e:nstence of' ~ ·.orld of substances lurking bel11.m 
-lhe worlcJ of .Sf;_;Jearances. BeJ.J'"I__g 13 not an 11 ex1s~.:ing substance" (seiende 
Substanz) and metaphysics 1s therefore not o s<nence a1rong o-':J:er sciences, 
but an attltude to reality.( 3) 
The stTength of lus posl tion vrou lC. appear to be its l1n': Wl th ln_e 
of real1 ty as bE> sic to prnlosoglncal th1nld.n;; and rejectlng the str1ct 
empir:Lcisl'l of modern scJ.ence as J.napproprlate to philosophy. But vrh~le 
he does have clear rel3tlons -,ilti" tne closslcal trad1 tlons of ph1losophy 
he must not be confused v-:Lth them. 
(1) Thla, p.11ar 
(2) ~, p.120 
(3) GW,I (~), p.302 (WR,p.35) 
The most lrrtportant cllfference b etvreen 
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hlm and Hegel1an 1dealism lS his refusal to allow the dialectical relationshlp 
of think1ng and being to be brought to an end by the final Vlctory 
of thin}ans over being. He do's not regard the ex1stent1al order as sunply 
the self-express1on o£' thougnt, YihlCh 1 s to be S\'fallowed up again by thoughtf 1) 
The System of ~ciences is not simply the exposl tion of a system j n 
the sense of an account of what actually 1s the case. It is not, therefore, 
a s1mple aco::>unt of Yrhat sc-Lences there are and what methods they use; it 
is of t!1e essence of systemat1cs that 1t should be normative in character. 
It explains therefore han many sc1ences there ought to be and wb.2t methods 
they ought to use. ( 2 ) But tba t 1s not to say t haL the sys tel'l 1 t proposes 
c~n be regarded as flnal or absolute. Every system PlL,st be prov1s1onal 
since it lS the product of an a ttL tude to l'eali ty. In the absence of final 
cr1 ter1a no att1 tude to reality canoe des1gn:hted as absolute. (3) 
11The l1vii1..g _power of a system lS 1ts 1mport, ( 4) 1ts creat11te stand= 
pomt, its orlglnal intu1 tion. .Cach p;ystem h ves b:;r the principle 
on Yhnch 1 t 1s based and w1th wlncl1 1 t 1s constructed. Every f1nal 
pr1nciple, however, 1s tne express1on of a final v1ew of'mality,a 
basic attitude to life. Thus at every moment, "there breaks through 
the formal system of sClences an 1mport wtdcD. is metaphysical, i.e. 
ilhlch lle s beyond ever;/ 1ndi v1dual form and beyond all forms and so 
cannot 1 tseli' be a form bes1de others according to a sort of false 
metaphys1cso The metaphys1cal 1s the hving po-,er, the mean1ng 
and the blood of the system. In th1s, and only th1s, sense, is 
the formal system of sclences metaphys1cal. tt (5) 
The Geistesvnssenscnaf'ten are also known, in Tillich 1 s system, as 
Nortmvis senschaften or norma t1 ve sc1ence s. They are therefore, closely 
connected to the task of the productJ.On of a system of s c1ences, indeed, 
to the task of cystematlslng in all areas af' human acti Vl ty. Harms are 
born, as it vre1·e, 1n the creative process af' t'"e cultural sc1ences;' 
( 1) Gl.V ,I (S d 1lfl, p.123. T'n1s is not to say thot there is no cont1nui ty 
between the ex1 stent1al order and thought. It 1s th.e correspondence of' 
the logos of ill e nund and the logos of rd.li ty that •mkes knovrledge 
possible, and 1 t lS "tile logos of reality that makes it poss1ble for 
reall ty to be symbollc. 
(2) 
(3) 
(1~) 
(5) 
Ibld, p.113 
Ibld, p.244 
We have adopted 
or 11 substnnce 11 
Thld, p.116f; 
Aaam' s translation of the term Gehalt by the words "import" 
to dlstlnc?:Uish 1t from Inhalt or "content". 
cf Yffi(1TQ), p.155f. 
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that lS to say 1 they co··1e 1nto be1ng as a du·ect result of the creat1ve or 
productlve work of the cultural sc1ences. 
"Cultural sc1ence ls productlve, ileelt lS alwa·rs at the same tirne the 
prius and the ;eosterius of spH'l tual (gelstig)u creahon. It o1;es .!.. ts 
l1fe to tl:e creations wlnch 1t helus to create (Sie lebt von den 
Scht!:lpfungen, ale sle rm tschafft); ~ t co-posJ.. ts the object vrlnch it 
recogn1ses .... " (1) 
The .fJYoCiuctlve CDa!:'acter· of tlle cultural sciences 1.s accounted for ln the 
followJ..ng way: 
11
••• in every spJ..ri tual-creatJ.. ve act an act of t_,e conscJ..ousness 
chre cted toYtard S the gener~::~l l S bound U) \i:L t._ -che lDdl v-..~_dual 
substaace. 11 (2) -
The culturel sclences seek to be creatlve, t!1.at lS to say, to bruJg meanlng 
(Sinn) to light. T:ns they do 1J:r rela tu1g 1ndl vldual tnJ..ngs to the general, 
for the pa.ctJ..culsr, or lndlVldual, is an erribodJ..went of J"ne general. •rne 
more lndlVlUUEll, the more •";XlJre;::;SJ.ve lt lS o7' t 1-:>.e ;:seneral, 8S lon3, as 1ts 
lntentlon lS di:!.~ected to''rard s the g,enor al. 0"C!i ei'\ iJ Sf' ti.l.e lll.dl vid uel 
becomes mere for!Cl,. .As the culturaJ scJ_cnces see~= to J'eJate tl1.e lndivJ..dual 
to the seneral, ::o -che; become Jroduct::t.ve of further HldJ.Vldu8-]torms and 
shON the 'VB;;' towal"ds a norn. 
"Tlns awareness, thls looking at ltself and .:tet~rrlmlng of J..tself by 
thought J..n the creatl ve act, ls the funclau,ental characteristlc of 
the s_pll"J.. tu81. The a·rarcnc.;ss, tne dJ..rectedness to1-rards the g:me1·3l, 
towards th~t Hl:nch bestows value (das Geltende) ls a co-creative 
elefllent J..n every s_9lrltual act. lt is not t~1e only element, for 
besJ..c3e it or jn it ine cre8tJ.ve subsLance lS at -,·orl::, tue llVlng 
structure (GcsiB!t) -~,ltll J..ts lm'i:Cdlote ex1.stential relptlons, and lt 
is only Ol)t--o-r tne co-operation of these ·bro that -che sp.ci'l. tu.al act 
arlses. But a·,\·areness, drrect~dne::ss tov-,-Drds the geoe:::·ol and towal'dS 
trwt ·;tnch bestovrs value lS Jnvolved ln c:ver•r S'Dlr:::_tu8l creatJ..on and 
is a l?roclucnve c;lcment of -cne creatlVe J_)roc~ss: 11 ' (3) 
Till1.ch 1 s ln-Lelltlon •J1ay becorre clearer lf we set lt wore concretely 
·vn tl:nn the structure of the cultural sclt.oces, vrhlch are cons tl tuted of 
turee elements, oan':'ly, plnlosophy, or the tn.eocy of tl1e orlrlciplt. of 
(1) Gll,I (Sd'!l), p.220 
(2) TOld, P• 218f 
(3) Ibld, p. 219. The productJ.. ve dwracter of tile culturol scJ..ences lS 
-:the1.r contrlbutJ..on to"'al·ds the creatlon of n3Yr cultural forms. 
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f•1eaning, cultur2l h1_story, or the theory of tl1e rnaterlal:bf t11e8nlrlf,, ;:mel 
::ystewatlcs or the t!1eory of the noms of meanmg. It ls ln':lortant to 
note that they a"L·e el-:::'Tcn ts a net not independent disciplines. They are 
clo::.el:,r lnterdep;o;noent, and, so vrl:d.le haVJ.ng indn'J .. dual characterlstlcs, 
ovel'lap to 3 certain degree. 
Philosophy, or tt.e theory of tne pnnclples of meanlng, lS fur"ther 
deflned by Tllh.ch vho tells LlS tllat the prlnclples of meanlYJg are the 
"spirl tu 91 .Lunctions and categorles of meanlr1g 11 , rooted on the one hand ln 
logic and on the other ln meta.;hys..Lcs. 'Ihe fw1ctions of meaning are those 
dl rections of actJ .. on by Yrhlch the are~£ of meanlng are de111arcatea, ·while 
catego:rles are the forms bjl Trhlctl tlle ob,iects ln those areas are constituteaf1 ) 
I.r1 oti1er words, the ttwory of the :;;rlnclples o£' meanmg has a .9rlmar2ly 
or ..L t2cal l"ole: tal2ng the rna terial furrushed ov the 'cileory of the material 
of mean1ng (cultural lustory) 1 t attempts to estBbllsh distinctions, to 
deffielrcate certain areas of lnvestig:?tion CJnd to produce cCJtegories CJnd 
concepts by 17hich the rr1a teri al IDDY be comprehended. 
The pr1nciples of me an..Lng, however, are not pure artefacts, s..Lnce 
they are related to meanlllg, v~nch itself comes to concrete realisatlon in 
hlstory, that lS to say: ln concrete cultural structures. Wi thcut cone rete 
cultural struct-u ..1 es the theory of the vrlnclple:::; of meanlng could not exlst, 
bu::, hBvlng dravm frow the materlal o£' meanlng lts categorles ln the theory 
of tne yrlnclples of meBnlng, cultural sclence r:::turns to U:e c:mnslderatlon 
o:f the mater..Lal of lfB8l1lll8,, d rl VlDg tO'l;ards lts &,oal ln the tL1eory o:f the 
norrlS of meanlng or systel'l..atics. 
"The yrlnclple of meanin;;, fulfllled vTlt .... the 1113terlel of meanlng, 
becomes the nor'ln of rre enlng. 11 ( 2) 
( 1 ) ~' pp~·231 :r:r 
(2) Ibid, P• 2L~1 
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The theory of the rnaterlals of mearung performs the lndispeDslble functJ.on 
of pro-v'lding the materJ.al 1. or both the flrst and U:.e thlrd elements as v"ell 
as the link be"brreen them. ( 1 ) Tillich 1 s main preoccupatioD however, is 
vnth the flrst and tlurd elements wl:nch, lt becomes clear, are related as 
i irst and second order tll.lnlang. Thilosopb.y J.s second order thlillnng, 
asking cp.estions such as 11what is beauty?" and 11vihat J.s morality?" vihlle 
systcmatJ.cs lS :t'J.rst order thJ.nJa.ng, asl::lng '\vhat ls beautiful?" and "what 
ls moral?" (2) 
Religion way slnn.larl:r be regarded as a cultural scJ.ence vrhJ.ch can 
be organJ.sed J.nto turee elewents, phllosophy of religlon occupying the 
place ar the flrst and "theology" occup;pDg the place of the norrnatl ve 
eler1ent. Thus theolog~- lS no longer the sclence of "one partJ.cul2r object 
vrh::.ci::. we c a 11 God 11 , 
revelatlon 11' ( 3 ) but 
" or a scJ.entJ.flc presentatlon of a speci8l co1nplex of 
a part of that group lll the system of SClences wJ:n.ch lS 
speClflcally concerned >vith brlnf,lDg meaning to hght by relatir,g each 
component of tre system to J.ts uncondltlonal ground. 
The cultural scJ.ence of r ehgion, however, cannot be treated 
entJ.rely in J.solatlon. L1 order to mal~ clearer its place vnthJ.n the 
system, it J.S necessary that we examlne fm·ther TillJ.ch 1 s e:x:pos:L tion of the 
cultural sciences as a whole. 
The descrlption of the cultural sclences J.S not completed by an 
account of the elements of whlcn they are constl tuted. They ~rust also be 
classlfied according to theJ.r attJ.tude and to thelr object. 
The two posslble "attJ. tudes" are those of "autonomy" and "theonomy
11 
tlb vrhich we shall return later. The ob,jects, on the other ba11d, may be 
divided J.nto two series of :functlons, wlucn are described as ~theoretJ.cal" 
( 1) The theory of the materla ls of meaning J.s also known as cultural nistorh (Geistesges~hichte).ThJ.s J.S not to be confuse~ iYi th Kulturg~schieht~ w:b...1.c , 
as an empirica 1 scJ.ence (a scJ.ence of being) lS concerned WJ. th _t~e J.nter-
connectlons of cultural forms inasmuch as they actually exlst, wnere as 
cultural lr stol'J vJ.e,-rs them from the polnt of VJ.evr of thelr meanlng. 
(Ibid, p.205; cf also p.239) 
(2)~VfR(ITC), p.156f (3) IbJ.d, p.157 
-- -
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Each of t11.ese P1ay be further dl Vlded .mto supported arrl 
~nally, the supported functions can be dJ.Vlded 
J.nto those that are deterru.ned by form and those that are deterrm.ned by 
l~oort or substance. 
The Objects of lliltural SCJ.ence 
.---------------------------L' ------------------------------
Theoretical series of fUnctions Practlcal series of functJ.ons 
Supported functions Supporting Supported functions Supporting 
functions functions 
\ -, 
Form- import Form- lmport 
deterffilned deterffilned determined deterrruned 
In the theoretJ.cal serJ.es, the fol1<1-deternuned sUpf?orted fUL1Ction 
J.s epistemology, the J.mport-determJ.ned supported functlon is aesthetJ.cs 
and the supportJ.ne, function is metaphyslcs, -vJ!.ule J.n the practJ.cal serJ.es 
Ghe respectlve funct10ns are juris~rudence, politJ.cal scJ.ence anC ethlcs. 
Exactly hihw the arrangement of the cultural sCJ.ences lS effected 
lS never made clear by Tillich, for, havin;::o distingulshed t;he components, 
!'.am ely, the elerrents, a ttJ.. tudes and objects, of CLll tural scJ.ence, no 
clear eJq? lanatlon lS offered of the way J.n Yrhich they flt together. Further-
more, having described the objects as consJ.stJ.ng of tvro "series"of "functJ.ons" 
each of vrluchvYe rnay assu111.e, lS constJ.tuted by the three elements, Yre fJ.fl..d 
l t dli'fJ cult to see ho.v there can be, lD addJ.tJ .. on, a :9hiloso:J?hY of science, 
unless it J.S to be regarded as a kJ.nd of by-product of tlle c)ll tural sciences. 
In other vrords, l t 1.s not clear whether T1llich1 s e:lq? os1 tion J.s intended 
to be exhaustJ.ve. 
Nevertheless, in .r;eneral the plan J.S faJ.rly clear, des)i te the 
lack of e..'::pllcl t relatJ.ng of tL1e detaJ.ls to each other. Eech of the separate 
functJ.ons or a Lscipllnes rr~a:t be constl tu ted of the three clements, whlle 
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retauri.ng l ts urm sneclf'l characterlstics. Thus, wntile epistemology lS 
r1ainly dlrected to.rard.:, the v&lld form of expression, aesthetlcs lS dlrected 
wore to'i3l'ds tLe lmport, t110t which breal:s throu2,h both forrn and content) 
and meta;Jhvsccs has Ymat lS called a dlrect lntentlon tovr2:::-ds the Uncorill-LioneC!. 
The major dl stlnctlon ls tna t •nncll. exlsts behveen -L:1e supportill.G .snd the 
sup__:,orted funC"GlO:l.S, fol' tne SUp)Ol'tlng functJ..Ons, Wlth 8 chrect lntentlon 
torrards the Uncoa.Clltloned, are descrlbed [rS haVln[, a dlrectly theonornous 
The su:9porting fm1ctlons can only 11& ve an 2utonomous 
lntent_1_on lh an .Lnchrect fashlon and the sup.901'ted funcLlons can onl. h<=Jve 
a -t:leonornous lntentlon, llke\Ylse, ln an .Lndlrect fasmon. 
iYhat Tllb_c:. {neans to say her:: rests, cleBrly, on tne tneanlll.t?., he 
?ttaches to t!l.e YTOl'O S 11au conomOUS 11 and 11 theonomous 11 , ,-rhich ll1 turn bl:L n2-s 
us bBck to tne tr~ree terms form, oontent and unoort. Fon1 a .:1d CD n tent 
clone cannot ex~1aust the object uf study, fo-r_ ev~1·:r object has a reference 
beyond J tself. •rrns 11beJond" whlch "BY break througn t1w object of stuuy 
2nd _r_w!;nn;::,e u_9on the suoJect' s consciousness, lS te 'Jlled t11e lill;?ol't or 
sulJstence. It lS t_-e U_l.COJ1ch tlonal v;,l.:_cn brecks tr_rougL~ every condi tl011ed 
object. i.-Jl1e1 e atte,l.tlon lS Olrected tovrards the fol'm, 1'lhetC.er to-r3rds an 
lD::llvlducl fc.c~1 m· r un-LV·~,·sc-·1 fo:c-n·, the ettl .,uC!e lS sald to -ce autonomous. 
Bot ··-hCl'e ettencl.O[l lS cLLI'CCted -'co-T8l"ds t_n_e lP1port, ti1e :JttltuCie lS S[llQ to 
be theonomoL' s. 
The st1:9 'OJ'ted ::-~u1~ctlons, conce::o:·npd ,~·rlfll?:c>lly, acco.cdJ 112, to Tlllcch 
.. -lLE ~' are chrect;lj- autono::1oGs, and iheonoll1ous of1l~r ln es fa:c- as the} 
ac"~110-,rled;;e lJLl_,ort (-,-J.l..LC-" featL•res, as we l1cl--e sa ._a, ••1ore l.)l"o·rlneLltly ll1 
aestuetlcs tll.Dll J n. e::n::.teJr:tology), .rhile -Lne sup~1or-c _ng ftmcilons are 
conc-:;cned _:_ri'llll22:'ll~r 1ab: lrD orL 2nd a.::e dl,ectl;r theonomous, and only 
lndllCctl-r rl•-cono 1ous ll1 as feu." as conce:-;;-;"uDl forms are reclUlled to E:,Tc1Sfl 
the U:1condl Llana l. 
As we helVe not1ceCl ln otuer areas of hls e:;.p osl tion, 
never Vel''l clear ln ins explanat1on of t.1e Unconditional. ( 1 ) 
Tilhoh5.s 
Tlu.s fact 
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.LS to be e:;q_J lalned not least by tl.e d::.ff_,_culty of character1sing the com opt 
:Lie CC1l c~~ ,, - cv-:LdeilCe for the 
e~astence of SUCh 3 ·vrorld; lDdeed, vO Jo SO "rould 1nvolve a contradict:Lon 
ln terms, -'-Or e:;astence cannot ·be pred:Lcated of 1t. lTor ls 1 t to -oe 
thou2,ht of ln terms of an 1ndependent orlC: of :for,ns lurJ:lng belnnd the Yiorld 
of eve.,...;:rda,;r experceuce. It ls, rather the e:xpres,Jion of Tlll.Lch's convlction 
-chat unless tne "'orlC: of condl t1oneCi real1. t:I (an 1dea l tself not e-..:plicated) 
has ""Lts grouri.l beyond itself, there can be no meamng. 
question, for lnm, of co ncelVJ..ng of a U!'..J. verse compounded ent1rely of 
relatblty. 
Tb.e Uncondj t1oned lS funda1'1ental to 'l'J..ll..cch' s ·,crorld vie•r, arrl 
stands at th'::! centre of lns d::.ssat:Lsfaction Wlth the ·-rorlu vie-,vs of t;he rn.neteerrlh 
century, and .:_1articularly vntl those of ldealism and real:Lsm. ( 2 ) The 
e.ffect of 1\ant' s rational.wtlc crl t1cal plulosophy t1ad been to reduce 
everyth1ng to a "closed systew of forms 11 ·vrhlcl1 allowed no room i'or 1'1eta-
physlcs or for the J..ndlVldual. German 1dealism, in l'evolt against Kant, 
sought to restore mets:_")hyslcs, but in doin£: so lost sight of the true 
character of tll.e world of reah t:r. 
"The fundamental attltude of t"1e t:Lme was too sLrongly real:Lst:Lc to 
be able to y1eld to an J..deal:Lsm -~du.ch was umnlllng to bear tl1e bu.r·dens 
of t!1e day. For · •hat had ·arous:1 t about the f.1..rst catastrophe of 
idealism and would have led to a sacond was just this, that J..t cannot 
see the true rellglous sltuat1on, the situatlon of tlim m the 
presence of eterm ty, that l t seeks to evade tl!.e Judgement una er wlnch 
the temporal stands before the eternal. Its forl'ls, to be sure, are 
ooen to the receutlon of the l.1. ving content; 1 t restores to the state a~d even to logl~ the.1..r primord1al and essent1al hollncss, but it rests 
content va th these sanct:Lf:Led forHJS; lt does not _penetrate to the 
absolutely transcendent, to that ·,rluch l1es beyond even tne most 
sacred forPl, whether 1 t be called church or state; it does not see 
the abyss >'ihlen opens before every time and every prese11t. 11 (3) 
( 1) He offers some interuretat1ve rewarks ln "The Two Ty9es of Philosophy of 
Religion" orig:Lnally- 1)ubhshed ln 1946, re;-rinted 1n Theol.CuJ.., cf p.24f' 
(2) IBW,I(savr),pp.230ff; cf' The Religions Sltuatlon,pp.70ff,80f; 
GH ,I(Rphj ,p. 307 (!@, p.42) 
{~1 The Relig:Lous SJ..tustlon, p. 73 
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If real~sm ooncerned ~ tself solely w~ th the closed c~rcle of forms and 
~deal~sm fa~led to recognJ.se th2t the eternal or uncond~tion.al ~1 ce th 1:' a s .. e 
condltloned 'rorld of reality under judgement, i;t; remained for some other 
alternative to be able to onng to l~ght not only the presence of the 
Uncond1 t~oDal 1n tl:1e cond~ t~oned, but also the implications for the 
condJ. tioned world. 1'his led to the development of vd1ot Tlll1ch describes 
Realismus) 
1 ~r, in his later works, self-as belief-ful realism (g1Mubiger 
transcend1ng realism~ 2 ) that ~s, a philosophy which view·s reality not as 
ex1st~ng in .Lsolat~on, as l t \Tere, nor as a drrt:ct revelation of the 1deal 
·,corld, Lhe Unconchtional, nor yet as 1n total contrast to it. It seeks 
to ground the condl honed world 1n the Uncondl tional, not for ~ts destruction, 
bu~or ~ts support and correction: 
"In opposl tion to romant~cism the new metaphys1cs 111ust be reallstlc, 
in opposltion to crJ.tlcal philosophy ~ t must be a belief~ful reahsm~' (3) 
J\lletaphysJ.cs and etlucs, then, are dJ.rec tly concerned uith the 
Uncondlt~onal, and so 1nth the l'elat~ng of the condJ.tJ.oned and the 
Uncondl t~o11$l, so t11a t the latter should be real~ sed and broujlt to 
exyress1on in bo.th the theoretJ.cal and t11e pract.Lcal dlscipllnes of 
OJ 1 tursl hi~ e. 
It ~s not yet clear, hov1ever, how theology is to fit ~nto tn~s 
scheme and ~ t lS our task nud to atte''1pt to expound Tillich' s tinnklng at 
thls pOJ.nt. '1e tTILlSt tal~e care, howev::;r, not to be led atray by ffis 
assertlons lD hJ.s autoblograpluc<•l reflectJ.ons (1.t.) thr.t J.n order to lncor-porate 
theolog::' 1n the systau of s clences 11e defJ.ned it as theonolllous metaphysics, 
since they neither coJ.noJ.de ''Tl th tre facts, nor do t:b..ey give a su~flclrontly 
full lrT.9ress.Lon of tne 'ray ln 1.1lo~-: he sa·;i theology around 1925. 
( 1) 
(2) 
e.g. in .9l:JKubiger Reallsl11Us I & II, J.n G!T,rv, I?P• 77-87, 88-106. 
'rhe P.coo.Lews of Theolog~cal Method" JR, vol.27 (1947),p.16. Later sbll 
he also s:poke of 11 seli' transcendJ.ng ;:;;turahsm 11 ST ,II,pp.6ff 
(3) The Rellglous S.Ltu~>tl on, .9.83 
(4) On the Boundary, p.55; Era ~ntro. J?•XXJ.J. 
-61-
MetaphysJ.cs, as ''Te have sald, hDs a dll"ectly "c'b.conoll1.ous lntentlon, 
out 1-L 118Y also have an lnchrectly autonou1ous J.ntention, ·vrhen it lS concerned 
DrlillCrll'y· ''/J t·1 '-l-= conce1·~ (-. . .,1 f d- t -'-- ~ ~ '~uc- orms use o grasp l~s 9erceptlon or J.nt-
Ul tlon of tr~e Unconc l tlonal. Theonornous metaphysJ.cs Tillich calls not 
theolo'-"4 but doD,l'l"' r-..Lcs,· J.t -J .~ ·c.~"le I' pr t ' f -'- t tl OJ, _ ~ u e:_ "csen 8-c"Lon o ~fle ru 1 concernln[. 
l t borro·"s fwm t.w lan[,U8ge of aesthetlcs, scJ.ence and otb.er· d:'..SClplines 
e>nd uses ln 2 ~netaphorlcal, or, as Tilb.c:_ prefers to exy~ess J t, sv!11bolloal, __.._____ __ _ 
·,'ra ,, to e:xpress t:1e substance of the trut:·" Lt has l:Jercerved.( 1 ) 'fhe truth 
lS exg:ressed lL1 l ts 1nost hir;hly ratlonal foTm in metaphyslos and J.n its 
syntll~sis, se:oking to af;ply sclentlflc symbols as tneonolllOUS syli1bols and 
enabling nwth to be S"811 DS myth. ~n lts normative as~ect, os a first 
order enq_ulry, theor10·.·ous ,netaphys1.cs, or dogmatJ.cs, as theolo2Y calls l t, 
see.v=s t.o contrlbute tm-;ards the constructlon of nevr syll1bols. 
It lS to thls normatlve task, i1ovvever, that the narne t!J.eologl: 
vr3s t;JVe11 J.n 1919, and nlucll ls also descrJ.bed J.n the __ System_.2f.._ScJ.ences 
as theonomou s sys tel•1a t1c s. But Tillich does not spe8k of theonomous 
systematJ.cs as assJ.stu~g YJJ tn the constructJ.on of symbols. Rather, vror·klng 
-, -l tr. tJ•e s:yubols 't~l:uc~ alread"r ex1.st J.n tll.e materi8l of the Church 
confessJ.ons, t11e Bl-ble and ChrJ.stJ.an 11m7thology11 , l ts task lS to represent, 
or e,rasp and br1n;; to b.;:r,ht, J~J:1e orJ.gmal splrl t of tne rellglous documents 
and then transfer the1,1 J.nto 11 the r:rc esent consciousr..ess 11 or the "modern 
''1lnd 11 , as ·.re l'ngnt way. Ult.u,wtely, tlns does o.r:pear to be vhat T1ll::..ch 
had ll1 m:md vrhen he S}1oke of doe,matJ.cs and 1 t 2a s, therefore a qpeclflcally 
eccleslastJ.cal character. 
-\'le begin to feel, however, that T1llich has not reall~r made a 
_pJ,!i ce for theolog~' at all. It lS tn1e th8t the ChrJ.stJ.an Church e)'::Lsts 
(1) g;r,r (sd~v), p.27s:r;. 9!~T (~), p.3o2 (Y!E,,p.35:V); 
The Re~ious Si tuatlon, p. 80f 
as a cultural ent~ ty and J s for that rea son wortny of study. It ~s never 
ent~rel~r clear however, qm te how theolog:,r lS relBted to the normat1.ve 
as_9ect of tl1eonomous metaphys~cs. It appears, but is by no means certa~n, 
that he •nshes to sug;;est that the Chr~stlan Church soys 1.n mythwal 
lenguege what 3 re tJ.onal n1etaphysJ..cs says ~n another. 
is offel":::d, hoviever, for such an assertion. 
Ho justlflcation 
Hevertheless, ~ t aTlpeal's that T1.llich Vle"tS theolo~y e s ::?rcVJ.dlXJg 
some klnd of l1.nk betueen metaphys~cs and etlucs, -che re3 son for .. J:licl1. may 
be fou.1d 1.n the concept of l'el~g~on, vrh1.ch Yre shaJ l discuss later. The 
exlstence s~Cle b:· s1de, of a philosoph.wal and a theologlcal ethics ls, 
in T1.ll~ch 1 s v1.ew, a oontrad~ct~on Hl terms, for a genuine eth~cs 1.s one 
tlla t is directed tOi"ard s tne Uncond 1. tional. Tht1s t!'le dif'ference betl'veen 
8 theonomous and a tl1eolo~;:Lcal etlncs J.S not one of st!tbstance, but, as ln 
theonomou& metaphys.:.cs, of forrr. T'neologlcal etr:1.cs lS SSJeclf~cally 
concerned F~tl:. tl:1e productlon of cult1.c fo:-:·ms, ,~n keeping witn 1.ts 
specif~call~r ecclesiastJ.cal chan~cter. 
(ii) On the Idea of' a Theolosy of Culture 
At tlus polnt we turn to the essay On the Idea of a Theology 
of Cultm·e, for here, and ~n ins Rehgionsphilosophie 11e find a rather 
fuller eccount of theology. It a p_t>ears as the tlnrd elerrBnt of the 
sc1.ence of r el~g~on, (whicc_ 1.s a~ Vlded accord~ng to tl1e elerrBnts of the 
cultural sc~ences), namely t}l..e conc:cete and normative sc1.ence of r el~g1.on. 
Here it a.i!pea:cs to be a part of a separate d~sclpline w~tlnn the cultural 
sc~ences, :;hereas ~n t:1.e Syste1n of ScJ ences 1. t ~s d~ff1.cul t to dlstlngmsh 
the s:;:JecJ.f~c role of theology. He desc:::ibes the task of theology in the 
follovnng terms: 
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~It lS the task of theology, ivorkuJg from a concrete standnolnt to 
- ' d:ravr up a 11orrna tl ve sys tern of l'elJ.glon based on the ce tegorle s of 
the philosophy of reli[,ion, .nth the llHh,d.dual stand!:;olnt being 
related to tn.e standpolnt of t:1e respect·L ve confesslon, the UDl versal 
history of rellgion, and the cultural-hlstorical standpoint 2n 
general."' ( 1) 
It realises its vmrk, therefore, in the same -~ray 2s aflY other cultural 
science by work.LD6 'dl th t!1e categorles of the phllosophy of religlon 
a:;;:>plled to the material of the confesslon and the universal history of 
religlon to·.vards a norn1.9tlve sy:stcm of rellglon. ( 2) 
How :ever, Tillich still found hlmself faced Wl th G..f"le proble•f1 of the 
lsolatlon of rebgion l ror1 the rest of cultui·e; even to have descrJ.bed 
it as conforming to the pattern of the el"'ments of cultural science did 
not necessDrlly lrrrply l ts acceptance as a genuine sc.wnce. 
'flus lsolatlon v2s re_pl·esented, Ds ue h::>ve mentJ.oned above, by the 
d.LstJ.nctJ.on dravm betvreen a plulosophlcal and a~heolog"Lcal etlncs, reflectlng 
the dlvlsion J.n socJ.:.ty betv-reen the seared aril the secular. But there 
can scarcely be tuo syste1ns of ethlcs Hhlc.:, can both sustaln a claim to 
be true, and to attempt to resolve the problell1 by deflDlng philosophlcal 
ethics as second order (i.e. assJ.;niD):.S it to the flrst element of a 
a~ sclpllne of etlncs) and theologJ.cal etlncs as first order thought 
(asslgning l t to the tlurd eleUBnt) lS not to explalY! why theologJ.cal ethlcs 
should be the norr.1at2ve etlncs. Fhilosoph-r would contJ.nue to prorJuce l ts 
rJNm syster.1 of ethics •vi Lhout a rGd"Lcally new understanding of philosophy 
and tl:teology. Even to vi:::1·1 them both as the products of' ooncrete stEmd-
points doc:s not, accordi118; to Tlllich, do an3rthing to resolve the duallty, 
because even though tlle churc!1 J.s a concrete ethlcal co'Urrunl ty, it is, in 
twentJ.eth 
the / century, nel ther the dominating cul tur2l cormnunl ty, nor the 
cultural leader. What lS requll' ed, c;herefOl~e, lS a reunific8tion of 
cul -cure -,-rJ. -ch r ell6lOD to replace then· oppos"L tlon to one another. 1'hus: 
(1) ~ (lTC), p.157f 
(2) of also 2!,I (~), pp.300ff (~, p.31f'f) 
"Wha:b ,•ras essentiolly lntended ln the theologlcal system of ethJ.cs 
can onl~- be rc:allsed by 11eans of a theology of culture a";.}ly:mg not 
only to etlncs but to all the functJ.ons of culture. Not a 
theolo2,J.cal sys terr: of etlncs, -but a theology of culture. tt (1 ) 
Thus rehgJ.on ls appheil to the fLLnctJ.ons of the objects of cultural 
scJ.ence, to t11e tneore1acal and tl!.e practJ.cal serJ.es UJ.thwhlch we are 
alreody famil1ar. But i7hat 1s "tne re::.ult of tlns apr:a rently promJ.siT'.g 
procedure? 
"The connect1on beiTreen relJ.gious _urlncJ.ple and cul turGl function 
now enables o specJ.fJ.call:i religious-cultural sphere to emerge: 
a rel:l gJ.ous perception - myth or dogma; a sphere of relJ.E:ious 
aesthetJ.cs - ~he cul tus; 2 relJ.gious iLJouldJ.ng of tne person -
senc"tifJ.catlon; e rellf;lous form of socJ.c;ty - c;l1e church, with 
J.ts speclol c<Hlon lavr and communal et,nc". (2) 
But thJ.s ay9ears to ·be precJ.sebr vrhat TillJ.ch du1 not vrant .• :1a1,1ely, the 
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creatlon of a S.:?ecJ.el area of J.ni'luence of 11 tne rell&,ious 11 ·vvhJ.C!l perpetuates 
the d 1. v"J..ded culture. 
In the essay On t11e Idea of a Theolog~r of Culture, T1llich docs 
llttle mole chan ~JOJ.nt to the solutJ.on of t11e problem, but l t J.S ··'Orked 
out 1n llUCll t;reater detall ln t11e "two \mrl;:s Tile Conquest of the Concept of 
N.ehgion :::£ __ t_-_e F:lnlosophy of Rehgl0!2- and The Hnlosoph:r of .f:.eligJ.on, 
and ue s..hall dJ.SCLJSS the concept cf relJ.gJ.o.n. as employed i)y T:Llllch 111ore 
lully le ter .Ln tl:ns chap!:;"":;_'. 
resolt-tion of the conflict be"t\reen a sacred a.n.d a secular cultu-L'e lles J.n 
1l.lS defJ.nJ. tlon of culture and rell2;J.on. Thus, m says: 
"Bello-ion J.s the directedness of t11e S)ir :t. t c;ov1ards unconditioned 
mean~ng; cultul"e 1.s the dJ.rectedness of ti1e s-.Jll'lt tov:nTds 
condl tloied form.3. But they 1neet l!l as 1111JCh as they are both 
dll·ected tov,2rds t11e corrr_?le te un1.ty of forrns of meam ne;, ulnch for 
culture lS lhe end, but for rellgJ.on J.s a s;,TJnbol both affJ.t'Jred anu 
demed f ::_'o1!1 the standpoJnt of the Unco.n.d.L tional ••• Rel1g,ion 1s, 
therefore, not a fu.n.ctJ.on of meCJnlYl-,2; aloJ1.6slde the oti!.r;Ts." (3) 
More succinctly: 
11
• • • Culture J.S tl1e form of 
is t: ,e J.mport of culture. 11 
( 1) vr.R. (rrc) p.16o 
(2) Ibld, p.161 
ex•Jress:::.on of r ellgJ.on, and ::_• elJ.g1.on 
(!I-) 
(3) My tr<?nslatlon: GW,I(B.EE.) ,p.329 
p.370 (~.R., p.1~f) 
(W.R. p. 72f); of also GW ,I (tfucrwindung) 
(1+) Gf.. W. ,I(~, p. 329 
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Oul ture can110t avo~d being L'el~gious, ·whether ~ t ~s so consclou sly or not, 
because intentionally or un~ntentlonally, ~t e]presses the Uncond~tionsl. ( 1 ) 
Thus Tillich :proposes a theology of cul -Lure -;rrluch once aga~n, may 
be patterned according to tlle el::m3nt~f cultural science, yrith the reserv-
at~on that the; theologian of culture cannot exercise a normative funct~on 
vr~th respect c,f cultural fo1·ms, but c21n in th~s sphere orillJ operate i.n a 
cri tJ cal role. Eavin~; proposed such a dlscipl~ne, he lS able to ar1vance 
to what he calls "cultural-theolozlcal analyses", in outline form .Ln the 
vrork of 1919, but in very great detail in The R~hg~ous S~tuat~on. 
We have, however, begun to flnd ourselves moving away, once again, 
from the l}ossibih tJ of conceJ. vinz of theology as an J.nde:pendant discipline 
Wl thJ.n a system of s c~ences and we are bound to wonder if Til..1J.cn does not 
hold on to the J.clea of theolog;r as an ecclesiast~cal chscipline J.n spite of 
the tnovement of h~s ovm argument, so thot we find him ar[;ui.ng far the 
contJ.nued exJ.stence of the church in terms su<h as these: 
11 • • • precisely J.n the manner of the pietistic corrmunJ. ties J.n the 
seventeenth century, vrhJ.ch hked to refer to themselves as eoolesiola 
in ecclesia, the clurch, as far as a theology of culture ~s concerned, 
will be so1reth~ng like an ecclesJ.ola in ecclesia to the c1,1ltural 
coJn11n.m~ ty as such. Tne church ~s the circle, as ~ t were, to wlnch 
J.S assJ.gned - ~deally speakmg - the task of creating a specJ.f~ca:..ly 
rel~gious sphere ~md thus removing the contJ.ngency from the living 
religious elements, collectJ.ng them, concentra tJ.ng them in theory 
and ~n pract~ce, ::'l£rl J.n th~s way waking them into a powerful -
J.ndeed, into the most powerful- Cl.lltural factor, capable of 
supporting everything else. 11 Cz) 
If theology J.s to remain a churcn discJ.pline, the9-, v1hen theology becomes a 
theolo2y of cultu~e, the church must undergo a radical change J.n its 
conceptJ.on. Yet Till~ch contJ.nues to speak, J.n the System of Sciences, of 
theology as related to the confesswn.s a rrl the relJ.gious docun1ents of the 
church. On the one hand theology appeaTs to be one element of the science 
(1) IbJ.d, p.347 
(2) \'T .R. (~), p.179 
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of religion, as a dlstinct and inde};lendent disclplme witln.n the cultural 
sciences, 1)ut on the other hand l t threatens to engulf the wl10le of the 
cultural sClences, a tenslor. vrhich epi tomlses the tenslon felt by Tilhch 
between the generel and tlle partlcular: ai;6ne moment it is a part1.cular 
example of the gener2l, at Bnother l t lS t11e .;cmeral itself. 
(ni) The Failure of a W.ssion 
It lS clear frou1 hJ s later reflectlo.:ts that Tlllich resarded 11lS 
eo:rly attewpts to counter tl:1e dlslntegratlon of the cultural and intellectual 
vrorld as over-optll!1lstJ.c; ne had, in short, undel'estlrrlated the gravity of 
the sl tua tlon and therefore adopted means lnadeq_uate for the end ln vicc-.v. 
He had sought to create a theono'!lous anal ysls of culture; to treat culture 
not me1ely wit!1 respect to :c.ts form but also Wlt;l respect to lts lrn_?ort, 
to treat l t not Slm..?l:· as rep:cesentat1. ve of an oge but of the Unconch. tlonal. 
The essence of his a_?p:c·oach vras cont~:nned lD the formula vre nave alread:;: 
quoted: 
"Religion is 
rellglon. 11 
the substance of culture and culture the form o.L 
( 1) 
But the culture he souJl' t to aDa lyse was not theonomous, l t chd not 
"· •• express in l ts crcatio.'l.s an ul t.;.111ate concern .0rrl a transcending 
meanlng not as sometlnng strange but as !liSI ;tJ · ~its oYrn spiritual 
ground. w (2) 
It was, rather, autonomous, assertln,r; that t-:Jan 
11as the bearer cf u1nversal r.sason lS -~he source anr:l 111easure of 
culture and r ehglon. 11 (3) 
PJ.O,'rever, he perslstea ln t11e bellef thot a theonoi<1ous ana lys1s 7/as possible, 
11to shovr that ln tlc.e deptn of ev-c::!:y autonorr10L•S cultul'e an UJ.tln.Bte 
co.1cern, sometrung unconchtlonal an-3 holy, lS ll11plJ .. ed. 11 (4) 
(1) cf p.71 above. The c!_uotatlon appears ln tl'ns fol'ln Jn "Rellglon and 
Secular Cultu-re", JR, vol.2J (19Li6), p.BO 
(2) Ibld 
(3) Ibld 
(LL) Ibld, p. 81 
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But in fact, th1.s ammunted :bot to an analysis of culture but of those elerrents 
of culture 'ThJ..ch he chose to regard as a protest, represented esyecJ..ally by 
the artis-cJ..c schooJ kno·sn as e:xp ress lOnlsm. Conse quentl~r, he concentrates 
1-G.s analysis rnore on sucn_ ;rotest lrJOVBl•1ents than on tLe fragmentary :;_~emnants 
of a relJ..gJ..ous substance' Jn culture as a ;ihole. But both come 1.nto VJ..evr 
lnasmucl1 as they represent an 11unconsc1.ous, self-evHient fa1. th 11 iYhich lies 
at 8 dee:;;>er level thDn t 10 a~;:!o;arent antJ..thesls of belief and unbelief, out 
of ·;fiucn bot:1 al'J..se and 1.11 uhJ..cl1 r_,oth are equally rooted. 
11 Th1.s unconsc1.ous fait:-:. wh1.cl1 J..S not ossailed because 1. t J..s the pre-
supposl t1.on of l1.fe and 1s l1. ved rather than thought of, th1.s all-
deterr.~rJ.J..DS, f1.nal source of meon1.ng const1.tutes the actual religious 
s1.tuat1on of a per1.od. 11 (1) 
To th1.s f a.L th, a theology of cul tu:;:e rnust seek to penetrate, but in 
doJ..nfs so, J..t J..s apt to take less than se::.·J.Cusly 11unbeb_ef11 or v.hot Tillich 
and 
lateT descr1.bed 8 s the sense of "estrangement", the lack of :porrer /meaning, 
the absence of a sense of the ultill1ate. Thus Tillich moves away from the 
Lebenspbilosophie of Dilthey, with its talk of' rre cllnng, to adopt the 18nguage 
and thougtlt forms of existentJ..alJ..s!Jl '-"l tL 1. ts emphasis on estran[';en,ent and 
on being. Eov1ever, the re:ult of thJ_s change of lenguage vras to r'18ke more 
urgent stJ..ll the uecess1. tv to deter!Yline the :preCJ.. se relatJ..onshJ..p between 
phlloso:p!-v ar.d theology. 
(c) Hulosophy and Theology 
In the Svstem of SCJ..ences, Tillich uses the word pmloso:phy 1.n tV'io 
The prllDBI';y use 1.s to describe the f1rst element of 
cul·wral science, tt1e theor,:,; of the :prlncJ..ples of treaning. In tlus sense 
philosophy has a cr'l.tJ.cal role: it 1.s second orde:r tlnhlung, chstingu1.slung 
vsr1 ous areas of meanJ..ng, de1narcatJ..ng boundarles between d:.cscJ..plJ..nes and 
prochein;:; categories and concepts for theli' use. He also speaks, hmvever, 
(1) The llelJ..6lOUS SltuatJ..on, p.40 
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of "theonomo~.-'S philosophy"( 1 ) whl.ch f:as the task of countering the tendency 
of r ehgloD and cul"Lure to polarlsc. Tlns it does by affrcming the um ty 
of fonP and substance. Thus plulosoph3r cannot be concerned simply with 
form but nust u..11.derstand tnat fo:rr ls used to bring substance to expression • 
.At the otl:.er end of the scale, theol10ffiOllS llletaphysics has to recognise thDt 
lt ls only tl1rougl1 forrr t~at substa::1ce comes to e~-press1on. Thus ll' 
theonomovs s:rste111atics (theology) performs the same function as normative 
theono1'1ous ,,.tetaph;y-slcs, albeit 1n a r10re restricted area, J.t 1srelated to 
philosophy as the t11ird element of cultural s c1ence to the f1rst. 
Wlnle ne way st1ll detect traces of this scheme 111 lus later accounts 
of tne r elationslnp of philosopi1y and theology, vre also f:Lnd thot the 
relBtJ.onship 1s very much less sirrvle. It 1s our purpose, ii1erefore, to 
examine the tvro concepts as expounded in t!1e later vmrks. 
It 1s vrell lmovm that the 1ns-pirat1on for lus attEmpt to un1te the 
tvro dlsciplines was derived f'rom lns eal~ly 1nte2.~est in Schelllng. Desp1t e 
the ev:r.dent weaknesses of' .3chell1ng 1 s ph1losophy and the disastrous effects 
of the First l'lorld 'liar on its credibility, Tillich reta1ned his enthusiasm 
for lnm. He vras strongly attracted to him not only because of his attEmpt 
to reconc1le phllosophJ and theology, but also because of his eh.'J)OSl tion of 
toth a ner;atlve and a positive philosophy. ( 2 ) In his later vrork Schell1ng 
sought to effect a unif1c~t1on of philosoph::; and theology by means of a 
philosophical interpretat1on o.E' Clll'l st1an doctrine, and in part1cUJ.a r of 
the themes of mystJ.ciSP1 arrl ~u1lt as the s~'1 11bols of union with and 
( 1) Glff ,I (~) ,p. 273f 
(2) The latter was characterishc of hJ.s later ph1losophy, the fanner of 
h1s earlJB r. By 11negah ve ph1losophy 11 he vnshed to be understood that 
ph1losophy which 1s concerned ''ll th essences, abstracting from the concrete 
situatlon 1n order to reach the essent2al structure of real1ty. Posltive 
philosophy concentrates on the concrete si tuat1on, on ex1stence ltself, 
_'ecognlsing the distorting effect of the negat::.. -v:L t1es of ex1stence • .A 
negative plulosoph~r Js not possible vathout a positive philosophy as its 
presuppos1. tlon, accorcling to Till1ch. (Perspect1ves on Nmeteenth and 
Twentieth Century Protestant Theolog;z, pp.150f,245; cf .. 11 The Na~ure and 
Significance of Ex:lstentlahst Thought 11 ', Journal of Philos,hy, val. 53 
(1956 , p. 742 
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separ·atlon from the Absolute. Into tlus pattern he sought to vreave lnter-
pretatlons of tne Chrlstlan doctrlnes of sll1, wrath and grace, but dld so 
D.?parently ln t:1e -belief that it Yif' s posslble to effect a slmple translation 
( 1 ) from theologlcal to _phllosophlcal terHunology. According to T1.lllch, 
tlOnever, the real vrealmess of' Schelling's plulosophy- and so of hls attempt 
to Wrl.te ptulosophy anc theology- was lus lncblllty to do justlCe to tlo.e 
e:;q;Jcrlence of "tn.e abyss in our llves 11 ; he could not t::~~mslate satisfactorlly 
lnto lus schelT'e t!J.e doctrine of e Vll as that w·lucr1 thr·eatens to svrallovv up 
ana destroy everythJ ng. Even hls posl tlve philosoph-:,- seetned lnadequate to 
the rem lut:wn of tne duallsm of good a,1d eVll. 
(2) 
In an arhcle published in Rellt;lon in Geschichte und Gee;onwart 
Tillich addresseil hF·lself to thE' :relc>tionS.l.J:r_) bet-vreen phllosophy and reli.glon, 
no d,Jubt _preferring to speak of rellglon ratner than theolo2:y on account of 
• l t 
ihe very llmited t'lcanin; he had ;:>;lven/in t!:":e System of Sclences. He 
deflnes phllosophy and religlon as attltudes, philosoph;r as the attitude of 
radlcal enyulry, rellglon as tr1e attlc;ude of possesslOn, su that lt seems 
that the distlnctlon betvreen the t·,m i::; tJ1at bet-'reen possesslng and not 
r>ossesslng, or bet-neen questlonin,s and heVlng the answer. me adml ts that 
thls suggests th.?t the two are ln fundamental conflict, but _propeses to 
show that tl.o..J.s lS not the case, 8rguing on the basis of "tlJ.elr ult1.1nate 
But lf he does succeed 
in shovrlng tnat the t>ro ere not ll1 fundamental opposl tlon, he does not 
succeed ln si:lCT.'TJ.ng hovr precJ.sel:;- tn.e;:r Dre to be relDted. Phllosophy's task 
( 1) 
(2) 
Tlllich offered em account of Schelling 1 s atteJitpts at interprets tlon 
in his licencJ.ate dJ ssertahon. lvo/stik und Schuldbevro~stseln J.n SchelllngS 
J2hlloso}?hlsche Entwlcklung_ ( GW ,I,pp.11-108) 
2nd edltlon 1927-1932. E.T. "The J!\mda111ental F.elatJ.onsl:up between 
Philo sopl-J.Y and lb ll;3J.On 11 TwentJ.eth Century Theology ln the Making 
{ea. Jaroslav Pehkan), vol. II, pp.297-309. 
~' p.)OO 
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cannot be totallv detached I"rotTJ !us enqull~y: he lS exlstentlall.·.~ 1nvolv-ecL 
"· ... phllosoph\ can be llildel's toad ln a 1 non-ex1ster1tl2l 1 sense, that 
lS 1n tl1e sense thF~t tlre er1q_mrer stands ou.ts1de lus enqu1ry <>nd 
adopts the point of VJ..ew of 'pure ~mo.rled&,e 1 , outs1de an ez::t.stentlal 
sl tua t1on. But t -:1s ls onl::,r true of the purpose of the enqu1ry, 
vrh1ch for plulosophy nust be 2:'3d:;..cal, arid not £'or tne app:L1cat1on 
o£' tt e .::;11quiry as an e:JV re ss1on of tne sl tua-c1on of the en~u1re-c. 11' ( 1) 
:iievertheless, 111 the case of plnlosophy the ex1.stent1al 1nvohr ement re<YJains 
ll1 t:>e background, uhereas 111 :c·:oll2,lOl1 l t J.s ln tne fo-·eg:cound. Further-
r•10re, l'ellglon J.S exoter1c: l t lf-, un1 versal 1n 1 ts cla1u1 and 1 ts sy•nbols 
anc1 a ctjons are 11d1rectly accesslble11 • By contrast ph1losophy, wlncl1 lS 
cll.:rectec1 tcnards :-no-I'Tledge, 1s esoterlc. BuJ(, haVlng 1r1ade th1s d1stinct1on, 
namel:r theolo2;y. 1'hls he descrl0es as the philosophlc3l sspect of rellgion, 
concerned -,d. tc l:,1o•,-l8c1;:o,e, ;lll.c ~ 111 turn J eads tlS back to tt:e lclen-Li ty of 
theolog.;-, ( 2 ) albc1t, we rna~' sav, on 2 sOrYJ8"rhat slender bas1s. 
NoYr lt a9 ears t!1at plnlosoph::,r and rel1g1on are connected by theolo&,y, 
But 1t lS stlll d1ificult to descrlbe 
~he reJ.?tlons:u_:?s betwec.n tl•e l~rn·ce because of tue d1fflCulty of ascert-
-'- tl -"-h t J 't"'tDer +11""-- a-j_'e .~-Jtltur_l,es- "'S "'1e alnlll/S,'Clav -1eyare, "-2 lS'oCS::<J, ~ u~ Ou ~· "' 
dlsclpllnes, ol' solfle tertluiD c.uld. It seems, ul tlri13-cel?, tl1at 1 :-)l1ilosophy' 
On 1-be one _12.1d 1 t lS .Lndeed on a ttl tude 'llshln.S to en.qu:rr e after tl1s t "'lnch 
lS not ~assessed. But on tne oti.1e1, hand, 1t :ns the enql'll,~' 1tself, as a 
searc11 for knv.-rleoge. 11 Rell[lOn 1' lS used rather r1ore atnblf,Uously; it lS 
Bnt v;e 
-1-1 v r 1 t l"' ,-,·1·o 11a to chnracterise the contrast bet--ueen ,)}uloso_Jhy and ,_oreo e , _ __ . '-' - "' 
( 1 ) Ib 1d, p. 30 2f 
(2) Ibld, p.303f 
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rellg:LOn as conslsting ln the Cllfference between possesslng and not 
.fe>ssesslng, as Tllllci1 does, oecause he vnshes to s:pcak of r ellglon not as 
n . "b u,~. possessln;3 u-r:; as uel;Jg possessed". Tlrrs is a very differ.::nt concept 
fro111 th2t •rhlc,, lS lDVolved :m thinla.Il6 of pnilosophy as striving for 
conce_?tual possesslon oL' .rnat 1 t does !'lot know. To e:;.p lo-:_ t the; verbal 
Sir:lll::' rl -::le S • a CO'. rp~_· ll,_r.l-, _f'rF>q_l' ~!' ~ 1_,'. ::lOP.,'~, - r> <"'-, mp1•T to j' 1 f :h t 
, - - -~- - -·- L. • '-' -- ~,_, "'~'' ~J u<:U::C USe 0 Blnulglll y 
instead ofeJ[JlaJnin.g lt, and noes not ac1c1 to our underst;:ndinz of t~1e 
relatlonsi1l:9 of ph.J..losoph~, and t·ro.eology. 
Des};)l te tl•e confusln£, nature of tins acru unt, iYe r1ay detect echoes 
of lt as well as echoes of the 'lccount £'rom the System of SCJ..ences ln !Jis 
later vvor~::. fi.Js address oD 11Flllosoph~i anJ 'Il':lteology", glven in 194-0, 
·9resents _9£n losophJ ln -b·,·o roles. ( 1) In the f'rrst ~:::lBce 1± fnlfLls a 
functlon ver3r slnulor to th2t oi" tnc i.J..rst element of cultLll'al sclence, 
But secondly, l t also raises the 
probler11s ln~lled ln t.wse categorles, for ··';ruch theology is to glve "the 
Bnswers dravm from t~.e substance of the Chrlstlan nmessag,e 11 ( 2 ) This echoes 
the article in Rell&,lon in Gesclrrchte una Gegemmrt in 1nnch he spol-::e of 
_flhilosophy as radical eiL<lUiry ana of the relatlonslup u.f' possessi11g and not 
possess mg. It lS one of tl'le eor::!..lest fol'J1Ulatlons of the question-ansYrer 
formula that cawe to domlnatcfJ.is account of' plo.:Llosophy and theology. Vi'hen 
tte tvro are brought together ln philosoplucal theology, an Bccount t:1ay be 
glven ln these terms: 
''l?hilosopb cal theology deals wit;, the :;once!_)t of' rea son and the 
categorles beloD.gJ.L12, to .!.. t and leads to t11e exlstentlal problem 
ll:!DlJ..ec1 ln reason to iri.1ich the answer ls: revelation. :P'nilosoph1.cal th~olomr Jeals Yll t!1 the conc.,ept of belng ond the categories belonglng 
to 1t and it leads to the e.xistentlal proolem implled in being to vrlnch 
the anmver lS.: God. Philosopmcal theology deals id t:1. the concept 
of' existence and the categor.J..es belong1ng to it and leads to the 
e:nstentJ..al problem lrnplJ..ed in e:ustence, to Yil1lch the aDswer lS: 
the Chrlst. PlnlosoplncDl theology deals -,ll t11 the conce;?t of llf e 
and the categories belonging to 1 t and leads to the existenhal 
-,)roblell1 liiTplied J..TJ llfe ~ to yrh1ch the a11SVrer lS: the SplrJ.. t. 
Hnlosopmcal tneology deals wi tll t11e concept of hlstor:r and the 
cate2,or1es belong::.ng to l t and leads to t>.e e:xistential problem J..H1plied 
ln lnstory, to >7llicL the a.1.swer lS: the K:wgdorn of God. 11 (3) 
(1) Era, pp.83-93 (2) Thld, :p. 92 (3) Ibld, :p.92f 
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In the srt1.cle 11 T'ne Prublem of 1'oeolot;J..call!lethod 11 , he sJ?eBks not 
of pJnlosoplucal tt1eoloes,y, but of BpologetJ..c theoJ ogy, lm t lte takes up the 
-Lhr:otr1e a2,a1.n of questlon and anmver, which he u:.sists ls possible because 
of -che "um. versal l'evelatlon" to 1·nucl1 botr1 _;h1.losophy and theolog:r can 
refer. Al thoug11 the1·e r,1ust be, in tt1e structu1.'e of socic:;t3', those who 
ask qu ~stJ..ons, as outsJ..cJers, end t:>wse who seek to answer, as bel:t.evers, 
yet TJ..ll..Lch Blso bel1.eves t11zt each wan l)OSsesses t11e answers as vrell as 
Everymne J..S grasped by t:~e Unconditional, and it is 
lus possess:wn of t::.1.s 11 anm7er 11 , indeed, thBt provol:es questions. It may 
be, r:.mrever, thot -:;he J..nd:;.vJ..CluCJl ls not e'·rare of' tins, anc1 so ap_t?ears eble 
only to ask ques tlons. 
But cl:::nl-.- :L t 1--voulcl be '.Tt'0112, to sllppose tL;ot 1. t l3 un1. ve:c'sally 
Jt lS 
e·IT.Lclent t:1c't :Lt 1.s 110-;,, and TJlllc11 apprec:L9tes the point. He recog;m.ses 
-·art to the absence of agrecom~~nt on the::;.r cleflnJ.. t:Lon. Hovrever, he h:Lmself 
a-.t_)pears to believe tllo t 1. t :c. s 1)ossible to solve the pro'Jle1r simply by 
propos1.ng f'urther de.f1.ni t:Lons. 
\Tnen we tclrn to Svsteuwt1.c Theola~ we find that TJ..ll1.ch is still 
unable k cJJ.spel t_,e coni'us1..on that sllrrounds h:!.s concept1.on uf the relation-
ship of ph1.losoph I and theolo;;y. In tl1e f'lrst volume nc offers a dc:din1. tlon 
of _phllosopb;y vilnm 1.s at f1.rst s1.:;11t very sim1.J.a r to one offersd 1.n 
Searcn for Ul hmate :2-ealJ.. ty. ( 1 ) In the f rc st 
he WI'l tes of plnlosoph·r that, l t J..S 
"that co::-:rnt1.ve a_~o.coach to real1.ty J.C -.7luch :::-ec.lity as such 
1.s the ~bject. 11 -- (2) 
a11d :LD che oth.:;l' he says ths t 1. t j s 
(2) ST,I,p.22 
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"that co_>;pltJ.ve :ondeavour J.n wnicn the qu-::stlon of being J.s asked". (1) 
The descrJ."Qtion of plnlosophv as a cot,nitive approoch or endeavour re11inds 
us that J.t J s co_'1cernec --.lbl knowledge, but olthough there lS cl:::arly, at 
leest ln TJ.llJ.ch' s trunCI, a connection bet-vreen 11 bei.ng 11 and 11realJ.ty11 ', J.-c J.S 
not certaJ.n the t t11ey are synowyrr1ous. ( 2) The der~nltaon of realJ.ty J.D. 
Syst;:;r~atJ.c T11eolo;;y J.s e~q::.ouDded J.n tt-.J.s way: 
"Reali.t·y as such, or reality as a whole, ls ~:ot the vrhole of :!."e91J.ty, 
J.t ls tl1e structure wrnch mal'es realJ.ty a ,~rhole and t.'1.e,·efore a 
poter1tJ.ol obJect of' knoi'rled6e. Inquiry J.nto the nature of realJ.ty 
as such 111eans J.ncpJ.rJ.ng J.nto t11ose structures, categories and 
concepts 1rlnch are presupposed J.n the cogm. tJ. ve encour1ter va th 
every realm of reality. 11 (3) 
Plnlosophy J.S revealed in its crJ. heal role ag:nn, e};p osuJg the struct-u1·e 
of re3ll ty, proC!ucJ.D.g concerts an:::! enquiring J.nto t11em. It J.s an o~tologic3l 
enqtnry, treatin:; reality as an integrated unl ty. The philosophical 
cpes"LJ.on J.S the search for the ge_l.e ('al stl·uctures that rr.ake experlence of 
realJ. ty possible anu as such J.s an elaboratJ.on of the ratJ.onale of reolJ.ty 
vhJ.ch JTlak es l t D Wl.J. ty. 
Wnether what TJ.llich means here J.s t.tle sar:1e a::; what he means by 
RealJ. ty, J.s open to doubt. "The que s tJ. on of •.• " .Ls a recurring phrase 
in lus work, but J.t J.s also very vague, a rrl reflects again, lns tendency to 
At tirr:~es the phrase means 11 tlH:: q,tPst for •.• 11 
and J.ndeed there are occasions vrhen he actually substl tutes that phrase, so 
thot there JS some doubt, crith respect to lns defJ.nition of philosophy, 
as to -vrhether he really does mean "the qucstJ.on of "or "the quest for ••• 11 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
BRSUR,p.5 Further defJ.ni tions are of'fel·ed J.n IlfnamJ.cs of Fsi th, p. 90 
~rJ..es to fJ.nd the um vers::Jl categorJ.es m whJ..ch being J.S ex-9erJ.enced) 
and "The RelstJ.on of Eetap.0.ys1cs and Theology", RevJ..evl of :tvietaph~rsJ.c~ 
vol.10 (1956), p.57f. 
J.H.Randell pomts ot.:'t that ''being 3S sl;lch 11 lS an ArJ.stotelian 
conception, vihereas "reality as a 'rJ"J.ole" l.S the object of 19th 
centm"y J_deahsrn ("T'ne Ontolo2,y of Paul Tillich", 1::!!' p.139) 
ST ,I,p22, cf also p. 24: "Philosophy asks the question of realJ. ty as a whole, 
1t asks the questJ.ons of tl:e structure of being,, and it answers J.n terms 
of categor1 es, structural laws, and unJ..versal cc;'lncepts. It rrust ansvfer 
in ontologJ.cal terms." 
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That he savs "the questJ..on of' " rather thAn "the quest1on about •. ~" may 
suggest that he 1·o:i shes us to liU"er thet philosopny 1s not a c~etached but 
( 1 \ 
rather, an 1nvolvea J..nqulry. J At the same tlme, hmvever, we aust reco,;;;;-
nlse thaJu !1e •nay be explo1 t1ng the amblgUl ty of' the G-ennan phrase 11f'ragen 
nach This ambl2Ult_ ls extremely conven1ent for 1t enables t11e 
transl t1on to be rna de from "the (lue stion about" to 11 the quest for II w 1 trrout 
dif flCulty. It wlght also be sale that i:he close sim1lar1 ty betvreen 
11 quest1on 11 1md "quest" J..n Engl1sh, yrhlch enables the tran1::1 tion to be made 
almost unnoticed, 7ells the distJ..nctlon J..n Gernan betvr::':en fragen and suchen. 
It seeoms, fl'Ol! B1blical :O..ehg1on and the Search r'or Ul~~ate RealJ..ty, 
that the 11 quest1on of BeuJg 11 is 1ndeed the quest, or search, for Being, a 
search for tL1e o~1tologJ..c:al _:orour1d of c;.lJ. reality, but vrhen VIe tw·n again to 
11Philosopny and theolog3- ask ti1e qusstion of beHJ.E,. But tney a::k 1t 
from d1fr'erent _9erspect1 ves. Fh1losoph:;r deals Vil Lh the structure 
of be1ng 1n 1 t self; theo lo SY deals · iJ.. th the rre anlrJ.g of beir.Jg for 
us." (3) 
Uoreove1·, "the nranin.g of being .L'or us" has a very special force, for 1t J..s 
the ult~unate mearnng of beir1g that conce~:ns us. Consequently, ha-ving 
descl'J..beC: che object of theolog:,r as that nhJ..clt concer·ns us ultJ..Fwtely he 
goes on, 1n t11e seconr'l of h~s for1nDJ criterJ..a of' theology, to say: 
11Qur ultllllate concern J..S that y;}ncb detere11ncs our be1n,;; or non-be1ng. 
Only those statements are theolot;lcal ·.,1nch deal Yvl th their object 
in so f3r a3 1 t con become a mottsr of be1n..;; or non-be1ng for us. 11 (4) 
The definl t1on of 1Jhllosophy 1n B-tbllcal Rr')Jiglon and the Search for Ul t::..ma te 
(1) Tlns co0..cept of J}lulosophy does r1ot rey_u1re -che con:::e.:_Jts and categories of 
tradl tional phJ.losop:ry. It 1s e plulosoplucal exercl se ln 11pre-phlloso-
phlcal11 f'orm (cf'. BRSUR, pp.&"f; Izy'namics of' FrnttJ, p.90) 
cf the U:::rrl8n translatlon of' BRS1JR (G·lr,V,p.140) ;;rhe:·e 11 th::: cpestion of 
1Jein.g11 becor'lf' s p8rt of th8 folloviin6 sentence: "Plnlosophie J..st Jenes 
erkennende Be,1D!f.hen, 1n dew es wn d1e Frage
11
nach dem Sein geht". The 
sect uon heDcLmg "The 1.i:eonlng of Philosophy becomes "Der Sinn der Fraeo,e 
noch delG Sell1. 11 
(3) S'J 1 ,I,p.25 (4) IbJ.d, p.17 
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while ph~losophy ~n Systel118h~- 'l'heolot£,1 is relegated to a lesser task wluch 
~s not cons~dered in the oth<;r '70l"k. 
Systet•1ahc Theolog,y that T1llich ··nshes to speak cf :9h~losoph·y- and theology 
in terms of c;u-cst..Lonin(; ana answering. >k mve, therefoce, 111 Systematic 
theolof:y. The one' drmm from the artlcle :Ln Rell0lOll ~n Gesclnchte una 
Gegenvrart rel2tes them os questlon and rnavrer, or perhaps we st10uld say quest/ 
questlon and answer, reliUnlscent of the l'achcal enqu..Lry seelang to grasp, 
and the 11be111g _?assessed" of rcol..Lglon. l'he other rcla tes then in a 
dlf'ferent VIFJY: they have the same object, nal!iely being, but B}yroach l t lll 
d~fferen t wa ;:s Wl t1·1 a 1.f fercn t ends 111 Vlew, prulo sop11}' enqm r1ng aftsr 1 ts 
structure, theoloby after its deptn. 'l'ins defi.n1 t1on 11as 1ts roots 111 
the S;y-ste1fl cf Sc1ences and recclls tt.e not1ons of 1)tuloso:9h,y as the f1rst 
c-le.:rJ.ent of t:le cultural sciences and theoloz.:r oc connected .. ;:r_th tueonotnous 
metaph~-slcs. 
It lJ1ay h~lp co re1n~roduce the d..LstJ "-v..;t1ons 'ie rnade earlier betvreen 
att1 tudes and clJ sc1pl1nes, 2 til Jco recall, also, t!19 t 111 the article in 
Rehgion il2; Gestilnchte una GegenWBZ"t, Tllllc~ chose to spe81' of l'el..LS1011 and 
of Lheolow as a ~)art of rell2,lon. 
Phllosol?lJY as a c1..Lsclpl1De, t:ne11, encu.J..res abwt tne structuTe cf 
realJ_ty, and, ln dol!!£; so, 1s concerned ,r1th concepts 2nd cate;:;orJ...es. It 
ta~~es, .Lor exa![rple, tl'le not1on of caL'sal_t:' f:;:o-o ph;:s1.cs, anC! exa,n10es 1..ts 
use: 1t ex.?nu_nc;s 1ts •J::;e 211 tnstol"lcal'•I.Clt1n[ and 111 othe::r spheres; 
But 1t neV'3l' loses toucn Wl th 
Jche struct\l:ce of 1eaJi ty - lt ls not an e:x&T•lll12tJ.on of uord<:, and conceyts 
de"tacllCd i l'Ot•l real1 ty. 'L'hus tlw ~=h=-loso.:;;her 
" •.• C.escrllx.s tiE: eplstel•1olo[,1Cal sulJj-.;st _l_ :.: tl1e j_ elat1on of 
'1!1d corrrnlll1~Lty. He llresents tl1e c~18l'acc;eristlcs of l1fe and 
;_n the1r de_pr::ndence ;n, a :cxl 1.nd~.:>~ndence of, ea.:::ll otl1er •••• 11 
----------------
(1) ST,I,p.26 
J?8l'S011 
s-.)Jri t 
~ ( 1 ) 
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detached, inasmuch as th•:; abserlCe of kno·-'led2;e does not threaten the 
contlnued bein,; of ue plnlosopher 8S o huiJ1..a'1 belng. 
l t lS 11 cosmolot_,lcal 11 ln c'1aracter. ( 1 ) 
In TJ_lllch 1 s tel'ms, 
Philoso-phy as an at-:;ltuC::e ls dlfferenc, h_ovrevel', fo.c nne:;:e the 
gu~s clons of lJDllosoph;t as a dlsClpllne are lD .._;rlncip.Le also ansvrerable by 
a~uestlons, £'or lt -'-S not 8 q_ues-clon at all, but 8 quest, a search for BelrL£::,, 
a se3rch for the Ground of Being. Ho lo.o;er ls lt a detached enqu:ry; 
l t ls .ocsvr en 11 invol v~·d 11 enqt.'.u:y. It lS, in fact, pln lo sophJ 1Y;come 
theolo[,y, questlr(•, for t11e ;;round of Deinr;, for to Vle•·; 8n object theolo::s-
lC8lly ls to Vlew ..Lt 8S 811 aspect of ma11 1 s ultiw2te concern. 
Now, however, plnlosophy as an attitLde J.s luentJ.c"'l Wlth theology 
2 s an 8 ttl tude: we C8T1.'1ot SJ?sok of plnlosop11:' as questing and theoloE'.Y 88 
su_pply:wg -che 8nS'!fer, unlc ss,, of course, "fe .Ln voke the solu 'Glo~l1ich 
Tllllcn sOJJ1etlmes appeals, ( 2 ) namely, -chat to ask :o quest,lon lrnplles poss-
esslon of tl1.e a.oswe1·, or, alternatlvely, tl1.e solutlon vre heve alr·eady 
sL~ggested as inrplled in the vray Tllllch speaks, L1.9l11cly, th8t me philosopher 
J.3 also thfe theologl8n: everyone lS both. 
?t1eology, accordln3 to the artlcle ln Rellg.Lon ln Qeschlchte und 
Gegemrart, ls the phillosophlcal aspect of r ellglon, the crl tlcal aspect 
wlncn seeks knmrledge and under stanchng, 7rlnci1 ls esoterlc and accesslble 
only to tne fevr. Rellgion, i~ contrast, is the unl versal state of rr.an. 
Thls dist.Lnction appears, at flrst sJg,fc.t, to h3Ve bee.o aba.odoned by 
Tilllch ln 11lD later w-1:' tln:?, s: theology, a skinz tne qu.::stlon of being 
.Eb r us, ls not an esotenc m8tt::;r. But, ln fact, the distlnctlons rrust 
remain lf "Te are to tnal:e s:ense of Tllllch, for at the found21tlon of 
( 1) Ibid 
(2) 11Vf'.oat ls Wronz 1•ntL1 the 1Dlalectld Theology11 JR, val. 15 (1935), p.137, 
BRSUR, p.11, ST,I,p.69 
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TJ.ll~ch' s attempt at apologeb.c theology ~s the conv~ct~on that rellglon 
~sa umversal otleno11enon of' un~versal valldJ.ty. (i) But just as D18n 
enq~res, ask~ng "radJ.cally" (hls philosophlcal att~tude), doubting and 
quest~onll1f;, and th~s may lead to tl1e dlsclpline of pmlosophy, so n:an 
lmo-1fs hJJDself also to be grasped, arrl t.1is state leads to theology as a 
disciphne. 'da rna~r also however, speak of theology as an attltude; it is 
the :po~nt at whlcLl. nan, ph~losopher, ceases to ask about the structure of 
being add to quest for Being ~tself. Tlns, as we have seen J.S J.dentJ.cal 
1rJ.tl1 plnlosopl1y as an attJ. tude, and J.s so1nehrr1es called plnlosophy. 
Between -cheolo;;,y an.d relJ.r~J on, DO"reveJ·, there stands a thlY'd 
factor, t.1e relJ.gJ.ous corrnnunJ.ty, or church, ;d_th J.ts structure of sy,nbols. 
Rell:?;lon lS no abstract concept, ncr J.s lt a p11enor11enon -rrl:ud1 receJ.ves a 
universal formulatlon. It is, rather, a concrete phenomenon: it receives 
concrete forr1s throughout hJ.story. It J.S exi.stentJ.al, related to rnstorical 
sJ. tuotions, and conseque~1.tly recel ves w: rYJ.ng fo·cms llecause different 
col11muni ties have expressed thell' app:' ehcnslon by the Uncondi tJ.oned J.n 
clJ.fferent ways. These ac;p:rehensJ.ons are ex_t)ressed in symbols v.hich are 
J.n tm n, handed on fro1n geneTation to generatlon and to other groups, a 
process winch necessJ. tE1tes constant rs-J.nterpretatlon of ii1e symbols as 
symbolJ.se. 'llv; symbols !:JUst lbe 11unlo eked 11 , tl1.e myth "bl'Oken 11 , so ·tll.a t 
ii1. e power contained J.n thern - or rather tr1e ::;>o-vmr or lmpiDrt to whict they 
polnt, 1'18~/ b.reak t!.:::'OUi)l onu pour forth. It lS c;he ta s~~ of theology to 
unlock these syribols. But oJore J.s necessary, ,for l t l s pointless to 
"unlock" a sytribol Lf the po•·v<?r pours forth ln;:;o a voJ.d. Theology 1'11st, 
oe 11 ~-astentlal 11 , :~.nter_9re bnc; the symbols to tne 11 sl tuatJ.on. 11 (2) 
(1) "ApologetJ.c th~olot-,y presup1Jos's tn.e ldea of a universal revsl::n;ion." 
"The Pl·oblem of TheologJ.cal i'.IethocJ 11 JR, Vol. 27 ( 1947) p. 25 
(2) TJ.ll:Lcn uses the ter1.1 eristem,J.al to Sl,;nlfy both tlJ.e elc·nent of ultl1'1acy 
(cf.lbJ.d p.17f) and also to ref:oJ' to tr..e concrete sJ.tuot_on (ST,I,p29) 
Theolo;v lS th(j::.'efore 2Y~lstenh2l to tile extent that J.t (i) deals vrith 
being 2 s a matt::::r· of ult:t.nwte concern, (il) seeks tol'elate 1.tself to 
the cultural e)p resslon of t!l.e day1. The cultur8l cxpressJ.ons re11resent, 
in turn, the "sJ.tuC~tlon" thst Js tl1e J.nterpl'etatlon of human exlstence. 
'l.'lllJS Cb.:c.Lstlan theolo~;j' ls 
11 T11e lntcroretC'tlon of -cl1c.- ,,,- ssa~e th.: t Jesus l3 tlle Chrl-:/c, c>nu 
of t:1e sy,obols a 110 ::..ns Cl ct LlO~'-S based en thot rr:e ssage. " ( 1) 
or, ln tl:.:; -ro.::. :ls of q,"! S~,-;o\+cc_-,11_07_'_' .~Cl""l~ces, -t -~-'-or-o -'- ~· U:..>.<:; -- v ~ .._, __ l .L .Lv .., e~ !"esenv vl18 
conscJ..ousness". 
Hovr then, ai 'B -~Jhllo soph~r and theo lo:::.Y to be cor1 rc;lo tec'i, m 
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It should now 1Je pos~a1Jle to fsrasp 
c;ne full ext <;nt ot t11e }Jl'oble)lfl posed by TJ..lllch 1 s 8Yfl osl JGlon. It lS not 
a qDe:;stion of naklng a slm_:;.le cholce beti';een one of tvro dj_fferent defl.Dl t:LOns 
oi' pl:ulosoph7 and theolo:;y, bewreen a ~uestlon-ansv,rer l'elatlonslnp and a 
structure-depth relcltlonsln1,>, uecause suet a !JlxtuLe has been •':c>de the t no 
slrr1ple cholce lS ~;osslble; nor, ..Lndeea, coes Tllllch --Tlsh to make a cilolce. 
So l"cHlY elements are l11volved that ·-,re may {J..nd oursslves co.·•pelled to .-'onder 
Nor J..s t!-1e fault to 
be laJ..~l s1wply At tlvo door o.L the absence of :: enel'el 2greement on the 
defln_Ltions of p!ulosoph;y( 2 ) or theology, for yce flJ..unt l1E•ve e::;p ect-::d fuat 
only confL, sed -;:;hec-1 fur-chcr b~r hJ..s d8sP'8 to Lncluce everytlnng. 
l)osed ln ph1.losoplncal terr•1s •-ntt1 an answer couched J..n tne tt·adlt:Lonal 
ternnnolo;;y of theolo,sy b~r meons of a transls t::._on of theolor~lcal J..nto 
:9lulo soplnca 1 terr:'lnology, 1)U -c i::::•D t _L s not necessa rllJ the ::.-arre tJ:ung as 
a correlctJ..on c.f "9lulosoph~- and theolo&,Y• If --re thJ..nk of .Ql:ulo sophy as 
concernod ,-l t;,l t_-_e structure of being 2ll1Cl tneology v,-J.. til. J ts depth, vre 
hav::. to r eco_:=:.tuse thct th::;-r '7o.::·1: tmrards c1lfferent ~,oals and can s ca1·cely 
avold the concluslon that Gltl1ougll they rr1ay be related, the3- cannot be 
a:orrelcted. 
( 1) 
(2) 
"The Pl·oble111 of 'l'heo1o:::_Jr::al 1/ethod 11 , p.19 
S'l',I p.21f cf,DvnarrLLCS of FaJth p.90: TJ..lllch recoz_,1nses thDt ew;ry 
deflnl tlon of nhiloso-nh , lS on ex-oresslon of tlLe 'fdint of Vlevv of the 
!=' .c- ' 
4 II •1 1 t 11 plnlosopher who S-L ves l t, but lnslsts on a pre-p osoplnca agreemen 
about the rrH::Gm 116 of phllosophJ vhlch :;_s that lt lS. tne attempt to an:vfer "'" 
"the 1,108 t :3eneral questJ ons about the r..,_• ture o.L reall ty and human exls L.enc'-0 
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Even 1f vre concede thet a corl'Clt"tion of question and answer J..S 
t11e only ge!luine correlotJ..on that can be consJ..Clered, 'Je must not oV•.Jrlook 
the J::.o:;nt '•{e have Just made, nomoly, th£t J..t J..s net necessar1ly 1.dent1cal 
WJ.. th a carreL t::.on bet-:•·sen :plnlosop11;r end Lheology. In the face of vr1de-
spread dJ.. S82,r-:;em-~l1t on tlc.e nature of phJ..losophy' TJ..llich prolJOSed oefJ..nl tions 
of pmlosoplrr 2nd 1-heolo,0_,y -·lncn v:ill allow lum to carry out ills project 
but -~:hJ..cr1 VJ..ll do l1ttle to n1eet the obJectJ..ons of plulosophe1·s, '1ot to 
ment1on those of U1eologJ ans. 
In sympathy more -,"J.. th the contmental plnlosophers than \•J..th Anglo-
Saxon plulosop!:·y, -.rhJ..ch he sevr as um"·:;lJ..eved logJ..c£11 posJ.. tJ..VJ..sm, T1llich 
seeks to re-establJ..sh ontology, o ri! to press pmlosopl1y to 8Sk ontolo2;1.cal 
<}Ue s tJ..ons. For TJ..llJ..clc th<:1t rneans askll16 quest.J..on::: about uhat e:Gstent-
being fro1(j J..ts ground, but, unlike many of tlle exJ..stentJ..alJ..sts, he J..S 
also coDVlnced thst the:·e are ansYrers to the questions ·,r}ach ov.::.rcome the 
estrangement. 
The varJ..ety of 1Jhilosopl1Lcal outlooks uould sug:::,est, once again, 
that while theolo :__y m1.2,ht be conc1ucted J..n dialooue -,·ri th flhilosophy, 1 t 
cannot be 1n correlatJ..on. J-icr.,rever, a dialogue alone precludes the 
possJ..bllJ.. ty of a ceo m_pllshing the synthesJ..s T1.ll1.c!:'. vnshes to aclueve 
since a synthesJ.s ul t1.ma tely requ1.res that the -b.vo _[)er spect:. ves should 
not or:by have the same object, but shou:i.d be cap£>ble of being shovm to 
be J..dent::;_cr.l, arrl clearl:y, the dlfferlnz VJ.ew~oints of the varlo\.Js 11 schools" 
of phJ..losoph;:- cannot be shovm to be identlcol, even •·rJ..t n each other, and 
l a l r • 11 ch 1 11 a hybrJ..d J..nccrporatJ..ng elewconts of eac1 _:?ro uces on :> one more s oo • 
'78 conclucle, then, t11c.t T1.llJ..c~1 lS unable to show tne>t J..t J..s 
possJ..ble to correlate :pffilosop:17 and theology, >~ri thol1t gJ..VJ..ng verv spec1.al 
n.earung to the iYm nords, a 2rocedure 1110re likely to estrBn,ge than to 
reconcile. Further, -"'e 1."'ind hls own accol.mt of the tuo objects he 
Wlshes to syn.t11esJ.se ext:-:·emel;r confusJ.ng, not l e2 st because of hls 
fUSlng Of t10 chl'fe:::·ellt clpproacne-s, one of W!l.l~h Vfe traced to the 
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Sys-Gem of Sclences and the ot!1er to the article ln Heliglon ln Gesclnchte 
und G-egen '!art. Finall~r, al thoush we found ln the System of Sciences 
some sug2,estlon of ti1e vray in vrhlch he thought do2,ma tics and systematJ.c 
t-heolog:r nu2,ht functJ.on with respect to wlwt he later called kerygmatJ.c 
theolo :'S, yet, J.n vrac tice, we find that he nss lJ. ttle room for a 
kerygmahc theology. 
2..- Ontology 
(a) Schelling 
Vle have already refer.L·ed to Tillich 1 s desjxe tor ecBlll)hllosopi1.y 
to a concern -;·1J.tl1 ontology or metaph~rslcs, as he at first called J.t, and 
in the course of ouT stud7 so faT, •,.-e bave foLmd ourseLres increasingly 
pressed to conclude ths t hls Vlevr of the role of theolggy lS to a consJ.derable 
extent dictated by IllS vJ.e·.v-, hm"ever confused, of ph::Llosophy. 'rhe desire 
to produce a correl<?,tJ.on of the tao req_UJres tl1.2: any definJ.tlon of theology 
::hould be able to 11 key J.nto" a defmitlon of philosophy. It J.s, indeed, 
our contentiun that J:ns theolo:;lcal met:10d J.s J.nforrned by l:us ontolo;;lcal 
and cosmological convJ.ctions ano vre shall, J.n this section, attem-ot to 
explaJ.n lll 1vhat sense t~1.lS J.s so. 
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.Attent1on llas olre3dy been drawn to tne 1nf' luence on Tllllct'> of' 
Schell1ng, an ulf'luence wln ch T1lhch was tnmself very Yr.i.llinc!: to admit 
and wh1ch ls vntnessed to at an earl~- da1:.e by the f:--f!t that Schelling 
prov:u:led tne subject not onJy for lns doctoral d2ssertation l::ut also for 
hls llcentlete d1ssertation. But although 'r .tllich r ega rd ed lurn, rather 
than .tG.erkegaard, as the father of existentJalls~~)an:1 vms deeply lnfluenced 
b ".hat Schelling lnmself' :Jescrlbed as hls 11posltlve :philosophy", chere 
are ot.h.er aspect,s too, of' Schelling 1 s thoug11t that rnay be recognised 1n 
T.tllich, not the leest being vrhat Tillich descr1bed as 
"the tremendous emotional l1npBct [of'] SchelJ.ing 1 s ph1losophy 
of nature • 11 ( 2) 
T1ll1ch prefers to d1ntingu1sh tvm major aspects of Schelling's phllosophy, 
those of' the r1et;a t.L ve and the po sl t1 ve :9h1lo sophy. But "Tl tlun ihe 
negatj_ve philosoph-,- there are at least three .L)hases, to oe d:c.sbnguished 
as tl:e plulosophv of n8tw:·e, the philosophy of aesthet•_c intul tion and the 
plulosophy of ldent:ri{j. (3) 
.Altnoug11 Tilhch objected to th~ second of' 
these, 1!1 -..vhich Schelllng replaced rel1g1on vfi th -Lhe arts, and put forFard 
a kind of quietls t1c gnostlclsm in vi'nich the artist 1s treated as the 
prophet of Gmd and h..J.s -vrorks as the revelotion of God, (4) nevertheless, 
he shows hlmself 1n sympathy Wl th -che Vle\vs tlJ.at hoJd the three phases of 
the flrst .;_)eriod together, f'or the problem Schelllng was atter'Ipting to 
resolve wa::J that of the 11112ty of the universe, of the relat1on of the 
1nd1vidual tinngs to tt1e totallty. Tlus problem has held a central 
:!:_Jositlon throug}'.out the hlstory of f>hllosophy, whethsr viewed epistemologically, 
as by August.tne, in the _9ro"bleL1 of the reJ 2t1on of t11e subject and tne ob,iect, 
---- ----------
( 1) 
(2) 
(]) 
11Schell1ng und die .Anf!lnge c~es &J stet1t1alJ.st1schen Protestes"· 
~eitschrJft n!r :;;:h1losphJsche Forschung vol.9 (1955), P-2·197-20~, "The 
r1ature and Slf:')l.lllCance of Exlstentlehr;t 1\lought", Journal of !~nlc.sophy 
vol.53 (1956), p.740, Pers£eCtlVcs on 19th and 20th century ~~ote~ 
Theology.p.150f 
T.P.T., p.~. 
GW,I(1.~;zstlk und Schuldbewusstseln ... ),pp.3:-75. PeTpsechves on 19th 
20th centur-r ?rot~stent Tneolasz~l1ereafter R:rspect1ves) 
arrl 
(h.) GJN,I,(Mysh"k una SchuldbeY'Usstseln. ), p.57f 
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or ontcloglc8lly, as by Soc:>:':.nee, ln the proble'l}6f the :celotlon of' the 
Accol'dln~ L· Tll hch, Schellin,s 1 s phlloso::~h:J' of nsturc, ·18s an 
appllc"' Clon to W?tu2 e 01' he .:Jlinc.Lple ofJdentlty. He ·e,?s able to assert, 
there.L'ore th,Jt ~he lndlvlduol J s ldent:Lcal Wlt"h C-od to the extent thPt he lS 
~u)entlcal ,,rei' nature, slnce na·cure ~1as the cl'eator both Ulthln l"t 8nd 
God ls not depenc!e:1.t on Dature, but doc;s Dot st2nd outs.Lae l t 
as a deJstlc con.cc:ptlon, but ··J:Lt:.cll1 lt, as a ma.nifest::>tlon, J..n conc_·ete form, 
NatLl.Ce lS spll'J.. t ll1 2 ts imn:odlacy. There ls, therefore, 
betvrec:;n G:an and God. X<e:bglon - exce}Jt ln the phase of aesthetlc si tu;otion 
lS an essent1al functLon o.f t:1e human spll'J..t; 2t J.s ti'e lntU:Ltlon of the 
dl V.LEe ln nature. (2) 
'L".r1.e r.ecsatl•re phJ..losophy, l!Ovever, l12d cr;Tt~l!c weaknesses, an:! leCI 
eventually(]) to the development of t;te posJ.t:Lve pi1llosophy, J..n vkncr1 he 
sou::,~1t c;o do greater Just:Lce to t..h.e not2on of the awareness of (;UJ..lt. He 
2:"i_,usc1 that there can be no tall~ of o 3ynthes1.s unless there ,s fE·st a 
contradlctlon to be overcome. But contrachct.Lon cloes not r1ean that na turc 
and Goa are 2n irreconc:Llable op_position to csch othf.c', for he 1naintains 
~lS bel:Lef that nnture .LS sp2rit. It lS not, howev':!r, W1dlffrerentiated 
spir1 t, but rather the essence of' God developed under the contradlctwn, 
a notJ.on wh1.ci~ lS d1ff .Lcul t to ::£Tasp and see111s almost to be a tautologous 
·--ray of e:x:rressJ..llG t!.1.e conVJ.ctlon t~1st nm. te and infllll te al"e TelE-ted "but 
chffeTent, Yfl tlwut e:>[) lalrnng how tllls can be so .. It appeo::os to be a lc1nd 
of symbol for the chacacter2s tlcs of eXlstence, nawely cont1.ngency and 
b.tm totion. 11an hlr'lself 1 s not the m nt1 aC!ict1on, nor 1.s m tu:re: 1t lS 
11 e~~2stence 11 as an abstract concept th2t lE, t1~e contra<hctJ..on. In man, 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Ib1d, p.18, PerspectJ..ves, p.145 
G!lf, I ,pp. 4M'f 
.AccordlDg to T:Llllch, it vras due to the lnrpact of the death of 
Carohna Schlegel (Perspechves,p.11;.8) 
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indeed, the contrachctJ.on lS conquered for, 211 man as a vvhole, und erstEJnolng 
ls .fu-Lly urn ted Fl th its g,:.:ound,. Consequently a relJ.gious relations8lp 
presupposes J.dentJ.ty as well as contradH:tJ.on, and J.dentJ.ty contalns the 
( 1 \ 
contrechction -rrJ. thln J. tself. 1 
tlBt an J.dea .iS lncomplete -Tlthout J.ts opposJ.te, for the posltive 11:t.mphes 11 
the negatlve: J.t 11 cont:nns 11 Jt -nthln J.tself~ 
L:t.ke SchellJ.ng, T.1llich •fishes to }ll"oduce a s!;:etch of l'ealJ. ty wlncll 
'las a IDOL1istJ.c fra,ne: yet an uncond L tional affumDt:t.on of tlce J.dent:t. ty 
of fue one and the many does not account for th::: elem-:nt of seperatJ.on in 
::..~eal:t. ty, nor do·.::s l t t21ke ser:t.ously the l?roblem of eVJ.l. 1m unconch tiona l 
denJ.al of J.dent:t.ty :t.9'11o less unacce::_Jtable. Both u:t.sh to reconc:t.le the 
elem::ont of se<)al'at:t.on an.d estrangement -,-Q th a rnonistic outlook, and 
Till:t.ctl :follo,rs 3chell:t.ng .111 Jus Bc1o~~ting of tl~e notlon of the contracllc tlon 
ln lns account of the reahs< tlOD of belng nnder the condl tlons of exJ.stence. 
Schelling also elaborated a doctrine of "pet enc:t.~s", traces of vil.uch 
nay be reco~nJ.sed :t.n T:t.llich. In hls 1 a ter ~)er:wd, he spoke of three 
potencJ.es, tbe :t.rrational, the rational and the spirit, in vvlnch the flrst 
tvvo are u~~ted. ( 2 ) :t.s a Tlns/sc..h.erne winch :t.!TI111ediately recalls the Systera of 
ScJ.ences, in wl1ich Being is associated "ll th ihe :t.rrat:t.onel ·wl-.LJ..dl resJ.sts 
t:-10u2,ht, the rational. Tb.e "br10 are brought together, however, in the 
Spir:t.t (Gelist), :t.n l'hic11 the 1elation to the Uncond:t.t:t.onal lS reallS ed so 
that mean:::..ng may be perceived. In ins later WT l t:t.ngs, Tillich speaks of 
God as bott1 ground and abyss, an :t.dea :t.n "T'LJ.ch, aga:t.n, we may detect echoes 
of the potencles, as J.n hls explicit connectloD vd.tl1 them of 11lS account of 
God's potent:t.alit>J and actual:t.ty, vmere Jus potentJ.ality lS the lJ.tmt of lns 
actuality. i•{e f:t.nd a further echo in '-us account of non-be:t.ng as the lltni t 
(;f· 
of being -v-rlnch :t.mposes f:t.l1l tude on being. ) 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
G?T,I,pp. 78,98 
Ibld, p. 84 
ST,I,pp.210,272f;cf.Randall,art.clt.T?r, p.156. ~dams also points to the 
theory of potenc1es as the foundatlon of TJ.llJ.ch s theory of the demonlc. 
~· pp.230,23q 
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Till1ch shares the 1nterests of Schellln_s; to t}].e extent that he, 
too WJ..shes to resolve the p:roble.n of the one and t:1e rnany, of ihe finl te 
and the 1nfiru te 7nthout fall1ng 111to the und1fferentiated monJ..sJJ1 of the 
:9h1losophy of nctm·e, or 1nto dual1sm. Moreover, he takes what 1s 
fundanentally the same route as Schelling in his search for a so lut1on, 
em.J?lo~'lng both the lClea of the contradJ..ct1on ;;md also, as vre have seen, 
Ul1lty. lie lS also akin to Schell1n2, 1n lns distaste for the Kantian reduction 
of rcl10ion to etlncs ~:;no lns conse~uent v1evnng of th~ separat1on oetween 
God and man .Ln ontolog1.cal ratl1e1' than etlncal terJ11s, but he also vo1ced 
lns dJ..ssatJ..sfactlon Yll th Schell1ng, because even in 'ns l:;te.r period he 
seera=:d uru:-hle to provide an answer to the destruct1. ve power of ev1.l. ( 1 ) 
(h) Sclile.Lerma cner 
Not onl:l l13s Tlll1ch Fluch in comPon Wl th Schellmg., but also vn th 
Schleiermacher, to '"ill.o,n Yre now turn .1n the atten~1t to chanJCteJ"l.se Till1ch 1 s 
ontolo.;1cal conv.c_ctlons and to descr1.be the ylace that they llold 1.n h1s 
thro;ology. 
ire find po1.nts of compBrl.son betvreen Till1ch and Schle1ermac"0..er 
not only vnt!-1 -cefe1cnce to the1r ontoloi_"';lcal outlool: but also in the 
c1rcur1stances and w.ot1.vation of therr wo-c"k. Indeed, v'e '1ay v-enture to 
su;:;est th •t much of 1':LllJ ch 1 s overall posi t1. ve response to SchleJ..erHlacber 
.LS dL'e to lns syrrrpathv -,-,1~~1 Scnle1ermach81' 1 s aim, 'iinc~· ',7as to •J.10unt an 
m:::a£1 t not 
( 1) 
( 2) 
ut,1ose W!'O 7ere ~ull of r1odC)lD eru:J1 t1on or sl;:eptlclslYl, -but those 
who vrere rnos"t afi ected ae1Cl oel'r!leated ,,'l tlc tl1e greet lcleal.L>Jt.Lc anJ 
s·o1.r2- tual cheractel'lStlcs ~lled from th.o poetry aJ·1Cl ph1.losophy 
of t~1~-~ at,e. 11 (2) 
cf, Boun:Jar:,' p.52. Ne1. ther Tillic'1 nor.~.-Barth however seer~_to be ::;~le t~ 
proouce a nore 33 tlsfactory ansvrer 111 c.ll.C eyes of Edwe-cd llladde!l and Peter 
Hare ("On the Diff1.culty of evaCl111g the; Problem of Evil11 IJJ:nlosophy and 
Phc;nomenolo~loal Research, vol.28 (1967-8),_pp.58-69). 
Sch:ei..ermacher, On Religlpn...z. lDh'ouuc-'clon, p. xv f. 
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Acco!'dlng to Rodolf Otto, Sche1ermacher 
11 
.... a1med chrectl' 2t tl:e d1sc1pJe s of Herder, Goethe, l\ant, and 
espec1all~r Fichte. He d1d not rnsh to overooJ11e c1oubt or athe1s!Yl, 
but a s::;lf-contrAd1ctory mood and sLate of Fund. 11 ( 1) 
In shol't, the spseches were a ct1.all"::n~e nut to those vrho had despa1red but 
to tr~ose \Vho carr Ed the banners of the proud optirrusrn of Kant or of romant-
rtE.l1t,iun Fa::, uis_yens:able to 
both sc1ence ar1.d rnoral1 ty, a nCl \'Q th l t God, J..ffimorta l1 ty, revelc tio:1 and 
m1racles could be dls.J?ensed ;Tl th. Put Sche1erm?cher, YrllJ.le sharing -,'lth 
the 11 dcspl3Grs 11 a d:tstaste fer 1el1g1on "\Tlevred as 2 system of doctrine;, 
nevertheless rezsrdecl th·; k·tal rr::jc:ct1on of rell:;ion as self-contrad1ctory 
and so set ont to re-cstabl1s!1 l t. 
a diVlne lrrrperatl\re author1totlvely declo1·ed by orthodmGJ, but he c:.:,uld 
r10t allol'f to the tvro fielcls couplete BUtono,cy, for to do so -;roulcl be to 
perrrn. t a d1chotom~r l;etNeen the ti•, o and to encow·2ge a compartmental:J..sin,:s of 
l:J..fe and J_ntellectugl act1v1 ty. Sc1ence was lncreBslnt,ly fa ll1ng a prey 
to tlle temptBt1on to treBt 111d1 Vldual objects as exist1n2, 1n vra tert1e:,ht 
com_L)aJ tmen.ts, unrelated to e8ch other, 'ilh1le t·lorals re2;a:cded the 
category. ( 2) 
The solutJ..on to "chJ..s atom1s:1..n.g process 1n science and mol"als \7as 
to be found in Schle1e:cmacher 1 s vie'll, 1n the; notaon of rc;liglon. But !lB 
reliJ,ion u;:1s to be conce1 ved not as loola.n~ Jn tvo dll'ec cions Bt once, 
seelo..ng to control sc1cnce ond mo:cals. In -LhBt Fay J.. t uould becom::; a 
Ratt1e1' 1t Y/Ds to be 
conceived of as J..Dd~.:?end'3nt of sc1ence and 1'1crals, but deeply lnvolved in 
bot! 1 1n 0 -,der -co J..nfor,, them, g1v:;_n;-:_ ·Lhen1 Q)ntent and holdJ...Tlf!, them togeth':!r. 
As an 1n0e.9C11dent d1sC.L:?line, l t; hs s 1 ts mrn cha1·acterlst1c, namely f_eelulf,, 
(1) Ibi~, p.xvi 
(2) ~' p. 73~f 
(3) Ibld, p. 31 
(t) E 
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vrhereas U:.e cha:ractel~lstlc cf science 1 s :t•erception a ri! thot of morals 
ach v1ty. ( 1 ) 
Feel1ng is not to be Vlewed as lea.J:;_n~ to subject1 Vlsm, nor 1 s 1 t 
tl:.e ach Vl ty of a lJartJ.cular f'acul ty: ( 2 ) rather it is 
"f'undamcntally nan 1 s af'£'ect1 ve response to i:i'le rel::Jtionsln,)s into 
Vffiic''l the ";!hole of human nstUl'e lS bound. II (3) -
It 1s an awareness of reb tJ..onslnps, a feehn.§, for the Dni ty of -the un1 verse, 
wh1ch exclcJ.cl2s indl·vJ.::!uallstJ.c et:·ncn and 11 object1 ve" science. It is the 
a\'TaTene;ss th. t 1nd .<.. V1.c1uals, vi,1ether _oeo·ple or obJects, stand in relation 
to one ::mother, os ~-·arts of a 'lvhole, Indeed sc1ence a:1d et.lncs oUI;ht not 
to be separated at all, .L'or Blthough -chey 111ay be drv'ided 1n contem:?lat.wn, 
yet 1n ..'_J::'actJ.ce t.'1e~r e]:.LSt together. 
"True scierlce 1s cot•lplete VJ.sJ.on; true 1wac-cJ.ce 1s culcure and 
art self-produc3d; h"'l.lE: rel1g1on 1..s sense and taste for the 
infJ.nlte. To ·1r1s.-_ to ~wve true sc1ence or true practice w"lthou.t 
reli~;1on, or to J.me~ine 1t .LS possessed 1s obstinate, a.To;ont, 
delusion and culpable er:;:or. 11' (i.J..) 
.All three spheres belong toc,ether, Ell though r eli2;1on, as is clear from 
SchleJ.ermacher's account, na:/a spec1al func l:J..on ·which un 1tes scJ.ence and 
morals. We should not1ce, too, th$t morals 1s not to be equated Slt~~ 
ViJ.th moral ph1losophy o:c' etlucs, but 1s concerneu 111tn all activity and 
can thus be spoken of as 11oul -.:;ure 11 1n 1 ts broadest sense. 
Rellglon as a feelJ.ng anCl taste for the infJ.nite hesihe function 
of relat:mg evprything ln the f1m te world to the Infinite, of e:xp ressing 
the Ul1l ty of real1 ty with l ts ground end ni til. it self. 
11
"il'hat 1s all sc1ence, if not the ex1stence of thi[1f';s 1n you, in your 
reason? ''hat 1s all ar-c and culture, if not your existence in the 
thinrrs to vrhich ;ou ;;>lve measure, forrn and order? .And how can both 
comeoto life 1n you except in so far as there lives 1mmedietely in 
you the etr:::rnal urn ty of Reason and Nature, the universal existence 
of all fuute -c;ll.illgs in ~..,he Inflm.te. 11' (5) 
(1) ~' p.45 
(2) .As MackiDtos"h. su gests (Types of l.Iodern_Theolo2JI;,P·49) cf, 
P ... R. Niebuhr: Schleiermacher on O:lrist and Rel1gion.p. 76n 
(3) Ne1buhr, ou. cit.p.181;cf.p.189 
(4) On RelJ.glon, p.39 (5) Ibid 
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We rnust be clear ih2 t SchleJ.ermacher does not tinnk of religion as 
a forrr. of natur.?lJ.stn or pantheism, as an emotJ.on of fear, awe or joy 
J.nsplred by tl1e Jna,;snltude of' tne unlverse or the rrnnutest detail of nature. 
RelJ.gion as a response lS provoked by th.::; eternal laws of the unJ.verse, 
u_ l'k1_icn is rerceived the perrc1eation of the Ho.rld by chvlnJ.ty. 'l'he la,vs of 
the um verse do lndeed lnspn·e a sense of the u1u ty of the whole, but 
&hleiermacher recommends that vre s.h.ould start not with nature, but with 
ou..r cvm lD.ner lJ.fe, in the searc!1 for "the sense of uru ty. ( 1 ) It J.s J.n the 
indlVldual that vre fi11d the awareness of the indJ.ssoluble um ty of all 
thlne?;s, lor the J..ndJ. vJ..dual ls a rnamfestation of huma1u ty, a mcrocosm in 
vlhlch the macrocosw lTia'' be dJ.scerned. From there, vre will learn to look 
at everytlnng as a lUlCl'ocosm and view all flnl te thJ.ngs as SlJlS of the 
Inflm te • ( 2) RelJ.f:J.On J.S seelnc; the Inflnl te J.n the .fJ.nl te .for the 
InflnJ.te is as near to us as our ovm heart. ( 3) 
In consequence of tlus view of rel ~ c9-oTh3 Schleiermacher J.s able 
to reE1ove some of the stumol1.11g blod;s of tradl tional relJ.gion. Re:bgi on 
can novr s-peal,_ of revelatlon and of nuracles wi thoctt embarl·asslP.ent or the need 
to become defensJ.ve, since a rrlira.cle lS rnerel=r an event vi'mcll J.S a si,~,n of 
tne InfJ.nJ.te, and an:r event; may have a claim to be a mita::;le. A sign of' 
the Ini'J.n1.te ls a revelatlon, as is any intuJ.tion and "orJ..<;i.Ylal feeling". 
Other erflbarrassin,g and problerrJDtlc features of tradl tional relJ.2;lOn way be 
clealt wi"tl~ J.n a simllD.c' way, includinr; inspJ.rotion, prophecy and stace. 
He argu·e:s that every sacred WTJ..tJ.ng ls a testimony, a 11 speakin2, monument" 
fran 11 the heroic tir-1e of relJ.E<,lon 11 , and that me relJ.gJ.ous man J.S one wtw 
has a livel3r u!ld2rstanding of J.t, but for tl13t reason, can do vnt.hout J.t. 
Thus he lS a-ole to lnclude the Bible vnthln !us frame>rro:'k, in a posJ..tJ_on 
. d. bl (4) to winch honour tJ1DY -oe accorded -,·l t wu t l t s beconn.ng J.n J.spensa e. 
( 1) ~' p. 71 
(2) Ibtta, p.88 
(3) ~' pp. 39, 79, 86 
(4) Ibld, pp.88-91 
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The Bl-ble is ti1e document of "the OhrlstHm rel1.c;lon, vvlnch 1s 1tself s1mply 
a concrete exm(jple of tl:.e e:;...'presslon of the appre~ens.ion of the Infinite 
by the human m1nc1. It lS true t.."l.at he goes on to argue that the O'nr1stian 
rehgion ls the superior 
exclus1ve pos.Ltlon. ( 1 ) 
form of relig1on, but he cannot grant it any 
The var1ous forws of re lig1on are merely wr1at:Lons 
to su::.t 1nd1viduals and rer11ain rel1g:wn in the same v:ray that the various 
for111s of mus1c st1ll remein mus1c. ( 2 ) 
Schlelermac'ler YTas aware that in speak1ng a c. he had done of 
rel1g1on and .:;spec:Lall~r in s-pealung of the f1n1te anu the Infin1te, he 
a:0peared not to be speakin.; of God at all. He bel1eved, however, thst 
such a charge would be unjust, for God .Ls tl1e h1ghest, lndeed, the only 
Unl ty., He vnll, therefore, have noth.tng to do w1 th any 11 nonn.nalistic 11 
conce1)t1on of God, for the 1dea of a personal God lS not to be clw1g to, but 
to be left belnnd. (3) 
F:mally Schle1ermacher shared lns conter(jporaries 1 antipathy tm-;ards 
theolo£>.;y v--:1ewed os a do2Jl1Gtlc system or as a system of doctrlnes. lhs 
ovm dogmat1c vrork, t::..eref01·e, cmnfor"ls wit::. ~11s outl1.ne of the idea of 
rel1g:1on to become a study of t~-le reb_glous self-consciousness - t}ce way 
in v.lt1icll awareness of cbsolute dependence lS man1festecl. Consequently 
Chl'ls"tlan 11fa1th-propos1tions 11 are 
"· ... conce')tions of Christ.Lan reli~1ous soul-states set forth 
in speech: 11 (Lf) 
and do~rDll t1c -cheolo:?;y is 
"· ... the sc1ence th8t systemot1zes the doctr1ne nrevalent 1n a 
O'nr:LStlon church at a e,r.ven tlfl1e. 11 (5) 
Do~mat1cs 1s thus anchored firml~- w:. tlun clce chl'l'ch, out at the same t1me, 
1t beclDtlles depr r1dent 2Jl'lrn8l'lly on the rel1g1ous self-awareness, so t.h.at 
(1) Ibid, pp.222 
(2) Ib1d, pp. 51, 173, 222 Ti.1e Ohr1stlan Fo1 th l9 (E.T • pp. 39ff) 
(3) On Rel1sion pp.94-99 Schle:Lernachc:r uses the \/o_·cl "anthro:pomo::cplnc" 
(L) 'rhe Oh::.·1stum Fa.tth I 15 (E.'r. p76) cf.Niebuhr op.clt.p.iLf-1 
(5) The OhrTstlan Folth I 19 (~.T. p.88) 
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tradl tlonal doct:Llncs ·TJus-t be treated as syrnbols for var1.cu s aspects of tlJ.at 
a·rareness :·i:lthe:l' thee as c.eekl£16 to •W3l:e 8SSertlOJ1S dll'ectl:r at-out ex'cerrwl 
real1ty. 'l'here 1s, t,J.erefore, no rootn fo1· ::1ny sola scr1ptura prlnclple, 
The essent1a l Ol"lentatlon, then, or~ Schle1er''1acl1er 1 s concc;?t of 
Tel1;;,::1on ls cle21·: l t lS -c'-:.e :_Jerceptlon of bw lfl ..flDJ te u1 clle :;:~i.m .. te, 
the .L eelin~ or .:r.ra:"en'.':- ss of b:e c.nl ty oi' tl:1e unlVeJ..' se, of' ,-!GlC l ve 8l'e 
r•1ost lti:l•-eClla'cel-- consClL•1..1S ·when 1re exaunne ot..n:-selv;Ss. ·.re S")e ourselves 
.. 'fe heve a "sense of absolute 
dependence." 
I:;:' ve call SchleleYP1ac.l8r a ri\)Stlc, we 1,1ust lJe su:·e of tll.e sense 
Ee uses the r;yst::...ct:l a_:Jproac.h not to escape but, by lookir1;; Ln"to the 
de:;)ths cf 1,1ar- and of no Lu:ce, "co }Jercer;e tl:.c: true uffi t;'/ of all t'~ lll.fl:S "il tl1 
the universe and of t:w srjlf •ntn all oth;r coc1c2ete objec-cs lD orde:.:- to 
~·:coduce ooth a lJ..fe .1.~or scnence and a coctent for urr.oral.-.:: 11 • 
Rcll~::..ou ~-.-es ti.1e conce~)t he used to ::,: .. ve 3Ub-
stance to botn. YTe tna-; sa-r that he y-ished to be vrnat Tilllch Fou ld call 
'.'le flrx1 t!l.c"t 'J'J..lllch end Scll..lelermacher sna-"e a co,mnOL1 apolo2,et1.c 
religion 
interest. Botn vnsll to corwcen.d / -co 1. ts cul tu1·ed desp1.sers. In 
Schleiel·woc!J.er 1 s case tt1e cultured desp,_sers vrel"e the dlsc-Lp:B s of 
Herder, Goethe, rant and F-LChte, in Tilllch 1 s the:r ere the rhsClples of 
cll..e empll'lC8l nethod of mat!1ematJ..cal ph::','SlCSe 'l'illich c1oes not -~,i..sh to 
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dls:pcnse with emJ?irlcal s clence any more than Schleler!I18cher dld; he 
iilsl'les, rathe!·, to cebte lt to lts context ln tr1e vrhole of reallty. 
He shares Schlelermocher 1 s convlction. of the valldl tv of both science 
and culture, but llke Schleien•wcher, wan.ts to dentonstrate the emptiness 
of' a culture separated from J'ehgion. He observes, i:i1e::-efore, thot it was 
11 a lJ'lsLmCle::·stanoln;; of Schlele::"r'lach.er 1 s defEli tion of r':'llgion 
('the fecll.ng of absolute de_Jendence') and a sym_ptom of religlous 
vreakness when successol's of Schleiermacher located rellglon ln the 
realm of feellnt:, as one psychologlcal func Lion among others. 11 ( 1) 
Schleiermacher 1 s concept ofrellgion lS, accordin.e; -to TillJ_ch, close to 
":hat Tlllich lllmself ca]s 11ul tunate cancer n Bbout the ground and meanlng 
of our being11 • FeelJ.ng is not a psychologlcal functlon but 
"the awareness of that -;·knc:1 transcends lntellect and will, 
subject and object. 11 (2) 
Tilllch lS close to descrl-binc; feelln;;:~ as an awai eness of' the U11l ty of 
the flm te and the Infll1l te. He does ,1ot use these vrord::., however, 
but s,!_)eal:s J.nstead, in lns early 1mrk, of the condi tloned and the 
Uncondl tlonal. Nevertheless, he l s concerned, like Schlelerma cher, 
to br:ing to consciousness a sense of the unl ty of ever~r lndi VJ..duDl entity 
with everythuJ.g else, so that the meartlng of those lndlVldual entlties 
wa·• be revealed in relatlon to each other, and also,. so that the 
UnconchtlOned ground of meanlng ma3r break through. It lS Tilhch 1 s 
conVlction as rnuc~1 as .Lt was Schleiermacher 1 s, t:'l~t sclence, of •.~hatever 
sort, lS 2n empty concept and cu 1 ture a dead form, wi t11out a s onse and 
taste for tne Inflnl te, the Uncor'l.dl tloned [;round of all being. 
In lns discussion of the e•npirical sClences he does not seek to 
demonstrate directly thelr conne ctlon wit:,_ the Uncondl tlonal. .Rather he 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
ST ,I,p.18, of. p.170 
Ibid, p.4 7 Tllllc,'l does crl ticise Schleierr1B cher, howeve:r, for 
trylng to 11derl ve all contents of the Chrlstum fal th fron1 what he 
called the 1rellglous consclousness 1 of the Ch:rlstlan 11 "because thlS 
lt,nores the fact t:'l.at ttw datD of the Chrlstlan faith nre not fcund 
in exporlence out 2,lVen in 1-nstory (Thid, p.47f) 
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seek.:, to shovr fll'st thelr J.nterconnectlons on the basis of their objects 
and re thod s. It ..LS '.T.+>.en he co,'1es tc chscuss the culturol sclences 
that he takes the further stelJ of seeklng to relate ever;rtl!ing to tl-}e 
Uncond l tlonal. The cul tul'al science~ thus, root tr1e whole of scientlfic 
and cultural llfe l£1 the Uncon:h t..Lonal, ln o.::'der thot meanlng s.hould break 
through. 2ell&.,:t.on ls tl1.e s eel:J.ng of t'1e Uncond..L tJ.of1al lll hle conditioned, 
and grace lS the breal=ttrout;l1 of t11e U,lConC! j_tlonal. ( 1) 
It IS espec2.ally '"J.. t 11 respect to cul1-ure i.hat the conceot of' 
relJ.sion lU em:plo~red; lndeea they are so closely bound togethe_,_ , that 
Tllllch dlf!.t~lnes them in ten1JS of e3c_l-} other: 
11T?:3llglon ls the dlrecteclness of the s_olrl t -tm-ra cds uncondl tioned 
meamn:J;, cultu:c"e ~s me dlrectedness of' tlle spJ.rlt to,7ards 
cond_L tloned forn1s. But botl1 n1eet ln the..Lr be..LYJE, dll'ected 
towards tl!e coll1plete unl ty of ~'orn1s of r1e onlng, vrhlch for 
cul tm·e J..S the en<J, but for l'e:i lglon a sym-bol both affJ..rmed and 
denled 1'rom the st Ell1d 0olnt of t11 e Uncond_Ltlona l . • • Rc h[,.Lon .l s, 
the1efore, not a func-clon of mei:il1lllg olon~s..Lde oLh-:ol"s.u 
"Culture .Ls the fo:::'l•' of eJ:&·esswn u.f relJ2-lon, 2nd rell.e,lon lS 
""u~.1e suostance of cultu~·e.ii (2) 
be in; tl~e vehlcle of' tv:; c;:;::t;resslon of t~_e Dnconcl.'-tlonal, for as l1.e 
wrote later: 
11 Rell2,lon, ll~:e God, is onll1.ipresc.nt; lts IJresence, ll1'e t_:.ct of God, 
can neve:..' be forzotten, neglected, ClenleCl. But l t ls al- rays 
effect:r_ve, Z::,ll.>in,s lDeX<1.austJ.ble de-Jt'' to hfe, ond lnex:':.1austible 
mean1-ng m ev--;r-:I cultul'8l c:..·eatlon. 11 (3) 
(1:. C'-.·.T.,I (Rph). p.33~ ~ p.82f); G H,I 
(2) Hy tran2.lotlon: w;r,I,(~), p.329, ('dR 
Th~ol.Cul, p.L:..2. 
(3) Era, Introductwn p.xl f; cf p. xlri 
11 , ( YTR.. p • 1 50f ) (UbeJ'VD.ndune;), p. 3867';?2..S'slm 
p. 72f); cf 'f.R.(XTC),p.165, 
-OOSSl'olo to P._'_",Y''_rl' ?nee .._,,e -,'-'_olJ-r t "' n t t 
-- '" _-- - vL -L !1ln cne I lnl e, o .9'''l'Cel "V8 Jc}le 
Unconc1:::.. tlonr. 1 -""l -LhJ n tl1e o::md '- tionGd. ( 2) 
Uncondl"tiom:l, t'::l?t. l3 to say, 
•Mf bec011~· a re ve lc' tio,1 Of 1 f .. Tr}C)1" .lhP"rP 
- -~ --- ----~ 
a _llcll'ado:clcal irrunanence of the transcendent rn -thln the fjnl te. There 
can, "'Chel"efo:_e, be ,10 splJ -" betvreen a l1DtUr3l ond A supsrnatural vrorld, 
nor be"b-reen a profane end a sacred sphere. (.3) 
lS 
~tel:tg:wn lS, theref'ol'e, not s:tn19ly the oc.'lentat:L.on of' the SJJlTl t 
It lS not one fu clb.ctlon of H1e 
hu,_\911 E>_:Jiri t alon,:_.s~de othe~·s bu""G~ ln Tllllcb 1 s ovm words "the dlmenslon 
The '-'elEJ-clons(np t!Wy, lndeed be s)oken of 
It l_S thls \Po-fold conce~'tion of' rellg:ton, EJS perce::;tion ano cs 
a sence of bein;s gras_pecl, lJ:::: t L)l'OVJ_cJes tl1e hnk bet-vrcen the tneoretlcal 
Cul-:ure 
ln t'1e broo<Jest sense lncludes boti1 serles, as ,.,JLill SchlelerL13cher 1 s loea of 
cultu:c·e, (5) ::me'! Tel..'.-glon yt'oVldes, Vla the ftm.ctlon of weta_h:rslcs anc:i ethlcs, 
the connectlon of all t,'le functlons '•'l tu che UnconC: :_tlonal. .A theolo2,y 
of culture, tDerefore, prooos'::s to lay ba_·e the Uncond.l tlonal I'll tlnn the 
concht2.oned cultural forr13, 11hlc~: lS .]l'3Clsel~r '''L1at 'l'illlC~1 Was attetiip"Ll:rlf, 
·---------------
( 1) 
(2) 
(J) 
(4) 
(5) 
cf, 11il'"hat lS vT.con,; ·JJ..Jch tl'":.e Dlalectlc 'lneology? 11 JR, vol.15 (1935) gp.127-
1l.t.5, "A ? .. Ennter:~:n·etatlon of the D::>ctrlne of the IncarnDtlon" Church , 
~r~erl:z_~~ri:::vl vo1.147 (1949).,p.137 clted by K. Osborne Hew Being,p.1b2n 
cf,'l'b.e FUture of Helit,lo~, p.86 
cf, Osborne: Nevr Being,:p.80ff 
lneoJ.Cul. p.6f; T.P.T., p.337 
Tilllch p:_~oposcs to understancJ Schleiermacher' s ''Handeln" as ''phllosophy 
of culture", ST,I, p.34 
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is made up not sirl::ly of forr·1 and conten-:;, but olso has a tronscendent 
refe,"ence vil1lch Tlllich l'efers to as 11 lrnyo.rt 11 or 11 substance 11 • Every 
object polnts beyond l tself, el thou~/' -t..l-J.ere al"e some thct do so mo1·e 
obVlousl::,· an(; n101'e a de qu:1 tely. Thus h.Ls enthus_ a~:n for the E:x:presslonlst 
school of D.L't ls Cue tu vrha t he percc.l ves to be the suborchna tlon of fol'm 
and content to 1.ile :llt1~'ort .knell th:."usts thl"ough the paintings of tl-J.e school. 
11IIot a transcendent •rorlc.l is depicted as in the art of the ancients 
but the transcendental reference ll1 things to that v;hlch lles 
beyond the<" ls e:>p ressed. tt (1) 
Import Joes not l:n:eak thrcqgh all cultural foTms J.n the same vmy. 
Indeed, unless culture lS conscious of ltE. O"'n 11 ttlansceDdental :ceference 11 
l t .Ls llkely to become autonomous, Uwlf.is to say, collce:.."ned merely with 
l tself as forrt. It may even b ecotne: heteronomous, dominated either by 
the form of another age, and therefore not true to ltself, or b;,- some 
prlnclple vrhlc•c has rslsed a false clDirr to ultlmacy, such as natlon.allSTn 
and eccleslasticism. 
Till:wh never abandoned lns theories on the lnterpenetration of 
rel.Lglon ano culture, ( 2 ) nor thelr ontological :9resupposlt.lons, but he 
met oonslclerable di.Lflcul ty in usln,S tllem for lns apologetic purposes. 
Culture lS not slmpl~r t..heonomous: it r'1ay, as ln ex-presslonlsm, or in the 
soclal structure of early LhdcUe Ages, ello·-r llll~Jort to break th..rough, but 
l t ma;r also be autonomous o:::' even heteronomous. It lS not posslble, 
therefo:-:·e to make D sim~le a)peal to the rellgJ ous substance of culture. 
Culture l'eqt.nres to be lnterpl'e ted and crl tlclsed. The capltalJsm and 
empElcism wh.Lch dornnate the interpretation of The Religlous Situahon 
are subJected to i:>Uch crlticlsln. Hevertheless, Tlllich 1 s early _tJeriod 
(1) Rel.Lgious Sltuation, p.88; cf \VR (ITO), p.169; Ultinl8te Concern, p.40; 
TI1eol.Cul, p~.71ff 
(2) cf On the Boundary, pp 68ff; Theol Cul. pp.40-67 
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J.s cnaracterJ.sed by -~m.at he himself' descrJ.bes as a romantlc attJ.tude. 
The artJ.cle J.!1 RehgJ.on in GeschJ.chte und Gegenvrart suggests a slor.rly 
grovnng awareness of i:he over-simplificatJ.on of his J.nterpretatJ.on of 
c·.1ltural forns, but lt vras not untll hJ.s move to America and -':.he catastl'ophlc 
effects of the Second VTorld \'Tar, t..h.at he was fJ.nally compelled to l'eview 
hls over-optJ.nustic assessment of' cul tul'e. He was forced, then, to come 
to terms Yd. th vihat he descrJ.bes as a nevr 11mood of the end 11 , a nevr pessJ.rrusm 
( 1 ' Yiholly resJ.stant to lns lffll1£4 DtJ.cJ.slll. ) From tlns sJ:;rin6 hls post-•var 
analyses o.f t11e 11 sJ.tuation 11 as interpreted by the varJ.ous .fo:rms of cultural 
eX'_9ressJ.on. Damnatins them all he fJ.nds an interpretation of exJ.stence 
wtnch ls control led by a sense of dJ.sjunction, isolation and estrangelf1ent. 
His ado1t2on of the tc:;rm "Ultimate Concern" ls slgnJ..flcant,, 
therefm·e, not s:.m:ply because hls 111ove to .Amerlca requJ.red a substl tute 
f'or the unlD.telllgible term "the Uncondl tlooal 11 , but because J. t lS 
susceptible of the 1ri.der J.nterpretation requJ.red by the va.nety of cultural 
Some cultural fonDs :c-ef'lect m~m's "Ultimate Concern", hls 
rclc, -Llon to t'ce Ur1condJ. tional. Some, hov1ever, do so onl~- J.n a negative 
sense: they substJ.tute other things .'or ''hat s.hould be their ultimate 
concern and elevate them to a posJ.tlon of ultJ.macy. 11Ul tlllia te Concern" 
also has the advantage to suggesting a sub,jecti ve reference, consisting ln 
t~~e indlVJ.dual 1 s or group's' a1,prehensJ.on of Vihat lS the.Lr ultJ.mate concern. 
Faith 
state 
lS tbe genulne app:::·ehensJ.on of one's ultJ.mate concern, J.t lS the 
of b einc, ul tlma ~ely concerned. ( 2 ) 
Tilllch rnodifles, but does not abandon fus romantlCJ.Slt1• rte 
retaJ.ns tlus element ·;~ucn he lnheri ted from SchleJ.ermachcr and Schelling, 
but he also learned th8 t tll e slrnple rorwnt1cism of Schleiermacher and 
o:>.' t..f'le nature phllosophy of Schellin2: uas inadeqLwte. The 11sJ.tuatJ.on 11 
(1) "RehE.LOD and SeculB-r Culture", JR, val. 26 (1946), p.82f' 
(2) Dynanncs of Fal th p. 1 
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as ex.9ressed bJ cultural forms requlred the lJOSl tl ve :p:nlosophy of 
SchellJ.ng for 1. ts lDt::ororetatlon i:1 terttlS of allenation Bnd estran6el!lent. 
However, posltJ..ve plnlosophy cDnnot exist on J..ts ovm: exlstentJ..alJ..sm 
(posl tl ve p!nlosophy) .cequ2res essentlalJ..sm (neg8tl ve phllosophy) l!1 order 
to ll8ke any statement at all, even c-bout enstence. (~!) To be able to ask 
questions about existe11ce 1.s t?lreaay to h1:1ve an inklJ.ng of thelr answer 
precJ.sel;r because exJ.stentlBllsm cannot eXlst Wl Lhou t essentJ..aliso,. because 
t'IJ.ere cannot be cstran;emsnt vn ttwut a -t_)revlou s uluon. 
We turn, now, to the consequences of TillJ..ch 1 s Vl8Vls on re liglon 
first, thelr conse!J!.uc:nces i'o::' :1is VlCW of' t'1e .,. ellglons of the 1 Jorlc1. 
llcco:c"ilin6 to 1'illlcl1 ~l_Lmself, l t '1WS t1e lnfluence of SchleJ.ermacher 
of 1Dt: Uncond1 tlona l ar-cCJ t'1e .L'•:;ll2,lons as concrete exp-cess 1.ons of t':-lclt 
~-,erceJ?ilOn. ( 2) Conscq_ue _l t.Ly' c:e "laic'ltalnS 8 posl tlOfl Ve'l.' 7 Sli!lllar to 
Ee clao.slfJ_es the l''arlcJ • elJ.6ions 
accordlD~ to r]J..ffe:c"e.D-'u cr .L -uerJ..a, bul .llS b D slc J!OSl tlon lS c,he salfle as 
bec::use l t beco •·'3s heteronornou.s ln the ,9rocess. 
u ••• the cr.L tlcal !)I'lflclple, Yn tlnn j :::l:Li;,lOi1 fo1:blcls the limlt:LJ16 
of :i clL·J on to 8YlV exlstln~ f.-:r · 1 of rclJ..gio'.lS devotlon; .l t mm, 
2 n the ~t2 ,n.e. of r'3ll~lon, take; a:;:,rs ae:ol11st rellglon as l t ls 
actualJ,r .Jro~tlsea." (3) 
.All l'ellllon lS 8·1 e.Xl_J.Cession of the a·rra:c en::;ss of the UnconolJclonsl 
------·---------... ~-(i) "Rehtlon of :i,Ieta::~hyslCS 2::1d Theolo,;y 11 , P.eVle-,v of 1Ietap!l,:lSl~, vol. 10 
( 1956) p. 63; cf abo 11Ti1e Ha-::ure snd SJ.._;mi'lcance of E.as tent.Lahst 
thou~l:_t 11 , Jou::n81 of E.nlo~~' vol.53 (1956), P· 742f:. 
(2\cf The ~Rehgious S.Lt~abon, p.215; The Futur·o; of Behglons, :9.84f 
r-/\ '1\m=m+;P+h ?'~Pn+l~:;o-;r 'Pn,onln0''1 "ll'l t.\lP. 1'i::J1n_n;:. vol. II. n.101 
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and estran;suent concorfil tent yri t '. l~uman tc;x::Ls-'cence u1ll :Je overco1.1e. 
the Ne·•r B"ing lD tl-v:; shape of transformed real2ty, in a lustor::ccal}.J:!.'ocess, 
of t!1e negBtlOl1 
("-round of Being E' lone. 11 ( 1) 
lln:nanentE:l ou1ce_- llon of relJ.gJ.on excludes any e:;:c'wtalo&., "Leal ~Jel'S{?ectl ve, 
but the.ce remains Lhe b el.Lef ex)ressed by both of tl:.em thl:'t every concrete 
thCJt tlle ]estern fmrms and, ,,,ore especially, C:'1rl stlanl ty, a:::e su~erlor. 
!1as l ts mos-'c adequc.te e:x;pression. Tb.et ls not to say, i1ovrever, trwt othel' 
rebgions llDve r.:.o :;. eveli'·hon, for Tlllic:~ stands fu·ml;• b3T the colV'_CtJ.on 
thet 11 revt::latory e:t;:p erJ.ences arc unJ.versally l1LUiwn". ( ~) 
11 RelJ.sions are -based on sornethlng thct lS ,SJVen to a ·•·an vrherever 
he lJ.ves. He lS given a revelat1on, a part1cula:c kin.d of 
ex_per1ence -dhlolo 1mpl1es soVln£; poHers. 11 (3) 
ca_!. co, nte_l.ance only D dialo::.,ue Yil t:-1 otl1er reli;s1ons, not proselytls n or 
cros~-fertil1sotion. 
"A mxtu:c'e of l' '::llg.Lons destroys 1n eac0 of tneP1 the concreteness 
•·rlnd: gl ves it dynEL''lO po•ver. The Vlctor;:l of o!le :.~ellS,lOn 
v-ould lnToose a oarticulor rel1gions answer on all other 
uartJ cul~r answ~rs. 11 (L~) 
( 1 ) S'r, II ,p .1 01 
(2) The FUture of ?.ehgions, p. 81 
(3) Ilnd 
(4) Ohn.st• a~ __ an0 t1~e ?..:~'E_i.er ~.r:__ th~-~~orld Rellg~oDs, _p.96 
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Not only is l'n.s VJ.ew of "the conCJ:ete ::'el.Lgions essentlally the 
sa,ne as thot of SchleJ.ertnaclJ.cr ~ but also his VJ.ew of revel2 tlon and~ -vre 
may say, of the Blble~ for tr1e Blblc lS the reco:cd of the revelBtlon received 
by t,1e early Chrlst.Lans 2nd an~r other sBcred oook may have the same yOsltlon 
Hl th respect tc tl-e ~,::."oup Ul t:1 -,n-ncl-1 l t ls assocla ted. 
F-.com thls~ too~ s_prln.=s hls some1vhat ambivalent attltucle to the 
It ls never ~~Ul te certaln whether 
ChrJ.stc_anlty cc-n do w_~_thout the events of the Gospels; on tne one i1ard 
there a9pears to be the Vlew~ expressed ln the 1911 theses that 
" the Chrlstian cannot llve as lf every l!1ornl.'1g the mail might 
bting nerrs of hlstorlcal re::>earches vitn.ch dlsc~·ech t the llirlstum 
f 2 l th. Itt ( 1 ) 
On t.~e oth::l hand, hov.rever, theL'e ls the cla:un th.ot the event on 'VDlch 
G"J.r:_stlarnty ls based~ Jesus of Nazareth~ is 6J-Ven J.n history ( 2) and 
eztended arwment trw t the pJ.ctu:ce of Jesus i::,l ven ..LD tt1e BJ.ble must 
( 7.' 
correspond to a reallty. ;;) On TJ.llich 1 s own argurr1ents~ what matters 
~llS 
lS 
the truth of ine lnslght receJ.ved, of ttw revelatlon of ChristumJ.ty, not 
the a ctua 1_ events or the concrete ~-'er sons or -ch.Lngs through wr1om the 
revela tlon vras lnedlated. Inasmuch as lt is one revelction among tnany, 
the events are umm1)ortant~ but lnasmuch as ChrJ.stiani ty J.S a concPete 
rellgJ.on~ the events !11ust be saJ.d to have ta~:en place~ or there "rould be 
no Chrls tHml ty. 
llicr eover, Tlllich has a specie] reason for J.nsJ_s tlns, on the 
hlstorlc..Lty of the 'cJe::cson of Chrlst~ for "'J.e lS t11e pa.radlgn of the 
reallsBtlon of the New Belng. In CJ.1rl st, humanl ty is fully UDl ted Yil th 
In Chrlst there Fas transformed 
(1) D.D.Williams: Interpretlng Theology 1918-1952 (London~ SCM Press, 1953) 
p.105 
( 2) S1' , I ,p. 48 
S'l',II,p.112ff, cf Kelsey's onalysls of TJ.llcch's argument and the fund-
amental self-contradJ.ction lnvolvBd J.n lt (The Fabrlc o~ Paul T~lllc~ 
Tneology, pp.91ff) 
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real1ty; 1 t has actuolly happened 1n Chrlst. Chr1st1ans may tlJ.c~·efore 
stand by the.tr beli~f in t~e couung of tne Neu Being. Nevertneless, it 
is til.e power that breaks t11rougn the J?icture of Jesus as the Christ offered 
ln the New Testament thst :t s 1m~ortant to us, the 1m~ort that breaks tln·ou,;h 
botll. the forn and the oontent, for unless we rece1ve Jesus as the Chr1st 
as the bearer of the Hew Be1n3,, and so rece1 ve the impo1·t, he lS not i:he 
Chr1s-c at all. 
i'lhen Vis turn to t1ce qucst1on of the rel2tion of tLe fin1 te to the 
Inf1mte -.re f1nd, as •-re have already not1ced, thet he has to take accClunt 
of t>l.e eleJllent of estran2,emer1t. Consequently, the ontolog1cal sche111e u1tn 
vi"i.nch he -,vorl:s speaks not s11nply of tne Inf1nite and the f1nite, but also 
of f1fnte be1nc2, Cleveloped under -che condJ t1ons of ex1stencc, winc~1 produces 
d1stortions so th2t things are not as they ou1:;~1t Lo lJe. Everytlnng lS 
seyal"ated frolil 1 ts essence, and so also I' rom 1 ts Ground. Existence has, 
therefore, a Vcc;ry Gl?eC13l rn:::an1ng, closely ak1n to tile tne2n1ng [:;,1 ven to ::;_ t 
by Scnell1ng,, so t1:12t 1t :-.s 1111poss1ble to v1cw 1 t except 1n negatr.re tel'ms. 
It 1s not to be confused '\7l t;l. f1n1 tude, vrh1ch lS at lea.s t a neutra~ 1f 
not a 00od concept. 
"It 1s not f1n1 tude as such tlla t 1s s1nf'ul, s1nce f:un tuc1e l'eflers 
both to essence and ex1stence. The pos1 t1 ve clemc.nt 1n the fin1 te 
essence Tcrialns the ?)oOO. i actor, not the s1nful factor. .Ac-cual1sed 
c::ceation and estr.s£l2,ed ex1.stence are ld'~ntlc2l 1!1 the se11se thbt they 
a1·e found toi;ethc:::r necessar1ly - necessal'1ly because ex.Lstence has 
only one n'ean.tns:;: uls cort1on cr estnmgement. 11 ( 1) 
Over against t''e InfJ_n1te Ground of Be1ng i:s f:llnte being, but 1t 
ma'' be Vle''red from two po2nts of Vlew, frou1 c;'1e po1nt of VleW of esse11ce 
of 
or7ezis-rence. Tillich :r ecogn1ses t':'le g,nb1gul ty of bo-ch words, Ylhlch 
rests 1n tl-::.e fact t:1at both have two bas1c n£3n.tng. Essence can r ef er 
e 1tl2er to t0.e nat\Jl'e of a thl!l.g ''1thout ony wluation of 1t, or it can be 
a valuat1on: 1t cc-n, 1n ot1:1.::-r -,,oros, nave an el•1_9ll'lcal or a nortna-c1ve sense 
(1) Osbornej Nevr B•::lng p.119 
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vli18t ls or vrhat ouc;ht tc "be the case. Sinularly, ex1stence can have an 
ell1p1r1cal or a nor,nat1ve senc,e, descTJ_bing t•1e actuality OJ.~ a tlnng or 
1ts departu.ce from t~1e norm. ( 1 ) Till1ch 1 s ovm use of the -b.-o ;-rords, 
llmveve:c-, 1s restr1ctod alrflost ent1rely iD the nor,r.atl ve or evaluative 
sense. J3e-bre'='n essence as i.l1-·t •·nlch ought to "be the c2se and eXJ..stence 
as that v.rlr!lCO lS th.e case, tnece st:Lll re•.1a1ns firute "being, ensiJ.ring 
c:1a t tJ.O ·rever dlstorted a tl:. -n1.:;: •11ay "b:;ro 1ne, 1 t still retains 1 ts l'el? t1on 
It a1;pears, i1m-rever, tll.o i Llle trans1-c1on fror,1 esse11ce to ex1stence 
- "' 
- v '1ecessary( 2) lf TTJaL 1s 1-o actual1se t11s essence 2nd to l'eall ·~e ll..l..S 
freeCiom: 
II IIan's oell13, lS clut onl-:,r 1udoen ll1 1)lC Cl'eatlve ;:,round of the 
d1'Y'1.ne l1i'e; it 1s also tnatlJ fest to 1 tself and to otl•cr l1fe \'TJ. th1n 
ti1a Y~nolc~ of' rcal1ty. I.lan -loc:s e1:1ct, 81!.0 :--1s eY~s"\.ence lS Cliffe >ent 
from tns '~ssence. Man 0110 the rest of -c "'al1t3r are D...ot only 1 1ns1oe 1 
the ~;rocess of the dJ.v'l11e 1:-...C"O, but Dlso 'ou GE'lc1e 1 lt. Ean5.s 
~rou.:-H:Ied 111 1t, bL.t 11e 1s not kept "ltrn.n t~1e f.:.'oLmd. liar llc;:., left 
the ,:::,::·ound 1n orde~: to 'stand L•pon' ~nrr1self, to actL'al1sc. -,-hCJt he 
essenheJ ly 1 s, ln order to be 1'1111 !_~ freed~~!' · (3) 
But thcs t:ransl bon fl"Oll1 ·~ss~nce to e:a.stence lS 1.-Gself t~1e fall, so l.'G 
:~ee,1s -;:;ru,t the fBll ,r1ust take .:;lace 1f <.an lS to De man. In defence of 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
11ThJ s 1.:3 the -JoJ.r_t a G IT~llCLl the doctr lne of' C:' eatlon a no t~e 0 outr_~_ne 
of tll e fall jo w. I-'c ls "G e t'lO s-v Cliff1cul t and tne r.-os\ldlalectlcal 
TJO:L11t J n t 1e doct.L'l,_e or' crea-b.on. A{la, as ever:- ex1stenc1al 
~{laly::::.s cf i)1e !.'.UI:J.8•l s1 tu~tlo·-" s~wvrs, :Lt lS ~:~e 'nst l'l'jsterl.ous 
no.L:::tm t'L "-- ::::nel'l.ecce. .F'uJl>; developed Cl':O:JCUI'8]ln3ss lS 
";., ll r CJ"An.Lll--cl-ll.n"'~~ II (I ) 
.1:8 ~-~n ~o!, .c.~ ~"'"'• '+ 
T_~_lllcb's adc•_:_>tJ0!1 of the evaluatJve u::;e cf essenc3 and ex1stence 
8:1', I,!). 225f 
i.e. tn 1·t ..:_t J s o 11e1-Lt2l' of los,:Lcal necess1ty. T1ll1c'1, hm1ever, 1s 
some '1-wt u.ncleal' ·:)ecause of "tee -.-ay 111 'rlnc.l he vravers be-bneen lo[:,lcal 
descrrotlon and e'r2ll'jcol desc1'1ption. (cf J.Fe)T'.roou Thowas, Paul 
Tilllch: An Ap_pra:Lsal, p.125f) 
--------- ·----
_ST ,I,p. 283 
Ibld, p.283f 
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Oper"rJ anr~1 c~lso •"P.tYOVPS -;·]~,P. 0U 0 "-LlOn f 1' · d th "ll l -0 - n - - - V--- l ~;:, v 0 s 11 9 n e I D ' D s '1 [l ::1 b-:; en 
frequentl~r not1ced, f::'olll be1.ng an etlnca l and voll tlon.al question to ·being 
an ontolo~lcal ~uestlon. ( 1) 
It foll01vs, Lhen, that l'llllch prefers to th1nk of God also 1n 
ontolobJ.csl terms, a'3 the G1·ound of Bel£1_:, ol' as Belnes-Itself, since for 
1'J.lllch tile l'Jost funC::amcntal quest1on ihat can be asked .LS t':e quc;stlon of 
Being, the q_u·~stlon about t.l.e rel8tionslnp of th.e J.ndlVJ.dual actuallsation 
of Bei n.b to l ts infJ.nl t e G:::·o o nd. 
"God 1s Bc:anz-Itself11 , _<_Ji"lor to all essence ano ex1stence. ( 2 ) Existen.ce 
c13nnot be ~_)redlcatec1 uf God, for t,ro reasons. In the f1rst pJa ce, one 
cannot speak of Goa as a beint::, for he YO uld, then, be s1.rrrply one being 
among otheL·s, even .Lf he were re~arded as a su:_)reme be1ng. A be1ne: 
possesses f:::.nltuoe; to Clesc-c-l0e God as a being, 1s t11elefo1·e to 1nvolve 
oneself 111 a self-ccntradlction. Secondly, existence cannot be predlcated 
of God because uf t:1e s~K"!Clsl, evaluative nean1n.g g1ven to ti1e ··,old 
"e~{lstence 11 • It csnnot 1Je sa1rJ that Goa lS separated fl"Olfl h1s essence, 
so 1 t cCJn,l.o1. be sald ti:l8t God ex1sts: it can only be s:nd of God that 
he .LS Bell-.tg-Itself. 
But lf God _,_s Be1ng-Itsclf, vhat 111USt '\fe may of the tradJ.tlonal 
conce:;?tion of God of 01r:::..stJ.anl ty l!l personDl terms? Tlllich 1 s solutlon 
to the Jroblem of ·-ihat he re:;ards,wi t_l. sreat cllsta<te, as a nol!D.nallst 
conce-_•tion of God ( 3) is that ontology absorbs personallsm and as such lS 
p.cloJ' to 1. t: 
" ••• beinE, ana ·oe rson are not contrad1ctory concepts. 
gersonal being; J.t does not deny it. The ~roum uf 
gyound of 2ersonal bein3;, not l ts negatlon. 11 (4) 
Being lncluCles 
being is the 
------------------------
( 1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
e.g. J.He:Trrood Tho11as, .Appralsal,p.126; Osborne New Being,p.180. Osborne 
however lS nrong to descrlbe the concept of sin as more ontologlcal than 
theolo,slcal, slnce Tillid1 Foulc1 s-:-e l1ttle d1fference. It should also 
~otlced thBt Tllllch does recognlse the rontrlbution of the concept 
of sln 1n ernphaslsing "the .Jel"sonal act of turnJ.ng away" (ST,II,p.52f) 
ST ,I,pp. 21S1ff 
cf "What lS 'Jrong rd. th the DlalectlC Theolo3~"? 11 ID::., 
Rellgion & SeculAr Culture, JR,vo~.26 (191f) p.85 
8 
vol.15l193~,p.137; 
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If we ask about the stB-cus of such terms as God, sm and so on, 
ue f2nd trw t v.re hs ve effectl vel~r turned full circle, to brliJg oL'rsel ves 
back to the conc::;_otlon o1' theology offered lll tne Svste1n of _§_ci~. 
flnally declded, "'S to 'rheth·3r the statement that God lS Being-Itself 
is or lS not ~ S}'mbollcal and also the c1uestLon of vrhether ontolog,lcal 
stBte,•·er~is are t!lc•I1clelves ~ya1bol2cal or llteral, "re f:tnd that theology 
hss a role Blongs:tde that of r:etap:-:yslcs, nar1ely that of 11representlog 
the sprci t 11 of t~:e orlg,:tnal documents and transferr:tng 1 t to the r1odern 
lfilnd. Theolo,!,;'- has tne role of :colo tins t11e la ngua.;e of the _?erceptlons 
of a lXll'tlcular group to that of t~1e m.odern 'ID..nd, wn:tch for Tlllich 
.?~;pears to toean relot1.0g lt to tl1e heirs c.£ class2cal philosophy. The 
connecting ~Jolni.. rests _u1 t11e fact t..l-18 t t..l-J.e:r a:te bot~: concerned -.-'l th 
Since rellglou s sy,,ibols have 
to be e:;p l:tcateC! to rJI'lt1f', to l2ght thelr ontolo;;_Le<.lJ reference, ue must 
-108-
CHAPTER 'lliREE 
'lliE STRUCT1JE"lli OF THEOLOGICAL METHOD 
We have, so far, at-';;empted to understand the prec~se role 
ass~gned to theolog_v by Tlllich and to bnng to l~ght the ontolog~cal 
conv:tctions Yrl-1 ~ch :mform h~s v~evrs. We encountered SOule d~f'f.Lculty 
because of the lack of cons~stency ~n hls account of the nature of 
ph~loso:9hy, but OL'r ~nvestlgBtions lead us to the conclus~on that ~t 
~s tt1.e tas~( of theology to engage ln what n19y tentatlvely be descr~bed 
as a translat~on of t:.YJ.e rellB,ious sy-mbols of the Chl"~stlan Church lnto 
the lant;uage and thought forms of contemporary ~nterp1·etatlons of human 
ex~stence ("the s~tuatlon"). 
The ph.Llosoph~cal lnvestigohon of t1c; structure of Teahty 
(the dis~lpl~ne of :9hilosophy) ~s ~}rovoked by the philosophical 
attitude of radlcBl enqulry, but l t provokes in turn the ph~losophical 
att~ tude of a search for -c[1e answers to the problems encountered ~n the 
dlsclpline, e s l t produces concepts and categories by 'l'hicll to grasp 
Vfhen tnese qu:-ostJ .. ons become a rnatter of nltimate concern, 
they are a matter of philosophlcBl, or rather, a theolo,sicel attitude. 
The theologlcal u~sclpllne seeks to expl~cate the s;1ribols whj c~' are 
produced ln the :t:.'rocess of -;:erception of t~1.e ansvrers to the questions. 
We turn, then, to a closer exam~mktlon of tbe method of 
theology, as l t seeks to fulfll thls f~nal tBsk. 
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1. ~ Possib1lity and Ratio~ality of Theology 
(a1 The Poss1b1litv of Theology 
It lS impossible to p~edicate existence of God, because to do so 
1s to treat God as a be1ng and, therefor·e, as one being among others. God, 
is therefore, not an object l.lfthe same sense 1n which anything else mav be 
treated as an obJect. Indeed, God ls not an object at all: as Ben1g-Itself 
Gi:>d is beyond the structm·e of subject and obJect. The very term "Being-
Itself" l.S des1gned to a VOld the suggestion that God c<:m be regarded as an 
If we elinnnate the possibility of speak1.ng of God as an object or 
as a being, we elimnate also the Decessity and the possib1lity of 
syeaking of natural theoloQT, at least, ln a T'nom1stJ.c sense. Tilhch, 
therefore, dismisses in a sotnevv-'oat caval:Ler fashlon the traditional arguments 
for the exlstence of C-Qd on the ground they all recpire the gl venness of the 
world, a fact v.>h1ch precludes the possibih ty of concel vin;; of Gi:>d as 
transcending i:;he world :iJ.U'lnJ. tely. He argueG that this lS h·ue not only 
of the cosTI1Cllog __ c:ol, but also of tr1e teleolog1cal and ontolog1cal arguments. ( 1 ) 
He Cloes not th1nk, i1owever, Uwt i:he tradi t1ona l arguments are 
entirely 1rrelevant to theology. ~Vhile they are of no use to demonstTate 
the eXlstence of a supreme be1ng, they do serve the function of revealing 
the question, implied :.;_n finite being, of the in£'"_nl.te 2_,round of being. 
The q1.1est1on could not have be~n asked J.f -chere wer·e not 1n the vrorld and 
self "something uncn ndl t1.onal 11 • The tradltional argumenc;s are formulations 
of the question implied ll1 finitude under the ln~act of the apprehension 
of the uncondl tiona:Velernen t. 
There may be substance ln the charge that Tillich has constructed 
a d1sgmsed form of natural theology to supply a foundation of h1s own 
(1) ST,I,pp.227 ff 
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approach, in S'ite of h1s disavowal of natural theology. ( 1) The 1mportant 
point, however, 1s not v1hethe:r the argument he used to d1sm1ss the trad1 tional 
arguments may be turned against h1mself, but the actuBl way 1n w-tnch he 
conce1ves the poss1b1l1ty of' theology. It .Ls qu1d;e clear that 1 t rests 
on vrhet 'Ye have already ref'erred to as the 11 paradox1cal imnJanence of' the 
transcendent. 11 
Having disnussed the questwn of' natural theolog<J, T1llich 1s under 
mo obligatJ.on to UlSCUSS the qQestlon of' a human capaclty for God or f'or 
revelation. He never_,.theless presupposes both in his ontolog1cal sssumptions. 
If' man 1s a _:)art of the f:m.1 te world, he too must conta1n an uncondi t1onal 
element, a link Vii th the Inf1n1 te. Tillich is p1ore interested, however, 
in the natm,e of' tl1e relat1onsln1.':J between man Md il1e 1nf ulite groLmd of 
Ius be1nc. Mnn' s e~:.Lstence, 1n a neutral sense, 1s evidence of' a relation 
to t,-Je g.cound of' being, but h1s "existence", in a techn1cal sense, is 
endence of' his estrangement f'rom, or lack of' tm1ty with it. 
Equslly, T1ll1ch 1 s ontolog1cal conce-ption of' God rel1eves him of' 
the task of d1scus"'1ng the conceJ?t of' the "Nord of God. It 1s not necessary 
to ref'er to Goa as speak1n2,, when the essence of the Chn.st1an message lS 
the conquest of' e::u,tent1al estrangement. Talk of' God as speakJng .tnvolves 
Strengely, however, T1ll1ch does lumself' 
lapse; into vra~rs of s_?eaklng Bbout God that are very t1"ad1 tional and suggest 
the v-:r·r SU.flernatural1Slll lle reject-s. tfol'eover, he employs the concept of' 
the Word of' God, but he 2_oes to cons1derable Jengths to explain vrhat he 
cons1de1's to be 1 ts legi tiu~ate uses. He 1ns1sts that 1 t cnn have onl~r a 
syo1bolic Inean1n_s, referring to the man1festa tions of' the d1 v:L'1e .nfe. In 
this sense 1t has a vride use ano 1s part1cularly smtoble because of 1ts 
-----~------
( 1) cf. Levr.ts S. Ford, "Till1ch 1 s Imphci t Natural 'l'heology", SJ'r, vol. 24 (1971), p.269. "If the radJ.Cal J.nsuff'lclency of' the ·world points to 
1 ts sou..~ce lD being-itself, God 88 that v,hich in.:f1ni tely transcends 
the uorld has 1)een derlved f'rom tl1.e vrorld." 
associat~on '"~ tl1 -che concept of rational~t::: oontained ~n logos. Tge 
revelation of t":lc ('ll Tine l~fe ~s rat~onal, but 2ncludes \v'l thin ~ t tbe 
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lrrat~on"'l or~nc,ple of tl"e abysc: ,· the ~ ..,exn' "Us-'-~ble d " .o 11 t ( 'l) 
..... o _ ..... ..... ·" ~ ....... o v..... ep-ctl 01. a Cl'ea lon. 
However, T~lliclJ. p:::-oscr~bes all reference to the Word of Goa as spoken. 
II Word II ~s ~here "'or·e 4-'h Ll rr'~ t 0.0 ' 0-1.-· the t or" 
..... , ~- - 1. , ""~- c,u 1. ln terms _ s ress on rat~onall ty 
t_he Greek notlon of' logos rather thEJn the Hebrew idea o:f the (verbal) 
ut te:cance of a pe:csonal God. ( 2) 
Theolozy is possible, therefol'e, not because God bas revealed 
h~mself ln t:-ce spoken Ylord and througt:. the records of' l t, but because Being-
Itself' ls the ground of our beins. But there ls more to the posslbillty 
of theology i.han t· ls; ~ t vrould not be possible if' no ques taon were iinJ.Jlied 
in the cate(,;,o-cies ~mC! conce_pts of o£:tolo2.lcal onalysls; it ,-,ou ld no c be 
:;?Oss::;_ble if tl1.ere vlere no answers; l t v7ould not "be po.sslbl~ lf' the ansvrers 
d1.d not exlst :; n symbol~c form; ~ t ''fould not be possible •n thout the 
theolo,;lcDl cn·cle • 
.At flTst s~ght, the conce.9t of tne theolo~:p-cal crrclc; su~;i!_ests t..h.at 
TJ.ll~ch bel~eves, as has been maltYGall'ed thToughout i:he lnstory oi' theology, 
ti:~at. cheology c~m only be en.seged upon :from t,1e s~tuAtion of falth: only 
he who kno'7S God for hu11s2lf can ,so on to a deeper unders Landing of C'>Od. 
In fact, however, the notlon ,of the theologlcel clrcle reflects ~'llllc..h.' s 
dlalect~caJ lnterpretatlon of reallty, for tne characterlstlc of the 
cir·cle ls not SlD"(ply faJ.th, but fa2th cor.t~nned v-'lth doubt. Theology lS 
only possible foe Jche t1J2n v•ho has ente:ceo the theologJcal c~rcle, that lS 
to say: lt ls oniliy posslble lf a lllen has commltted rnmself. If he lS 
dis~>ass~onate, detacheo and objectlve ln his att:Ltude, he cannot be said 
( 1 ) ST, I ,pp. 1 74ff; "The Ylo1'o 
Function (ed. Ruth Nanda 
(2) cf .A.J.McKelway, 'lbe S:rsten~t~<::_'!~heolog,'!.__g_f.._)C~ul Ti_!hoh, p. 88f and note; 
E. la B. Cherbomuer;-ii'l'he Theolo&,y of the '.ford of God", JR, vol. 33 
(1953), p.22ff. 
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to have entered the theologJ.cal circle. Dut even having committed lnmself 
he still reuwins afflJ.cted b;sr doubt: 
"Being J.nsJ.de tt1e cJ.rcle, he trust have tnade an exJ.stentJ.al decision; 
he 1nust 1)e ln the situotion of faJ.th. But no-one can say of hJ.rlSelf 
thc:t he J.s J.n t1e sl tuatlon of falth. No-one can call himself a 
theologian ••• Every;'theologian J.s con1mi tted and alienated; he J.S 
alvrays in fBl th and J.n doubt; ;,e J.s inside end outsJ.de the theol-
ogJ.cal cJ.rcle. 11 ( 1) 
We are rennnded again of our suggestJ.on that when TillJ.ch explains the 
relationslnp of plulosophy- end theology, he seems to be thinkJ.hg of man who 
J.s at once both phJ.losopher and theologian. It J.S not re8lly possible to 
speak of enterJ.ng the theologJ.cal cJ.rcle, for ev:ol'yone who "acknowledges the 
content of the theologJ.cal cJ.rcle 11 as hJ.s ul tJ.mate concern has J.nmedJ.E!tely 
entered J. t. And yet, inasmuch as he does :1.ot have the answer to the 
questJ.ons he WJ.shes to ask, lle st8nds outsjde J.t. The uncertair1 borderline 
between philosoph'' and theology whiCh makes J. t --'-'ossible to ref:;r to one and 
the same a ttl tude by both names J.S uncertain because l t J.s man himself who 
represer1ts the border, man ·nho at tJ.mes tBlces a detached agpro8ch, at times 
a cOt1!1l tted e·?proBch, man ·who at tJ.rres J.s torn b;- doubts, Bt tJ.mes J.s 
grDsped by faJ.th, ma:1 who Bt tJ.mes can do nothJ.n__g buj; questlon, at times c8n 
verbalise the en~Ner -who J.ndeed could not esk the questJ.ons unless he knew 
the answers Blready. The possJ.blh ty of theolo~,y .:..s precisely the possJ.1nli ty 
of enswerJ.n6 questions. 
At the same time, the interpretBtJ.on of theology wl:nch stems from 
the Svstem of Sciences supplies the other imyortBnt aspect of the possibJ.lity 
of theology, natnely the possJ.bJ.lJ. ty of J.nterpreting the relJ.gious symbols 
of tt1e Chris tJ.Bn faJ. th "lhJ.ch are the :product of Bn encounter Vll th 
ult1mate 
reality. 'lhe v 2 r-'" ex1stence of tl•e s:;;-tabols makes theology possible becBuse 
they proVJ.de J.t with an obJect. 
-------~-----
( 1 ) ST, I ,p. 13 
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The object of theology is not God, but the s:Jnnbols of t.b.e Chnshan 
f~:nth. Indeed, as we have already seen, God cannot be an object because 
as Be~P.g-Itself, he ~s beyond the ''subject-obJect cleavage. 11 To na 1-:e an 
assertion such as itns, however, leads to ~mned~ate d~ffJ.cul t~es - difflCul ties 
"'hJ.ch are amply ~llustrated by T:t.lhch's doctrine of reli~;~ous symbols. ( 1 ) 
We do not vn sh to enga:;e upon an extend en d 1 s ClJ ssion of the debate on 
rellgious symbols engendered by Tillich 1 s doctr~ne, but J.t will be salutary 
to outlJ.ne lns tl1eory anc. -co draw attention to some of the sa l~ent features 
<vluch are relevant to our ~nvest~.;at~on. 
There are a number of accou11ts of ::>."c lic;ious SYJnbolism offer·ed by 
T~ll.LCh, among wl"nch there is a lngh degree of cons~stency, ( 2 ) as is VGrifi:;d 
(J_:>.115) 
by the first ta-blei :rhere are also, however, a number of differences to 
~~rhich atten lion I!1Ust be d:eavvn. Tr1e most obVJ.ous of these ~s the a~fference 
betwe-:on the account of the characte:nst~cs offered Ul the art~cle "The 
Religious Sytnbol 11 and all the other accounts. Tne rad~cal dJ.fference J.n 
termnology may be accounted for by the early date of ihe or~ginal article 
(1928)( 3 ) It reappeared in translBtion, hovrever, ~n 1940( 4) (sl~ghtly 
revised) and again ~n 1958{ 5 ), 1961( 6 ) and 1966(7 ) (further re~sed). 
All the other artlcles c~ted appeared between 1955 and 1961 (~) 
( 1) It vras TJ.lllch h~mself Yiho made the assert~on that the doctrine of the 
symbolJies at the centTe of lns theolog~cal doctrine of lmowled:;e. (TPT, p.333) 
( 2) It should b3 added th2 t the characteristlcs are rarel~, hsted ~n the same 
order, and in some 8ccounts do not appear ~n the form of a coherent list. 
(3) BlMtter fdr ~~utsche FhilosSEhie, vol.I,reprinted in Rel~gi8se 
Venvir~~?hung, (1930) 
(4) Journal of Li~~ felJ.gJ.on, vol. 2 (19!~), pp.13-33 
(5) Daedalus, vol. 87 (1958), pp.3-21 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
O~rculated at the fourth annual New York Un1 vers~ ty InstJ. tute and publ~shed 
~n the proceedings (RelJ.g~ous _ Ex·oar~ence and TlUth, ed. S.Hook, pp. 301-322) 
Myth & SJ1nbol, ed.F.W.DJ.llJ.stone, pp.15-34, The most sign~flcant alterat~on 
was the far fror1 consistently pursued substitution of "ultlmate concern" 
for "uncondl t~onal transcendent". 
"The Nature of :?.ehgious Language", Theol. Oul,pp. 53-67; "Theology and 
SJ111bolism11 , .Religious Sym_"Polism (ed.F.E.Johnson) pp.107-116; "The Word of 
God 11 , Languae;e: Its Mean~ng ,;_ E\.mction, ( ed Ruth Nand a Anshen), pp.1 22-13 3 ; 
I:ynamlcs of _;:nth, pp. 41ff"; 11 :L'h.e lvleanJ.ng and Jushf~cBtJ.on of Religious 
SJ111bols, 11 RelJ.gi_£us E'?9?c..~·J.ence Bnd Truth, pp.3-11 
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The very :f~ct o:f l ts reappearance sug;;ests that Tillich had not abandoned 
the opimons ne expressed and we he ve there:fore made sor1e a tterrpt to J.dentl.:fy 
the llst o:f characterJ.stJ.cs offered there 1nt.h his later lists. •.'le may 
sa:fely assume mat he means the same by descrJ.bing symbols as :fJ.guratJ. ve, as 
he does b2r sayJ..n.g that they poJ.nt beyond themselves. Tv.o o:f our other 
J.dentlf'J.cations, however, are more tentatJ.ve, namely those betvveen percept-
ibilJ.ty and the use o:f t~e medJ.a o:f ordJ.nary or everyday experJ.ence and 
betvreen acceptJ.bJ.h ty and the e!;covrth and death o:f symbols. ThJ.s last 
J.dentlflcation J.s made on tl~e ground that 11acceptibJ.lJ.ty 11 is used to describe 
the socJ.al rooting o:f the symbol; where the symbol :fails to connect vrith a 
socJ.al sltuation, J.t dies. 
We turn, the.ce:fore, to some of tbe questJ.o.n.s raJ.sed by Tillich' s 
VleW'. 
(i) A certain degree of variEJtJ.on will be .:J.O"ticed among the descriptions 
of the tl1.Lrd chnracterlstJ.c Gnd we must ask, therefore, whether they are 
consistent WJ.th each othe.c. For ex~nrple, we may ask whether the possession 
of innate _9ovrer ls the same as part1.cipatJ.on in the reality of the referent 
or whether :Qart.LcipatJ.on in the realit;' of' the referent J.s the same as 
partJ.cipation J.n its povrer, or l ts rneam.ng. 
Jean-Paul Gabus re.narks that vihereas TJ.l'lich speaks of innate or 
instrinsic power in the article of 1928, he spoke a year later of t.he power 
belonglng to symbols as a power inherent in nature itself. He :fJ.nd s that 
the two accounts are dlfferent in meanJ.ng and dismisses the flrst as quasi-
magical. ( 1 ) However, he expla1ns nel ther the dif:ference nor ihe meamng 
of the descrJ.ption as quasi-magical. In fact, if there J.s a dlfference, 
J.t is probably due to Tilllch 1 s desire to emphasise in the second that any 
object may, on account of l ts partlclpotJ.on ln being, become a symbol of 
( 1) J.P.Gabus,Incroductlon a la Theologie de la Culture de Paul_TillJ.ch, p.116 
Gabus an~ears to have 1r.ade a mJ.stake concerning the date of tl;e second 
account l''Natur und Sakrament") wrnch was g::Lven as a lecture J.n 1928, and 
later uublJ.shed J.n RelJ.g18se Vervarkli~upg (1930) (cf ~ff,~I,p.263) 
It J.S transl8ted in Era as "Nature & Sacrarrenc" (pp.94-112) 
TABLE 1. 
THE CFIAJ.:c.ACT&t.?IS'riCS OF "RELIGIOUS SYiV!BOLS 
-----·-------- ----- - -
The Religious 
Symbol 
1928, 1940, 
1961, 1966 
1. Fle;uratl ve cpali ty 
Religious 
Symbolism 
1955 
F:t.gurati ve 
·- ------
------------------
'l'he Nature of' 
Religious 
Language 
1955 
Point beyond 
themselves 
The Word of' 
God 
1957 
Figuratlve 
-------------------------------------------·----------------------------------· 
2. Perceptibility 
3 .Have J.n:na te 
power 
4. Acceytibility 
5. 
Participate in 
the power of' 
wttat they 
symbolise 
Grow and die, 
cannot be 
lnvented 
Open up levels of 
nea1u~ & corres-
ponding levels of' 
the mind 
Participate in the 
meanJ.ng and povrer 
(? and reality) 
of v.ihat they 
symbolJ.se 
Are lJorn & die; 
cannot be invented 
or produced J.nten-
tJ.onally, born J.n 
the~roup unconsc-
J.ous1 
Open up levels of' 
realJ. t.>r and levels 
of -che soul. 
Use the me~ia of' 
ordinary experlence 
Participate in the 
povrer and meaning 
of that vrhJ.ch 
!they symbolise 
G:;_·ow & die, cannot 
be invented or 
abohshed, saf'e 
f'rom czJ.ticism by 
non- s~}Ynbo lJ.c 
language 
Open up levels of' 
beinz & levels of' 
the soul. ?omt to 
ultimate reality. 
The Dynarm.cs 
of' Faith 
1957 
Pomt beyond 
Ti:1ernsel ves 
Use the media of' 
everyday experience 
Participate in 
that to whJ.ch 
they point 
Grow 0. die ,cannot 
be produced J.nt-
entionally.Crea-ced 
or accepted by the 
~roup unconscious' 
Open up levels of 
realJ.ty & dimens-
ions & elements of' 
our soul Yih J.ch 
correspond to the 
dimenslons & ele-
ments of reaJity 
The Meaning and 
JustJ.fication of' 
UelJ.gJ.ous ~~nbols 
1%1 
PoJ.nt beyond 
Themselves 
Participate J.n the 
realJ. ty of that wluch 
they L'epresent. 
Radiate l ts :_;ower 
and mea nlng. 
Are born an) di.e, 
cannot be created 
at vdll 
Open up dJ.mensJ.ons of' 
reality in correlation 
to cl:,.mensJ.ons of the 
human s1nri t. 
---------------- -----------------------·----
G. ,_ 
-----·----- -----
H.' ve J.Yl tegr a ting & 
disJ.n i::;eg:.:a ting Dower. 
---·--------------
I 
--'" 
--'" 
I.Jl 
I 
Level 
I 
II 
"The Eellglous Symbol 11 
ObJectlve 
a. The world of dl·VJ..ne bein.e,s 
- the supreme being God 
b. Cllaracterisatlons of' the 
nature and sctions of Gcd 
c. 1\fa-LL.lrel and h:u:;tor J.cDl objects 
historlcal personall ties etc 
Self-transcendlng 
a • .Actions wrncb symbolise the 
rell[,ious atti tnde e. g. 
"cultlc gestures" 
b. Objects vvl:uch symbollse the 
l'ehglous a ttl tude e.g .. cross 
_______ _._ - ---------~-----~ 
TABLE 2 
TYPES OF RELIGIOUS SLMBOL 
- ---------------------· 
11The Nature of I-tell[!,lous 
Lan.;uage" 
Transcendent 
a. God 
b. The attribules of' God 
c. Tb.e acts of God 
Immanent 
c. Q;_ltlc sign-symbols e.g. 
cross, candles etc. 
b. "The Sacramental 11 
e.g. The Lord's Supper 
a. Incarrotlons oi~ thG divlne 
·------------------· 
"The !:ieanlng and Justlf'ication 
of' Rellglous S:jnnbols 11 
Frimary 
a. ~lghest being and 
hls 
attributes 
b. Divine actLons 
c. Dlvlne l!laroi'estations 
in finite reality 
Seco_ndary 
Metaphors: 
-:rater hght oll etc 
Poetlc syc11bols 
-- -------- - -----------
I 
.....>. 
-" 
()\ 
I 
-117-
the Uncondlt~onal. (i) At the same tJ.me, however, he rrust recocmse that 
oome objects are J.n fleet t-.ceated as rellg~ous syll'bols -vvhile othe1·s a:..·e not. 
He n'izht have chall6ec1 tus mlnd, of coorso, but slnce he publJ.shed more than one 
version of the 1928 artJ.cle ln v;luch these essentlal details vrere not changed 
and dJ.d ln fact a~..rculDte J.t at a co0.i'erence in 1961, it see;rns reasonable to 
conciiude thBt t1e clld not d1ange i:ls mJ.nd and that :w contradJ.ctJ.on lS J.ntended 
betYrecm the ·b:ro artJ.cles to vrlnch Gebus refers, nor between the 1928 article 
and those whlc..h. c1esc1'ibe sj'l!lbols as partJ.clpatJ.ng 1.n the realJ.ty of that to 
wlnch they :;?Olnt. 
'rhe questlon of _rJa:>:>tJ.cipation, l10vrev:o;1·, 11os freque11tly ViOrl'J.ed 
TillJ.ch 1 s critics ( ;) for l t J.s not ltnnedia LelJ clear J.n uha t v·ay the svmbols 
T~o-.-rever ,fl'om 
referenJc J.s wore tha.:1 the , ere pa.:-tJ.cJ.patJ.on of the finJ. te object .Ln t~1e 
InfJ.nlGO, J.t .LS, J.n f2c"t, ecpJ.valent to ~)aJ'tJ.cJ.patJ.on J.n J.ts weaning or 
J.ts l)ower. ( 3) 
Both J.n speakl11.g of the J.nna te power of S,YHlbols and of the pal'tJ.cipatlon of 
s;:;mbols J.n -t:1ell' referen~~.,, '.Cillich J.s seeklng to say i:hBt a sywbol owes J. ts 
desc:..'lptJ.on as a symbol co t:w fact tlw t l t 1•1echates the po'7er arii 1neanJ.ng of 
'ffnen a symbol ceasss to functJ.on J.n t!ns 
-rrsy l t ceases to be a symbol. 
( 1 ) cf !Wrf, I, (.!Sl?E) ,p. 3) 3f, (~,p. 79f) ; S'r, I ,p. 26 6 
(2) 
(3) 
<T.HeyYood Tho111aS, 11 R:clJ.gJ.ous La116uac:,e as Sy,1ibolJ.sm 11 , RelJ.gioL'.S StudJ.es, 
vol.1 (1965-:i), p.91; H.D.McDonalCl, "The Sy,rtbohc Theolog,y of Paul TJ.llich" 
SJT,vol.17 (1904), p.425; V.·r.Bullock,.A Ont.Lc:::_l Exal~ll.t18tlon of Paul 
Tilhch Is Doctrine of the Holy SOJ.ri t, "0p.47ff; vr.L.Ro··;e' Relisious Syulbols -~m:Ci""~(Oh::_cago & London, Um versi ty of Ohicag,o F-"ess, 1968) p:p.112ff 
"Analyses ')f rreanlng a::.'e snalyses of being because r1ieanJ.tlg bl'J.ngs being to 
spnitual fuli'J.l,nent" (1VR(~),p.72)" •• Beinz is conce1ved noL sJ..l~ly as a 
logJ.Cal category, but also ss hving J.mport" (G.lli(,I,(SdW),p.122) 
G.F.McLean co1n ~•ents succJ.nctly "Tiw povre-r part::c.cipa l~ed in J.s not 
cntltatJ.ve but Sl[',nificative povrer 11 ("Sywbol anu Analogy: T:Illich c't 
Thot,1as", Paul Tillich 1 s_Oa!1wlJ.c Thoug):lt (hereafter proT) p.163 
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Tlns ln tw:n~ sw_,gests that the1e ='-S l:L ttle dlff'erence -oetween 
tJ-,e ~h"r"c"ce":t.st:Lc " t t d I t 
- "' "' - or par lClpa :Lon an t1a of gl"ov,-th ~ncl death. Indeed 
Tlllich 1 s point:Ln.; to the al'bl trar:Lness of t~e sl g,tl c1 uring h:E! d:Lscu ssions 
of the quest:Lon of part.tclpat:J on serves only to conf:Lrm thls lmpresslon; 
to ''Olnt t th b t t tl l 1: o - elr ar l rar:Ln:::ss 2s o say 1at t1ey are not consciously 
seledted and to polnt to thell' ra.rtlcJ.patlon ls s2mply to sa-- that they 
;;,row and d:Le. When the_r cease to wedJ.ate the Unco11dJ. t:Lonal~ they dJ.c. ( 1 ) 
TJ.llJ.ch's constant rnovem:mt among realJ.ty~ meamrl{S and ymver 
J.ndJ.cate hls dlssatJ.sfactJ.on Yv'i ttl any one term. 11Reall ty" is apt to 
suggest an ontolot?,.Y shorn of dynanucs or fo:t. rn; 11meanJ.ng 11 lS likely to be 
confused YTl-;;h lingu:Lstlc ,Qhilosoph~; and so lose the dynauuc of contological 
relotlons; 11 po'rer 11 ~ lS apt to de~;en0rate 211-Lo blind dynom:Lcs vatt1.out 
meaDliJ.g. EEJCh vro1·d for hltt1 must lnclude the connotat:Lons cf -..,he othe~· t--ro. 
We must pass 011., tl.owever~ to so,1e further· points. 
(n) Tillich explauls thBt rellr_;lou s s -.nDbols a.ce of tao l':J .. ndij!~ ( 2 ) but 
l t lS irnposs:Lole not to notlce the ver·r consldel'Oble dlffel"ences bet-rreen 
the accounts he Jl ves. Thls lS due, 11.0 doubt, to the d:Lf.f:Lculty of cleC:Lding 
on cr:Lter:La, as lS ev:Ldenced by the var:Let;v of nauBs wh:Lc~l. he :;lves to the 
tvw levels. It ~gpears th8t 1!e wJ shes to collect togeth2r :Ln one group 
all t"iose 11 symbols 11 ·wine relDte dn·ectly to out." s:,_:Je8kJ.nt; a bout GDd, h:Ls 
attr"Lbutes and actions, but lS uncertain about the proper class:LflcatJ.on 
for example 
of other cla:Lmants to the nar,1e of 11 symbol 11 • He lS uncertaln/where to 
place vrhat he calls 11d:Lvine manlfest8t:Lons ln l'eal:Lty", we bel:Leve, becau...;e 
Chrlst, jn part.tcul[1r, has the ewbarrassing featm.'e of a clalm to beJ.11[!; God 
ana man at one atld the same t:Lme. 
( 1) 
(2) 
Tavard has, therefore, m:Lssed the r)oint Ylhen he objects to T:Lllich Is 
clalm that symbols &,l'O 1 anc1 che i.hEJ t a s:y--mbol cannot lose its 
revelatory power ("Since ul timete tYuth does 110t d:Lslntegrate, neither 
do its symboJs "). It is at the subject:Lve pole that SY111bols c 118Y grow or die. 
( "Christology as Symbol11 ', prrcT ,p. 211f; Paul TJ_llich and the Ch1·istian 
Mess~ge, p.58) 
Table 2 sets out the contents of three of h:Ls accounts, (p.116) 
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The rest of t:1e symbols included in the second level present a 
wultiplicit:,' of dlfferent :::bJects, operating ln <nan~- dlfr'erent vmys. 
He hardly repeats hlmself ln any of the a:dacles, so "Ghat vre ma,, t;aln very 
different lWpresslons of ·what ,,Ja:- co!lstl tute a symbol on tne second level 
and, consequently, of hov1 such syr.1bols ,11ay be s1nd to operate. ( 1 ) Houever, 
all the s':,rrrbols of the second level have a featu~"e 2n comrron, to YrhJ.cll. 
Tilhch, strangely, fails to draw our attentlon. Each of the symbolic 
objects rra~" be encoLmtered ln human lllne, nhether lt lS a canc:lle, a poetlc 
image, a sacred bullding or a 11cultic sign11 • We cannot doubt thell' 
exlstence, slnce tl1ey ma-- be seen or touched. We may se~r that they confonn 
to the second of T2llich 1 s characterlstlcs,namely that the3r are obJects of 
One cannot, ~1uaever, sa\- t>e sa 11e tlung of God, hls attrlbutes 
and a ct:wns. Tiley are not objects of everyday experl-::nce, certalnly not 
J_n tll.e sense of the obJec--cs used J.n tlle second level. These are 11objects 11 
about the exJ.stence of v~l.lch ~:1ere has been endless debate. T.1ey must , 
therefore, be s~nr:bols in a v0ry dlfferent sense from those of the s econda:cy 
level. 
syrnbol2se, they ''JUSt do so J_D a different wa:1 from that of the sytnbols of 
the second level. "God 11 C!oes not particl:;,1ate in tl1e Ground of Being: 
l1e ls the Ground of Belng. 
Once a&,aln, l t lS the q_uestlon of the functlon of -the SJPlbol that 
lS the lffi:?ortant, indeed, the declsJ ve factor, for tlw real crlterlon of 
the sy,-,1bol Js whether -~t mediates ultiwate reality, vvhether uncon_dltioned 
mean~ng breaks throu2_.h it. The dlff'erence bet··ween the t-l"ro levels lJ.es m 
( 1) In another artlcle, '.hlllcll. clair1s that fuere are thl'ee levels of 
syrrtbol. The f 1.rst inclL1Cl es God viewed as a supreme being, hls 
attrlbutes anr'l actlons: the second, tnanlfestatlons of the divllle 
2nfini to reallty; t1!e t11n'd, cul tic s__:_gns-symbols, objects, gestm"cs, 
clothlng, aDd other sytDbollc objects 3UC~1 as vrater, oil, etc. 
(trTheology ana Syll1bolism", :!:l.ellglOUS Symbo:OSm, Ed. F.E.Johnson, p.11lJi') 
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the rel2tion to thelr referent. The fJ.rst level of symbols have an 
:imnedJ.ate relation to l t, while th&t of the second Je vel is one stage 
ranovea. 
(in) The crucial questJ.on, ~owever, for the possibJ.lity of theology 
J.S the p1·ec1.se purpose of symbols. A symbol has a referent, but what is 
it to effect i''i t~1 respect to J. ts refer'3nt? Surely, to say that a symbol 
has a referent is another ·vay of sa;y:mg thBt J.t hBs an obJect. But God 
J.S not an object, nor is Be2ng-Itself. Yet unless a referent J.s an object 
nothing can be sBid about J.t. Perhaps, then, it lS not the purpose of a 
symbol to tell us something but to evoke a response, by mediatin2, ultimate 
re(!h ty to u.s. But there can, surely, be no response unless we know i'.hat 
we are respondJ.ng to: -chere can be no response unless there J.s also concef?tU al 
content for us to respond to: fJ.des esse nequit sJ.ne conceptione. ( 1 ) 
(iv) If 11 God 11 .LS a symbol, we rrust ask vrhat J.ts referent J.s, and the 
answer appears tm be that God J.s a symbol for Bein6-Itself. However, J.t 
also appears that we cannot cease to talk about God and talk:, instead, 
slmply about BeJ.ng,-Itself, for, J.n t11e fJ.rst place 11 God 11 symbolJ.ses the 
grow1d of personall ty J.n e wey in whJ.ch Being-Itself does not end :9erhaps 
cannot. Secondl~·, BeJ.ng-Itself turns out to be e symbol too: ( 2 ) to s:peak 
of God as Bell1g-Itself is not to speak literally but conceptually, or 
rather, to use the com eptu.all ty of a different tradJ. tJ.on. It seems that 
( 11 W.P.Alston makes a sJ.miler poJ.nt when he observes in a pseudo-Kentian 
dJ.ctuma "Concepts wJ.thout feelings are errpty; feelings without 
concepts ere blind." ( 11 Tilhcl1. 1 S Conception of e RellgJ.otJ.,sSyn1bol 11 , 
ReligJ.ous E?perjence end Truth, p.13) Tilllch appears to come pert 
of the way to the point when he admits that the fact thet every 
symbol has conceptual potentJ.eh ties meres theology pes s:i. ble. 
(~;nemJ.cs of Faith, p.95) 
(2) As early as &J.W, TJ.lllch observed that metaphysical concepts are 
symbolic not sclentlfic. 
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J.t lS out of the qucstJ.on to ruppose that He can speak llterally of the 
referent: J.t lS lmposslble even to say ·what the re:.ferent _._s, since any 
word lS J.rnmedJ.atel" a symbol. Tne UncondJ.tlonal cannot be an object at 
all: only J.ts symbols can be oijects. ( 1 ) But the concept of the 
Uncond1.. t2onal - or o:f ~J.ng-Itself - J.s J.mrredJ.ately a sJrribol. 
(v) If' both the ternunology of relJ.gJ.on and that of metaphys2cs or 
ontology( 2) ls syrnbol:LC, then J.t seems that the task of theology, is, ln 
Scharlemann 1 s woi'ds, to e:x:plain the content of religious symbols 
correlatJ. vely, correlating the philosoplncal concept with the rell.gJ.ous 
symbol. But Scharlemann must sui'elJ be Wl'ong "Yhen he says that a philo-
sophical concept e~nsts co enable us to grasp the content end the relig.tous 
sy111bol to enable us to oe grasped by l t, because both philosophJ.cal concept 
end rel2g2ous symbol ere symbols. He mekes a brave attempt to show that 
l t J s not e quest2on of e ti'ailSln hon of religlOl•S s;}nnbols into ontological 
sy111bols, or a reduction of' one to t~1e other, but a correlative e:xplanat2on, 
but th2s e:xpl~matlon must fall because of t.J.e con:fus2on lnherent .tn T:Lllich' s 
account of ph2lo sophy ana theology. ( 3 ) The posslbillty of theology is 
the exlstence of symbols, but unless we can have some more ::~reclse under-
standJ.ng of syrnbo ls and thelr referent it J.S dlfi'J.cul t to sec; how theolQgy 
can J.n :fact be carried out. 
----------------
(1) BW,I, (Rph), p.331f (WR, p. 76f) 
(2) Tillich uses 11metaphyslcs 11 and 11 ontology 11' as synonyms, although 
ontology has, strictl~· speakmg, a narrower range of meanJ.ng. He 
felt cornpelled to edopt the term ontology because of' the "supra-
naturalJ.stic" connotetJ.or.s of 11metaJ?h~rsJ.cs 11 ("Relation of' Metaph~rsJ.cs 
and 1heology11 , ReVJ.ew o~-:_)fe~hysics, vol. 10 (1956)) p.57f:. 
(3) Scharlemann, Beflectlon and Doubt in the Theolog;; of Paul TJ.lhch, :9• 75 
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(vi) I:f til.e Uncond1.t1.onal carwot become an object, 1.t is, as we have 
said, impossible to say an~ri.lung about 1. t. Eot l t lS cleal' that Tillicl: 
does not belJB ve th1.s to be the case at all. To say sometlnr1g symbol1.cally 
is to say sornethlng, so th2t ·:ie lntJst conclude that the Uncond-'- t1.onal can 
become an object a:fter all, even i::hoUGl. 1. t must be regarded as a ver,7 s-pe clal 
k1.nCI o:f obJect. 
(vil) The rell2,lOll8 SYt'1bols o:f che Chl'lStHln falth, as ldentlfled by 
T1.ll1.ch, are m fact, not slrrrply s:')n1bols o:f t!ce U:wondJ. tional. Indeed the 
only one that ls, strlct.ly speakmg, a symbol of -'J1e U,l.condJ.tional lS God, 
as correl<?ted rD-tl}: :fJ.Lnte being. Other symbols :18'1/e a wide range of 
referconts, more J..r1tltn.B -eeL,'' connected 1 1i th the condl tJ.ons of exls tence, narr1ely 
Tevelst1.on, as tll.e :..'estol·atJ.on o:f reason to :L·es ,s::.·ound, Cln'J.st as the 
overcouu.n,l!, of ex:J.stence, the Klnbdo··u of God as the ovel·conu.!12, of Lll.e 
meamnglessness af tnstory. We !11.a',' say that the:;e are s:j'·abols of aSjJects 
of t;,•e Uncondl hoD.al, b_ t there are other symbols :J'et vr}nch go1.nt lll. tl1e 
opposlJce dJ.l'ectJ.on, sucl:!. as the 1<311 and sin, vrn::-~0!:'. are symbols not of the 
UncondltJ.onal but of estrangeT'lent. 
(vhi) vie have dJ.scovered that the most important aspect of a s:rmbol 1.s 
the fact "cn8t J. t r:~ed1.ates povver. If J. t does not open up levels of realJ. ty 
and the human spJ.ri t 1. t cannot be a syrr.bol, for J.f 1. t fails to connect vzi.. th 
therefo1·e, vhether the:..'e J.S ony need for theol.o.;:", .Lor lt l1Ubht be e.lp ected 
that the alm of theolo;s~· 1.s to explaJ.n a s~-n1bol. But lf 8 symbol needs 
ex:plsnation then one '"'8" be justJ.flecl J.n supposJ.n; th8t l t ro.as ln f8ct alreadv 
dled, for 3 s; •'ibol 1,h:...c~1 <~Oe":J 11ot ln fact 1nechate ultJ.ulate re8llty lS no 
Three possible ans-·rers may be proposed for tll.JS 
c1ilem.na: 1. t il1l6''-t be s1.nd ei i..h:ol' th8 t tho s:~uibols are still ca}:!8ble of 
med1.at1.ng real1.ty but recplre explicotion to c1o so, or that it lS 
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neces;:oal'Y that Yve cont1nue to u;:;e th.:; symbols unt1l ne'iV symhols are born, 
ol' that theology ls siP1ply a matter of correl8t1ng one set of s~·mbols v·ath 
anotl1er set. 
.Agem, hovreve:c, the ens-trers do not really seem able to 
satlsfy the quest1on. 
Just es everyth1ng partlclpates in being, }.irodtJmng the 
posSlblbty of sy<11bolism, so huwan ratio:r..al1ty nas 1ts grou.nd 1n the 
r2t1onal1ty of the groUt.1d of be1nt,; consequc;ntly theology ma2' be a 
'I'here are, however, so1ne qual1fications to be made. 
In the .2ll"st ~)lBce, T1lllch C!oes not c-risl1 to su:::-render theology to 
rat1onal1sm, for rat1onelism restr·lcts ti1e sCLl'ces of l~nowledge to 1·etional 
inference fl'O'il ernpir1cal real1ty. It lS not reason alone th2t produces 
the contents of theology, but reason ·dl.en lt lS unlted ·d.th, or· 6 rasf>ed by, 
1ts grow1d, Ol' ultunate concern. l{hen reason ls thus grasped, lt may be 
called ecstatic, or self-transcending, reason, because lt reaches out 
beyond 1t self. ( 1 ) But just a s f1ni te thu12, s w1der the cond l t1 ons of 
exlstence D!t'e estranged fnnm then· inf1m te gl'ound, so also 1s reason, 
under the condltions of e:::a..stence, estranged from 1ts ground. It lS 
rooted in the un1 versal logos end ::;et estrenged fDOt'l ±t. Inesmuch es the 
estran~;ement lS overcome, we 11137 speek of rearon es having f::uth; lnasrouch 
es the estrangEment l'emains, we lilBY speak of 1 t as belllg ln doubt. T:Cus 
ls akin to the sitouletaneous states of sin e rrl justif1cat1on and so Till1ch 
..._ 
expla1ns thet ne may 1ndeed apply the doctrine of justification by feith 
not onl-; to the 11 religlous-ethlcal 11 sphere but also to the "religious-
(1) ST,I,pp.59ff 
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intellectual" SJ?here, an 1dea vrhlch he claims to have reoel ved from Martm 
Knhler, hls teacher at Halle. ( 1 ) The rBtlonalJ.ty of "theology 1nust, 
therefore, alvrays reckon Yfl th tlns epistemolog1cal aypl1cat1on of just-
if:Lcat:Lons: reason lS not, of 1tself, self-transcendent. It is only 
Yrhen 1t 1s grasped by ultlliJate concern that 1t reaches out beyond 1tself. 
'lne fBct LhBt the rat1onal1ty of "theology consists ln the ecstatic 
unl tHJG o.2 reason wi tl1 its O"Tn g~"ou"1d dee s not mean that theolog - Cc1L1 lay 
as1de all obl 1.gat1on to be rational in other senses of tl1e ''Vord. Indeed, 
Tillich argues fuot 1t obliges theology to submit to tiEee princ1ples of 
rational:Lty, narnel=r sel!1ant:Lc, lo;;:,lcal and methodoihog.wal rat1onalJ:ty. 
By semantlc rationality, he rreans that theology must take account 
of the normal rnean1.ng of words. Th1s ls not to say that eve!."J V'ord can 
be, or 1s to be, reduced to a single mearung as thougt1 1t yrere a mathem-
that 
at1cal s1g,n, but/ every word used 1n theology nust be rehted to 1 ts normal 
usage: Sp1rit, for exanple, must be related to spir1t 
tt ••• the _:_;rJ.ml t1 ve ruagic sense •nust be excluded, the myst1cal 
connotafuns must be discussed 1n relation to the personallstic 
connotat1ons, etc." (2) 
Logical1·ationalJ.ty 1s eq_uall~r imJ?ortant to t11eology: it J.S not 
to flout at ·-ill the laws of formal logic. At -the same time, however, it 
must not b.:: the slave of f arrr181 logic. Contradictions are to be r ecogn:Lsed 
as such, but paradox cannot be evaded J.n the effort to do justlce to the 
d:Lalect:Lcal nature of the moter:Lal -r1.t~l •·rhich J.t lS concel'nec1. 
"llialect:Lcs follows the movement of thou;ht or the 1novement of 
real:Lty through yes and no, but J.t describes it in logically 
correct terms. 111 (3) 
l.Iethodolog1cal :·at.Lo11ali ty lS the obliga c:Lon laid upon theolos,y to approach 
1 ts work systerMtJ.cally and conslstently! 
( 1) Era, p.xf; of Dorot11y 1I. Emmet, 11 Ep:Lstemology and the Idea of 
Revelation It T.PT, p. 20 3 
( 2) ST , I ,p. 6 2 
( 3 ) IblCl, p. 6 3 
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"It lmplles that tneology follows a metnod, thot ls, a 
deflnite Viay o.fderiv:Lng and st2tinslbts praposltions." (1) 
It is clear from Tilllch 1 s account of the ecstatic ratlonality of 
theology tl1a t he l s fully ln accord "Tl t;l ln s ovm prlncJ.pibes, as vre 
expounded them J.n t'~e previous chapter. We do not re0nre revelation 
to u1ake lmovm to u.s -vhat we CDnnot knovr at all, but vre reqw..re the t reason 
he DDl ted •n-':;h its ovr.:.1 ground, tl-_cJt J.t become self-transcendent arrl reach 
out beyond 2 t self. And yet it lS not to be sald tl-ut the act of reaching 
out beyond itself' lS the act of reason of l ts ovm vall tion~ theology is 
not slmply a :?rocess of 2nfe1'ence from reason to lts ground, for reason is 
J. tself' grasped b.Y its grow1d. 
We are rather less t:1an s9 tJ.sfJ.ed, hcrrever, "rith the accounts 
gJ.ven b:v- Tillich of t:.e semantJ.c end loglcal rDtionality of theology • 
.Althougl1 J. t lS clear that he does not vnsh to reduce language to vrhat he 
desc:>:·J.bes as a pan-1U8tl1emetical f'orlnalJ.sm, yet, not only ln his expLmatlon 
umnll2n;;, to r edognJ.se the e:x:te11t of the .flexlbilJ.ty of language. 'Uns 
is reflected not least in his atten9ts to m.ylam t:1e meann1gs of' certain 
key words by a)peD ling to tl:eJ.r e cymologlcal deri vatJ..on. He argues, for 
example, that ex2stence ls derived from e:x:stare meanJ.nt> "to stand out" 
-----
and moves to the conclusJ.on that existence J.s standing out of' non-being. 
Al tl1ougl1 he J.s rlght to insJ.st that the theoloslcal usage of vmrds must 
be related to other usages, neverth,3les3, tl1e theological usage cannot 
propeTly be undel'stood unless careful attention J.s :JB.Ld to the specif.Lc 
context 211 •.vhlc~ they become theolo~.Lca l words. 
the meaning of 11Spirlt 11 by an l11VestlgCJtion of tl:.e general conce1Jt of 
"spirJ.t" than by exa,'lJ.nln[, the vraJ ln wrnch lt lS used theologlcally. 
Again, wrnle lt lS clear that Tillich lS correct ln CTI![hasislng 
that theolo&- cannot J.~:;nore the rules of f'ortml lo;;-:ic and eq.:wlly corn:;ct 
in insisting tl-8; J.. t J..S "l.cong to dismiss dJ.alectic ond .L)aradox as 
(1) Ibid, p.65 
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contrad:t.ctJ.on, he nevertheless a1):Jears to make more use of the not:t.on of 
dialectJ..c than l s justifiable. Fe cr:t.tJ..cised Barth severely for ado~t:t.ng 
a dJliect:t.c wlnch vra s in h:t.s Vlew no d:t.alect:t.c at all, one :t.n which "Yes" 
and "No" are irreconc:t.lably separated, but he hlmself sorrletlr:Jes stretches 
d:t.alect:t.c to the po:t.nt of wean:t.nglessness, as for exan19le, m his assert:t.on 
of the 
11
dJ..alectJ..cal value of' erring lmowledge". ( 1 ) He prefers to hold 
concepts "in dJ..alect:t.cal tension 11 rathe-'-" than to e cknowledge them as 
contran .. es, arguing that sJ..nce a concept inrol:t.es i Ls ooposJ..te, the opposJ.. te 
:t.s J..ncluded in the concept dialectJ..cally. Ll this way he believes lnmself' 
able to reconc:t.le what would elsevrhere be ackno·.rled ged as opposite~. 
2. The Sources of Theology 
We may ast ourselves noYr •'lhat ef'fect Till:t.ch 's VJ..ew of the task 
of' theology arrl his ontologJ..cal conVJ..ct:t.ons have on the -v-lews he hoJds on 
the sources on wh:t.ch theology may draw for its materials. ( 2 ) 
It J..s to be remembered that Tillich has alw·ays regarded h:t.mseli' 
as a Church theologian. By this vre r!ust understand him as VTJ..sh:mg to 
operate not Wl th rehg:t.ous symbols :t.n general, nor vr.i th the r elJ..gJ..ous 
symbols of' weste1·n relig:t.ons, but specJ..f':t.cally WJ.. t11 those of the ChrJ..stJ..an 
f'a:t. th, in order to re 18 te the<'1 to on to log:wa 1 syrnbols. We may trace th:t.s 
approach, once agaJ..n, to the System of ScJ..ences, Yihere T:t.llJ..ch s·omke of' 
theonomous metaphysics and systematJ..c theology. H:t.s :t.ntent:t.on was not 
expla:t.ned clearly at that time, but fro<n J. t developed the VJ..cW of 
philosophy a"1d theology as 1·elated in terms of thelr conce:cn, respect:t. vely 
with tl1e structu.ce and the depth of being. Since the relJ.gJ.ous syrnbols 
(1) "Wb.at :t.s Wront, ,ofitlL the Dialectic Theology", JR, vol. 15 (1935), p.139f' 
(2) For thJ.s sectJ.on see especJ.ally ST,I,}p.39ff' 
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Wl th which he proposes to operate are thcs e of the Chn.sb.an faith, he 
must turn f1.rst to the B1.ble as a source for hls material. But 1t is to 
the Bible as furnish1ng the data of rel1g10us symbols, as a record of the 
symbols of t1.e early Chrishans. The B1.ble ls a collection of reli3,1ous 
literature and can onl- be a norm for systematlc "ti1eology 1.n the sense 
that lt proVJ..des the earliest records of Chr1.st1an relig1ous s;yrnbols. 
S.::mbols, however, grow and d1e, and so while the B1ble furn1shes 
the baslc syrnbols of tr-w Chr1.st1.an fal th, 1t ,rust be recognised thet some 
of them rna~· have ceased to conve:r vihat they or1.gmally d1.d (Tillich cites 
'1') . the Virg1.n B1.rth as an example~ ) , wh1.le other new sy,rJbols may have 
appeared SlnCe V'flllCh remain Yrithll1 the cont1.nu1. t:/ of the Ch:n.stJ.an 
trad1 t1on. Theology l11ust, therefore, look not onlyia cbe Bible, but also 
to Churc..h. tn s t.ory as o soLcrce for 1. ts material. Indeed, T1.llich u1aintains 
that to use the B1.ble is to 111.ake use nf C'·mrch l11.story and there is a sense 
in ,lrnch he 1.s qu1. te rigp t. He might equcll~- nunntain that to use Church 
h1.story lS also to use the B1.ble, s1nce so.ne of t.1e syr1bol s which come to 
peei tJ ons of prominence after the closure of the canon are nevertheless 
rooted 1.11 the Bible, to a greater or lesser extent. Here T1llich would 
c..L te as exa~I!Jles the Virgin Mary or just1f'1.cat1on by faith. ( 2) 
To these two sources, however, Till1.ch adds tno mo:::e, both 
thoroug~>.ly in keepmg vr.i.. th h1.s bas1.c presupposl tion. F1.rst we remarked 
on T:!..ll1.ch 1 s aff ll1l ty vr1. th Schle1.ermacher, in decla rlrJg rel1.g1.on as a 
umversal phenomenon and the ind1.v1.dual rel1.gions as 1.ts concrete expressions. 
Theolibgy must the1•efore take account of t:1e v-rork of the history of religions, 
not as a detached enqun·y, but seelnng i'r.i.. thin the concrete rel1.g1ons the 
intuition of the Uncond:r.tional. T'ne perceptions of other religions 
expressed in thelr i'elig,l.ous sy1jbols tnay be of value 1n 1llunnnating the 
(1) Theol.Cul~ p66 
( 2) _§!,I ,p.142 
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s:y!nbols of the Christian fal th as uell as furtheTing the dlalogu-e \'flth 
( 1' 
other fal ths. J 
To a theologJ.cal histor:r of religlon he adds, secondly, a 
theologJ.cal ins tory of culture, or 2 tno:ology of culture, the task of vrluch 
is to decJ.pher the "st:;·le" of an autonomous culture ln all its charact-
erJ.stic e:xpressJ.ons ::ii..d! to fiad thelr hidden I'el..gJ.ous slznlflcance. ( 2 ) 
Horrever, there are certain chfflcul tles in.herent lfl TJ.lhch 1 s concept of a 
tb eology of cul tvre. We have already seen thct, on 11is om ad.!1lssion, 
his early atterrpts at a theology of culture were of a romantlc cll.aracter. 
It seeks ln culture a religlous signifJ.cance: that ls to say lt seeks to 
look st culture ln such a vray that l ts J.mport breaks through ancl it 
becomes transyarent to tr1e Unconch tional. But Tilllcn '1_Uickly dlscovered 
that t1 uch of culture dld not have the 11 theonomous 11 ch:llractel' requisJ.te 
for such an ap:;:n·oach. It was autonomous - dJ.rected not towards J.mport but 
towards form. Nevertheless, he persJ.sted ln the belief th2t religJ.on and 
culture are ITlJJtually interdependent, ox! even J.n h1s later psriod still 
appeal's to believe that such an approach to culture is possJ.ble. 
Set, agaJ.nst tlns, however, we fJ.nd the attitude to'vards a theology 
of culture vrnJ.cl1 he develoDed in his .AmerJ.can ;;erwd. .At best J.t aopears 
to be able to seek ln cul tu.L·e those fragments of an awareness of t~e 
UncondJ. tional or of ultuD£lte concern YihJ.ch •flB:'/ "\)e detected in C!eoocracy, 
depth psychcibgy or art. For the most part, however, it seems to have a 
lesser task, wlncn lS descnbed as 11declphen. ng the style of an 
autonomous culture. 11' 
"· •• eve-:.·v style polnts to a self-lnterpretatJ.on of man, tll.us 
answering t~'l:=' questJ.o:J;iof t.1e ultJ.mate meaJ.lDg of lJ.fe. 
Vlhatev~r the subject mat tel' ·vihJ.ch an artlst chooses, however, 
vreak or strong tns artJ.stJ.c form, ;1e connot l1elp but betray 
------------
(1) of also The Future of Religio~, pp.80ff 
(2) 11 Relic;ion and Secular Culture", JR, vol. 26 (1946), p.81 
by hJ.s style hls ovm ultJ.H1ate concern~ as well as that of' his 
&,roup~ and hJ.s perJ.od. He cannot escape relJ.gJ.on even if' he 
reJects rel1.g1.on~ for relJ.gl.on J.s the state of' being ultJ.tmtely 
concerned. Ana J.n evn7 style the ul tJ.mate concern of' a 
human group or _yer1.od 1.s made ill8nlf'est. 11 (1) 
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T..n.ere lS no guarantee thet any culture aQ;tually exJ?resses what is, 
objectively speakJ.ng, its ult211ate Ct:>ncern. It ma~r only express what l t 
takes as J.cs ult1.mate concern: thot J.s to say, J.t t'19Y elevate to a position 
of' ul tJ.macy sotne object 171ncn ls 1::1erely of' 11 pl'elll11J.j_1ar-~n or secondary 
concern. ( 2 ) At best a culture whJ.ch substJ.tutes some secondary con:: ern 
f'or J.ts ult1rnate concern t'18V be saJ.d to \'TJ..tness to its ultJ.tnate concc;rn 
The kJ.nd of theology of culture ·;rluch Tlll:t.ch rnakes use of' J.n 
entJ.allsm and of' the ·Jost-second V{ol'ld War si tuctlon. It J.s really a 
questJ.on of' tne self'-interp:ceta tion of' man and tns exJ.stence. The 
cultural forms of the r'JJ.d-tl•fentJ.et~l centur7 ex:Jress man's awareness of' 
estrangem:::nt and alJ.enatlon, ·vvhlch TJ.lllch J.nter_:?rets as alJ.enatJ.on f'rom 
nls true bein6. ( 3) 1'lns J.s Fl mFltter of' ultimate concern for nls being J.S 
threatened u11less he can fJ.nd renewed umon v•TJ..th th::d, ground of' being vhlch 
un::.tes ''ltll YiJ..th the '.nole of' realJ.ty and witil. hJ.u1self'. 1heology, therefore, 
draws on an analysls of the 11 sJ.tuatJ.on11 (l. e. an analysJ.s of' wan 1 s self'-
ll1 cerpretatJ.on). 
It ls thJ.s last sta.se J.n tne theology of' culture 1'lhid1 leads to 
··,rhat TJ.lllCcl desCJ'J.bes as nJ.s method of correlatJ.on, the correlation of' 
(1) Theol.Cul, p. 70 
(2) cf'. ST,I,pp.14i'f'; G1TJ.stianJ.t:~_an~_t£e_Ef2.~~u!2.~~of t11~ .. .::Ysn·ld RelJ.gl~, 
pp.18ff'. He s~)eaks of the same thJ.ng as worshipping f'alse J.dols and es 
creatJ.ng quasi-relJ.gions. 
(3) of 11"RY• stentJ.al l\nalvses enCl I?.c]igious Symbols" Four E:~J.stent.Lallst 
Theologums, pp. 277ff'. 'l'il LJ.ch 1 e6ards e:nstentJ.alist -phflosoplrf-; s the 
;::,ood fortune of' -theology, but it ls not clear ymethe1· J.t J.s because J.t 
provldes analyses vvhJ.ch a:!:'e CHore C'hrlstJ.8D than those cf' ideab.sm or 
because J. ts cow1srel of despalr offers a .90D1t of' contact for 
Chl'lstJ.an symbollstn. 
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questlons em answers. The questlon ls posed ln the exlstentlallst 
3. Tne £1!ethod of Oorrela tion 
(a) .Antecedents 
Befoi'e -He osn examine in Cletail the method of correletlon, ae 
mu sL turn D_gain co be ea.cly vror:Y/of Tllhc..h. Tne necessl t:;- of uolng tl1lS 
lS suz;este~l by TJ..llicl1 hlinself Fhen he :h·aws our attentJ..on to tne 11 fl:.."st 
::md ratl1er J..nsufflcic:;nt step towards what I now cell the metrwd of 
corrE-l.stJ..on11 ln the deli Dl tJ..on of theolo[::,Y as theonolllous m-3taph~;slos. ( 1) 
We notJ..oed thc·t Tllll0~1 dlcl not, ln fE~ot, deflne theology as 
tlleonomous rnetaphyslcs and thot there ls a consJ..uerable deg:<.'ec of confuslon 
surroU.t1dJ..n[:, hls J..Cleos oonoernJ..ng t11e role of tl1eolog;; as ex-_.?ressed lll the 
System of Scaenoes and J..n oth-~r vor~~s of ti1e s sme verlod, a oonfu slon vrhlch 
ls oue not least to tne ways .1.11 '.l}nc::.. he uses tel'tns su.c11 as rellglon and 
theology. 
It a_:!pears, at fi('st sig,t1t, as lf the cultur·al sciences are to be 
re6arded as ooln::;:>lete once the ob,y::ots have be2n ::claboreted and t.:hv:t.d'3d lnto 
-J1.e two serJ..,~s of fltnctlons, the tl1eoretJ..oal serJ..es, oompl'lSlng eplstemology, 
aestll.etlos and me tsgil,;rs..t.cs, and tl1e _rJrsctloal ser les comprislng jurlsprudence 
poll tlca l sclenoe and ethlcs. Systernatlo thea Logy fuer1 a~)pears as servlng 
approx.Lmotely tl::e same functloc1 as theon0T<1ous metaphysics, but ·work~ng vntrdn 
the:: bounds of a •)artJ..cular relJ..glous tradl tlon. It v-ol'ks Wl tL1 tne sy1,Tiols 
of a co.1C rete rel~glon and seeks thereby to contrJ..bu ;;c to t'>.e Yrork of the-
onowous ne taphy slo s. It clalTnS a part ln the s:~rste:n for thls reason 
~111d also because, as a concrete traclltlon J..t sU_.Jplles materJ..al for the 
cultural b..J..s tory of raetaph:yslc s. 
(1) ~' introdu.ction p.xxli, of also Boundary, p.55 
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In his !1ulosophy of Re~iglon, !l.ovrever, Tillich elaborates more 
fully a sclence of rellglon vVhlci1 ls to be lncluded among the cultural 
acJ.ences, but he also makes l t clear that rcllglon lS not to be ree;arded 
as one function among others, and therefore exlsting alongslde aesthetlcs, 
metaphyslcs and so on, but as a Vltal element of all t11e fw1ctlons. It lS, 
indeed, t11e element lfl all which is dil·ected tovrards the Uncondl tlonal • 
.At ttw same tlme, he sees l t as necessary to develop an acoount of a science 
of l'ellglon constl tuted, a ccordine:, to tile same pattern as the other cultural 
sciences, by tl1e three elAments of J?hllosophy' cultural In story arrl system-
atlcs. Withln this patt:>cn, theology re.vresents the thJ.rd element, with 
a normatlve fur1ction. 
Rellgion has th ls see-saw exls ter1ce because, v,h ile it lS an element 
of all the functions (and necessarlly so if Tilllch's system of sclences is 
to be more thBrl afl arbltrary arrangerrent), tl:.e perception of the truth of 
the Uncondl tlonal has recel ved not only Uflconscious e:xpresslon, vrlnch 
reg_Lnres to be lnvestl2,Bted, but hes also achleved more conscicus ex;resslon 
ln the J)artlcUlRl', concrete symbols of varlous l'ellglous groups. 
The system of s Clences, however, is arranged not solel:r on the 
basls of the objects uf the sclences, buybn the basls of method. Each 
lnch vidual science has l ts ovm partlcula· met~'.od, al)f>roprlate for l ts own 
work, but each 2,rou9 of sclences 112 s l ts ovm. t-ype of method, of vVmch every 
method ....-~lthln the group may be described as a sub-type. T'.0e type of method 
whlch characterises the cultural sclences lS the metalog1.cel mefuod. 
Indeed l t ls ihe metaloglcel 1netl1od Vihlch ls the method J.nvol ved ln the 
systematising of all the sc.wnces, but .flrst and fo1emost, lt ls the method 
of phllosophy. But just because l t l s the ll1efuod of phllosophy ana plnlosophy 
holds a fundamental posl tion in t11e cultural sclences, l t l s also, accoraing 
to Tilllch, the method of the culhU'al sclences ln general. 
n ••• ev-=;ry constructlon in cultural history and systematlcs lS rooted 
in the grasp of the elements and princlpl; s of' rre anlng." ( 1) 
(1) GW,r,(sdw), p.238 
-132-
Since the sclence of' rellf;lOn and theology are J..nclooed vllthln 
the scope of' cultural scJ..ence, they therefore s.hare ln the metalogical method. 
The me-thod of' philosophy sprl!Jgs from J.. ts t~sk, f'or lt has not 
only to abstract the prlnc:Lples of meanlng f'rom 11meanlng-reallty 11 but also 
to relate tne -;Jrlnclples of' meanlng to one another. The basJ..s, therefore, 
of the .9hllosophlcal mett10d is the crl tlcal-dJ..alectJ..cal trethod. It lS 
critical J..naslTILlCh as J.. t abstracts the _9ritlcJ..ples of' meanJ..11f> and di8lect..Lcal 
ioosmuch as lt 1·elates them to each otheor. 
"Both wethods, ~1cw ever, are one: the crl tlcal rnethod .LS always 
dJ..alectJ..cal as well. For there lS no posslbili ty of' artlcula ting 
the prlnciples of' meanJ..ng £':com the meanlng-reality other than by 
demonstrating theJ..r necessJ..ty for the construction of' a unified 
ordet' of being; and tne dlalectlcal method lS necessarily also 
crJ.. tJ..cal, for the necessary J..nterconnection of' meaning appears only 
ln a system of' the J?r:LnclpJe s of rreanJ..ng and n0t ln the meanJ..ng-
re~lJ..ty itself.n (1) 
IndescrJ..bing the vray lnvlinch the crJ..tJ..cal-dJ..alectJ..cal nethod aclueves its 
pur_9ose, TJ..llJ..ch rejects not only ep:Lstemological ide~?lJ..sm bmt also epl-
.Althougt1 the o"Bthod presupposes the autonomy of 
the sp:Lri tual over against every "immediately gJ.. ven exJ..sting tl:ling", 
nevertheless it need not assume that spJ..rlt gives laws to natu1e. lt is 
not thou~ht whJ..c!J lmJ?oses meaning on reahty, nor lS J..t spJ..rlt ·whlch does 
tl-ns. TJ..llich does not substltute one fo:::m of ep:Lsternolog..Lcal J..deallSlt1 for 
another. But J..f he refuses to see the functlon of mearung J..n terms of the 
bestowal or J..rnposlng of' meanlng U?On realJ.. ty (Slnnt;ebung), equally he refuses 
to see J..t J..n terms of the gras~lng of meaning: nature does not gJ.. ve laws 
to splrJ.. t, as epistemoJ tJQJ_c2l reE j is"n asserts. ( 2) 
"IdealJ..sm lS vn:ong, because l t cannot shaw how the forms of meanlng 
reach thJ..ngs; reallsm lS wron~ b4cause 2t cannot show how thlngs 
reach f'o1ms of ne anlng. 1" (3) 
(1) mv,r,(~), p.307 (WR,p.41f) 
(2) GW,I,(Rph), p.307 (WR,p.42) of' GW,I, (SffiY), p.138,233 
(3) GW,I,(SdW), p.233 
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What J..s r eg.nred is a method vvi"lJ cl-J. 1s not :restricted to the interaction of 
the sbject and the nnnd bu"t cBn reach beyond; a metv1od, 1n short, wh1ch 
sees 1ndJ..v1.dual meanings not only 1n the context df other ~ndiVldual 
mean:Lllds, but of the root of all mean1ng. 
''ll!t must assume that the princi:yles of meaning to whici1 consciousness 
submits 1. t self 1n tl1e spir·i tual act are at the same time the 
pr1nc1ples of meon1ne_ to wluc'l being 1s subjected. It rust asrume 
that the mean1ng of be1.ng oomes to e:JP ress1on J..n tne consciousness 
informed by mean1ng. tt ( 1) 
So T:LllJ..cll speaks of the 11ful.fJ..lluJg 11 of mean~ng, 1nstead of the bestowal 
at grasping of meanmg. MeanJ..ng ex1sts neither 1n the object 1tself, nor 
1s 1t a product of t~e m1nd impressJ..ng itself upon realJ..ty. MeanJ..ng, 
rather, J..s fulfJ..lled, or brougt1t to conscJ..ous awareness, vihen the J..ntent:Lon, 
or dlrectedness, of J..ndividual th1ngs, t~vards uncond:LtJ..oned foTID, J..S 
(2 \ 
recognJ..sed and exal!l!i:ned. ) 
The cr1t1oal method, however, J..s inadequate for philosophy, for 
philosophy must take account not simply of tl1e forms. A cri tJ..cal method 
1s apt to reduce everytl1ln':) to a matter of forms, so that Being ceases to 
be rec06UJ..sed as any '•lore than the negatJ..ve correlate of .9erception: 
that J..s to say: 
"· .• 1.t can only define bein.s as a category, or as the boundary of 
percept1on. It passes over 1ts }Os:LtJ..ve content, because it sees 
in it a metaphys1.cal hypostatJ..sation. 11 
ThJ..s weakness 1s due to the log1cal (logJ..stisch)( 3) start1n~ po1nt of the 
cr1 t1cal method. Logic becomes, thereby, not simply a tool, but a pr1nc1ple. 
or 1 tself, J..t cannot avo1d fall1.ng short of the goal of recogn1si.ng the 
intentJ..on of all thJ..ngs towards UncondJ.. tJDned forrr1 and of r ecognJ..s:Lng the 
real1ty of be1.ng. This log1.sm (Logismus) as TJ..llJ..ch cells it, of the 
cr:Ltical-dJ..alect:Lcal me"thod, prevents understandlng and so precludes the 
possj_blll ty of gra sp1ng the essence of l1E anJ..ng. 
( 1) GW ,I,(~), p. 307 (VTR, p .1.~2) 
(2) GW ,I,(SdW), p. 233 
(3) We must dJ..st1.ngu1sh logu..stJ..sch frol!l logJ..sch: logist:J..sch refers to i..hat 
sJ.. tuation J..n vitnch the dynamic of b eing is subdued completely by 
logj_cal form. 
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Now understandiD.g lS the buSlness of phenomenology, and J.t lS 
therefo1·e from phenomenology that the crl tJ.cal mefuod comes under severe 
attack, and phenomenology which must be used to make up sorne of the 
deficJ.encies of the cr.LtJ.cal-dJ.alectJ.cal method. 
Tn.e kJ.nd of phenot'lenolo.g-· whlch TJ.llich has J.n mJ.nd J.s that of 
Husserl Its purpose J.s, as we ~ave said, understandJ.ng (Verstehen) 
Wi1J.ch lS achJ.eved by tne lll"b..l.L tJ.on of essences. In order to a coo mplJ. sh 
an J.ntuJ. tJ.on of essences, phenomenology employs fue concept of "epoche" • 
.Although J. t corrrnences l ts work with concrete or J.ITIB!?.,lnar;:r phenowena, it 
"brackets" the actual existence of t1ose phenomena J.n order to consider 
theJ.r essence. Judgemflnt as to I'Theth:or the object actually e:x:Lsts is 
~llspended J.n order that an understan.dlng way be g~lined of +lle essence of 
the object. Accordingly, l11 a phllosophy of r~lJ.gJ.on, the phenomenologJ.cal 
method wouJd make pibssible the intui tJ.on of the essence and the peculJ.ar 
quall ties of rehglon J.n any example of 1. t. 
The great value of the phenonenologJ.cal method lS J.CS abilJ. ty 
to approacl1 tne real object of enquiry "more closely and vi tally" 
is possible for eJ. ther cri tJ.cism or dJ.alectJ.c. It lives, as TJ.llich says, 
"in the verY thing itself, not J.n J. ts ratlonal-abstract aspect. 11 ( 1) 
It can do justJ.ce to tne .:_)artJ.cl'll;Jr charact:c1· of th'.:: functJ.ons of meaning 
and grasp them J.n theJ.r pecul1ar characterlstJ.cs, seekJ.ng to establJ.sh areas 
of weanlng and to construct prlncJ:yles 0f meanJ.ng. ( 2) But Lt has, never-
theless, serious wealmesses. 
It:/chJ.ef fault ls that J.t J.s unable to dJ.stJ.ngulsh oetween an 
essence end a norm. ThJ.s lS occasioned by the J.l18 11ili ty of phenomen-
ology to treat eXJ.stence as any more than the 11eccJ.dental 2nd ultimately 
J.ndJ.fferen t comng togethertt•(3) J.n one 1.ndl VJ.dual thing of dJ.stlnct 
-----------------
(1) mv,r,(~), p.309 (WR,p.45) 
(2) GW,I,(SdW), p.237 
(3) G"W,I,(gph), p.309f (WR, p.45) 
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essentJ.al attrJ.butes. fhenomenology cannot, in consequence, r ecognlse 
the peculJ.ar character..LstJ.cs v:rh1.ch 1118~· d1.st1.nguish one phenon.enon from 
another of the sarre type. Two alternatJ.ves, therefore, stana before 
phenomenologlcal _phllosoph"- of relJ.gion: in proCluclng an essence of 
l'elJ.gJ.on,J.t can esteblJ.s.h an essence wlnch, in transcerihng all empirJ.cal 
relJ.gJ.on, bears the features of one partHular relJ.gJ.on, or else constructs 
a new, J.deal rellglon. ( 1) 
11 SJ.nce tne dJ.rectedness of all tlungs towaL"ds UncondJ.t:u:mal form 
and vdth J t the dynaFu.c r ela tionslnp of realJ. ty and spirJ. t J.s 
forelgn to !..t, J.t has to chspute the treanlng-fulfllling character 
of splrlt and find meanJ.Dg realJ.sed ln the essences themselves. 11 (2) 
The consequence J.s that 
"That vrhicl:l J.s g1.ven J.n idea (das Idealgegebene) lS at the S9me time 
that wlnch lS normatJ..vely correct. -So -J. t comes about that phenom-
enolog,ical philosophy ls also ah7ays normative systetll8hcs. 11· (3) 
If the cri tJ.cal method pays too rr:ucl1 ~:d;tention to form, and falls J.nto 
"logJ.sm" pheno~1enology pays too rrucll attention to bein2, and falls into 
The mettwd of plnlosophy u'ust combat both the 11 logism 11 of critJ.cism 
and the 11 alogJ.sm 11 of phenomenology. It rr1ust, therefore, gJ. ve due regard 
botb. to t':1e ele>nent of thought aJil to the el.::r,1en t of beJ.ng, but lt must 
alSO l" ecogruse n1.e dy11.8rrtLC tensJ.on between them. Geist lS J. tself a product 
of tree tensJ.on bebr•ee.c1 thou2,ht and -oeing vrlnch makes possJ.ble the realJ.SBtion 
of meanJ.ne,, and so phJ.losophy, as an element of cultural science (GeJ.stes-
~senschaft) must ackncwledge the tenslo11 if l t J.S to fu1fil J. ts purpose. 
When the cri tlcal-dlalechcal rr1e thod J.S thus modif.ted by the phen-
omenologJ.cal metl10d J. t J.s on l ts vra/ tr) becomng the metaloglcal met11od. 
TJ.lllch gave J.t thJ.s narne because lt lS, he says, 
"logJ.cal (logJ.sch) for the sal:::e of the thought-forms, metalogJ.cal 
for the sake of the being-import." (4) 
(1) ~V,I,(Rph), p.310 (VfR, p.46) 
(2) rnq,r,(saw1, p.237 
(3) Ibid 
(4) Ibld, p.122 
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Its logJ.cal character J.S derJ. ved from the Sf/3 cJ.fJ_c concern of phJ.losophy 
VTJ.th pure :catJ.onal forms; but phJ.losophy cannot be satJ.sfJ.ed 7Tl th thJS 
alohe. It lS therefo_-e also rnetalogJ.cal, by analog;7 va th. the J.dea of 
nletaphys2.cs, becEIL' :,::: l t /Soes beyond fonns both J.!1 til.at l t seeks to grasp 
the l:nport J.nhel'ln;; 1n tcl.e forms and J.n th2t lt drrves towards ihe setting-
U.? of norms. 
seeks to intuJ.t the "ir"nel' d;vna•Ilic of the structure of' the meanlng-realJ.ty." 
It employs the p[J.enomenolot_;lCal approach but refuses to be bound to 
partlcular forms and, J.nstead, 
11 reatJhes baclc crJ. tJ.cally a1XI J.ntlntlvel=' to the p:..•J.ncJ.ules of 
meanu1g whic:1 are con:Jl tloned by botl1 form and J m~ort~ .... 11 ( 1) 
The rnost 1.mportant feature of i£13 metaloglcal method 1S i:h1.s drlve towards 
the establlshment of n.orr11s, "b1st 1.s to say the dr:.ve tovra1·ds the realJ.s-
C~tion of the Uncondl tlonal, towards mak1.ng plaJ.n tl1.e OJ'J.entatJ.on of every-
thing "to the Uncondl tJ.onal. ::Lt lS for thls reason tha L phJ.losophy cannot 
be sJ.mply cri tlcJ.sm, J.solated fron1 all other dJ.sciplJ.hes: J. t , •ust also 
be theonomous plulosophy, assertJ.ng the ultJ.mate orlent£,tJ.On of the whole 
of condJ.tloned reality to t11e Uncondl tJ.Ot1al. 
If novr, we see tneo lo;s:;r as a part Ol~ tne s cJ.ence of relJ.gJ.on, 
then lYe ~''ay see clear·ly tll.s-:; l t must partake lll l1le ll1etaloglcal method. 
It cannot ex1.st apart f:com t!-:e phllosoph? of l'elJ.glon and the cultural 
hJ.story of r ellt!,lon and J.ndeed e:::J.sts J_n t~J.e ver·- tension betvreen thou,;;ht 
and bein~, vih.ich rnal;:es possible the fulfilment of lTJeam.nt:~· It lS :;}artlcula.rly 
concel·ned, o s a norrnat.L ve sclence, to brlD2, to consclousness the orlen L8tion 
of all tlllngs tovmrd i,he Unconchtional. 
It lS .9erhaps, smne\'rh~H nusleadlng, to speak of a norrnatlve sclence, 
sJ.nce tl~115 1 ,0 rd nonn tends r;o s·u,;2:est ti1cot t.he ;:pol of the cultural sclences 
J.s tlw .fll'oductlon of sowetlnr16 ns--r, the est2bllsh1nent of stanclards by 
In a sense thls lS true, but lt lS 
--------.------
(1) nm I (1:h)'nn) p. '114 (~ffi, p.51f) 
-""i' ' .::.:.s:.:: , ../ 
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not T:Llllch's lntentlon that 8 syst:m of sc~ences such 8S ~us mould become 
a dlC"t8tor to Ule V8l'10US d isclpllnes to tell chem "Phat they IM~' or may 
not dib. It-is rather, an attanpt to demo:>:1st::ate t'1e wnt:r of the sc.Lentlf1c 
vrorld by l8ying bare i:he ontologlc8l roo"ts. The percept1on of the onto-
lo2,1cal un1ty of all -L:nn::o,s and of U1:oll" Uncond1t1on8l root.Lng J_::; also, 
TLe 1 eal1sa Clon of 
t£leamng 1s, thus, "the est8blishner;.t of norms. 
11 These norms 8re ,ot 1 subJec t1 ve 1 • 1be term 1 value 1 sut.;f.ests 
subJectlV~ ty; hence it l£18 ~- be vr:;ll 8Volded. 1he norms are 
str1 v1ngs l!1 the d.Ll·ectlon of ii1e unconch t1onally V8l1d, and 
the uncond1 t1on8ll.~' reol. The "l"ord 1 value 1 accents t1.1.e refe-cence 
to Lhe subject, a seconu~n·y chaTacterlst.Lc of ihe norm. S_t?1r1t 
.is ~)rlfaarlly val1d1ty, truth, nord1. There are num~rous values 
- b1olog1cal wlue-s, ps;rcholot,lcal va Jues, econonuc valuc;s, aL1d so 
on. Spir1illal VF,lues, 11owever, are Ol'len-red co the Uncond1t1oned. 11 ' (1) 
The ~Ul'.t"JOS e of nor,na tive sc1er1ce lS t.) le8d to'iards tne brealnng-tl1rough 
o:;_'"' conoJ_tloned reality by Uncond1t1onal mean1ng, to ass1st, 8S 1t wsn'e, 
to.-r8rds the r eveLdaon of the Ini'unte 2-rouna of 811 f1n1 ce real1 ty. 
But i:h1s breakHJ.g-th.cough cannot be en;s1neered: t_1ere lS no p:Jss1b1l1 ty 
c.f 1ts bei112. Clel1beratel:;.' brousht about. We <rust speak 01.~ thls phenomenon, 
,-ihen 1t tokes place, E·S grace or -oareClox and tne 111·~thod, therefore, of 
theology, as the method of !J8l'ado:;c. 'llie nor1netrve sciences, snd in 
_?artlcular, t':e normatl ve 8spects of' metaphvslcs and ethJ_cs, seek to br111.g 
cne Uncondl tlonal to oux ewareness by means of an 1ntu1~.Lon of the presence 
of the Uncond1 tlonal wi t~un cond1 t1oned reality. 
Inasmuch as l t lS d""Lrectec1 tm-rards Uncondl tional 1m9ort, rellglon 
s"tands 8s tne complement of plnlosopl1y, •rh1c11 has a pi'lP18l'ily cr1tlcal 
faced 
ol"lentstlon, but we find ou1·sel ves y.ct aga1ll,7vli lh the dlfii culty of pl8Clllf!, 
rell;::,lun E>nd theology. B.1.1losophy, accoi'diing, to Bn account ne ll2ve JUst 
cited, seeks, by means of the metaloglcal •1et'l0d, to 1ntmt the umer 
dynsmic of the structm"e of 11meaiung-:r·eDllty11 • If vre then propose that 
theology-, or rellg.Lon, hes the task of bl'lngu1g to l1,2.ht the reL"' cion of 
-·-------
(1) .Adams, P.c.s.R. p.157 
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"meanlng-reaLity11 to lts Uncond1Jcaonal ground, then iVe should !.1ave the 
st.cucture-depth relctlonshlp propmsed by TillJ.ch as t:-,_e r elationslnp be~neen 
Ii.ellt;lon, ~1owever, does not stand s:::.mply as -the 
complement of plnlosoph~· but as the frundn:;lon uf the v;hole of t.he cultural 
so1ences. Re:bf,1on ls at tl1e root of botll. metaph;tslcs and etlnos, slnoe 
metaph rsics aw:i eLhius represent tne theoretical and tt1e practlcal ser.tes 
of functions ·.'.11lcb arlse from the dlcectedness of all realJ.ty to the 
Uncond ltlonal. 
T'neology as a speclflc d1sciplme Wl -'.:Jnn the cul tm·al scJ.ences, 
is a part of the sclence cf r ellglon w'nich a1'J.ses from the phenon1enon 
of religlon. 
"Theolog:' lS the norii19tl ve and zys teti19tlc :9reserrt2tion of the 
concrete realJ.satJ.on of the concept of 1rellglon'. 1be cultural 
lnstory of r·el:.gJ.on acts as a br .tdge bet<.veen phllosophy of relJ.gJ.on 
and theology. I L _·rasps crJ. tlcally the J.nch vJ.dual reallsations 
of the concept of "C'·cllglon ln lnstor,y a11d thereby leads to a 
speclal systemotlc solutlon of Jts own. 11 (1) 
A norm is neVel" unrelated to the cultural hlstory, ihat 1s, to the 
material of mean1ng, and theology may then work vnth the materllll of any 
partlcular group ::;>rOY.Lded tb.c t .L t 0 oes so ln full r ecognl tion of the fact 
tl1at the ti19terlal of any one 2,roup cannot make exclus1.ve claJ.ms. Vle must 
kee,; J.n mlfid TJ.lhd1 1 s fundar1ental assertion that :c,eveL·tJ.on is a universal 
1)henomenon and tho t, therefoj_·e, the rr1aterJ.ol of any one concrete rclJ.glon 
1'heolo8,Y, then 
seeks to bring to lJ.ght the J.ntuitlon of the Uncondltional contaJ.ned in 
the religious symbols of DllJ concrete relJgJ.ous group. As far as Tlllich 
lS concerned, ne lS most concerned -rli t'' t.'l.ose of Cl1rlstlanl ty. Theology 
must, therefore, s~e beyond t 11e symbols as such, beyond the forms, to 
that to vrhlch t11ey polnt a11d t:: do so cl>:oarly involve-s the r!letaloglcal 
method. 
But the concept of the rretaloglcal method lS not so much an 
account of t'.l.e me-thod l tself as of vhat J.t strives to achJ.eve. It 
(1) GW,I,(B.Eb,), p.301 (VTR, p.33) 
descrilh:es the way in which reality must be newed, namely, as pointing 
beyond itself to ~ts Unoonditional grotmd. 
Clearly, any method which works towards this end has close 
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a:ffini ties with the mystical method. Tillich does not deny this, but the 
question nevertheless, requires careful exPlanation, for Tillich will not 
permit the reduction of the essence of religion to a ~stical ll1tuitittn 
of the Unconditional. A phenomenological account of the essence of 
religion might well make such a reduction, but to do so is to ignore other 
important elEments of rel~gion, which may not be :found universally, but 
\vhich may nevertheless have an important role to :f~ll, and ~eed, a claim 
t t . . :l;" t f 1" . (1 ) o a pos~ ~on ~n a norma ~ve accoun o re ~g~on. 
Mysticism is always an element of religion; it can never be 
regarded as though it were an independent~ of religion.( 2) 
Indeed, it is clear that ~n Tillich's view, there ~s no true rel~gion 
without a reyshcal element, but Vle must not ~magine that by nwsticism he 
means the eastern kind of mysticism which seeks to eacape :from the world 
of physical reality by means of a radial negation. Rather ~t recognises 
the presence of the Unconditional in the conditional and the orientation of 
the conditioned towards the Unconditional. It urges every kind of rel~gion 
to recognise this relationship. The metalogical method achieves its 
purpose by a mystical intuition of the Uncond~tional w~thin the conditioned. 
In other language, it recognises the principles of the macrocosm in the 
microcosm or the presence of God in the depth of things. (3) 
Again, we may detect strong similarities be~veen Tillich and 
Schleierma ch er. Schleiermacher, as much as Tillich, rejected the negat~ve 
type of mysticism, with the same purpose in mind, namely, of establishing 
the orientat~on of the :f~nite to the Infinite, and of intuiting the 
(1) In order to achieve its purpose of bringing meaning to light, the normative 
sciences must concern themselves with :form as well as import. 
(2) GW,I,(Bphl,~·341 (WR,p.90); cf also Chr~stianity & the Encounter of the 
WOrld -ner~~ons, p :Bsr; _§!,II ,pp. 9 2f:f. 
Footnote (3) will be :found on the next page. 
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macrocosmvVlthJ.n the 1fDcrocosm. There are, hcwever, some 1mportant 
differences be-b7ecn the;n thGt reveal TJ.llich as be1ng only partially 
dependent on Sc.hleierrro cher. 
Schleiermacher recarr:'ended that l"e beg1n, in our searc~ for the 
InfJ.nJ. te, not vd. th na tm"e, but WJ. -:h humanJ. ty, and m particular vu tll. the 
mdJ.VJ.dual's awareness of the ind1saoluble uni~" of all thJ.ngs as represented 
by h:t s awareness of himself as a manJ.festation of l11nnan:t ty .. Fran h1s 
awa1·en:oss of the unJ. ty of hurrumJ.. ty he '1ay go on to an awa1 eness of the 
un1 t~{ of al.L tt1ings ant$ so to an swal'cness of t_l.e I11.f1ni te. ( 1 ) There is 
a lilanger here, however, that the Jnfl11l te will be confused vu th the 
totality of ii1e unlverse, ~nd tl12t the J.ndJ.VJ.dual way J.den-... J.fy the depihs 
of ~us own self vii th Gud. .A6ainst th1s Tillich guards hi.nself ',men, J.n 
cri ticls..Lng Barth l1e obser,;cs: 
1
'He 1s correct in his resistance to all II\YSticism, v7hJ.ch would 
permit union with God J.n the de:p ths cf man 1 s 0\'ffi human nature. 
Apart from the Augustinian transcende te i;12sum there J.S no access 
to God. But this precept aoes contain wi th:w 1 tself the demand 
to proceed througp self beyon~ self. TI1erefore, the other 
statement, in interiorJ. anirna habJ.tat veritas, is more basal J.n 
the dJ.alectic of August1ne. We can only fJ.nd God in us vihen 
we rJ.se ~ ourselves." (2) -
We must beware of constru1ng Tillich moreover, in such a way 
that our religJ.ous e.xperJ.ence becomes a source of theology. It is tcue 
that both Schleier!IlB cher and T:t llJ.ch regard the InfinJ.te as being revealed 
in tll.e fJ.nJ.te, but Schleiermacher J.s apt to elevate the indiVJ.dual 's e:;p erience 
to a normatJ.ve pos1t1on, w'o.ereas T1llich wishes always to bring the J.ntuition 
of the Unconditional Vil fum the interpretative orbit of existing relJ.gious 
symbols. Tillich, indeed, specJ..f1cally reJects SchleJ.ermachcr' s de.scriptJ.on 
----- ------------
(No ce 3 froll1 the precedJ.ll..g page) 
(3) GW,I,~), p.314 (IVR, p.52); cf ~T,VIJ. p.222 (E.T. BeginnJ.~~ 
vo2.. I, p.13~ 
---------
(1) On Rel1gion, p.71f 
(2) "What is -:rrong with che D:Lalectic 'rheology?",~, vol.15 (1935), p.14D 
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of experience as a source of theology, reducing 1t to the status of a 
medium through wh1ch the contents of systematic theology a.ce enstent1ally 
received. It 1s the symbols of theology vh ich exercise a normative 
function, not the 11 rel1g1ous consciousness". ( 1 ) The mystical intu1tion 
of the Unconditional 1n the cond1t1oned reality 1s d1rected by the sywbols 
-rrhlci.1 are the product of the "group Lmconscious". Thus myst1cism always 
remai.ns "VJ.thln the orb1t of tb.e church (i.e. of the rel1g1ous group \vhich 
produces the symboJs) ana lS not allowed to beoo me pure subject1 vism. 
S1nnlarly, the symbols of the church 1nvolve a strongly myst1cal element, in 
tvro d1fferent ''lays. Not only 1 s there tll e part1eipa tion of' the symbol 1n 
the real1ty of' that ••Jlnch 1 t symbol1ses, but also the uwst1cal element 
involved 1n the 1nterpretat1on of the symbols where the 3.Ubject seeks to 
allow t.he truth to break througl: the symbol 1n order tb.at o mystical un1on 
may be ef'fected vrmct1. transcends the subject-object split normally 1nvolvea 
Because theology seeks to explaJ.n symbols it must have this 
myst1cal method, for J t rrust penetrate through the symbols to t11e 1·eal1 ty 
to wlncl1 they po1nt. Relig1on affirrns t.~e transcendental reference of 
the whole of real1 ty and the rellgious attitude grasps that transcendental 
reference, or orientat1on to tlle Uncond1t1onal. Tl1eology on the other 
hand seeks to penetrate those spec1al rel1g1ous symbols wlucl1 are the 
products of rel1g1ous ;sroups. 'rhey are necessary 1t seems, bec~lllse they 
have somethJ.ng _gart1cular to sa-- -Nmcrl cannot be sa1d by toe ordinary 
transcendc;ntal reference of 1nd1VJ.dual objects. Theology 1s ca1-r1ed out 
alongs1de meta2hys1cs and eth1cs, and, J.Ddeed, 1s carr1ed out as that 
part1cular 8 spect •7 hich is concerned ,vi th 
111mport 11 and as the complement 
of the ph1loso_ph1cal 11 el"',,1ent" vil:nch strives to cl1:1ssify and categor1se 
t.he forms of .ceality. 
(1) ST,I,p.47f 
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(b) The I.iethod o.f Correla t:I.on 
.As we ~1ave seen, T1lhch regarded lns classii'lc:Jtion of plnlosophy 
and ti1cology 1n the System of Sc1ences as onl:- a first and 1nadeqt12te step 
towards the method of correlation. But he d1d not abandon thls auproaoh 
in spl te of an:r lnadec~uacy he TJl.a:- have discovered, for vre l'l/3y st1ll detect 
tne lllfluence of the System of Smences in ti-1e structure-depth account of 
the relatlonsh:t.p of ph1losophy and theology, an occoll11t •·rJ.uch reflects -t.'1e 
::."elatlonslup of nego Gl ve and posl tJ. ve ph1losophy 1n Sc.hell1ng. furthermore 
just as 111 the System of Sc1ences the method of theology has two dlrections, 
that 1s, to-7ards 1ts ovm material and also towal'ds phllosophy, and the 
method lS determ1ned by h1s metaphys1cs, so also, we contena, in h1s later 
formulations of the task of theology h1s method has the same two d1rect1ons, 
end ls ::otlll dete:..'mL'led by lns metaphyslc. 
Having sa1d th1s, l'owever, vre must, befoi'e go1ng on to defend our 
thes1s, bear 1n unnd some of t~-le conclusions we have already Clravm re5ard1ng 
Tillich 1 s vicvrs on philosophy and theology. In his eerly vrork tl:le a ccoo.nt 
g1 ven of the:;.">" l'elehons!:up 1n the System of Sciences re1gns supreme, but 
be2:in£111v· vr1th the arb cle 1n R::cllg_~_oo ln Geschichte und Gegel1'Nart, he 
c ~' -------
;;radually cha116es lns pos1 t1on, so that although he s hll retains the 
structure-depth relet1onSh1p the focus of atceot1on 1s really fixed upon 
the q_uest1on-ansvmr reletionslrcp vrh1c11 1s marked by ttle amblgtnty of the 
word 11 question". Tlns accom1t of the relstlons11lp of ph1losophy and 
theolos,y, ,,rJ.ncl1 1s central to ius understanding of theolog.wal method, lS 
further obscured by tl:.e d1ff1cul ty of decldlnf, What lS the preclse nature 
of phllosoph~r ana theolo;;y. Both tenns a-c"e used 1n a bevrilderlng va1.'1ety 
of vrays, '-7h1ch 1ve l1ave attem_9ted to unClerstand by clescrlbln!?; both as 
attitudes as well as cll3cipllnes. 
Tl1e confus1on 0 ccss1oned by T1ll1ch 1 s incoos1stency lS responsible 
for t~1e confuslon that -.re f1nd among scholar's who have sou,;:,ht to offer 
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Bccounts of the rrethod of cor.rel2tion. The-L·e ls a marl:ed aosence of agree-
ment amon['; ii1em vrhicl' ls dL1e, v:re believe, to a fBllure to enq_ur·e sufflclently 
closel~" :mt.o the questlon of i7hat 1 s b eiD.g cor1·elated witl1 7ihat. On the 
one hand, then, we have .~. C. Outler assertlng that Tilhch's Systematlc 
T.h.eo Log.Y atterrr_9ts to show t.l2.at the Chrlstlan message 
"does, actuallv and ln truth, answer t:1e questlons •i.r1lCh modern 
man ls asla.ng, or beiDf:, f'orded to ask, about hls exlstence, hlS 
salvatlon., and lus destwy. 11 ( 1) 
-;il.J.ether Tllllcn achleves th_Ls goal lS a matL:;r of c-OrJ.Slden•ble debate. 
ilitle-L·, with a fevr r:c:servetio.ns seems to t!nn_lc tlwt he does, vitnle Tavard, 
on tt:C: otha' twnd beheves the lJreclse o)yElslte, for tlJ.e phllosoptler ls 
Tnese t..-;o Of'}?OSl.:16 coDcluslons al"e _r::Jossible 
correlete a pinloso:?hlcal questlon '.ti tn a theolo2,ical ansvre1·, '7e rrust be 
clea1· Bbout 11cwr 17e are uslr1S the term 1~rulosop11y 11 • J:avard lS che:cefo-_·e 
matter of ultin19te concern. It cannot enswe:" t11e plnlosopl1e:" YT11o, llke 
L::;on BrunschVlg, l)elleves t~1at lhs cm1 death ls phllosophlcally irrelevant 
~:md q_Dlce unmterescing to hunself. ITor can lt answer tbe Clespalr of those 
far Fiwm des-J?alr lS ul tlma te. ( 2 ) The re thod of correlation can only be 
a correlatior1 of a q_u:::stlOJ1 1n-Gr1 an answer ::f tl1e gu.:;stion is of the Y'l6ht 
On the otner nBnd, Loower mal~c:s the claJ m that Tilllch lS seekJJJg 
to correlate exls tentlallst ana lysls Vfl1, 1 cla sslcal tr1eolog;:;- and plnloso:phy 
0-:lnc_l he further descrlbes as a "theology of being t'H>de relevant to 
cmnternpor817 r~,an11 )and adcls 
( 1 )"The llethocJ of Correlotlon11 ~eVleW of ~7~-~eu1Bt~~'1:'J.l.~o.~og_.y, Vol. I) 
InterlJ:cetaho.n, vol. 5 (1951), p.477 
(2) G.H.Tavard "Cl1l'::_stlanlty c!:; the Hnlosoplneo of E::lstence", Theologlc~! 
3,udles vol. 18 1957, p.11 
11 It lS the ex1.sten tu-,lJ s t s ,-;ho••1 Tillich lS concerned to 
and he attEmpts to do so ln terms of trach tlonal 1.deas 
ins1.::;hts. 11 (1) 
ansvrer, 
and 
Once again there ls a de&,Tee of just2ce ln Ins assessment, bujc 1.t l.S not 
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the 1•.hole tn;th, and fails to penetrate to the 1.nchnduality of' Till1.ch 1 s 
It ls true that he lilshes to conduct a dialogue wi tl-:. the 
ezistentiahsts, but to bke phllosoph~r to liB an sl1 -.ply the ex1.stent1.alj_sts 
lS to have understood only a small part of Tlll1.ch 1 s lntentlLD, for the 
exlstent1.al1.sts al'c:; only re_9l'esentat1.ve or symptomatic of soweth::_ng far 
large1·. Taubes, tl1erefo:L'3, l.S nearer to the truth when he descrj_bes 
T1.lllch 1 s correlction as ch.al0cb_cal. He obcerves th~t lns 1.nterest ln 
sociology, psycholo2,y ano :phllosophy ls not :perip}J.eral but that Tillich 
himself par GlClfates ln the "cleavages and contra,hctl.ons 11 • He concludes 
from tlns that h::_s anal:rs::_s of tt1e human situ:;tlon lS dec1.sive 2.11 tne 
( 2' 
shaplng of llis theologJ_cal ansvrer. ) 
It lS scarcel:• possible to reduce T1.ll1.ch 's ,1ethod of correlat1.on 
to one 2de2, Sll1Ce T2ll1.ch h2111self vnshe':) to lnclude a number of d2fferent 
tlnngs w1. thln t;J.e scoye of lns correlation. We c18y draw attent1.on to 
f1.ve el~:cments, at least, of T1.ll1.ch 1 s prograwme. 
Frr st there l.S a sense of correlat1.on :Ln -.vh1.ch T:Lll1.ch seeks to 
hold to&,eth·J' ver1.ou s 1.deas -·tll.C-'- are the result of the e:Ji? os1. tion of 
plnlosophJ cal ~'ro ble't1S. We m~;e sa~r t11nt he •,-;1. ~hes to correlate :Ldeas 
wh1.ch are custom<?rlly, or at least frequently, taken to be mutually exclus1.ve. 
~'Te rna- i:;o~=e es an cxam_ole h1.s attem1)t to correlate the 1.deas of freedom 
and destiny. 'l'he ant1thes1.s lS not resolved by a s1.mple d1ssolut1.on into 
a hlgher synt:1es1.s, nor by the destruct1.on of one eLement by the other. 
Rather he seeks to ::how that they must be held 1.n dHJlect:Lcal tenslon, as 
(1) B.Loih:ner "Tl.lllch 1 s Theolo&,,:' of Correhtlonu, JR, vol. 36 (1956), J?.151 
(2) J. Taubes "On the Nature o£' the T'neolo::,lcal l\Iethod 11 , JR, vol. 34 
( 19 54), p • 1 6 
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polar oppos1 tes, v 1ncl1 re<].nre each other, contending that the one ldea 
rec1u1res tl1e other for its com,Pletion. (i) Th1s la.nd of correlation stands 
as a Wl tness to Till1ch 1 s reb tion to the 1deal1st trad1 t 1on, but the 
solut1on of be 1deal.tst l)roblem 1s ne.L ther that of Hegel nor that of 
K1.erkegaard; it is,rather, akin to Schell111g 1 s, and is based on his 
monistic metaph•·s1c, in wh1ch all eler:,-=nts are h::ld together ll1 the 
ontolo,sJ.cal 1 ihole, which is 1 tself rooted 1n the Ground of Being. 
Secondly, there J.s the correlatJ.on noticed by Loomer, the attenpt 
made by Tillich to answer the ex1stent1alists. There can be no doubt that 
TJ.J liol1 conducts much of lns theolo;sio31 chscuss1on v'li ttl the speoifin: 
intention of ene;aging 1n a dJ.alogue with certain s:pecif1c :ph1losoplncal 
trad1 t1ons and even vr1 th J.ndJ. VJ.dual ph1lo so:phers. He has lJ.ttle time for 
.Anglo-Saxon l1nguist1c analys1s (wlnc __ he fails to d1st1nguish from loe;1cal 
posi t1vism), but he has much to say to the existen"t1al1st trad1 tlon and 
parhcularly 1n .~-'e-ply to Sartre, whose denJ.al of essence T1llich counters 
w1th lns dootr1ne of dialectJ.cal polar1 ty. There connot be ex1stenoe 
unless there 1s essence, there cannot be non-be1ng unless there lS being, 
there cannot be mean1nglessness unless there 1s meaning. ( 2 ) 
vrishes to put forward '::.1s own metophys1c as more adeq_U8te than that of the 
existen tJ.al1sts, or for that matter, of Hegelians or Kierkegaard1ans. 
His answer to the ex1stent1alists 1s not so much an ance a l t o the Chr1 stlan 
~- lol 
message as an appeal to h.ts ovrn metaphys1c wh1d1 1ns1sts that ex1stence 
cannot be undel'stood vnthout essence and tl1 at rr12n 1 s self-estrangement 1s 
not hls f1nal state. VTe lilay sa"'- tho-c his theologj" 1s corried on i11 
oorrela tion vvi th concrete plnlosoph1cal tradl t1ons to tne exter1t ~hat he 
( 1) 
(2) 
H. Sohr8er e:x:-oresses a similar Vle"T, deser1bing T1ll1ch 1 s use of 
correlatlon h~re as "complementary dlalect1c 11 D1e Denkform der 
Paradoxall1tMt als theologLsches Prob~, p.162f. 
of "The Nature and S1gn1f1cance of E~clster1t1allst Thought", Journal 
Ph1losophy,vol. 53 (1956), p.7l¥f.; 11 Schelhng una che AnfMn:.:,e des 
Ex::Lstenz'1ahstischen Protestes 11 , Ze1 tschr1ft fftr ;phllosophische 
ThrschuP£;, vol. 9 (1955), p.204-; The Courage to Be, pp.i47, 169:rf 
of 
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carrles out a rLmning dialogue with them \"ll tlnn tne broader context of lns 
"mole v~ark. vn.1ether l'!i ultirnately ad1leVes his pur3Jose is a !IlBtter of 
lndlVlduaJ_ judt,ement, although we cannot lgnore the colT!fYlents of Tavard to 
the efrect that he can only anSI'ver those for vmom despalr is not ul tlma te. 
Nor can v1e lgnore the comments, :for exau1ple, o:f G. F. Thomas, vrho brlngs 
to Tlllich 1 s attempts to re-establish the tcle011omous conceptlons of reason 
the crl hcism that 
"Naturallst.Lc philosophers •.• can see notlnng iT.cong ·wJ.. tl-· the 
autonomy of reason, and cannot see wh7 the "anxiety" o:f flnite 
man should cause lum to seek an "escape :from reality" in 
rellglous fn th. 11 ( 1) 
A third sense in wh:LOh vre ,JBY speak of Tlllich 1 s correlative 
method ls a sense suge;ested by Scharlemann, a sense vrruch is connected wl th 
Tilhch's e}:pOslhon of the relatlonship of philosoph~' ~?no theology :'.n 
tert"S o:f structure and depth a!ld hence "Titb. the System ofi:lclences. The 
rellglOus symbols o:f the depth of being are e:;.;p ounded ln the liesht of the 
catecorles and concepts produced by en lnvestlgation af the structure of 
belng. 'rhus the e:xposl tJ.on of the syrnbols takes cognizance of such 
categol"les as causality, purr;>ose and so on. We have eh·eady argued, 
however, thDt lt ls vr.cong to U3e the Viord correlatlon et th.Ls polnt, slnce 
coTrelatlon su2,;es Ls thB t a much closeT connectlon cen be establlshed then 
lS :.11 fact present ln the structuTe-depth relationslEp. In any case, 
since theology lS bour1d to employ philosop!ucal termmology thls k.Lnd of 
"correlstlon 11 can scarcel~' be e volded, andnchematize it a cco ... "c1ing to 
the 1;atcern of the culturol sclences is not after all, to have sald 
very much. 
The po1.nt made by Scharlemarm, !loweve~, lS s hghtlj' dlffe.cent. 
He argues t11at it is a t•lstake to thlnk that Tllllch denies that the 
refe:cent of a :c ellglOL•S symbol can be glven nons:rmbolically. What 
Tlllich does C:eny lS that the:r can be 2,lVen noncor::'elatively. It lS 
( 1 )GF. Thon18s "The Method and Structure of ~'llllch 1 s 'l'heology 11 , ~' p •. 1 02 
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lll1pOSSlble to l'educe a 1 ellglo\Js s:r1,1bol to Bn ontolo;, Lc8l concept or an 
ontObglcal concept 
correlBtively. ( 1) 
The t-110 must be offered 
Tlns lS due to vrhat Scharlernann bel1eves to be the 
underlYlng ther1es of T1ll1ch 1 s doctrlne of rehgious kno-v-rledge, 1;;ft1 _,_ch 
cons1sts both. of "grasplng 11 by means of ontologlca l concepts and of 
"respond lD...Q 11 to being gr a s0ed J.n tb_P. f'or· m f "' 1 ib 1 
_ ~ ~ ... -- o ... e c..g::..ous symo ... s. Both, 
he argues are necessary lf just:tce J.S to be done to the cheTacter of 
lmonledge; botl-:. poJ.nt -beyond theP1selves to theu~ referent in tne 
UncondltJ.onal or Ultirrate Concern. 
do 
The t there ls an element of truth J.n thJ.s claJ.m vre jnot doubt 
but 1 t 1 s a so meviha t confused .tdea, wtncr1 J. tself rec, ts on the uncertainty 
that Tillicl1 hu'lself shows about the cnc~"<"ac:j;c;r of l'el.tg.tous symbols. ( 2~ 
It 1s J.ndou bteclly true thBt TJ.llJ.c~ t!nnks that the e::p osJ. tJ.on of relJ.glous 
symbols must be done in cor rc; lation with a11 ex:posl tlon of onto log:LCal 
language, that they "!Ust be allowed to J.nterpret each other, but even thJ.s 
is not the main tl1rust of TillJ.ch 1 s 1neanlng vihen he descrlbes the method 
of theolog·:· as the method of correlAtJ.OJ1. 
Finally, thel'efo::_"e, we tUl~n to wl.1at J.s clearly, J.n Tillich's 
vievr, the central aspect of Ins method of correlation, namely, the 
correl2tion of question and anffiver. TJ.llic':-1 hJ.mself, in discu ssi. ng the 
method of correlation hsts three ways in vrlnch lt tYJay be used ( 3) (wh1.ch, 
incidentally, b;-· no means exhaust the meanlYliSS the t VJe hB ve suggested so far). 
It can, he says, desJ.gnate t:1e corres-pondence of d:U'ferent s erles of data, 
such as, in theology, J.n tcle correS1Jondence be-bneen tlle data "symbols" and 
( 1) 
( 2) 
cf "The Mero 1ng and Just1f1catJ on of l1elJ.glOL s S~rttibols 11 Rellglous 
§x:perience and_~uth 11 1 p. 6f 
Reflechon and Doubt in the 1'nought of Paul Tlllich, p. 75 Much of 
Scharlemann1 s argument rests on a play of the vmrd grasp used to 
link the functwns of graspJ.ng and beJ.ng t!:rasped, 1h1ch reflects 
TJ.llich 1 s ovm use of possessJ.ng and beJ.ng possessed. An argument 
lS thus bujlt upon the uncertaJ.D foundatioifof the ambiguity of language. 
(3) ST,I,p.68 
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Secondly, 1.t ca11 tles1.gna te tt1e log1.cal 1.nter-
dependence cf concepts, suc'1 as -_n t:1e oorrel8 t1.on of 1.nf1.n1. te and f1.n1.t e~ 1 ) 
It 1.s cleer, however,that tnese t-wo are Huno.c matters for T1.llJ..ch, even 
though i/'ey are 1.n fact essent1.al to lns wode of o:t:;er·c-tJ..on, in coDTpBJ_'J..son 
i7lth the tlnrd t"'1ean1.ng Yi'.nch des1.gnates 11 the real 1.nterdependence of 
th1.ne;s Ol' events 1.n s truc-Lural whole s 11 , virncr1 1.n tl-;.eolo~] refers to tne 
J..nterae,:;t:ndence of c~uest1.o11 and answer·. It Ls to tills usage of t~1e 1.dea 
of correbt1.on tn2t he dedJ..cGte:, the bulle of 1_ns e:~ osltlffin. 
Tlns cen tl·al aspect of the met wd of correlation depends on 
TJ..ll1.ch 1 s COllplJ..cater1 unders tand"Lng of plulosoph~' and tneoloiS:r. It is 
cleo•", however, that when he syeaks of a correlEltion between a phllOSO:!,lhlc8l 
ques taon and a theologicto,l answer he coes uot mean by 1Jhilosophy 3·"--Y 
partJ..cul3r .9lnlosophlcal school, nor 911 aggre:-;a te of the pr:.1.losoplucal 
Indeed, -, e i1eve seen thot -U-c.::- quest1.on 'Yrl.J..ch 
requ:rr es an ansvrm_· 1.s _9l"o:_Je-'-1Y descr1.bed as theologicel rather than 
phllosophL.cEll. T''le -tre..,lo~J..cal quest1.on is 1.molJ..cl t in tl-c.e philosoph1.cal 
tas~'- beccuse ~Jlnloso.f_Jh,·- concer·ns 1. tself "'1. -ch an J..nvcstig8tlon of the 
structure of b-=-ing. fn_e,1 t'te ph1.losop11er asks 11 '.1l1y lS there SOtiietlnng 
and not nothing? 11 Dnd goes on to tr·ea-c tt1e qucstlon as 8 mattc:r of ul t1.mate 
concern, 11e lS aslnng a theolog1.cal c1uestion. To eloborate en tl1e 
quest1.on lS to unde::c·take 8 theolog1.ccl task. 
"Tneolo,sy fo2:•mula ces t:1e questlons 1rnf1lled J.n human e;Gstence, 8nd 
theology formulates tlce answers J..ll1Illled lD d1.vine self-manifestatlon 
under the 2Pldance of tlle cpest1.ons 1.mpl1.ed 1.n l1Ut11an ex1.stence. 11 (2) 
It 1.s not dJ..fflcult, hov.rev:;r, to see tha c the:e 1.s a very great d1.f:ierence 
between the ph1.loso~1her seeln_1£ to elaborate on tl1e question as a matter 
of ultl,nate concern to hlm, and Tlllicr'l, from -,,l ttnn the Chr1.stum 
trwh t1.on, seelo_ng to elaborate on the ouestion in orrler -co correlate jt 
Yri th an ansvrer. 'rlllJ..ch glosses over th:o._s d_•l'fel'3nce too easily. 
( 1) 1'hJ s corresponds to the fr,·st of senses vrh1.ch -,re have expounded 
about, namely the d1.a Lec"vlc9l :celatinE:, of concepts. 
(2) Ibid, p.69 
Be 
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argues, there.f'ore, tha-t lJhilosophJ 1s not lrrelevant to theology: lndeed, 
exlstentlalist plnlosoph~r is of great wlue since l t has 'rEc1e t"fle clearest 
art1culatlon of any ~hllosophy, of the questions lmplled 1n existence. 
lvfar eover, besldes philosophy, there lS also p;>3 try, drallla, t!J.e novel, 
therapeutlc psycholog<'r and sociology, all of whloh ma~r contriuute mater1al 
on wtncn theology rnay dravr ln order to wake an a:J.alyslG of e:t::.lstence. ( 1 ) 
He r1ay even refer these anal)rses to specli'lCelly relizlous sy11bols, such 
as the s~l,Dbols of sin and the .fall. The funda1:1en ts of t:1.e analysis he ve 
never changed: 
"Whenever man has looked 1:1t h1..s wo1.ld l1e has found lnrnself 1n l t as 
a part of l t. But he has also realised thAt he 1s a stranger in 
the vrorld of objects, unable to penetrate l t beyond a certain level 
of sc1entJ..flc analysis.'~ (2) 
But lt seems, althouglc the anal}·sls has not cGanged, tne terms ln whlc11 
that aEalysls have been e:;pressed have, SJ -that lt 1s t:1.e .fwlCtlon of the 
theologian not slmply to elaborate the qu:ostlons, or to reiterate them ln 
a new set of terms, but to show each new a,se 11.ow the ten1s of the eJq? ression 
or the sl tuotion a:re to be ~_,nClerstood, how they are to be related to the 
sy··ibols of the si tuetion erected by past ages and in partlcular to those 
of the Nevr Testament era. The polnt, hovrever, wh1.c!1 Tlllich glosses over, 
is the question as to whe tl1.er the-ce ls on~ necesoity to rel<Jte the rnodern 
ex-pre:.oslon of t:•e sltuct_._on to that of the New Testatnent el'a. 1tore ovsr, l t 
ls doubtful whether man ln all ages has ln fact made the same analyslS of 
his exlstence. 
It seet'ls to be J.ITI.9lJ.cl t J.n Tllhch 1 s thullnng that the theolog1an 
'"rorklnc<; from vntlun a concrete traditlon can contrJ.bute to an analysls of' 
exlstence in a 17ay ln vr,ncll t,le tnan w· 10 >mrks from outsJ de cDnnot. It 
1s certaJ.nly true th.?t he may be Bble to offer the ll1Slgh-Ls of that partJ.cular 
tradl tlon fo1 Hha ~ they ,my be worth. :Moreover, in Tllllch 1 s V.J..ew, he 
must go further and correlate tne quest1ons with the Bnswers he has received 
showing how the ansVlers formulated WJ.. tl1.ln t11e concrete tradJ. tion with 
( 1) Ibid_, p. 71 (2) ~' p. 70 
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wlnch he ~s f'amillar are actually related to the questions. But lt lS not, 
str~ctly s-_9eekm;;, a matter of slmple apolot;etlcs, s~nce the scheme w~ th 
whlch T:Lllich vrorks ls, as we have ruggested, one ln ·which man lS seen 
bJ th as phllosopll.er and theologlan, as aslr..J.ng and also knowJng the answer, 
as estranged but also unlted. It 1. s tll.lS scheme vrhlch enables Tillich 
to ,:sloss over the dlfference between tl'le phllosopher elaborat~n;:; tll.e 
theoloe,lcal question and t:1e thcoloB,lan engaging on the same task. 
The s_c>eclflc task of' systeffi8 tlc theolo6)1', then, ls not so 
much the correlation of questlon and answer as the correl9t~on of the 
symbols of a conCl'ete rellgious tradl non VTl th the questlons El!ld their 
answers. More precisely lt lS 
II tll.e conceptual inter-pretatlon, explanation and cri tiClsm of 
the sybmols ~n which a s.pec.Lal encounter betvreen God and l!loD has 
found e:>g;J re sslon. tt ( 1) 
We can see now the complexi.ty of the scheme of correlation, far 
lt lncludes tll.e correlation of religious symbols representatlve of the 
si tuatlon Vll th contemporary e:x.presslons of the sl tuatlon, co1nbmed to 
produce an analysls of existence, the correlation of r ellgiou s symbols 
representatlve of the a:Jprohension o.C tne Uncon.Chtlonal with the answers 
formed ln the lan[!,uage o.C the analysls of existence, arrl fmally the actual 
correlat~on of question ana answer. 
Tillich bel~eves that hlS a1?proach avoids the rlltfalls \ituoh face 
others and, ln "}Jart.LCular, wlnch fsoe the aJ!l:Jl'Oaoh o.C supernsturalism, of 
of 
aa cu::.'allsm and/rJuallsm, because l t does not regy.il·e bellef ln a body of 
revealed truths inaccesslble to man, nor does l t succumb to the tendency 
to ldentlfy the Cb.ru.tien 1nessage w~th man's rellgious self-redasatlon, 
nor does l t 2p···eal to a klnd of ttnatural l'evelation"'• ( 2 ) It does, hovrever, 
recognlse thDt the answer cowes from beyond man, as l t 1nust lf man lS to 
escape the v:Lclous circle of lns own eXlstence. It recogn~ses that the 
and 
( 1) "Theology/3y1·1bohsm", Hellgiou s Synibolism, ed. F. E. Johnson, p.108 
(2) ST ,I,p. 72£ 
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ansv1ers have been formula ted ln trad~t~onal symbols and theref'ore seeks to 
unlock tnose sy,nbols so that the po'rer fue::,r med~at5 may :pcur forth. But 
if' the power ~s to be able to pour f'orfu, the symbols nust be subjected to 
careful attentlon J.n the a ttem,?t to relate theP1 to the f'orrn of fue question. 
It ls for thls reason that he off'ers the descriphon of the task of' t..'h.eology 
in t..'h.e terms we have JUst Cl ted. 
In order to ensure that the s;y1nbols are unlocked properly, 
fu 1 t J.. lf -"' t ' 1 II ' l J ' II .u__ 1 t eo ogy mus concern ~ t..Se .L J.rs "12 1;n concep-cua lS2 c~on or t..ue J'e a ~ng 
of symbols to e8ch other. T'·ms l t 1mst for example, exaffilne and descr~be 
the ~elation between the symbols of dlv~e love and d~~ne justJ.ce or be~veen 
divine omn~potence and human s~n. Secondly, it must explain -che synibols, 
that lS to say, J. t se<3ks to ,nake understandable the relat~on of' the 
syu1bols to that nl'nch they point by 1·el1:1tJ.ng ti1e religious meanlng of' the 
s;y1nbolJ.c material to J. ts 11 orJ.gJ.nal and SJ.P1ple me"!DJ.ng 11 • Thus, f'or example: 
11 
••• We way cons~der t:.11e symbol of' the K:i.nt:;,clom o£' Goa. 11 I\ingdom 11 is 
taken from the politJ.cal realm. Theology asks, "How J.s the polJ.tJ.cal 
reality, how J.s t~1e hJ.storJ.cal development, related to th::cs symbol? 
What does lt say a bout the meanJ.ng of LJ.story in relJ.gious terms, 
~n terms of ul tJ.ma te concern. " ( 1 ) 
1'lurdly, it must exercJ.se a cl'J."tJcal f'unctJ.on, v1h:i.ch J.s not an attempt to 
show that a symbol J.s lus-torJ.cally, sclcntlficelly or psychologically 
untrue, but an attempt to ensure that they are not reduced to t..'h.e level 
of' non-symbolic thJ.nkJ.nc, end elso to test the adec.:_uac:;r of' the symbols to 
th:nr content. 
if{e l!lUst, however, see thJ.s part.wuler aspect of the method of' 
correlation lrlthln the cnntext of the wovement of the method as a ·whole. 
Each sectJ.on of' the SystematJ.c Theology begJ.ns Wl th t;-_e questlon or, rather, 
the quest or' flnl te man bound by the condltlons of enstence for :ceumon 
;;r.i th lus esscntlal bei.ng and vn th the de-pth of b elng. Her1ce reasor. cpests 
remnon WJ.. ~~.JL ct1e a epth of rea son and being for .ceun:i.on WJ.. t' t:1e dept..~ of 
beJ.ng. The qusstJ .. on lS posed ::mcJ fue kind of answer that is r cqu:rr ed 
( 1) "Theology and Sytnbohsm11', RehgJ.ous Syrribohsm P .112 
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suggested. In the second part the answer 1.s developed in tne fom of an 
expos1.t1.on of tne s;;<nbol, incorporat:rng t11e elements that ·we have JUst 
descr1.bed in a method that 11e lumself descr1.bes as cr1. t1.cal phenomenology. 
To speak of cr1. heal phenomenology recalls immediately the 
descl"J..ptJ..on g:Lven 1.n the System of Sc1.ences of the wethod of the cultural 
sc1.ences 1.n seneral and of plulosoph~r in part1.cular, except that ln the 
earlier work he thou2)1.t of t!1e mefuod 1.n terms of en t1.cism tempered by 
phenomenology, rather than phenomenology tempered by criticism. Tne end 
product, however, 1.s the same, an.D the reasons g1.ven for the necess1.ty of 
us1.ng both factors are 1J.1;ei'TJ..se the same, althoug,h he docs not g1.ve the 
sar'1e care to h1.s discuss1.on J.n Systematic Theolibgy as we find in lus 
earl1.e:c wor~=. 
The phenomenolog1.cal an:roach J..S necessary, he argues, 1.n order 
not only to cor!1pel the cr1. tics of theology to see what 1. ts com epts mean, 
but also to compel itself to a careful description of 1. ts concepts wh1.ch 
will elJ.ffilnate lot.,J..cal incons1.stency. For these reasons, 
"The :i_)resent system ••• begins each of 1. ts fJ. ve ;>arts 
description of the meanJ.nS of the determ1.n1ng J.deas, 
asserting and chscussing their truth and reality. 11' 
·1d. th a 
before 
( 1) 
Thus, for example, he d1.scusses the meaning of revelatJ.on or the mean1ng, 
of sp1.r1 t, disregardJ.ng, to bee;in >nth, tl-:e reali tJ.es to vh1.ch they refer. 
He WJ.shes to eJq?ound tl1e essence of tl'J.e concept of reveletion befol"e 
go1ng on to cons1.der the specJ..fJ..c clGims of' Cll.l'istu•m ty to revelation. 
It 1.s undoul~tedly true that Till1.ch J..S fe1.thful to ,ns proposed 
method at th1.s po1.nt, see1an 6 to ex_?lain in each case vhat is i:he essence 
of the concept he vas~1es to use. 1-iowever, in add1. tlon to the wealmc sses 
vl..ruch he 11lmself reco2,n1.ses ln the phenomenolog1.cal !J1ethod, -.. ·e rnust tal-e 
note aga1.n of a recLU"rin[. tendency in lus analyses to a .9pe al to etymolog1.cal 
der1. vet1.on J.n atten:pt1.ng to uncover the meaning of elenents of the concepts 
he uses. In. aJ.scussing the concept of revelatJ.on, for example, he d1.scovers 
( 1 ) ST, I ,p. 11 8 
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the elewents of m--stery and ecstasy, whlch he traces to the root forms 
and ex-sto. 
l t ls a ver-J uncertain weapon, and may produce hlghly nnsleading results, 
for a conce.:;>t lS su:rely better understood by an examuw tion of the partlcular 
context ln v,tnch J.t lS used them by an eX3nunation of J.ts derivation. 
In short, TillJ.ch 1 s idea of the way ln whlc:h language functions seems 
more than a lJ.ttle naJ.ve, and seems to deny J.t the fleXlbllJ.t37 •vmch in 
prectlCe it cleal'l,'' tles.(i) 
The major vreakne ss of tne phenoll1enolot;lcal me t:1od, lrThlch Tillich 
acknmiledges, lS lts J.nabllJ. ty to provide cri terla by vvrnch ·~-e may select 
suitable examples from which to n18ke an anelysls. 
examples me2~e clal'lls to be revel8tion, how are vre to di stinguJ.sh among 
them? El the:r, es TJ.lhc...h. sEnd in hls ~i.el; gion_s12!1ilosophie, l t vvill 
select one example qul te arbl trarJ.ly as a nonn or else J. t 1vill produce a 
TJ.lll.ch argues, therefore, tl.1a t phenomenology also re~nre s 
a crl tJ.cal elc:ment, or an eXJ.stentJ.al-cri tJ.cal ek··aent, as he C8lls l t, 
where t11e decJ.sion 8oout the crJ.terJ.on of the cho1ce J..S made apart from 
the t:Jhenomenologlc8l analysis. The only crJ. terJ.on, 1owever, vrhJ ch Tillich 
produces, lS conVJ.ctJ.on, namely, the conv.LCtJ.on that a special revel2tJ.on 
J.s the fJ.nDl revelation whJ.ch is, consequently, universally valld. ( 2 ) 
This procedu.:re, however, seems to lnvolve TJ.lllc~>. 1n somethinz of a viclous 
cJ.rcle, since l t rna~r be ar6ued that the crJ. tJ..cal choice made apa1·t from 
phenomenology ls ever~- bl t as arbl ~rary as any choJ.ce made l)y phenomen-
ology. The result J..s that -,-;hen TJ.llich cowes to ells cuss the concept of 
flnal revelation, he offers a phenomenologJ.cal descrJ.~tJ.on of J.ts essence 
whJ.Cll. he bases on the convlctlon that t~1e flnal r::ovelation lS Jesus ChrJ.st., 
The end YJl'oduct of the 2nalysJ.s lS to sho·vr that Christ fulfils the reqlnre-
ments of the concept of flnal revelatJ.on, a result v;l.11..ch J.s scarcely 
(1) cf above, p.125 
(2) ST,I, p.fl9f 
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surprls.mg because of tlle circular nature of the procedure. 
claims that trns J.s the .9roper procedure for theology.(1 ) 
Indeed Tilhch 
It rrmst certalnly be ochntted that TlllJ.ch e:JP oses t~1e dJ.leHJne 
of apologetJ.c theology, lnasmuch as l t seeks to occupy two ::;>osJ. tions at 
once, naL11ely th8t of tile sceptic seekJ.r18, valld crlterJ.a by vfnJ.ch he ''18Y 
j~d3e ChrJ.stJ.anlty, and ~1at of tne belJ.ever, already firrnly convJ.nced 
of tt1e trut~-~ of the f<:nt11. It seems, ~1owever, that he does not vrish to 
fJ.ncl a solutlon i.,~ t;·w dJ.le1mna, and consequently he flmls hlmself ln the 
hlS a:9Proad1, at first slght, attemptJ.ng 
to analyse the 11 sJ.tuatlon'1 and to su;;gest tne kind of answer that 1mght 
be recpJ.red, J.S attractJ.ve, but one never esca:;>es t.J.e feeling thet the 
answer a_c>pears rathr::r llke tl1e 1:abbi t froP1 the rm glclsn 1 s hat: the 
argument ls loaded o.1a the anal:lsls ls consequ:.:.ntl:r gu1.dP.d b:r the answer 
\Yhlc'-1 he l::noFs he Wlll ti ve. ( 2 ) 0 
There lS one further poin.t: while l t J.S not unreasonable to accept 
·,u ·ch Tilllch thet th3re ls a dimension to lJ.fe 'vh=' ch tl·ansforws the 1v'nole 
of reDlity, namely, the ·~elJ.gious dJ.1<1en:::aon, J.t lS still not cl~ar1•1hy 
TillJ.cl1 s elec--cs the -partlcular concrete ·r"ellgious tradl tion l"lh:'-ch he does, 
apart from the convJ.ction thatJ.i:s sy'Tlbols are the !'lOst adequate to the 
expressJ.on of that dJ.mensJ.on, a convJction w:1J.ch draws J. ts crJ. terla from 
Indeed one may suspect thc1t tt1e reason lS IilUCh 
rat~er slrrr.9ly that tne Chrlstian s;ymbols are those ~~f the Yi estern 1rorld. 
Hls :;?J'eference for dJ.alo;;,ue rather t•tan proselytisatJ.on serves only to 
support tlns conclusion. 
It lS chffJ. cult to escape the lm}?resslon -chat TillJ.ch I' eels a 
certain ernbarrDssment about the central concepts of the ChrJ.stJ.ccm fal th, 
·------------
(1) Ibid, p.150 
(2) 'rl1ls polnt has been ,nooe frequently, as for exam.9le, b~r Tavard 
(TheologJ.ca_:!:_ Stuches, vol. 18 (1957), p.10f) 
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in SJ?l te of lus orm deeply felt fel th ( 1) end seeks to defend thei'1 as 
symbols, sJ..nce :_ t J s easler to defend sy1nbols than to c1 ei'end statem:::nts 
of fact. Even so there remalns the one lntractable question of fact, 
namely the question of the factucllty of the New Belng: lS the ClrJ..Ve towards 
11essentJ.alJ..satlon 11 es he calls the reconclllation effected by the coiTilng 
of the Hevv BeJ.ng, resl, or ::JI'P we left, f:r.n9lly.; onl:r "l th th.e 3ssur2nce 
that despJ. te i:he se:1se of estrane:,emen t vre are nevertheless, still um ted 
l1 ~oreove:..", the approac."l ·;rhlc'l he o dopts seems 
to render the 1hole system questlonable. 
hwnan sltuatJ..on, questing fol" <:L' ans'V"er. He t:..·eats God :9henomenologically, 
tnat ls, as u1an 1 s ultlmate concern, and t:.1e.1 ontolot,lcally, as Being-Itself, 
sug§oestJ..nj t!J.ot <.loa ls, 2f tcr all, a funmtlon of 1nen 1 s need. LikeYllse, 
revelab.on J..s treated as o function of t:1c ~1eed o..: an ans·rrer to the ::?"-'ob}ern 
a ··Josterlori faslnon, from a conce_::;t of Goa aril of l'e velatJ..on to the f 8ct, 
J..n order to lnter.9ret the fcc t or Lhe syr,~ol ln t!1e llJ)H of the concept. 
But at the s2rne "Gl!lle, he ~::rw·,rs chat Goa ::.s 110-t slmpl:,r t:w functlon of man 1 s 
need but L!.J.at tne r ellgloL'S sy1xr10ls of t~1e dlVlile ::ce 'Jroduoed under the 
lmpact of the e,·1counter cf '1an ,,.:..th the d.L V"J.De ,nee tin~ hlfl1 fra·n l)eyond hJ..u1self. 
TneJ..'e lS one more conseque,nce flovring fron1 the phenomenolog::..cal 
me chad. It •'lll be recalled SJ.st one essentlal feature of Husserl' s 
1fB tiJ.od lS t~1e concept of 11 epoche 11 , tl1e su;:;_&enslon o.L jude;ctnent on tlle 
questlOn of th::: r1 ctual exlstence of the obJect. 'rill1.ch 1 s pheno;nenolo;:;J..cal 
8pproad1 to the symbols of the Chn.stlaD fal-Lh, seelCJ.ng to ~aln <:m lntLntl.ve 
understanding of -clle1.r essence, tends to l~nore t..'IJ.e factualJ..ty of the 
syrrbols. Thus a cholce Yil.J.J ct. ou~·~ t not to be l.CJ£ de lS made bet.,-reen 
fnctuallty and truth. 
( 1) Aurole e-nde11 ce of thl s Gild 11J..s desJ..re to "1ake l t unde:cstanrJable lS 
offered by Nels F.S. Ferr~ ln a lo'3VLeW ar tJ..cle on Kelsey'~ book 
(The Fabrlc of J?aul Tlllich 1 s Theolozy), ~' vol. 21 (19b8) 
pp.157-169. 
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question of ttle f'actu9llty of' Cln·lst, of '.7hom he mo""e than once S.?ld that 
lt !Clade no chfference to ~1lllli7hethe;r or not Jesus ever llved.(1 ) The 
cpestlon vrhlch conce:r:neo Tllllc.h. was not hlstory, but the power medlated by 
symbols th1·ovrn up !_l1 t·-,_e cot.,:;:se of lnstory. Indeed the very es se0ce of' 
lns s ,vstem l s the a 'c tem)t tr, a llo11r the poYrer cf t.-, e s;rmbols to pour forth. 
Theolo~y must, ln the ternnnology of th.e S~rstem of Sclences be metalogical: 
it must strlve, ln a nwstlcal underst.?ndJ.rJg of t:w syuibols to ::-elease theJ..r 
povrer for othe.cs, lfl2~an.;, tr1em transparent to t"IJ.eJ r referent. Scharlemann, 
then, lS qul te r3.2,ht uhcn ll.e corr3cts Tlllic:h' s assert.Lon that systematlcs 
must demonstrate that the syu1bol s L'sed ln the Chr'lstlan messa&,e are the 
ansiiers to the ~uestlons and observed: 
11~.'/hat Tllllch actuall-,- does .LS to pb ce the sytnbols :r_Jroperly, so 
that anyone con l:noYi -hat lS belng saiJ bJ themo He does not 
tr.r to _.:)rove that Jcney a2.·e true. The tru:th of t_<.e sy;nbols cannot 
be, ar1d need not be, 'proved 1 • The:c_r truth lS therr power to 
lay hold of ano tr8nsform those for 'i'rhom they a1•e symbols; it ls 
thelr capacl t~;- to expresc and COti1mUL1lCate ultimate co_1cern. tt (2) 
Vfe retu-cn, then, to the po1nt at vi!:nc:1 vre started, narnely, Tilllch 1 s 
claim to engage 1n apolo:_,etlc theoloc,:J- as the conplement of kery2,,natlc 
theology, eno to as1: yrh3ther he has •Jresented l t ln such a vm:- that it 
car1 be regarded as complementary. It ls dJ_fflcult to g1ve a f1nal a:>.1.swer 
to tlns quest1on since he rerely sa-rs ,-r~uch about kery2;matic theolo~w a rii 
does not explsln hovr ~1.e thlnks l t ou~)l.t to o:9erate. However, •·k1e11 he does 
Sfleek of lt, he usually does so illt,l special reference to Barth. L1 the 
hc,ht of lns uvm ex_pos1tion of thsolog:..cal wcthod, lt eppears that the 
only ter111s on l'l..rJ.lch ke:::·y[')11atic theologv- uould be .?cceptable '«ould r equ1..re 
that lt &hould ebandon all claims to excluslveness, recognJ..sin~ not only 
lts character as o concrete res-ponse to the lJ1!>act of the Utlcondltlonal, 
1)ut the character as one response arnong many. Its w..ain value even then 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
Ibld, p.163 
~eflectlOn and Doubt lll. the 'rl2~1t of .t'aul T1lhch, p .136 
At the sm·1e tlll1e, ho•·rever, '.rllllch does at tlmes attem.9t to p::c·ove t..h.e 
truth of symbols, 8 s i'or example 1ll th the symbol of the doct1·1ne 
of' orlglnal sln. lo do.Ln::; so, he 8 ppears to C011~rad1ct ~he esse11t1al 
movement of ln s method as he does ln h1s argurrenc;s conc~rnlng the 
.v -r ;-1 ture of' Cl1r1st cf also ST ,I,p. 266, 
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ls to act as a corrective to a~cibget1.c theolo£Y, recalling to apolosetic 
theolo3._y ti1e fGJct th2t t:Le Uncond1.tional comes to man .from beyond h.un and 
therefore fro1a outs1.de hls o•rn control. 
But one J..ntractible pl'oblemrel-al.ns, which T1.llich 1 s ap~roach 
seems unable tor esolve. Even g-rant1.ng thet kery:;In9tlc theology is 
-,,1llin.; to mob; the conces::aons l'equ:o·ed uf 1.t uy apologetJ..c theology, 
nevertheless there remalns the qucstJ..on of reconclllng the estimate of man 
off~red by kerygmat1.c -Lheolog_r iVi th the UDders"~oandlng of maYJ. ''ltnch epologetJ..c 
theolog~r culls from lJ..teratUl'e, phJ..losoph• and otrter cultural vrork. 
Correct _')ltWcedure -Ll--cough l t H'By lJe for apologetJ..c tlJ.eology to seek to 
understand 111an's own estirwte of hlmself, lt must reckon wit~l the fact 
that that esJGJ..lill te has var1.ed enormously. If Tilhch sebcts the estltr1.!3te 
of one partlcular age he must su1·el~r si.1.ovr vrhy he thlnks l t to be more 
accurate tha:::-1 any other. 7/e are led to bel1.eve, m tl1e lonz run, that 1.n 
f'act TlllJ..c:h 1 s analysls of man lS furnished -oy the Chrlstian message. ( 1) 
"Nhet Tillich vnshes to do Ls to bring t~1e 01''lStlan nessage 
J..nto sowe klnd of relations..>np -vntl1 phlloso~hy, 1·Jhose central concern he 
takes to be ontolog1.cal lnvestJ..getion. Granted that he ma~r h3ve performed 
a useful servlce in drai'Tin6 tlle at tent1.on of t11ose sectors of philosophy 
vlfnch decline to be any more than empJ..ricJ..st ln a posJ..tivlstic sense to 
the lmportance of a la1·ger perspect:Lve, 1. t relr13J..ns qu."'s tJ..onable uharther 
he can ac~c.ieve Jus ul t1.ma te _]Urpose \ll thout unjustlfled e=:-pense. On 
the one hano, he must, as Yre hDve seen, turn tradl-Llonal Chr1.stian conceyts 
into syrnbols. ( 2) Even if he J..nslsts that on-Lolog1.cal conce_9ts are also 
symbolical, "re fino 1. t dlffl cult to bel1.eve that tl.1ey are symbolical 1.n 
th'3 sa;-fle 3ense as are rell&,lOlJ s syt11bols. Even though, ul tlmately, the 
status uf syr•1bols lS aeterr:nned by theJ..r actuall:' fulflllHJ.g t!,e functiol1 of 
(1) of 1IcKelway; The Systemah<:J~l'he_olosy of Paul. Tlllich, p.G9 
(2) Th1.s process almost esca.9es our not1.ce ln a 'York such as BRSUR 
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rncdlatlng power, nevertheless, we do not seem to have exhausted the content 
of t"ne ldea of sy,nbol by saYJ_ng this. VTe suspect that he c3lls 
concepts symbollcal ~)u:..·ely because they are lnadequate, ( 1 ) Yihlle 
ontologlcal 
rellgious 
sy1ribols are both uwdequate and metaphorlcal, and so one step further 
reubved from thelr referent. 
It l s not as though Tillidl. vrorl:s wi. th s01ne generally agreed 
ontologlcal analysls of ::::-eali ty, vihlch will readily provlc1e a bn.d_se between 
the dlsciphne of philosoph·, a.:1d tt1e 'hscipline of theology. We rrust 
accept Tllllch' s onn analysl:::;, 1'~1lcn lS certain to have a someYihat lll1Uted 
appeal, even to dJSClr)les of Feldegger, for despl te structural s:umlarl tles 
with Heidegger, Tilllch has, as Thotna s 0 ':Meara has sho\'rn, departed at a 
number of llrr_portant :poln ts. ( 2 ) Despl -ce Ins attEmp-cs to show that ontology 
Pdd theology are not onl:; com)atlble but l~ly eac..h other, l t still rer,1ains 
true that even lf vre can dls_pose of the obJeCtlons to hls arguPlects, we 
are stlll bound to face h:..s ontologlcal scheme ancl the analysl3 whlCl1 lS 
fow1ded upon it. In ::rpl te m' Tllllch 1 s attewsrts to flnd cannon ground 
there remalns the fact -G.1at the phllosopher rust colfle to -cerr•1s •rlth :us 
scheme and the susplclon, vrluch flnd s conslderable justlflcatlon, that 
Tllllch cannot flnd the cot~TTJon ground he c1eslres. The .?nalySls of the 
human Sl tUEJ cion lna~' be stated l!l. terms COl1gelnal to i:he t!l.8::l vrho has absorbed 
exlstentlallst terminology, but l ts content ll!BY be no 111ore congenial than 
that of tradl tlonal Chrlstlan terr.nnolot,y. In s•:ort, Tllllch cannot build 
the flnal brldge from the apologlst to t[1e ll1CI_uire:c (or to the sceptic): 
it can onl:r be built by the sceptlc hlt,1self. But we .JUst, nevertheless, 
adaure lns deslre to engage lll honest dlalogue "T:t.th the sceptlc, even :t.f 
l1e becomes thoroughljr do~.mot:t.c at tlmes l!l doi:ng so. 
( 1) 
(2) 
i.e. inadequate as hurn.an vrordi:l. We taight also add t11at ontologlcel symbols 
cannot be sald to grow and dle ln quite the same vray as rellgious syr11bols, 
s:t.nce ti1ey 8l'e not tLe I'll"oduct 01.~ the group unconscious. 
T.F.O 'l'leara, Tlll:t.ch & Heidegger: A Structurel Relationslnp", Harvard 
Theologlcal ~Vlew, vol.61 (1968) P?•249-261. Tillich hlmself admit~ that 
he learnt more frow He:t.degger's rrethod rather than h:t.s concluslons (TPT .. p14) 
It lS lnteresting to note that Heldegger remarked that lf he vrere to vrrl te 
a theolomr es he vras at times tempted to do, he wruld not allow the word bJ' t n .L' ~ ) (contlnued at the foo or ..,ne neAu page 
-159-
In the last resort l t ls dlfflcul t to a vold the concluslon 
concermng the later Tilllch that we felt compelled to draw about hls 
early worl~, na,aely, that lns method is deter,:uned by- lus ontolihglcal 
conVlctlons rathel' then by his Church trach tlon. Even lf the Chri stlan 
symbols are gl ven greater pronunence ln lus later vrork than they were 
ln lns early uorl~, yet he 2.nslsts on lr1terpretlng them ontoJ.oglcally, 
and thelr very exlstence and operation depends on the ontological 
structure vrhlc:1 lS expressed ln lllS concept of rellglon. 
(concluslon of not~ fro11 "oreVlou s pa~;e) - 1'bein3 11 to a~J_pear ln l t. (Zurlch, 
11Tovember 1951, cited b;y J. Taubes "On tVJ.e Nature of Theolo;jlcal Method 11 , 
JR, vol. 3Lt ( 1954) p. 20) 
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P A R T III 
BARTH 
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CHAPTER JroUR 
1.lETHOOOIOGIC.AL :F\..J"UNDATIONS 
1. The Task of Theplo_g.y 
(a) 'lhe .Pe:ciod ofl the Epistle to the Romans 
Tnat th~ology ls, for Barth, mtil£lately related to proclamation 
is clear, but vre rnus c novr exa nn.ne ln closer detall the nature of t.he 
rehtionslnp. In doln&, so, we l!lust recognise a development in Barth's 
understaming winch corresponds to a general deveLopment m hls theology. 
The task of proclt:Jmatlon con::nsts in an attewpt to I epeat the 
Word of God and Barth concluded that ln order to hear the Word of God he 
must engage upon a serlous and patJ.ent study of' the Blble. One product 
of thls s tud~r was the vvri "Clng of the co1m1en tary on P.omans, wlnd:1 provoked 
a storm of cn tlclsm not least because of l ts approach to the Epistle. 
In treating Romans as a place ln 'lvl:nch the Word of God .tnght be heard, 
Barth adopted an ap[Jroach qu2te out oJ' character with contemporary trends 
in theology, vrlnch seemed to be settlD3 the clock back to the Reformation. 
In spl t;e of the belief vrh2ch he e:;p ressed 2n the f2rst edl tion of 
Romans, -chen the doctrine of lnsplration and the histor2cal-cri tical 
method must both hold a l;lace in theology, he vras taken by Adolf' Jl'ilicher 
to be an opponent of ln ston .. cal crl ticism who dld not even take the trouble 
to refute the contentlom of ll teral'Y cri tic2s111 and the hJ story of religions 
ln thell' study of the text. Barth, therefore, felt 2t incuu1bent upon lnrn 
to explaln lus meanlng more fully ln the preface to the second, radically 
reVlsed ech tlon of the Co,,u,1entary. ( 1 ) 
( 1) ''A Modern Intel'preter of Paul 11 , Beglrmings, Vol. I, p. 74£ (translated 
from the ong2nal pubhshed ln Dle Chrlsth_?he Welt, vol. 34 ( 1920), 
no.29, cols 453-57 
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The chJ..cf poJ..nt that he WJ..shed to malce J..n the nevr edJ..tJ..on was 
th2-L~ J..n hJ..s vieu, cur::-ent comnentarJ..es on ScrJ..pt'.lre were J..n.?dequate 
because the~r came to a halt at the very poJ..nt at vmJ..ch they ou!91t to go on. 
Thell' •-rork vras J..nClispensable to an understanchng of t:1e text;~ but puxely 
prelirrunary: in short they wc-_~e, as Barth put J.. t, "merely t:1e fJ..rst step 
towards a comi!lentery." (1) 
Bbr Barth, hJ..sto1·ical crLticJ..sm J..nvolved sirrrply the establis..lnng 
of the text, appealJ.ng to the work of textual crl tJ..cism, t;1e at tempt to 
offer lJrecJ..sc translations of' t!1e Greek ·words and phrases, a collection 
of archaeologJ..cel and philologJ..cal notes and 
11
'a H1ore or less plall sible arrangement of tD.e subject matter thet J.. t 
may be made tJ..storJ..cally and J:1sychologJ..cally J..ntelligJ..ble from the 
standpOJ..nt of pure pragmatJ..sm. 11 (2) 
All thla, Bart:J. recognJ..sed, was esseGtJ..al to tt.e •:1ork of exegeSJ.s and 
he clauned to be WJ.lling to listen to those vvl1o were l!1ore e:1c-pert than 
lnmself J..n the Platter. HO\-rever, at the next s cage he found it necessary 
to part compa11y Wl th JtllJ..cher, for although both Jl!ilJ..cher and Lietzman.n, 
among others, intenc1eCl to go be~rond thJ..s prelJ.minal'Y vrork to an understan::hng 
of' Paul, they dJ.d so J.n a manner wJ.th •rrncl-c Barth could not find any 
sympathy. He conh 1ented 
"Taking Jtlhcher 1 s vrork as typlcal of ''1LJch mode.cn exegesis, vre 
observe hoYr closely he keeps to the r1ere decipheri.YJ.g of' worCls as 
thoLJ:;h theJ were rLwes. But, ·,-,chen all J..s done, they still 
remain largely onJ..ntell 'ji.. ble. 11 (3) 
He accll sed JtlliclJ.er of a f<:nlLt"ce to en,s[l,;e lL1 a l~eal strug;_:;l::; •u th the 
"raw materJ.al 11 d' the epJ..stle, and of resortJ..ng, for the ex.f:)lar1atio11. of 
a dJ..ffJ..cult :9assage, to t:1e device of descrlbing it as a :oeculJ..ar doctrlne 
or oplnl.ol1 of PDul, thus ClJ..s,,u::;si11g t::e 11eea to toke it seriously. 
It lS i1ovrever, a ll ttle dlfflcul t to ClecJ..de quite how Barth 
hJ..mself thou:sclt the' t tl1e cpestlon of bJ..blJ..cal C01111\entary <:md ezc_t)OSl tJ..on 
( 1) 2R, p6 
(2) Ibid 
(3) Ibid, p. 7 
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should be app::oached. Even such a passage as tlns follovnng one, does not 
seem to solve tne _:Jroblem: 
11
' how energeticall:r Cal VJ..n, hav'ln·~ fll'st establlsh:::d ·what s tends 
ln the Lext, sets nlmself to rethin}: the y;hole mater·lal and to 
w.cestle vri -c'• it, til] tt1e <.ralls vrluch sel.)arate the Slxteenth 
cen-bJ.r:r fror'1 the fJ.Tst bec0me transparent! Paul speaks and the 
man of t'le slXteeni:;h century hears. 11 ( 1) 
From the general context of the "r~wle )l'eface, ana ;rom -cne approach revealed 
b~r en exannnatio11 of ·U:1e text of Barth's co1r~'1entary, it 8ppears th.?t he 
has two 6llt•1S l11 Dllno. h!.e f'll'st o.f tnese lS t:1e unde1 standl£~g of .Paul: 
that lS to sa3r, he nishes to grasp Jcl:.e message of Paul as a •7hole. 
Ro "ans, and lndeed the entll'e Blble, lS to be seen ar/a Ylhole rather than 
as a collectJon of frat:;,i1en-cs, eacn to be exainlned ancJ explalned c.~ ~,o~~ 
..,otallty, a"c seelng tl1e Trhole :;ncture as St. Paul sees it. 
The second alt(] lS a qucstlon of mahng the vralls be-brl8en the 
It 1.s o11e ti.lng to see a11Cl 
vre wl,;ht cell an uciloteral trans-gal'ency. It ~LS qul te ano !:;her matter 
to "lake the present transpal"::mt to tr:.e .fl:..'s L centlrry; tllat lS tl1e secor:.Cl 
a:U11 of U1 eology. Pau 1 must lJe Bllov ed to speak ·co the tvrentleth centm·:•, 
for, vihiJe he addressed lus conteo'!90l'ar·Les, 
11It ls ••• far more J mr::-crtont that, a G Prophe-r; and .Apostle o.f t,he 
1\i.ne,do'' of God, he v~:-.·ll:;alJly spea•"s to oll ijlen of eve:ry a.=;e. 11 (2) 
Every neans avalJa lJle ,nust be used ln order to ·.)e·c,rn_ t Paul to speak to the 
p:esenl:; age, or, i:;o use Barth's v;ords at;,ain,to expose "the Word ••• in 
the ':;o:,:ds". It lS tlns tnat B8rth found lacklng in contemgorary 
ln t:1e Blble. To treat t~1e Blble as !us tory, even as the ius tor:: of a 
retmrkable and unlqLJe people, '"l thout reckonill_g Fit;1 t~1e decls.LVe cause 
of that hlstOl'Y, is to fail to unde:2stancJ the Blble at all. 
(3) 
--------------------
( 1) Ibid 
(2) 1R, p.v 
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To treat J..t, Sll1Ulal"ly, as D soll.l"ce docur:1ent for· the lnstor,y of r·ell6lons, 
lS to f2ll to redos,tuse its specJ..al content. ( 1) 
T'.o.eology, then, ls chal'gec3 '",J. t11 the task of the exaP1lna tlon and 
understa:1d:u1g of the BiblJ..cal text, ln order that t'Qe :_:Jreacher should be 
able to decla::::·e the ~ford of God to .-::ls lJ..steners. 
Bu L tvro points 111ust be added to tr~J..s. In the f~"st place, Barth 
saw lns tas~= 11Tl th respect to Romans in a rather restrJ..cted manner, yrl:.J..ch lS 
ex.!.;ressed J.l1 a provocatJ_ve reew:ck as a concern 
11 v.,rith the ve::.'l table rather than the '"hole Gospel"'· (2) 
It was Bartl1. 1 s contentJ..on Lhat contem1)0l"ary theoloe-,y had lost sight of 
th8t "verl table Gospel", ''ITllch vre '1i6ht desc-rlbe os the lcernel, ::md so 
ifu e cot11menta:cy on P.omans has the polemlcal purpose of seelnng to establlsh 
the precJ..se centre of the Gospel, l ts kernel, in o:r5er that a tteatlon na~r 
then be dE·ected to•-rards the "ihole Gospel ln l ts soclal and politJ..cal 
It J..s .Ln thJ..s sense th3t "e ,ust undej·stnnd Barth's 
descrJ..~tJ..on of lns theology as a 11 p1.nch of spJ..ce n, as a '1 corrective'', a 
~mar~lnal no~en.C 3 ) In the eerl~r _Jerlod of lus norl:, l t '·ms intended to 
heJ:p the preac::.er to Lnon d.1at to greach, Ellld ln so 5oJ..ng to recall theology 
to a new uri!erstandlll..g of tl>.e centr·e of the Gospel. Barth uas by no 
weans convinced thet theology l::ne~;r ,Jh8t J..t was. 
Seconclly, Fe "lust ask how Bart11 :;.ro,cJosed to embark on lns ne\7 
enga;:;ernent I'll th tl1e BJ..ble. To rr12l~e tl1.e assertlon that the B1.ble spea:::Cs 
not only to its oYm age, but to every age, lS a dlfferent ,,1atter from 
shovrlng ln i7hat vray l t does so. 1'he ;_):coblem lS st;J..l+ tne :9robler11 of under-
stanchng, of detr:;l'TJJ.nlng what the Blble lS saying, or 1.11 Barch's words 
"' l·n o"~ actu,ll:~- loca~l·Y1c- the ·r-ord lD the vrorCis. 
_, 0 a , .L "' _ v .""b u 
We are here already 
be,;J..nnlng to trespass on tl1e 6round of the method of theolo~, l;ut Yre t'1Ust make 
( 1) Ibld, pp. 60ff 
(2) 2R, p.12 
(3) Yi.G.'T.M., p.98 
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some remarks on the exegetical pru1cJ.pJe s of Romans which may shed some 
lJ.gh t on Bartl1 1 s conception oi' the task of theology-. 
While he f'inds a place f'or the hlstorlcal-crit.wal method J.n the 
work of exegesJ.s, he finds no 9lace at all for the use of the materJ.Bl 
f\.Jrmshed by the hlstory of rellgJ.ons: 
•~ ••• I entJ.rely fall to see -why parallels dravm frow the a11cient 
world - and vvi. th such parallels modern commentators are chJ.efly 
concerned - should be of u1ore value for an under s taniing of the 
EpJ.stle than the sl tuCJtJ.on in whJ.ch we ourselves actually a:re, 
and to Vli:1J.C_1 We Cc?ln therefore bear witness. 11 ( 1) 
The hlstory of rehgions cloes not, in Barth 1 s submlSSlon, contrlbute to an 
understandJ.ng of ·what Paul has to say about God. He pref'ers,. rather to 
work WJ. th t;le assumpt.ton that Paul has as much to say about Gocl to the 
::;>resent age as to hJ.s own because there J.s no fundamental change J.i;Ahe 
sJ. tuatJ.on to wb.J.ch the Vford of God J.s addressed. 
Accordingly, Romar1s is treated as en ett8ck on human IDJ.sconceptlons 
about God .:md on all forms of human self-rJ.ghteousness. He feels 'lt 
hberty therefore, to elaborate the J.!Il.fllJ.catJ.ons of Roma[ls J.n ter11s of an 
twentJ..eth 
attack on / centur;r forms of J.dola try, and J.n partJ.cular, on those 
perversions of the go::;pel wh.J.cl1 he bel1.eves to have been fostered by the 
Church. In both edltJ..ons he attacks vehemently the Vle''' of relJ.gJ..on as a 
means of appl'oach to God, wh1.ch a._9pears to treat God as within its reach. 
He attacks, too, romantJ..c, rqystical and moralJ.stJ..c ::eductions of relJ..gJ.on, 
and the distortions of the truth by pietlsrn. In addl tJ..on, the first e dJ. tion 
heaps scorn on the hberal identJ.ficatJ..on of soc.talJ.sm vrJ..th the KJ.ngdom of 
God, on capJ.talJ.sra, and u_Jon ever37 form of J.ndlVJ.dualJ..sm. 
The a irn of the attack J..s to der<1olJ.sh every form of human rl2,-ht-
eousr1ess and to set J.n contrast to J.t, God 1 s rlghteousness and the recon-
cJ.lJ.ation ~1lch God alone effects. 
twentieth 
In the proces~f J.nterpretJ.ng the Epistle to the I century, 
Barth deter11n.nes to adopt an attitude towards the Bible ~nch he describes 
(1) 2R, p.11 
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as Bibliclst, by vrlu.ch he means thet he deslres to take seriously those 
aspects of Paul's teaohlng wluoh nave caused ewbarrassment to other 
comn1en-cators, rather than to explam thern away as merely Paul's oplnlon. ( 1 ) 
Tvvo concluslons tPay be dravm, so fa:r, about Barth 1 s uev1 of the 
task of theology. Flrst, he was seekinJ; to re-establish the relationshlp 
be"baeen theolow and preachlng, a relatlonshlp nlnch, l t seemed to }nm, 
had dropped out of t(le conslderation of the modern solentlfic corrmentary. 
The Blble was to be re-established as the Word of C':r0d to tlan, and therefore 
relevant to preaching. Attentlon was to be 9ald to the objectl ve quall ty 
of sori_f)ture as the 117ord of God, rather than on its subjeoti ve qtJGll ty, 
as a huma11 response to "the dl vlne "· ( 2) 
It ls not surpl'lSU1g, tl-:erefore, to <hsoover that Barth 1 s efforts 
were greeted by a storrn of protest frow the proponents of a scientlflc 
theolow, who sought to give to theolo&,y a respectBblll ty in the UlilVersl tles 
by adoptlng for lt a method as close to that of tne nBtural sclenoes as 
possible. Harnack protested thBt Barth mshed to turn the professor's 
Barth contended that theolog::v had no rl;;ht to 
lll8squerade as sclentlfic under the gu:LS e of the hlstor:l of religlons. 
If J_t was to nold a place in tlJ.e unlversltles lt must do so only by under-
tab.!1g to say, or by polntlng out t~1e need to c,ey, what the other dlscipllnes 
VJill not say, thst 
( 1) 
11 a chaos, though uonderful, is not therefore a cosmos." (4) 
D-nd, l'·11f. Bultrnann, however, rep2.ied in crl tlcism of Barth: "It lS 
7~sslble -co assuue th8t evervwhere in the letter to the P..oma!1s the 
su=-bject matter ll1a:y· have found ;dequate expression, Lmless one lntends 
to establish a modern dogma of lnsplratlon ••• 11 "Karl Barth's Eplstle 
to the Roma11S in its Second Edltlon01 , Be~llll1J.Yl3S, val. I, p.119 
(ong,lnall:;- pubhshed :m Dle C'_'lrlsthche 1"Telt, val. 36 (1922), nos. 
18, 19, and 20) 
(2) "Ein Briefwechsel rru t Adolf von Harnack", Theologische Frage~ 
Antworten (hereafter 13'. u • .A), p. 20 (E. T. Beginnin~, vol. I, p.177) 
(3) Ibid, p.1LI- (E.'r. p.171) 
( 4) W. G. W. M. p. 1 9 3f. 
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It must always stand as the q.Jestion mark beyond 11 the furthest n 111 of 
scientif1c poss1bil1ty 1~ 
. 
In other words, Barth was moving towards the 
beb.ef that theolog;;.' must be confessional 1n cl-a:"acter. 
Secondly, Berth vras seek1ng to re-establish the relationslnp 
between the B1ble and preaclnng; for, if tlc.eology was to serve t.h.e 
preacher, it must d~L.cect its attentlon tovmrds understend·mg the Bible. 
Net only is theology to be directed away from the l11story of' rel1g1ons 
and towards the B1ble, but 1 t lS to be dn·ected tovrerds the B1ble as the 
place •·.here God st1ll speaks to man. Tb.eology, therefore, fulfils the 
role griu1ar1ly of blblical exegesis, but not as the pu:..·cl.y ll terary work 
th3t we are accustomed to regard 1 t. Indeed, we may sa:,r that Barth short-
circuits the w!10le theolo6lcal pr·ocess by using exegesls to t LD.~n a first 
t-neq.heth 
century document ln.to a 1 century docwnent, 1gnoru1g or concealing th.e 
(b) F-.com Romans to the F3r st Ed_t t1on of the Dogmat1cs 
It vmuld be vrrong to sup];>Ose th2t 1t vras a false modesty that 
ceused Barth to speal~ of h:LS theology as a corrective. He 1ntended it 
to be so 111 consc1ous imi tat 1011 of I<:Lerkegaard. But even 1f he ~ad 
intended 1t o:dg1nall3r s1mply as a correct1ve, lt could not remain such, 
especially 111 tll.e highly un-Ilierkegaardum s1hvt1on of a un1vers1ty 
faculty. Nevertheless, he cont•.nued to maint:i:Ln that theology l•as a 
fundamental and 1ndestruct_l\rle 1'elet1onshi:9 Y'l tll procl2ma t..Lon, as 1s 
partlcularly clear from rns Wr1t:in,;;?,s ll1 Theology and vturc.tl a"1d 111 Die 
Chn.stl1che Dogmahk. It :.:.s to these tvro Yiorks 111 part1cula1' that Yre 
shaJl nm7 tu.cn 111 order to cont1nue to trace the development of h1s under-
stand1ng of the na-ture of theology. 
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The frrst polnt whlch ue must Flake lS thst 13arth ceased to 
co.nceJ.ve of t;l.e;ology .9r <JD.8:i:il~r ln terms of a ln.nd or~ blblJ.cal exegesis. 
Instead, he dJ.stingLnshed be"baeen three areas of tlleologlcal vrorl:. Tne 
flrst of these areas lS thct of exegesis, charged ·:Lth the task of contlnually 
I'DlGlng the 
11 fUDD ernental questions of' tlce genuine prophr::tJ.c am apostolJ.c Wl tness 
to the revelatlon .SlVe.n ln the canonJ.c3l sources. 11 ( 1) 
Sud>. 8 lllsclpllnc has two llnes of a~1proach, both of vrhlC.l. are esset'.tlfll 
to the fulfil111ent of the task. The first lJ.ne of au·.Jroacll. 1_s the line 
whicn ls concerned 'Vith t11e establishment of tr1e text. To achJ.eve this, 
all the resources of textual crl tJ.clsm must be brought to bear. Ytben thJ.s 
vrort lS done, exeges1_s can tLU"n to tile ::,econd line of approach, wlncil. is the 
u..nderstandL ng of t.ne text. In order to ac'12eVe the necessanr understanc1J.ng 
the exegete must stru_;;gle 1nth the text, to tlunl':: hJ.mself 2nto the sJ.ttwtion 
1_n winch l t was s_t?oken, to create a plc GUl'e for hJ.mself of the ln.storJ.cal 
si tw:>tions u.ntJ.l he bero mes a pa1·t of l t. 
It trm.st be adllu ttea tlEt C'le essay 11C:h.urcn and T..r1eology11 .from 
whJ.ch -tne quotation 1:1bove was taken, lS too b1:bf to offer more than the 
merest hJ..nt of the ,l.ature of the task set before exegesis. In Dle Chrlst-
liche DogrnatJ.k, lw :ceproduces and expands th1.s outlJ..ne, bu.t his eJq? lanEJ tion 
lacks clarJ.ty. 1~1ere he argues t!l.at blbllcal ozeges::;_s passes th:·ough 
stages J.dentlcal to ti.l.e stEJges of any otr:.er land of exegesls. In other 
words, l t lS f..'..Tst of all a lJ.teral'Y actJ. vi ty, ln ,,rhJ.ch the schola1' seeks to 
establlsh the frame of nu.nd J.n vrn.J.Cc1 he l·lBY Gchl.oYrledge that sotneone ex~el"nal 
to hJ ,uself ls S[Jeaklng, then to follow the argument as a fellovr-travellcr 
and flnally to 1.dent2fy :ntnself 1'Jltl1 ti1e a1gument, so t:.1a0 tt:e authors 
(2' Yrords are lns elsa. ) 
·-----·---- - --
(1) TO, -p.303 
T'!l.e Bl blJ.cal exe[t,e"te, novreve-:::, tUS t go one stage 
(2) Dle ChrJ.sthcll.e Dogmatik (hereafter Chr.D), p. 39•4 f · 
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further, because he lS called upon to tt'eat the material ln l'lls hands 8 s the 
truth. He "ther-sfore ex:9ounds not -whBt P:W to or Goethe thou;;ht but vrJ.1at 
God has sald. (1) 
Exegesls i'Ul'Dlshes t'le sources for ·cl.e seco!l.d area of t~1.eolo~lcal 
But dognatics •1Jst not -oe ldenb.f'ied •rit~l or 
reduced to exe~Sesls ,w ho,nlletics. It ~1.as a Jistlnct task of 1 Jcs- oYm, 
althoush, llke that of exegesls, lts task ls J_ntlmately related to t'::le 
It must, a cco:cdi ng to Berth, 
"con t-'-n,ually work out afresh t,)_e fundamental affrcrnetlons of the 
Chl'lstlan r.1essage ln accordance "il th ·c:.1'3 _f)revalling background 
and the norrr1 of the -\,Tl tness J..l1 t~le Cl'eeds and the Fa c'lcTs. II (~) 
Once a;?;al.n, Barth 1 s deflnl ~lon l11 the e sse:• "Church er:.d Theology" leeks 
clarl ty end •re shall hrve to "tUl'n ogaln to lns :hscussloD ln Ih.e Chrlstllche 
Dogmatl}<= for .curther lllumln8t;lon. 
do~mmclcs lS not procla~~tion. It lS not lnten::led to fulfll an epologetLC 
l'ole, nor can l ts tnaterlal be preached dJ.rectly. A true sermon only 
erlses fTOtfl t,~e; blblJ_ca 1 text: 
"Only tiw a_1alyt~ c0l S"'l'unn, onl:r the hoNily, is true preechlng. 11 (3) 
be that - lnasmt:.ch, lYe may rsGlllfle, es -:;l1e outslrJer 1118Y pick u:p e volume of' 
Its fJ..l'st lDtentlon lS not to teac'l. otne.cs 
uhet Ch•.'l~:ltla11S believe; nor J..s J_t l:o _;Jrescrlbe iiicat ls t.J be belleved 
as a necessar:r r.:;qLuremc;l1t for SE1lv2 t:wn, telang as l ts motl vstion ti1e 
oyenln,S vrords cf tne Athanasian Cl'ec;d (~~) and beconnng a sclentlCic comtrentar=r 
on lt, as Barth belleves to be t~1e _§,enel'al case •7ltl1 Roma11 CatholJ..c dog}natl.cs. 
DogmEJtlcs lS not even a cOtJT!lental'Y on e rule of tescl1ln.&, (I.ehrgesetz), 
(1) Ibld, p • .396 
(2) TC, p.303 
(3) Chr.D, p.l+38 
(4) "Qu:I.cunque vult salvus esse, ante onmia opus est, ut teneat ca tholicam 
fJ..dem quam nisl qulsquc integ,ral!1 inVlolatuwque servaverJ..L, al)sque 
' - 1 II dublo J.n eer-Lertmm J?erlbl t. Fldes cetholJ.ca naec est ••• 
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introductions, inaica tors, polnts of Vlcvr, foundations or boundc.1:' fences, to 
that r.'hlCl1. lS Jn l tse1i.f Hl8Xl1austlble. 
re;sarded _;u1·el~r as t_-:.e sa c.Ls.L:'lng of the !mrrlan deslre to t_lltJ.:.C. ( 1 ) 
Do;;mo tlcs - s, and can 11eVel- cease to ue, concerned Til tn C:.1nstlan 
speech. 
qulte clear: 
11 llit,u1Btlcs _cs tr1e nar,1e i"ihicc~ 1Te gl ve to the s-:;rlvirJ,; for l:no'~>rledge 
of the correct content of C'rWlStlan s:pccc:ch about God and about 
TP.8n. 11 ' (2) 
Do;:J'lB bcs lS therefo1'e a dlscipllne to ·d.1lch no J lllU ts can be set: 
is to say, 2ts '"01 'l: is never at an end, both because Gn"lsti.sn sp::ech 
cannot come to .sn enc~, ana b:o;cause the sub j::;ct matter :Jf Ohristlan speech 
can never be finally exnau sted. It has, therefore, the cheracter of 
l'esearch (~~E_chu,1g) or str1.ving (BemW1Ung), ano is ahra:-s ln prog1·ess; 
lt [leVer becOE1es a com{)enolum of results. 
1m should ado ~:;hat for Ba:cth the1"e lS onl~r one fon1 of Oh:t."lstlan speech 
Hhlc~l can be :tegerdeo as corTect; preachlng lS ~le correct fo:;.·,,, because 
l t expresses not an oplnlon but the trut:~ and J_s therefo1·e vrorth; of b ellef ~ 
L1 lt tne p:.:oeecher lS ·bounC.: to relt.erate the Word of Goa and so not only 
( ~' 
to declare t,1e truth but also to demand a response. ) ) 
Vhen the qu"'stion of t11e cor:cect forrr• of speech !:las ·oeen asked, l t 
1 s t,1en, and onl:\" then, posslble to ~;1slc c.'oou t the correct cnr1te,1t of 
Chl'l stlan speech. nut lt lS just this -c __ $~ -,s undeT ClUCStion. Pre a clung 
therefore, supplles the ravr na te:.."lol (Stoff) of dogr.latlcs J.n the n,essa[,e that 
l t ur eaches. ( 4 ) 
.1; 
DogmatlCS ai1''S to se:cve ,lreaclung by exar;uning yrrha"t lS 
---------------------
( ·1 \ Ohr" D PD. 7,J"Zff ) • ::::.L - ..; (3) ~' pp.18-21 
(11-) Ibld, pp. 28ff (2) rold, p.1 
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preached and testing ~ ts clB itfi to speak the truth. Novr, clearly, in 
order -co ech~eve ih~s pu1·pose, dog1•1at~cs cannot l~sten to ~nd2ndual se1·mons: 
it is not s rumun.g commentary on the sermons that take :;>lace dally. Rather 
lt lJ.stens co ;:re11er~l trends, and thus ex:?~nunes what J.S being rreached ln 
tbe Church at large. It vms, lndeed, th~s quest~on, of uhat yras beins 
preached ln tne Chul'ch at large, ti1at troubled Bal'ti-:. es eerly as 1910. 
Whereas, ho,rever, the specJ.flc problern tl:<.at Barth faced at Safenrfll ~Tas 
til.e 3unday Sermon ln Church, ~ t F1ust b-e admJ.ttea that the :9rocle1r>EJt~on 
vhJ.cl1 troubleCJ h~m 1ras by no weans ,iJechatea solely ~n the form of sermons, 
but also J.n bool::s, lec·cures and the general content of C11rJ.stian poll t2_cal 
act~on and ecumen~cal actJ.~ty. Thus, altbou2,-1. he describes preaching alone 
as the _9ro:_)e:r· forrr1 of Christum speech, his attention lS also drrecte-:1 to 
tl1e YT..Lder actl vi ~r of the ~Lurch. 
Dogma t~cs arJ.ses, then, for the need fol' pure doctrJ.ne J.n the 
Church, but there relJla~ns the questJ.on of how dogmat~cs J_s to be able to 
test the proclamatJ.on ~n order to ascertam ~-.hether ~ t ..LS :pure Cloctrine • 
.Acc:or(hngly, Earth Clefmes :pure Cloctrine as 11 doctr~ne com~ornnng to the 
ScrJ.pture a1l.d to the SrJJ.r~t", (1 ) makJ.ng clear, at least, that the work of 
Clogma tics :c.s acu~eved by c::orTJparJ.De, -,-?nat ~s ::?reached Fitl'1 the BJ.ble. In so 
doJ.ng, ~ t Yrorl:s out afresh the fundamental aff..Lrt1wtions of the ChrJ.stJ.an 
messa~e. 
'l'here rema~ns, ho-,7ever, the _:iuzzlJ.L12, assert~on that thJ.s last 
the nortn of that witness ln the creeos a1l.d the F8thers". T11e idea of 
"the prevailJ.ng back[iround 11 lS partJ.cularly obscure, but appenrs, ~n the 
Jight of Die Chr~sthdw lligmatJ.k to vnean thDt dogmatJ_cs must be dot1e ll1 a 
st2,rle approprud,e to t;w present day, however aouurable the style and 
lane:_uage of anothsr day ma:r appear. ( 2) 
(1) TO, p.303 
(2) Chr.D, p.4ltl+ In addition, Barth may have l1l. mind. the need for theolo;sy to 
address itself to the part~cular doctr~nal quest~ons wh:..ch trou-ble 
preach~ng at a ::;iven moment. 
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The norm of the VTl. tness _Ln tile creeds and the ]Bth er 3 sets dogma tlcs flrJnly 
witln.n the contex c of tl;e C'.nurch. Strlctly spealang, t..he norm set; for 
dogmatics lS the revelatlon itself 1ihich is testlfied to m Scrlpture, ( 1 ) 
but norws fol' t11e ln terpretation of the revelatlon a1'e set by the creeds 
a ted the Fathers ln the se.'lse tha -'c they provlde princlples for und ers tandll1g 
a ,d bound2ry posts wi th:w vihic:1 d..Lscusslon may -oe contlnued. In thls 
sense dogiMtlcs l!18J oe called tne sclence of trw norms of Cl1rlstlan gpeech:. ( 2 ) 
l t does not :<;wodt'ce nB.'T 0..orms but seeks to make e~cpllcl t for the Church the 
norws l t Blready possesses, and does so by constant re-exanllna tion of 
Scrlpture lL1 diBlogue, 8S lt vrere, rD.th t11c ,,110le hlstory of Chrlstian 
Not only lS preachlng -lhe ravr •l'laterlal of dog,matlcs, l t lS also 
the goal: its -~)ln'.':JOSe lS to i.nfor1" tile Cl1urch ln lts .r_Jreachlng :;_'ole, so that 
''Te rna,' sBy that l t 
11 seeks ••• ln the preachine; vilnch tokes place toC!ay H1e preechill..t, 
'7nich lS to ta~=e place toroorrmv. 11' ( 3) 
It 111ay be descrlbed as a form of ~)reaching to the preacher( 4 ) c-ceating a t~Vo 
'rray traff J..c bet' .. -een pre2chin.r; and the Tevelation of God. It does ~ot tell 
the preacher preclsely "-lha c he :_s to say; rather, it lnfol'Ws his thlnlnng 
and ro hls preachlng: 
u ••• behlnd every -uarticular senmn that ls .9reached theJ e stands 
and 1.s af·:es:1 dlsclosed the dogmatlc conslderatlon of the unity, 
the ~•iholerless, the trL1th and tr1e lntelllgible coherence of 'che 
kerygma." ( 5) 
Dogma-clcs does !10t, -;re repeat, tel] the oreacher what to say or how to say 
it: that lS ~1e tasl: of ti".e trw.rd branch of the theolog1.cal dlsclpllne, 
namely, houu..letics: 
( 1) Ibid, p. 428 
(2) IbJd, pp.133f, 428 
(J) Ibld, p.36 
(4) Hel.o.rlch Ott, Theology)and ~·eachlng, trans. Harold l~lght (London, 
Lutte:r'vrorth P:cess 1965, p.20f 
(5) Ibld, p.26f; cf Chr.D. p.423 
"As hom~let~cs, safeguarded thrrugl'l i:ne pr~nc1.ples so vron end 
taught lJ~' i:he unwr1. tten co,ru'31Y1 of the present hom·, 1.t rrust 
consider the Vhat? and the Hew? of ih.e ChrJ..sta11 message to 
the ~r·1mediate yresent. 11 ' ( 1) 
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It has t:1e funct~on of seek~ng to l~rove the 11rhetor1.cal effectiveness" ( 2) 
of preach~ng, that lS to say, 1. t cons1.ders vrha -r, • re may call tl1e mechan~cs of 
preadnng. But J t also •::onslc1ers, 2ccordin~ to "What?" of 
the C!lTistlan raesSB28 to the lPllilediate pres::::nt. Clearly, rnore thBn a 
11 8tter of techn1.que lS involved here, but preclsely how twm~let~cs dec-Ldes 
mn ·rnat lS demanCJed by the "unrr:dtten cowrna.'1d of t!le _present nour 11 lS 
ver { J ar fro,-rl olea:". iTO tneOl02,lCal rhscipll£18 02:1 cell the _?reacher 
prec1.sely vrha t :1e lS to ~Jreac!1 on any g1. ven .Jccasion, since onl~r the 
preacher hunself can dec1.oe, on the basls o:.~ h~s awareness both of the 
gospel and of t 'le concrete r1eeds of i:J.1e coag:rega tion. If thJ..s J..S to be 
re~,ardeC1 as a theolo,3lOA] dJ..soJ.pl .. ne, theCJ. ..!. t rHtst be so 1.:n a sense dif1.~e:r:ent 
lt Foul:1 be u:::;eful to cr~n,:z, to a close our dJ..scu~oSlon of t:.ns _JerJ..od 
of Barth 1 s murlc by consider1.ng what exactl:,r Bar·th r11eans o=• the Worcl of Gcd. 
Not only does t~'le 1.dea f1.gure 1 •ore pro~nently t':wn ~n P..omans, but ~ t also 
carr~es a more systen1BtLsea ran,se of mean1.ng. 
~de argued earlier th<n although Ee d1.d not tnal~e freque11t use of 
t.t1.e term 1.n Romans ana other vrorks of the 1,erioa, thDt ::;.. t could nevertheless 
be sh.own to be t 1e concept ·wl:nc l is dete:::'t•1lnative of t'-le SlG,Tilflcance of 
It tS as tl•e 'Nord of God th0t he treats 
ScrJ..:ptuno, Anc lns concern vTJ. t 1 t_1e serwon lS charged •·""i t>1 the urgent des~re 
to filake rc the ve•1i.cle for repeat~nt, the "tTord of Goa to wan. 
Underlying the ,-rork of D1.~ C'nr1.stl~che Dog1118-Llk ~s the sawe des~re 
thDt preaching snould be a repet1. t~on of God 1 s 7/ord to man, but :1e goes to 
some length to expound the concept of the '\'ford of Goa. 
( 1) 1'0, p.304 
( 2) Chr .. D ., p .1 
Whereas, ~n Rom~, 
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J. t was used :r)r J.,narJ.ly to denote the decree of God J.n creation, judgement 
or salvatJ.on, J.n thJ.s fil:::;t edJ.tJ.on of hJ.& dogmat1.cs (-.. vinch never vvent 
\ beyond its fJ.rst volume), he dedJ.cates the vihole of the fJ.rst volu•1e to 
tne doctrine, vrrncll he develops J.n a threefold form. The tt1ree forrns r.e 
dJ.stJ.nguishes as tc!.e sernbn, the canon, and l'evelation. In practice, 
however, the dJ.stJ.nctJ.on is son1evrhat artJ.fJ.cJ.al, because there is .. i.n 
fact, onl7 or1e r''orm of the Word of Goa: the fJ.rst tw1a are derJ. ved frow 
the trnrd. The sermon has n.o authority of its own and J.S therefore only 
the Wo~ of God vmen J.t permJ.ts Goa ~J.mself to speak. SJ.mJ.larly, the 
canon, by vrhJ.c!:1 he means 8criptu:::·e, J.S also the ~lord of C-ua J.n a cl eri 'la live 
sense, in the extent to ili1J.Ch J.t, lJ.ke preachJ.n§,, is a faJ.thful vrJ.tne.ss 
to God's m~~ self-revelation. It 1s onlj- ln the foJ·m of Gcrl 1 s self-
revelc,tJ.on throuzl1 hls actJ.][::.C. ty directeC! tovra-rds man that t~1e ~:ror'd of C-od 
]_ s una en. ved • ( 1) 
The concept lS useful to f3arth not least because l t J.s :celsted to 
tne <].lc3tlon of authorJ. tym theology. It ]laces t11e Felght of eHrphasJ.s 
not upon theology and :_)reaclnng as being concern:od 1'!J. th an analysls of the 
subjectc.ve response to an.d apprehenslon of the 11 relJ.gJ.ous encounter", nor 
\Vl th a synthetJ.c Jud:;eP1ent based on those responses but Wl th the objectl ve 
actJ. vl cy of Goo addressJ.n,;_;, h _,1self to rran. It represents hls resJ.stance 
to the :RelJ..;_wnsgeschlchtliche Schule and l ts tendency to regard all 
relgJ.ous data as materlal for a scJ.ence of relJ.gJ.on on the basis of '"hich 
proposl tions mav- be tl1ade obout the diVJ.ne. I.'lorc over, it en"[)hasJ.ses Barth's 
conviction that God does actUE•ll/ address man: hi:s revelation lS ratJ.onal 
J.n form. 
"The Wib:;:d of Goo, w-:.(nd1 has l ts correlete and 1"eflectlon J.n tne human 
·words of the act of preaclnng, J.S J. tself ori;sJ.nall~, and in its own 
rlght Word, langua.;Se s-poken from reason to reason, Logos restlng on 
knovvledge and relJJ.ng on co.;m tJ.On. 11 (2) 
The adoption of t~us term, therefore, also reflects lus reJectJ.on of 
(1) Ibld, pp.37ff (2) Ibld, p.62, cf also p.111 
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the lnter-yretation of t'le concept of revelation bJ·r t!1e concepts of t' h 1 ne .o_y, 
the nuwinous or llf~-force. Go"' 1 s r -'- -1 1 , t 
- - u a1Jlona se_I-con•JllJnlca lon is normatlve 
for the i•rork of theolo,::>-r; l t 1.S vii tnessed to b7 Scrlpture ana should be 
the content of yreachlng. 
Flnally, he lS able to exploit i,,-,_e conceot inasmuch as God 1 s 
As God ls eternal eno unc~anglng, so ls ius 
IYord; al thou~lc l t ls revealed i11 lnstor2' _~_ t 1 s not subject to lnstoi'lcal 
( 1) 
contlngency or l'elativity. 111us tne si;;rufJ_cance of the tern:9oral 
dls tlnctlon bet-.'reen the luc et nunc 01" preaclnn;; today and the illic et tunc 
of the B2:ollcal _9roclamatJ.on lS eh.mll1a ted. Just as tD.e Blble was the 
yroouct of a response to l'evelation, so preachlng ~as l ts orlgln ln 
a :re3_)onse to Gtl.e revelatlon iiJ.. tnessed to J.n tne Bible. 
(c) Anselm : Fides ~aeren~ Intellectum 
Befm·e passing on to Barth 1 s tre3tment o:;:" the task of theology 
ln its relatlon to Cb.lU'Cc1 proclaP1Btlon as descr::.bed l11 Church Dogma tlcs, 
we propose to conslder brlefl.l- t!:le vrork on .Anselm ll1 o1d'"r to establ:t.sh 
Barth hlll1self drew attention to tl'e lEi_:?or tance of the book :fl"or an 
unders-Landin2, of hls theology, and to the fact that, w~ t!1 the excel? tlon of 
Hans Urs von Balthasar and a fevi others, hls comwentators had failed to 
. ( 2) 
acknowledge J.ts J..rnportane'e. More recently, ho,7ever, l t has become somet, .. lng 
of 811 orthodoxy to draw attextlon to t"1e slt;nlflcance of t!:le book. 
Ib.s lntel'est ll1 Anselm stretched back long befo-c'e the seffilnar at 
Bohn ll1 1930 ,,,->nch E',£Oe r1.se to the bcok. Jnde2d, as eB:cly as 1920 we 
---- -----------
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find lnm declvring hls lDte11b.on to +ook into the Cur Deus liomo? of .Anselm~ 
lD 8 le L> cer to Thul"ne"seD, ( 1 ) Furtnenno.ce~ Ell thoue,h t 1e senunar and book 
are gen2::call;:; l"eg<?rded as of decJ.s::cve Sli:sTIE'::.cance lD ,na:cking a new dJ.rectlon 
publlshed ln 1927~ contalns a nu.•1be1· of refel'ences to .Anselm~ vkJ.cl, he: took 
These l"eferences have as 
thelT cenh'al u10b.:f l.)le task o1' tl1cology. 
In -Ll1e two 'Jlost ext.enslve d.LnCL1sSlOl13 of' .AnseL,- ~ Ba:ct':-1 quotes 
It ls because he belJ.eves tna t .Anselw YTlshes 
to un6erstond. .Acco::ilin,::;l:r, lns pl'oposal to conc1uct "!.ns ~1rork~ remota 
lt 1neons that vre ··lL'st L'm" ou:cseJ ves be,:;in all over 
l'evela !:;loil. 
thel'efore 3Clop-Ls an attl tude cf prayel' lD l ts att:::m_.Jt to serve t!1e 
Church. ( 2) 
I11 .Anseltn : Fides Quae::ens Intellectum he bruJ,;:';S to fuller 
---- .. _._._ .,.. __ ~-------- -·~------ ----·---
_9f tl·,eolot,y i:J s undel' s caDdJ.n,S, We can slso see chat the l'clotloDsl1J.p 
not oniliy does ::_ t seel~ to leEJd ~1J111 to a closer understanc'lln_g of the content 
(1) ne-,·.Theol. p.55 
(2) Chr.D., pp.~, 98-100, 22(;f' 
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of hls f2::..th, but 1t seck-:, ~o allov the behevc:;r to penetrate J.Dto the 
II for Ansel111 1 t.::; bcl1eve 1 does not 1ne2n sF,rply a strlVJ.l12, of 
the huma.1 vrill ·cov•ard3 God, but a strlVJ.IJ2, of' t'1e human ·nll 
into Goa and so a pal'tlCl.9atloL1 (albel t 111 a rrBnfl.er l1rru ted by 
crea-curellness) ll1 God 1 s 111ode of Be1n~ ar1d so a slmllar 
l_)artlclp:3tlon ln C-od 1 s asel ty 11: t_J.e matchless glor~· of h1s very 
seli', anC: the:;·eforc also lr1 God 1 s utter absence of necess1 ty. 11 ' ( 1) 
In oonsequ::::01ce of tl'lls, the a1w o.l t~'leology 
"cannot be to lead tnen to foJ. tp:, nor -'cc cc r1f::.1'P1 them in the 
fa1 th, nor even tc cl elrver then· fa 1_ th frow doubt. 11 ' ( 2) 
t::no-riledge 11 , and it lS .unportant to not1ce -:nat 1t ..:.s rqy .laJ.th that summons 
O''iTI benef1t, or rathe1:, J.t ::..s enga.;:>d upon by the Church, the vhole con~any 
Fa::..th 
cEmnot ex1st vritnout concep tual1 tyP~v-t 1s to so.{ at 1ts ver;_,r conce}?tlon 
fa1th hos an _dea 01." 1ts object. tin; ::.t 11ust str1ve tmrards a cltHl.fic?tion 
of 1-vs o1Jject: 1t cannot. e:nst 111 a "cloud of un.k:OJO''Tir1g 11 2s 1t ''Tere. 
Paitt1 has arl avmreness of 1-Ls object, an er11bryon1c underscand1n2,, but J.n 
order thc;t 1.t ma)7 be more profound 1n character, do2,tila-~.,lcs L,oes allou L 1 ts 
work. 
understanding sJ.nularl,;,r stands at the be;;1nn1ng 2nd the end, but be'b·reen 
the beg11111ll1g 2nd t11e end Li1er·e :.s an 1•J11•'ensc dlf.::'e.cence .Ll1 qualJ.ty. 
Faith 1s 1tself en embry01nc 1ntelligere, but str1ves tovia.cos 
1ntell1~~ as 1 ts goal, by -che use c.f prayer anc1 by "the pcrsu:·.tent 
appl1catJ.On of (the) 1ntellectual :9ovrers" ( 4) Barth further defines 
( 1 ) FQI, p • 1 7 
(2) IbJ.d 
(]) "Fides esse neou1t s1ne conceDtlonc 1~ (TbJ.d, p.19); cf forrance, R ___ .. ___ ---
Gocl ana r-btlonali t;y, p.170: "Even t.'lOUt;o,h God transcends all 
that \;re can tFnnk and s8y of Ihm, it still holds 600d thot '"ie 
can11ot have e:xp en encs of Him or believe :tn RiP1 without concept1onal 
forms of unde1·standlng. 11 
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~tel~igere as Gerlved from lntus-1egere:(i) th2t ls to say, unders"tand::w.1.g 
ls 8 reflectlon u.pon •h:ot hos been sald ln the Credo: 
"In recoe:,nlsine; 8n::l assentln8 to truth lntellige.re 8nd credere 
corn'O together an:J t:1::.s lntelligere lS l tself and remains a 
credere vrhlle the c:cedere ln and by l tself, as we have seen, 
ls al:O an embryonlc intellisere. But lnt~lligere means stlll 
more vhan that: to read and 1Jonder Yill.at h2s already been sald -
th8t lS to say, lL1 tne approprlatlon of truth, actually to 
tr&verse that lr.tterven.Lng dJ st8nce (oet-,,-een recognl tlon and 8 ssen c) 
am $0 therefo::_-e to understand the truth as trut!1.. 11 (2) 
It lS fol" tlus that .J_t reqtnres the use cf' prayer 2nd the appllcation of 
the lntellectual powers, for l t must dlscern the "inner text 1' of Scriptme, 
vrl1.lch cannot be heard slmply by a re;:;ding of t!1.e lmt,,edlate text. 
D::lgtn8tlcs reflects on -;;mat has lJeen sald ln Scrlpture 8nd ::;_n the Ore~_£. 
It 2.s ltl1_oortant to notlce tha c doe;matics lS to be a ref'lectlon 
tl1e C:cedo. It cannot lJe a 
-
l"epetltlon of Sc:..,lpture of the~' nor even a tronslatlon; rather lt 
penet:.~ates Sc:."l::_:lture and the Credo. Ti:ns means, on tne one hanu, that the 
belleve:.." elms throug.:. lns tnedlation to ::_:>enetrate to the B.:::1.ng of GoJ, and 
on the o"tber that !1.e should ln consequence, e1:press "mat he sees and 
m1.derstands. This ll1 turn means th~,t theologj' begins vihere blbllcal 
quotation stops: lt ls a question (to use the ·,vords of Church Dogma clcs) 
of vrhat ·rrc F1ay say '1 on the b:ll.SlS oi' the ·<;:n·ophets and the apostles. q 
No statement wade b:; uog,ma tlcs that ls ln confllct wi tll the BJ.ble can be 
regardeC: as tl·ue, but at the sawe titue, dogrJatJ.cs rr1ay tnake many statements 
( 1 ) Barth 1 s cmn .Lnter~)retatJ.on of 11unders-ca.nd1.ng 11 1112:,;· be legl tlm8te, but 
there lS lJ.ttle eVJ..dence to support his etynnlog.tcal accoLi.nt. We 
have found onl; one lexlcon wluch ofFers supporL. Others are 
unanimous 211. deri VJ.ng lntelhgeTe from ::Lnter-lege.re (Lewls and Short; 
A LatJ.n Dlct.Lonal~, OUP, 1879; TI1.eaurus Linguae Latlnae, Leipzig, 
B.G.Teubne:-:·, 1936-1956; A V{a~de.8_ J.B.Ho~mann, Lateinisches Ettmol~giscl~ 
W8rterbuch, nelo elberg, Carl :Vinters Um versJ. tMtbuchhandlung 193J). 
T'.r1c root me8m.ng ls, thus, "to choose between" or "to dlstlngulsh"' 
and not "to read li1s.Lde 11 , ona so, 8s Barth claillls 11 to read the 21111er 
iBxt. 11 
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that are not covered dE'ectl:r bJ the autnorJ..ty or' the BJ..ble:(i) lndeed, 
any statewent ''•i1lch ls truly tneolo&,lcal lS a statement T.tncn lS not 
covered by blblical authorlty. But as such lt ceQ~ot be regarded as flnal 
n.,.,. fvridanentally it lS an 1nterim statement, the best 
knonled.;e and consclence cBn for ti1e present construe; 
a'Val ts better c._nstructlon from Goa or rnan. 11 (2) 
It lrwy be objected, hovrever, th2t bot~1. the Blble ano the creeds, 
not to mel1t_on the l<'athers, tHe ther1selves theology, and ought therefoTe to 
obVlate the necessl ty for fuxther dozm3tlc vro::_·k, but J..t •'llst be sEne 1J_l'st 
that the Blble ::..s theology of a fr•agmenta1y and uns:-steJMtic cheracter. 
It does not attempt to brl!~ toe;e ther the '·'Thole l'c'nge of l ts yefle):-Lon ln 
an orde1•ed fashlon, but ls, rather, made up of sevej"al boo~zs, ;;fuch are J..n 
var·vrlng Ciegl"ees testunony to hlstory, YiJ.. tness of revelctlon end reflexlon 
upon re:llelBtion. Dogmo ncs, cssentJ..sll:J, is an orderec reflectlon. 
Seccndly, the creeds 
theu1selves only ma1'k oot b1e boUDdal"les for ~d1.;:..o::._og:c_cal discussJ..on: they 
do not on~a0e ln deep reflectJ..on. T!nrdl;:;r, nelther the Blble, nor the 
Creeds, nor yet t..he :B'athers, are the reflection of the Church of the twentieth 
century on lts falth. Each 11ew age r.1ust thlnt out lts fal tl1 aDd the 
ex.J:)resslon of :tts fal th ln human language for ltself. 
of Goa? 
In -;mat sense can all thl s be sald to be concerned YTl tl:-1 t11e 'dcr a 
fud1rtics, as a ~Jl'oi'ound meditatlon on the Barr9tu:cP and the~' (3) 
( 1 ) cf Torrance Intro due tion p .188 11 Solen tlflc theo lo6J..cal o otl Vl ty b eglns 
1rhere straJ..ghtforvrard blbJ J_oal quotations e11d, -9recJ..sely because l t lS 
the task of theo] og~r t9i_Jenetrate to the solid truth u_9on -ulnct1 blblioal 
statements rest. That does not .nean that soJ..entu"lc theology can leave 
the grou11d of b:::.blJ..cal teach~_ng, for tl1e lnner text '''l th "lblch l t lS 
concerned lS o!lly to be dJ..soernec1 ln and along 7Titil the external text, 
but J..t ctoes 1J1ean ti1a-c lt t•1ust ocnetrate lnto the lrwer rst:w of the 
ScngtuJ es and so u1to t11e lnn~r loglc and form of the 'iord -~1lnch l t hea-::'s. 
and seeks to art-Lculote l t ll1 an orderly l11Dnner or· ratlo J..n our understa11dlng 
(2) FQI, p.31 
(3: Tl-re tert'1 C::_·edo lS so•nevmat al!'Olt_;uous, lnasmuc:h as J..t could refer to any 
of the accepteC! credal formularles, or could even denote the content of 
the f.?J..th of the Church. However, ln vleH of the attentlon :,iven by Barth 
to t~1.e .Apostles 1 Creed we tal:e lnr.1 to be referring pal t:c_cul8rly to th2t. 
Bott:: Credo 2nd Dos]oat~<?S2J?:_OutlJ..ne are e_:po:=atlons of the .Apostles' Creed. 
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lS meditatlon on tne ilo1d of God lnasmuch as l t seeks a dee_?er understandlng 
of all that God h::;s sald to rrwn abotiLt n~mseJ.i', CJn:J about lns -, elctlonsrnp 
Jfltl1 man, ln contrnst to Bll -Lh.<Jt rnan can sa:yr to hlmself about Goa. (-l) 
Thls concept d.LfTef's Sl[,rnr'lcantly frota Bartn 1 s earlv talk of the 1'{ora of 
God only in the loss of l.h e emp:1a s lS on t11.e 1,'To::c"d of Goo as G-oCl 1 s \ford of 
Judgement agBinst all human cultural and religlous endeavour. DogmatJ.cs 
asslsts the expos .. t.or~- sermon by e.:12bllng the :;>reacher to :--·elate the text 
to the ''lhole of the ChrlstJ_an 1.~a.L th. 
(a) (">' Church Do 2)11~ .... 1 
In l;l_1e lnl tial volut11es o.f' the Church Dogtnatlcs, Barth cor1tlnues 
to dlstingulsh three ereas of theological Bchvlty, BS ~1e does .1n Dle 
phrlstb.che DowBtik, descrlbing tr..em as exegesis, dogma tics and practical 
theology. (3) He does, l1o7rever, mal:e some attemot to classlfy the relations 
between thetll by spealang or' then" respective tasks as ex-.9licatio, medltatio 
and anullcatlo Bnd by descrlblne, ii1.e second as tl1.e brldge be17:reen the 
o'ther tvw. (4) 
He ls still vae;ue, hovrever, obout the preclse task of practlcal 
theology, as ,.e novr refers to homllatlcs. l t lG concerned vd. tl1 the goal 
o£' the langua;:,e of the Church, and .1.s t11erefore responslble fo1." the questlon 
( 1 ) of TC, p • 200 
(2) In tins sectlon vve .mclucle other Fo.L'ks publlst"wd dv.rlng the span of 
Church lligmatics 
(3) CD,I, 
(4) CD,I, 
1 
2 
3 
722f:f' 766 
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of' 11 the adaptation of' the WoTa of' Goa to t~e serVJ..ce of' ll18n. 11 But t 1ns does 
not mean thet l t seeks t_) cle krenne the "relevance 11 of the '''Or~;: of' doglnEJ·v~C 
ana exeget~cal theolot;~' ln ansvrer:ll1g 11 the so-called burning c~estioCJ.s of' 
the yresent day • 11 
"It sl1ould and wust be carr2.eo out in serene com"ldence that .L t 
WJ..ll ln fact do iins; but it rrust be left to Boly Scriptm"e to 
decide ho;7 far it docs so." ( 1) 
Frachcal theolo2:1 stands on the boundary bet-vreen "blro t~rpes of lai1__gua;;c, 
thot of dogm2tlcs ancl tl1a t of ev-:;ryday l~fe, and ls therefol'e concerned 
vr~tl1 tl1e adaptatlon of Lhe one to the other. At the sao1e tlme, 1l0wever, 
Barth repeatedl:r asserts th21t lt ls concerneJ vri t~1 the shope aud fon1 of 
tne procla,nat:..on of' the Chul"c.h., but ~t ls not clear Trhether he means by 
thls sirnpl:r tl1e technLques of' sermon construot2.on and v1hat he e;a:::.L~e:t· 
calle:l the 11 rhetorlcal el"fectl"l7'8l1SSs 11 of yreac_h.il'..g, or w-hether [le also 
lnc:;_udes the q1est~on of the adaptatlon of languac;e. J-Ie does 11ot 6~ve 
any detailed accn ULlt of -cl2.e task oi' -~:,raotlcel beolocy rrh~ch enables us 
to 11a ve 8 9recise unde:cstandl.rlg of ~ ts scope. 
\"Jhen vre tm·n to -r;he task of do£}119"Llcs, ne f~.r1d some equlvoc8tion 
on Barth 1 s part, about the role of Church J:hstory. In the fll'st volu'11e 
he ~s emphatlc thz,t ~ t hes onl~- a-1 enclllery roJe : 
11 Church ~ory so called a11swers, from the ~)Olnt of view of' 
Chrlstlan lan,?;u2g,e about GDd, to no qu·~stion that need be :yut 
independently am lS therefo:ce not 1JD be ret:,arded BS an 
inde11endent theologlcDl chsci~)line. It ~s tc1e ~ndlspensable 
8\L'Cll~ary sc~ence to e:x:es,et~cal, dognmtlc and practlcel th·3ology. 11 (2) 
Later, ~1oYrever, l1e appeers to tLave chongea lLJ_s mind, for -'l·llle he P18lntains 
the same :pos~t1on ~n Dogmatlcs ln Outllne( 3) as he eXj_)ressed ll;lt:1e fl::cst 
volurm of Church Dot:,1nDtics, 1n C~mrc:1 Dog111Bt~cs IV:3 he descrlbes Chmch 
(1) ~, p. 738 
(2) ,92,I : 1 : 3 
(3) op clt, p.12 
-182-
Hi-story as a fourth disc..Lpb .. ne WJ.. ::Inn theolo~?,J..oal science. Its scope 
:Ln.cludes the stud" of 11 sJrrlbols 11 (ln t~e s.mse of 11symbolics") and con_fessions 
as vrell as tt1e stwJ;,- of --c:'le a c CJ.. vi ty of ihe C'nu1·ch J..n rel2 tion to the rest 
of !ll sto.ry. ( 1 ) 
It 1•1a~r be that he e:xpre;:,sec1 tlns ap.;Ja-::-ent change of rrund J..n 
deference to TJ..llJ..ch' s crJ..tJ..cJ..su1 l..n tn.e fJ..rst mlurre of hJ s SystematJ..c 
Theology, ( 2) out J .. t lS dlElcul t to l:novr vil.1.e"::h 'Jl' : .. t J..S any more than an 
It J..S doubtful -.•hether lle would have been llJ..llJ..ng to 
~,rant Church RJ..stor;.r a t:cul~r J..nde:;_Jendent status. He tHUS t cert8J..nly have 
been --.Q.llJ..nJ to reco2,nJ..se that :..t ,,msc be conducceC! J..n accordance wJ..th J..ts 
o.-m J..nteg:cJ.. ty :md l''l thol1 t external J.nt el'ference, bu-t J..t J..S i•11possible to 
It J..S J..n-ceresti11-e.,, also, to notice Barth's changing attltude to 
In rus 
or -:-'iel_tanschauung. I,l. soue or hls late:c' WO:'.'k, ho"Tever, lle lS flreyareC! to 
alla.Y J.. ts use, (3) but in Evan;::,elJ..cal J'heolot;y he retw.'ns to his fol'w:;::.' con-
tentJ.on JL<.1at J..t J..s a contraOJ..c{:;:.on J..n tel"ms. If J .. t J s to be used 2t Lll~, 
l t c2n .ne2n onl:· thet do.?;'lo ~J..cs mus"c ~wld fast to -cne "orde:::', fol't:3tloD 
God J.tself. (LL) 
IilJ..e OlJ.Tlstllcl-:e Do2Jl18tJ..k t11.at do(!H19 :~J .. cs J..S s_JecJ.fJ..coll3~ concerned 'Tlt!:-1 
---~-------
( i) QQ,T.V : 3 : 380; cf slso Ev. ·~, .Dt176f 
(2) R.l1JLLsl'eCl J..n 1951, Cel'c18n l.'ransla JcJ..on U55 
(:;) Do::;;m tJ cs J..n OutlJ..ne (hereafter D:LO), p .12; CD, IV 
(4) Ev.Tlleol, p.181 
3 800 
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some d:u"f'3.cence :::;i' emp:casJ.s. 
11 Ch:c"J.:J tJ.an sJ?eecD. 11 ~ in tr2.e second l1e refers to che laL1gu.s2,e pecullar to 
( 1 \ 
"the Cil.rJ.stlon Church. ; 
I.Ioreover~ J.n 
~ _lldepe!l.Clcntly ol' J. t s spe alnn;:, :J bou G God, ln tt1e f'o-·'r" of an 
11 e:;:J.s te11ti8l anelysJ.s 11 • (3) 
Thus B8J'th S82'S ln t.:!.e SGCOL1d ech tJ.on C;I 
J_ t s task lS Go ·cest t"l1e 
Once 2;ain he r]escnbes 
86ain ile11les th2t proclaLC!a clan J.s l Ls task. 
( 1) 
(2) 
11The langu8c.::e a-oout God to be l'oLmd in t11e Church cJ oJ..11s, as proclarr.atJ.on 
to be the 'rord of Goc. E~' thJ.s J.ts o';m pecuJJ.ar standard J_t lS 
meosured J.n do,;n1PtJ.cs. In the raw ma tel'lal of do::_ril8 tJ.cs ·che fJ.rst 
object lS a serJ.es of ex::;ressJ_ol1s '·rluch, r•1ore or less constantly 
cmd C:Lfji_JhatJ.celly, usuall- Lilak'3 up tl'.e s_Joken rYJ8ttsr of proclamatJ.on 
m tl1e vrhole Chu:cch. But he1e, as every•.,rhe:_'e, these e:xpressJ.Ons 
acquJ.:ce t:1e2r rr1ean:2.:1g from cl1e assocJ.otions and contexts in Hhich 
the;:; are used. Io VJ.rtue of ti-ns VBl'J'inf, meanJ.ng, langua:;e about 
God becon1e s fiDOL•l tim:; t;o tJ.rne a defiln te, ci12-c'ac terJ.stic langua;;e. 
Tt e:2sts for do:J,r'1EltJ.cs ln a coL1gerJ.es of analo.;ot.'S det::::l"t:JJ.nc-Lions 
(in elner Ftllle von de:::-.artigen ~ s tir.rmti1eJ. ten) and tne sense of the 
dogmatlc questlon YTJ.ll g2nd·all}' be, ,,hetlJ.e.c and how fal' J.t (l.e. 
the n:e anlnc~ ill tn •·ibJ.cl:. che expressions are used) 2s ap.c:ropriate 
or not to J.ts :ou:::-gose of' serv:iJ.1g t11e '.!ora of Ckld. 11 ' (5) 
Chr.D~ p.1; CD, I: 1:1 
II .,. II 
cf CD,I : 1 : lX "When t11e "'oi'd Cfnurch 11 replaces tne .lord Cll.l'lstt.an" 
ln the tc_ ;;le of tne book, t"hot •11eans fJ.rstl:~ thr t ';,-J_th re;3ard to 
renounclng the lljlt-l1eorted use~ so l·1uch combatted by myself of t~1e 
Great vmrd 11 ChrJ.stJ.an11 I r:uj1-'v groceed Yrith :;ood precedent - bm; also 
the n12 terlal fact~ th::d; a urJ.ori I mJ.t!;ht poi_n. t to tl1e cJ.rcumstances tha-G 
Clog,1,13 tlcs l s no L a 1 free 1 sclence ~ but one bound to tl:le s-phere of the 
Church.1 •• 11 
(3) cf CD.I:1 :141fT (4) Ibid, 55,91ff (Note 5 follows at tho foot of 
the next page) 
-184-
Dognwt1cs 1s, t'1en, a land of lln(Sulstlc anal~"SlS, SJ nee 1 t seeks to 
unders-cano the meanin,; of the langua;;_e used by the .x-·ocl8matlon of the 
Church. 
not slu19ly to underst8nd the rules of t'1e language-game of procl8f•1Btlon, 
but. to fulfll a norn£da ve role b3• rr.easurJ_ng the BJ?.:•roprlateness of the 
l8n[;,U8ge to the object tc -.v-lncl1 lt refers,(i) wlnch can be Rcoomplishec1 onl3r 
-by 8 orofouna med.Ltat1on on 8nd enq_u1ry into ti1e object. Tnus dounat1cs 
strl ves toual'U s lJure doctrlne and 1s thel"efo:·e useful not only for 
11reaclung l tself but also 1'or llturg;;r a11d even hymn vr.nting. ( 2 ) 
Barth 1'epeats hls assertlon, 1118Cle in the f}__rs-c edi tlon that 
doe,ma tics ls d1r"'cted tovrards the pre2chlng that J.s to tale place tomorrow, 
but ',";hereas, ln 1927, he sald th8t lt seeks tomorroN's ~;reaclnng ..Ln toJay's, 
ln the ;:,econd edl tlon i.1e says that l t seeks 1 t ln yesterda~-r s preGchlrlg 9 s 
uell v s l!l toda3~ 1 s. 1'ioreover, he g1ves more precise sug~estions as to 
Yihere tlns grec-chln; lTJ8:f be found, especlB:Lly ,.,J.. th respect to 11yesterday 1 s 11 • 
"Yesterday's _<.Jroclamatlon, 1Yi t~ c:::'i tJ clsms of vi'm.ch dogt•1atlcs method-
ically starts out, vrould t~~lerefore co11sist fundamentally of the 
su•n total of t::.e attempts at Church proclamatlon that have occu.r1·ed 
u~._J t,:; date, as voriously detel"lDlned b~r the meamng attached to the 
e:>;p ressions ln question. Actuolly l t ls but a very su1all fraction of 
tl-us total wluch, ·.-rhere c:IogTiBtlc "lorl~ is done, con be taken as kncvm 
and therefore can be t118de the object of ll1Vestigation. But even 
VJ.th::_n ti1is knoYm fraction the:.:e con be, once 1~ore, only some few 
elements, "Ti1lch stend out l'epresentat~_vel~r from the rest ln the 
serles and vnt!1 vVh.J.dl. tlus "Tork can bus,'! ltself. Pinally lt could 
nel ther be relevant nor .:::·rofl table fol' dogma tlcs tc dl'eam of 
assoclatlng :J..tself 2t all -,'l th Cl.1urch yreao.1nng as dellvered yesterday 
or the day before or .9reVlous to that. P.atlwr, ln order to demand 
truly that the Ci1u1'ch cest herself concermng thls her central functlon, 
l t •nll get in toucll ··rl ch tha·c for•'1 of yesterday 1 s proclamatlon l11 
vrlucll 1~ flnd thls fu_1Ction already tested, cri ticlsed, and revlsed, 
i.e. Wltn the results of tl.1.e hlstory of do;;ll1a'clcs ltseli'. (3) 
Preclsely ln hel' doe;mn:acs u-.9 to date the church has glvetl ar1 author-
l tatlve deliverence on the extent to v1hich, ln her oY:n opinlon, she 
regards asproclama tlon the language about Goa to be found Y.J.. thln her 
when measured b3r the sta.nda1·d of the Word of Goa." (4) 
(Note 5 f:col!1 1JreVlous :<,lage) (5) Ibid, p.8Gf The penultimate sentence ln the 
E.T. ls a bad translatlon of a verr dlfficult sentence. The sen.se of the _Dart 
we !.1.a1iB cpoted ln Gert11an ilould 8l1p~ar to ·be 11 al1 abundance of these expresslons. 11 
(1) cf CD,I:2:781 "The task of dogmahcs consists generally ln a crJtlcal 
exnill'i'nation of lts 1reter..Lal, •il1lch means 1n fact of' those key-words and 
baslc outllne s of the G'hurch 1 s speach about God. 11 
(2) 
({3), 
4) 
CD,I:2:758ff; I:1:90 
Ihave cor1·ect;ed thls sentence as the E.T. does not mal:e sense. 
CD,I:1:87 
-185-
It lS g_u.1.te clear ~hat Bart.h. tekes tlns part of the tesk of dogr<wtJ.cs 
sen ously, Slt1Ce a large part cf tD.e clJ 3cuss1on of Church Dogl!le tJ.cs consJ.sts 
of a dlalogue Wl. th the dogrnatJ.c ·rork of the past, but J.t lS also clear t.het 
he acts as a judge to-,rards much of v1hat has been w:::'l tten. The theologJ.a!l 
is r1ot, cherefol'e, bou.nd to treat the raaterlal of dognwt1c -\rrl ting as 
mater1el for a si,::;:JntJ.c synt!o_esis, ~u-!:; as r:>.aterJ.al for 8 conve:c"s::Jtlon, 
E1aterial .nuch or vr}nch ma:' have Lo be rejected. nevertheless., the last 
sentence of our quotGtJ.on still appears to be tnaklng a rather pretentJ.ous 
clalm, because, hmrever t:cue l t tnay be thst the £e!ler~l trend in proclaltlatJ.Oll 
ln any pex'ioC! lc reflected ll1 J.ts do2,'Tl1ahcs, l t remains true that dogmatics 
is lar·gel~r the •'rork of indl Vld ua ls. l:Oreover, assumlng that SchleJ.ennacher' s 
"11'0rk is J.ncluded awo11g the cJogrnatJ.c '''ork of t..1-J.e :,?a st, l t lS d::t.f'fJ.cul t to 
supl.Jose that 3.srtl-: ".'ould c_lalFl that 1n 1 "t the language used ~;:-/ "the Cl1w:ch 
~-n .c-:!.'oclsl'18tlon lS tHeasured by the standard of the ~lord of Gorl. In S'cort, 
Bsrth 1 s account J.s prescr1pt1 ve rather than descrj_pt1ve; he ma~- vrell be 
-cizht to maintoin that !.ns account ou:.:,ht to be the J.latteTnJ:;resented by 
cJogw.at::t.cs, but ~1.e l~as not establ1s~1ed t11at thJ.s _LS 111 fact the case. 
He also L'laiDtains the posi t::t.on, -,,irncl-: he defended J.n the .first 
ed::t.tJ.on, fuat c1o.;ma;dcs OLlGht to be confessional, by vA1lC~1. he tfleans that 
l t 1nust be carTiec1 out Yi:t.1Jnn the tradl tions of a ::_1artJ.cular church. 
FoT Barth hlH1Self, that can onl-/ tnean the D.efor!l ed tr adJ. tion of the 
Evangel:t.cal Chuxdh. 
creeds and confessions ac~::.tlo'.lle::l;sed b-,- the E.efo1".11ed Church. .At the same 
tJ.Clle, he does not Yilsh to per-yetuate h.l_storJ.cal d:t.fference::, -rJut to create 
a 2.enuine Church (logmahcs. ( 1 ) 
'ihe Aut~1orl ty of the creeds a no conf'e ss1ons is only ::.·ela tJ_ve 1:md 
seconc1Gr:r to t11e bindin; eu ;;;!1orl ty of Scrip--cure ( 2 ), so that l t r:JUSt be said 
(1) rynr.D, pp.441ff, CD,Is2:828ff 
(2) Dle, p.13 
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that then· l'ole, hke that of the lnstory of dosu18tlc thou;::;ht, lS to 
ass1st the Churdl 1r;Ats mJ.de:rs::;andlng of the Scr1ptme and so .Ln 1ts 
To sa~· that HolJ 3crlpture ~las b.Lnchn:;, authorl ty, however, 1s 
me1ntains l:1s .AnsellnlaYl stance that dogi•!l t1.cs lS an at-renrp"t to Lt.nderstand 
-~-··-·t'l"'+ ---'-s •o 'o•"' S"'l'a" 11 01-1 :',-,_~ 'O"'SlS O_l.n 1 A tl 1 " ' ' 11 d 
· c• v L. c: ~ v _::;; ~ l;_1e _GOS es anc, _t'",~."O_f),1ec;s an lS 
the:cefore an attenp't tu l~ear t~1e -~7ord of C1Q'.J ''l th.Ln Scr1pture, a::1d 1n 
Lhat sense to seelc ~e:Velatlon. 
11 The l_)rec1se task of fu:·ology .•• ls CI'codo ut 1ntelligam ••• Ih the 
fulf1llnent of t!L s task, cheologv seeks to z.cas;J and undel'stan(l syeclflc-
ally one tlnDs: tbr:; e:x:tent to Ylhlsh the cDnonlcsl collect1on ack-
nowledged 1;y earller ge11eratJ ons actuoll~; ~ Li1e canon of Holy 
Scr1pture. But, ho·r can th-'-s quest1on be dec1ded other than tnl'ough 
lmonledge N" t11e coni e.r:1t of Lhose vn,l t1ngs. Ho','l' othe1· can Lhe 
ri,;:>1t.ness ar tl'ach tlonal respect for the canon be tested other than 
ty actlvDtlng thDt -.-url:::Lr1g 11f.fJO"thesls? Hovv other than by questlonlng 
the texts of t•1e Old 2nC: liew Testaments as to whethe.c and to -,rhat-
exLent au-.~t1enc- c YTJ_tness of C-od's ~'ford nw~r be actually llearo ln tl1em? 
How else, there.Lo:._'e, ::i.c::'n : _l l','~ careful Juvestlgation of tnosc; texts 
J.n t£1e l1gh t of Jctns c~ue st1or1, lJy enga;semcn t l n the exeget1csl Cll"cle 
thot lS WlaVolda-ole Jl' ttw texts a1·e to be understood? T'nls 
J.nvest1:::,at1on Cloes not consls t ln premature 8"1tlclpat:Lon -out .111 
ex_pectat-Lon of a"1 event, an event ln Yitncll the aut1:1or1 ty of tt1ose 
texts aill10L'nces 1tseJ£. 11 (1) 
Becsuse God has :revealed h11nself, do,c~'not1cs .LS a response ,-rhlch 
lS cna-L·ac~cer:sed b- such attltudes as .:~rayer, servlce 
seel:s to hear and understand God's '7ord ln Scr .Lghn'e. Indeed, :prsyer 
ls so much a characteristlc of oo.:;matlc:J th8t .Lt '"8Y be seen, a cco:coing 
For thls reason, i.heolo,:!:-' is 
not, str.LCtly s_:eslGng, tr1e -.,orl~ of )l1dl.Vlduals, but u:f' H1e whole Church. 
It lBY even be re;:;,ar·ded as a klnd of lltu:rglcal act, from ·-ihic:l arises the 
_,)artlcuJar do2,T''Dtlc vfllL.Lngs of .LnCllvJ..dual theolo~;J.ans. ( 3 ) 
( 1) Ev. Theol. :i?• 41-r.f; cf .?P • .39Inf 
(2) cf TI1e flnal sectlon of Ev.Th?ol (part IV) 
(.3) CD,I: 1; 18, 25; I: 2:771 ff; IV:3:882; Ev.1~eol. pp.16f, 164. 
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We conclucle trns sectlon 1 /J. th & fu.rt11.er consleleratlon of the 
concept of the iord of Goel, ''ih J.ch Be1'tl1 contlfmes, in Church Dogmcd:;lcs to 
expoW1d under the threefold form os 1-:<reached, ~Tl'l tten Blld revealed. .de 
Jays a sz:reater Ct~"Iphasls, i1ovrev2r, on li1e person of Chrl;Jt and on the 
Incarr:.a-Lion as t11e locus of God's self-revelatlon. ( 1 ) He does clravr 
a-ltcmt.Lon to tlle _;r eccuen i:; _,_u ilefor mc-t.Lon -cheology for Ins th:;::·eefold cone-
But he also draws 
attent.Lon to Luther 1 s scant 1·ega r·d for -;:;he concept of prea cl1.lhg as the 
Word of God and to c·ther comb.Lnations of three that he l'lace, rucll as tl1e three 
vrays ln if!1lch trutt1 lS revesled, in Scrl~ tuJ."e, Yrord anc thought. He 
further notes the rapld dlsappearance of' the thn·d· fol',,l of the Vford of God 
Yd. th tree Tlse of -:;ne doctrlne of ver·bal ll1S=t)lratlon. ( 2 ) Curlously, 
however, it sp::_Jeo:cs til ot Barth himself Vlrtually abonJoned lns att~Fpt to 
rehablll tate the concept after the secor1C:: ::-lB_"t of volUl'Je one of Churcl.1 
Thus, cl though t1e speaks of t11e •,ioru, tne ~7J. tness and the 
ConJr.mnlty i.n Evs?;;elical 'l'ehology, and of the 'Jord as God's r:;vel8t.Lon ln 
Jesus Clrrlst and as 3ol;r ~crlptL,re, he does not spe8k of _Jreachlng as i:he 
"'ford of God. ( 3) 
Dogrnatlcs 
The reason '13Y perhaps be seen even ln the f'lrst Vb lu1ne of Church 
v1here the nhrases je und je or jevreils (1.) freq_uenc;ly appear ln 
Hurrwn ls11aouac;e as such lS not language about 
God, even ,,hen tLe claim lS rraoe fol' lt thc>t 1.t lS. TI1.lS lS true too of 
former l t lS rnuch t1ore so for the latter. 
( 1) cf CD,I:1:131ff; 1:2:883 ("God's Word .LS lns Son Jesus CJ:1rJ.st"); 
rv:.3;96. It 'lould be "T.cong, 11o·;ever, to suggest that tne lOea lS 
absent frot'1 Chr.D (cf' p.2Li-3) 
(2) CD,I:1:137ff 
(3) Ev. ~heol. pp .15-4 7 Ba1·th coL'lo have appesled to Bulhnger for sup:Jol~t 
for the use of ti1.e t:;rw Word of God YTl th reference to ~Jreadnng 
(ConfesslO HelvetlC8 PosterJ.or 1 :2) but ooes not Fl gpear to ao so. 
(LI-) •rr·enslatea ln Eras 11from tin'e to tlu1e 11 CD,I:1:103, 123, 131 pas~:nm. 
11R§Bl ~;roclau1a0ion ••• means God 1 s 1ford preached, and Goa 1 s Word 
pl'eached means ••• man's lan:;ua;;e about God on i..t1e bas1s of C-od 1 s 
seli'-object1flc8 01on 1·Jl-nch 1s nel thel JJresent nor predictable nor 
relatable to o"1~- C:lesign, but lS l'eal solely 1n -c:1e freedom of lhs 
grace, 1n v"J.rtue of 1il.uc1~ f::·oc·1 tlC·le to t1rne He v7ills to be the 
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object of tlus lan::o<Jage, and ls so accordin,; to hls own good -,)Jeasure. 11 
- ( 1) 
" ••• •re t~ust sa:· of proclatnotlon and the Biole, that the~[ are God's 
Word, b./ from t1.ae to tulle becormng God 1 s Word. 11 (2) 
Hot O{ll:;- C1 oes 1ce S:Jeolc of hurnan la:t1,[;Ua[ie as beconnng the Word of C-od 
, II (3) t~1e VTord cf God as event 11 , in 
o::'der t.-:; s1:::,n1:fy t'IJ.e sane _9olnt, nat·1ely, that c"!UD18l1 la!12,U8.!,e becor1es the 
Word of God onl:- by Goa 1 s :srace. S1m1lorly he syeaks of l1an 1 s kno:rledge 
of God and hlS freedOl'l under the author1 t;yr o£' the Word of God Ds 11event 11 , 
(4) 
the: V/o<"d of' GocJ t:1e1t 1t 1::; so onl,;· as "event 11 , 11 from time to t1me", 
a_?>J?eaJ.'S to !:-laVe ccDVlnced Bsrt!1 of ti'.e undesn•ab1J.ity or contmu::.ng to 
Howeve1·, he could not l1ke·,·r:Lse 8bondon 1ts use 
to 
vr1 t!1 J.'eference to Scr1ytu.re, because !•o'\rever muc~1 it h.::• s/be qu:Jlif1ed, 
it lS ~evert!:leless e sscntlal to n1s co"1cep t1un of' the task of ciwology. 
To abcll1Clon ttus use uould be ·;:;o L•LldeJ.'IJUne lus tlleolo;;lcal enterprlse. 
·-----
( 1) CD ,1: 1 : 102f 
(2) Ib1d, p .132f 
(j) E:r elfsl11S 
(L) CD,I:1:!15, I: 2: 697:f:f 
2. God and Man 
We have already indicated that Barth's conception of the task 
and roothod of theology as related to proclamation must be seen in the 
context of his reaction against liberal theology. But lt was not only 
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against liberal theology that he reacted. Schleiermacher also exercised 
a strong negative influence on him, as a representative of romantic idealism, 
and his work is characterised by a constant dialogue with the positions not 
only of liberal and romantic theology but also with that of the Bultmann 
school .. All three contain fundamental presuppositions with which Barth 
cannot agree, and which therefore affect profoundly the conception of the 
nature and task of theology. Nowhere is this more apparent than in his 
conception of the relationship between man and God as expressed, for example, 
in his treatment of such questions as revelatlon and history and revelation 
and religion. In order, therefore to illuminate this aspect of his work 
we shall in this section pay special attentlon to these two questions. 
(a) Revelation and History 
In the work of Albert Schweitzer, liberal theology fell firmly 
under the influence of what is variously known as "positivistic historiography" 
11hlstoricism11 or 11historism11' (Historismus). Theology was, therefore, 
re~ired to work with the same presuppositlOns as that concept of historical 
study which had adopted the positivism of empirical science. Not only did 
this mean a very clear idea of what may be described as possible, but also 
an outright rejection of anythlng that might be described as supernatural. 
Accordingly, theology engaged upon a 11 Q.lest for the Historlcal Jesus" which 
-190-
would produce a credible account of the life and teaching of the remarkable 
rabbi, of such a kind as would fUrnish authority for the liberal conception 
of' the Gospel. In the process, Schweitzer found it necessary to shed the 
eschatological teaching of' Jesus as irrelevant illusion. 
In contrast, Barth took up again just those points which liberal 
theology had found it necessary to gJ.ve up, in particular the supernatural 
character of the events of ihc&ears AD1-30 and the eschatelogical 
perspective of the Gospels. 
Barth returns to the contention of orthodo~ that Christ is the 
Absolute Paradox, being both God and man. The history of the life of Jesus 
cannot therefore be regarded as simply an elenent of the flux of historical 
causality. It is not possible, therefore, to treat Jesus, as positivistic 
historiography does, simply as an historical figure, for the real significance 
of Christ does not consist in the ascertainable facts of his life and deeds, 
but in those very events which positivistic historiography discards as 
impossible or improbable, namely, in those events which surround the 
resurrection. The resurrection is the focal point of revelation, the 
point at which the two spheres of the human and the divine touch.. Ha.vever, 
Barth's fear of appearing to suggest that historical events can as such be 
regarded as revelation, cause him, in Romans, to hold apart the two spheres 
so severely that it can only be said that they touch tangentially. 
"The years AD1-30 are the era of revelation and disclosure; the 
era which, as is shown by the reference to David, sets forth the new 
and strange and divine def:ini tion of all tine. The particullri ty 
of' the years of AD1-30 is dissolved by this divine definition, because 
it makes every epoch a potential field of revelation and disclosure. 
The point on the line of intersection is no more extended onto the 
known plane than is the unkn~lane of' v.hidl it proclaims the 
existence. The effulgence, or, rather, the crater made at the 
percussion point of an exploding shell, the void by which the point 
on the line of intersection makes J.tself known in theconcrete world 
of history, is not-even though it be named the Life of Jesus -
that other world which touches our world in Him. In so far as our 
world is touched in Jesus by the other world, it ceases to be capable 
or direct observation as history, time or thing.• (11 
( 1) gg, p.29 
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"In the Resurrection Ithe new world of' the Holy Spirit touches the 
old world of flesh, but touches it as a tangent touches a circle, 
that is, Wl. thout touching it. .And, precisely because it does not 
touch it, it touches it as its frontier - as the new world. The 
Resurrection is therefore an accurrence in history, which took place 
outside the gates of Jerusalem in the year NJ 301 inasrwdl as it 
there "came to pass", was discovered and recognised. fut inasmuch 
as the_oocurrence was conditioned by the Resurrection, in so far, 
that is, as it was not the "coming to pass", or the discovery, or 
the recognition, which conditionec}its necessity and appearance 
and revelation, the Resurrection is not an event in history at all."' ( 1) 
In order to make clear his belief that the events of AD1-30 are not to be 
reduced to the flux of historical causality he describes them, and particularly 
the resurrection, as non-historical. ( 2) He does not mean by this term 
that the events d:id not take place. Nevertheless, he appears to feel 
acute discomf'ort at times, on account of the vulnerability of a theology 
which does insist that supernaturally caused events should also be 
hJ.storical events, because in being historical events they may be thought 
to share the same relativity as all other historical events. 
"Were there a direct and causal connexion between the historical 
1facts 1 of the Resurrection - the empty tomb, for example, or 
the appearances detailed in I.Cor. xv- and the Resurrection itself, 
were it in any sense of the word a 'fact 1 in hi story, then no 
profession of faith or refinement of devotion could prevent it 
being involved J.n the see-saw of 1Yes 1 and 1No 1 , lif'e an:l death, 
God and man, which is ch.aracteiistic of all that happens on the 
historical plane. There is under this heaven and this earth no 
existence or occurrence which is not caugnt up by a relativity in 
which great and small are inextricably wov~ogether. Therefore, 
if the Resurrection be brought within the context of history it 
must share its obscurity and error and essential questionableness.''' (3) 
Barth wishes to assert that the events of revelation are genuine 
events of history, but he does not want to commit himself to a position 
which would allow positivistic historiography to compromise their significance 
by discountJ.ng the resurrection and reduci. ng the events to the same value 
as all other events; for that reason he has to insist on thell' supernatural 
(1) Ibid, p.30; of also W.G.W.M. p.283 
(2) ~ p.195 passim 
(3) ~~ p.204 
=192-
character. But the relativity which seems to be attached to historical 
events causes him to adopt a somewhat ambivalent attitude particularly 
towards the resurrection. At the same time he is afraid of' ihe danger 
of' falling f'oul of the belief that all events may be regarded as revelation 
of' the divine. This was the view of Hegal, who,by involving human 
history in the dialectic of' thesis, antithesis and synthesis, erased the 
distinctions between theology and anthropology. Barth joins with 
Kierkegaard in rejecting this view, ( 1) but his fear of appearing to 
surrender either to it, or to positivistic historiography tends to give 
an air of unreality to his account of' the resurrection and of' eschatology. 
<bnsequently his interpretation of' eschatology consists largely in viewing 
the resurrection as confronting human history with the eternal "now" of 
divine history, which does not enter human history but only touches it. 
Later he was to say of himself 
"Because we were more consistent and proceeded in a more clear-cut 
way than our predecessors we were well on the way to just as 
systematic a reduction of' God's eternity to the denominator of' 
post-temporality, the eternally f'uture, as the Ref'ormers had that 
of pretemporality and the Neo-Erotestants of supra-temporality~. 
11That we had only an uncertain grip of the matter became apparent ••• 
m those passages of the exposition in which I had to speak positively 
about the divine f'uture and hope as such. It emerged in the fact 
that although I was confident to treat the far-sidedness of the 
coming Kingdom of God with absolute seriousness, I had no such 
confidence in relation to its coming as such. (2) 
He made a further attenpt to defend the position he held by 
adopting a term which Overbeck had used in his attack on Christianity 
as mediated by Christian history. 0\rerbeck argued that the history o"f 
the Christian Church was such as to discrecli t all the claims of Ohristiani ty 
unless Christianity should itself be distinguished sharply from the 
history of the Church. 
( 1) of :Ehilos ·cal Fra ments, trans. D.Swenson (Princeton University Press 
1967 , p. 73; Training in Christianitz trans. w. LONI'ie (Oxford 
University Press, 1941), pp.26ff 
(2) CD,IIa1:635 
"Te include Chris bani ty umler the concept !Df' the his in rical, 
means to admi.. t that it is of this worihd, and like all life 
has lived in the world in order to die."' (1) 
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l!n consequence, he argued that the only possible "abode" of' Cbristiamty 
is in 1'Urgeschichte 11 (primordial history). 
It is uncertain whether Overbeck thought that in using this idea, 
he was removing Christianity from serious consideration. Barth, apparently, 
did not think so, and seized upon the term as a synonym far the non-historical, 
to highlight the distinction between God and man and the total absence of' 
continui -cy between the old and the new creation. de stand in Urgeschichte 
by God's grace alone. (2) 
Barth continued to use the concept of Urgeschichte, but abandoned 
it after the publication of Die Christliche Eogmatik. It had already by 
then undergone some change of' n:eaning, as he had succeeded in clari:f'ying 
some of the issues that concerned him. The principal point that he wished 
to make was sumned up in an axiom which he proposed in a Je cture on Erioh 
Peterson's conception of theology ( 3) and later repeated in Die Christliche 
D:>gmatik and in Church Ihgma tics: 
''History can indeed become a predicate of revelation, but never 
possibly can revelation become the :tr edicate of history • 111 (4) 
Oonsec;pently, in Die Christliche Dogmatik, he uses Urgeschichte not so rruch 
to stress the discont:inuity between human and divine history, as the 
impossibility of treating history as such as revelation. His contention 
is that there is nothing in history as such on whim to base f'ai th, nothing 
that the h:is torian could e:x.a mine and oonclude to be divine revelation. At 
the same tjme, however, revelation does not take place in an entirely 
(1) Christentum und Kultur oi ted by Barrth, ~ p.62 
(2) ~ pp.29, 140, 171, 237, 249f, W.G.W.M. pp.74ff' 
(3) The lecture was pron:pted by 
What is Theologz? :in 1925. 
Theology at Bonn but he was 
Catholic Church. 
the publication of Peterson's book 
At the time, Peterson was ETofessor of 
later (1929) received into the Roman 
(4)"0hurch and Theology'11, ~ p.292; Ohr.D.p23? ~,I: 2a58 
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separate sphere: it is not super-history (tfbergeschiohte), as though it 
were some kind of eternal happening between the Father, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit. (1) Revelation is Urgeschiohte, and as suoh in some sense 
distinct from history and therefore beyond the scrutiny of positivism, 
but it is also Geschichte. It takes place in history, but is more than 
history because it is an act of God in history. ( 2) 
"That revelation is more than eternal history is demonstrated 
by the fact that it is a point in temporal history. That it 
is oore than tenporal history is demonstrated by the fact 
that it is not bound to the irreversible secpenoe of te~qporal 
history, that the rest of history is united as a circle about 
it as its centre point, even if it is distinguished as events 
preceding and following it. 111 (3) 
The historian may indeed see this history as revelation, but only if he 
first becomes a member of the Ohurdh and so a theologian.(4) 
So far we have discussed two theological options which Barth 
regards as closed if theology is to fulfil its prqper task. It cannot 
accept the canons of historicism, even if it nust submit to some historical 
research. Equally, it cannot accept the thesis of romantic idealism, that 
all history may be regarded as revelation. 
There are however, two further options coming into view which 
Barth also regards as closed. The one is related to the thesis of romantic 
idealism which we have just mentioned, and is the view held by members of 
the Religionsgesohiahtliche Sohule that Christianity should be regarded as 
one manifestation of religion and revelation among many. Against this, 
Barth insists on the absoluteness of the revelation in Christ and therefore 
of the events of Christian revelation. The other is -the approach he 
perceives to have been adopted by strauss, Drews, or Bultmann, in which 
(1) Chr.D• p.231 
(2) ~' pp.81, 232f'f 
(3) ~~ p.239 
(4) Ibid, P• 335f 
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the "historJ.cal kernel"' of' the statements of' the biblical documents is 
regarded as so clouded that the ~estion arises as to whether they are 
historical at all or whether they are. merely a matter of' "myth-construction."' 
Against this view he urges that reitelation is indeed history and finally 
~1) 
rooted in historical events •• 
As we have already indicated, Barth abandoned the term Urgeschichte 
after the first edition of' the Dogmatics, but he did not abandon the idea 
he had sought to convey by it. He ceased to use it, it seems, in order 
to cut links with the past, in oraer to allay suspicion that he was under 
the influence of' various philosophies or Weltanschauungen, such as Kantianism 
or Existentialism, and to destroy the impression given by the use of the 
term that there is a strict dichoto~ or diastasis between the spheres of 
the divine and the human which prevents a~ real concept of' incarnation.(2 ) 
But he co\il.d not abandon the idea as long as there remained the 
threat of' positivistic historiography to theology. Consequently there 
is to be found in Church Do~atics an extensive polemic against historicism 
and against the option takw by Bultmann in response to it. ( 3 ) Divine 
and human history are not held rigidly apart as ih Bomans, but, nevertheless, 
while Barth maintains that the events of revelation are genuine historical 
events, and that all the acts of' God in the sphere of the created world 
genuinely take place in history, he still insists that such events are not 
accessible to the research of positivistic historiography. He admits that 
the category of saga may well be applicsble to certain parts of' the material 
(1) Ibid, p.235f 
(2) cf Torsten Bohlin 11Di.e Reich-Gottes-Idee im letzten halben Jahrhundert"' 
Z.Th.K. vo1.43 (vo1.10 of Neue Folge, 1929), pp.1-27 
(3) cf also Ev. Theol. p.29 passim; "Rudolf' Bultmann, An .Attempt to Understand 
Him"' Kerygma and ~' ed'"1Bartsch, trans. R.lru.lJ!er (London, Sl?CK, 1959) 
Vol. II, PP'• 83-1321 ••• all I can do is to put to (:BUl tmann) the real 
theological q.1estion on which everything devolves. Is the deii\Vthologised 
kerygma allowed to say anything about God's having condescendled to become 
this worldly, objective and ••• (Kerygma and Mcytb, vol. II, p.109) 
datable?" 
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contained in the Bible, but denies that historicism can have anything of' 
value to say about it, and certainly cannot make it irrelevant to the 
Church. (1) Thus although he does not use to any extent the terms 
Heilsgeschichte or Historie and Geschiohte, nevertheless the ideas lie under 
the surf'ace of' the discussion. Geschichte ref'ers to the activity of' God, 
inaccessible to historicians and theref'ore described as non-historical or 
pre-historical history. ~istorie on the other hand, is that which is 
observable f'or ihe historian as creaturely activity. ( 2) Th.e distinguishing 
f'eature of' ihe events of' "ihe very special history of' God with man"' is 
that they are unique and unrepeatable: they cannot be regarded as examples 
of a general occurrence. 
"'Historical' in regard to 'revelation 1 must rather mean an event as 
a f'act with no court of ref'erence above it by which it could be 
inspected as a f'act and as this f'act." (3) 
We f'ind in Church Dogmativs an increasing emphasis on the 
incarnation; whereas in Romans Barth stressed the divinity of' Christ 
almost to the exclusion mf the humanity• We find him speald.ng, in 1956, of' 
"The Humanity of God", and stressing ihe historicity of Jesus to such an 
extent that at Jeast one critic claimed that Feuerbach had, after all, been 
proved col'!itect. (4 ) Barth, however, is also at pains to emphasise that God 
does not cease to be God because of the incarnation. He is not subject to 
the contingencies and relativities of history in the incarnation: this 
historical event remains the absolute event with absolute signif'icance. ( 5) 
(1) cf f'or example his discussion of Creation in CD,III:1:80ff and 
angelology in CD.III:3:374 ff 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
The terms Hi storie and Geschichte are used with particular reference to 
the doctrine df creation (CD.III:1:59ff,78ff) but he does not maintain 
the distinction consistently elsewhere. He says of reconciliation that 
it is Geschichte but means by ihat that it nust be recognised as actual 
fact, as having genuinely taken place. To try to grasp it as supra-
historical or non-historical is not to grasp it at all. It is indeed 
divine activity, not the activity of man, but it is "truth actualised in 
a history (Geschichte) and revealed in this history as such - revealed, 
theref'ore as history•. ~Nevertheless it is 11the very special history of God 
with man, •• of man with God 11' {gQ,IV: 1 I 157) 
.QE,I:1:378 
J.Taubes, "The Copernican Turn of Theology", Religious ~erience & Truth 
(ed S.Hook). p.74. (5) cf ~om R&Usseau to Ritschl, p.299f 
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The resurrection conpels us to Vl.ew Jesus in an altogether different light 
from that in which the ~est for the Histor~cal Jesus saw him. The 
resurrection itself is also an event in history, just as the incarnation is; 
it ~s not a timeless idea.(1) But at the same time it is more than an 
event in the flux of historical causality: it is the prism through which 
Jesus should be regarded, indeed it is the prism which alters our perspective 
on the whole of reality.(2) 
In Jesus, therefore, divine and human history genuinely come together: 
Jesus is not timeless truth, but truth in history. For this reason we find 
it inpossible to accept Alan Richardson 1 s characterisation of' Barth 1 s work 
as a 11disengagenent from history 111(3) It is rather, as Richardson himself 
admits, a rejection of historicism, but it ~ also a rejection of the 
Bultmannian school and of the romantic idealist interpretation of history. 
Theology can have only one goal, a deeper understanding of God as revealed 
in Jesus Christ; it cannot, therefore, engage upon the philosqphy of 
history apsrt from Christ, for it is concerned with the "very special" 
history of Goa with man. It therefore claims for the events of the Gospel 
a unique significance and must be prepared to allow the exposition of 
those events to appear to be "supernaturalistic" because they are the 
activity of a God who is quite dlst:i.nct from man and :from the natural world. 
( 1) _2!?,m:2:442 
(2) Ibid 
(3) History Sacred and Profane (London, S.C.M.Press, 1964), pp.13~39 
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(b) Revelation and Religion 
Although Barth is well known f'or h1s vehement rejection of' natural 
theology he did at one time contemplate its valJ.dity. In 1923 he wrote to 
'lhurneysen: 
"There is a 1 natural theology'; even the proof's of' God are not to be 
wholly de~ised; specif'ically f'rom the standpoint of revelation 
one must postulate a relative and naturally imperf'ect knowledge of' 
God on the part of' the intellect."' (1) 
This he had learned f'rom an tmderstanding of' Book I of' Calvin's Institutes 
through Peterson 1 s lectures on Aquinas. ( 2) However, he never promlgated 
' the view and indeed the lecture "Ohurch and Theology 11 seems to mark his 
turn against :Eeterson and natural theology. 'Mlen he came to write his 
Church Dogmatics he was ready f'or a vigorous disavowal of' natural fueology 
and the notion of' analogia entia which he saw as re~onsible f'or it.(3) 
It is not omr intention to engage in a discussion of' Thomistic studies in 
order to decide what Aquinas meant by the analogy of' being - in any case we 
have Bouillard' s well-documented evidence ihat it was Przywara who led 
Barth astray and not Aquinas (4 ) - but to draw attention to the f'act that the 
analogia entis of' which Barth speaks in Church Dogmatics and in No! ( 5) 
is the doctrine Vlhich attributes Being bo1h to God and to creation as the 
common £'actor on the f'oundation of' which it is supposed that a natural 
knowledge of God may be constructed which is relevant to Christian theology. 
This Barth contests vigorously, but chief'ly on the ground not so much that no 
analogy exists (he can scarcely deny that a doctrine of creation is essential 
(1) Rev.Theol. p.161 (Dec 20th 1923) 
(2) Peterson lectured on Church Histary at ~ttingen from 1920 until 1924. 
Barth added after his remarks on natural theology however: "But tell that 
to no-one, I must first sleep on it for a while until it becomes ripe for 
promulgation111 (Ibid, p.162) 
(3), CD,I: 1 ax, 28-30, lJ4 pal!fErl.m 
(4) Karl Barth, vol.3, p.212f'; Knowledge of' God, p.120. Bouillard f'urther 
says that it was not Ac:pinas' doctrine of analogy that Barth should hsve 
attacked, but that of' Cajetan and Suarez (Karl Barth, vol. 3, pp.194fi') 
(5) fublished in Natural Theology, pp.65-128 
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to any doctrine of the Incarnation), but that any attenpt to build a theology 
in this way is futile. What Barth wishes to reject is not so nuch analogy 
itself, as the use made of it by natural theology to infer knowledg~f 
God from finite reality. 
But if there is no continuity between God am nature of such a 
sort as to furnish a foundation for the knowledge of God, that is not to 
deny that the created world is God 1 s creation, but nerely to point to the 
fact that for Chr~stian theology i;is the Incarnation, the cross and the 
resurrection that must be both normative and the starting point. 
Not only was Barth in opposition to Brunner and the advocates of 
natural theolabgy( 1) but also to Schleiermacher and the romantic approach 
to nature which is in some respects closely related to natural theo~ogy. 
A consideration of Schleiermacher is, therefore, important to a study of 
Barth 1 s theological rrethod on account of' the strong negative influence which 
he exercised on him. 
The focal point of Barth's negative response to Schleiermacher as 
~representative of 19th century theology is Schleiermacher 1s thesis that 
the point of contact between God and man is to be located :i.r/the concept of' 
religion. However, when Barth speale of religion, particularly in Romans, 
his target is not always Schleiermaoher, but in many cases is the idea of 
religion as piety. It is in his later works and chiefly in Die Christliche 
Dbgmatik, that he is concerned more with Schleiermacher's own conception of 
religion. Nevertheless, the two are not entirely distinct and we nust 
speak of both. 
(i) In the volume of' cr1 ticism of the concept of religion it is easy 
to gain the impression that Barth took a wholly negative view of the concept, 
( 1) Barth would include Althaus with his "Prime" or "Primal 11 
revelation in this category. 
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but such is not in fact the case ( 1 ) Religion (and here he is speaking more 
of religion conceived as piety than in Schleiermacher's sense or the word) 
does have some positive value, as is evidenced in both the first and second 
editions of Romans. It is, indeed, a necessary and inevitable outco~re 
of God 1 s action. 
"Religion is the necessary response of the spirit to the creative 
act of God , the Church an inevitable hi storica 1, controlling, 
directing and channelling of the divine spring as it bursts out."' (2) 
"Religion is the unavoidable reflection in the soul - in e:JP erience -
of the miracle of faith which has occurred to the soul. The Church, 
from which we can never escape, is the canalisation in history of 
that divine transaction in men which can never become a matter of 
history. 111 (3) 
Religion is akin to circumcision: it is a result of the event of revelation, 
but it is in itself nothing at all. Its value is as a token, or a seal, 
pointing beyond i~se~, like the value of circumcision: 
"tTheocracy, Religion and the Church) are the living si. gn of the dl vine 
promise, not for those Who casually gather around the sign - at best 
it is a signfbr them too - but for those for whom it has indispensable 
value, for the dlurch of Abraham in faith, viho, like him are in deed 
and in truth genuine hearers of the divine •ord. 11 ' (4) 
"True religion is a seal, reminding men that they have been established 
by God :and that they will be established by Him; it reminds them 
also of their dissolution and of their redemtpion, and of the daily 
renewed faithfulness of God. As a seal it points onwards to the 
covenant between God and man, which still remains unfulfilled, and 
which stil]. awaits its inauguration. 11 ' (S) 
Barth has, therefore, no interest in winning men, Whether they be cultured, 
artisans or young people to "religion" or "the Church"(6 ) since these are 
( 1) As J. A. Veitch has recently pointed out in "Revelation and Religion in 
the Theology of Karl Barth"', ~,vol.24 (1971), pp.1-22 
(2) ~' p.86 
(3) ~ p.129 
(4) j!, P• 87 
(5) 2R, p.129f 
(6)' j!, P• 89 
-201-
not things which exist for themselves. Schleiermach.er himself would have 
agreed, for the idea of religion which he commended to its cultured despisers 
could not be expected to lead to a resurgence of piety without a transform-
ation out of all recognition of existing structures. 
(ii) In the first edition of Romans, Barth speaks of religion as a 
reminder of the fact that man is a member of a divine race, as a recollection 
of the former inmediate relationship with God and as a longing for the 
lost origin. ( 1 ) He speaks in similar Platonic terms in the second edition 
"CA.tr memory of God accon:g;>anies us always as problem and warning. 
He is the hidden abyss; but He is also the hidden home at the 
beginning and end of all our journeyings. 11 (2) 
But no religion, or natural theol~gy, can save us, or bridge the gulf' 
between man and his "lost origin.'" 
The difference between the two editions at this point lies in the 
sharpness with which the line is drawn between man and his lost origin. 
If the first edition sgggests that religion makes man aware of the problem, 
Barth seeks to correct the impression in the second with the assertion 
that religion does not even discover the problem, let alone solve ita it 
merezy makes the problem more pointed. (3) Nor is an awareness of the 
problem, however acute the awareness may be, the solutions it is mere 
''pious dialectic • to speak as though disapproval of sin was its dismissal 
and forgiveness. (4) Religion can only sharpen the awareness of the contrast 
between God and mana it marks out the last human possibility, in contrast 
to divine possibility, and the great gulf between them. Thrnugh religion 
grace is seen to be grace, for religion makes man aware of his own impotence; 
(1) Ibid, pp.18,26 
(2) 2R, p.46 
(3) 2m, P• 258 
(4) Ibid, p.261f 
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but this very fact conf'ronts man with the divine possi biad ty and awakens 
the desire to be reached by that divine possibility. Religion itself' 
can only leave man in a ''Yew1' and "No" position, hovering between the Either 
and the Or, and so points to its own impotence ,but thereby also, negativeJ.y, 
to God 1 s grace which conf'ronts man. 
"Religion speaks only of' dis sen:i on ••• Religion mere:cy e:x;poses 
the disunion of' human knowledge and human life • for it speaks 
of' one reality only- the reality of sin.• (1) 
But paradoxical:cy: 
"In the inexorable reality .... of this supreme human possibility sin 
is shown forth as the power which reigns wi "thin the closed c:ircle of' 
humanity.. Nevertheless, its power is bounded by the .freedom of' God, 
of God himself 1 and of' God alone. But it has no other boundary. 
This is the meaning of the laws it sharpens our ~ntelligence that 
we may perceive ••• the sheer impossibility of our attaining that 
freedom from the law1 that service in newness of the spirit( at 
which have gazed - outside the frontiers of religion. tt (2} 
The very existence of' religion as the worshipping of God is an 
indication of' sin: Eve ought not to have worshipped God because doing so 
separated her from God. Wheh men, knowing good and evil, become like God, 
theu direct relation gives birth to independent action and so the direct 
relation is broken of'f. Religion, therefore, is the symptom of' the fact 
that our whole concrete e:xi stance is sinful. (3) 
"Religion is that h\Jill8n necessity in which the power exercised over 
man by sin is clear~ demonstrated." (4) 
It is clear from the account so far given, that there is a 
certain lack of' precision in Barth 1 s concept of' religion, which can lead 
to the impression that he is contradicting himself. On the one hand he 
has described religion as a token of' the promise of God, and on the other 
hand as the supreme human possibility which is a token of' the inability 
of' man to reach God. 
(1) ~. p.262 
(2) ~' p.257 
(3) Ibid, p.246f' 
(4) ~~ p.253 
However, it is to be remembered that the first 
def'ini tion is propoo ed within the exposition of the meaning of' circumcision. 
Thus the piety of the church is the reminder of God 1 s promise, but it is the 
reminder of God's promise, and so in the discussion of Romans VII, it is 
also the reminder of man 1 s inoapaci ty to solve the problem of sin f'or himself-
the reminder that piety is a response and not a method of salvation. 
Religion viewed as piety is incapable of saving man, of' bridging 
the gulf' between God and man. ( 1 ) But it does appear to serve the function 
of confronting man with the impossibiadty of' reaching God, and of dri v:ing 
him to despair in the face of this apparent impasse. At the moment of 
his despair, however, he can be confronted with the impossible possibility 
that is within God 1 s power. Not only dlbes Barth approximate closely to 
the method of Kierkegaard at this point, but he was, as he saw later, in 
danger of creating a kind of negative natural theology, inasmuch as the 
despair engendered by religion may be thought to eJ!Pose some negative 
1point of' contact• (Ankn#Pf'ungspunkt) ( 2 ) 
(ti:i) Religion viewed as piety or "reli§iosi ty 11 is not the sole type of 
religion discussed by Barth. Mixed with the attack on 11 religiosity" is 
also a fierce attack on Schleiermacher, and his concept of religion. Nor 
are the two concepts wholly unrelated, even though they are to be distinguiShed, 
f'or they both treat of' the relationship between God and man. The dif'ference 
is that religiosity regards the gulf' as in principle br~dgeable, while 
Schleiermaaher 1 s conc~t treats it as non-existent. 
The critical point in Barth 1 s attack on the oo ncept of' religion is 
the relationship between God and man. In opposition to Schleiermacher 1 s 
assertion of' a fundamental continuity, Barth mainta:ins that there is a 
( 1) Vhere chapter vr:n: in 2R is used f'or our attack on Religion, in j! it is 
used f'or an attack on inditidualism. The ef'fect, however, is very 
similar as in 1R he attacks the pietistic com:Paint "M'iv sin! my sin! 
What shall .! do? 111 
(2) Natural Theology, p.114f 
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radical discontinuity between God and man, for the question of the relation-
ship between God and man, is, at base, not a question of the relationship 
between the finite and :t.he infinite, but a question about sin. To treat 
it as a question of' the relationship between the f'ini te and the infinite, 
to be solved on the basis of our living, moving and having our being in God, 
is not only a misreading of the intention of the passage frmm the Acts of 
the .Apostles,(1)' but ~s indeed a trivialisati()n of the problem of sin; it 
makes religion into a "trivial and harmless" thing that does not approach 
the awfulness of' the problem of sin and cannot cause any offence. ( 2) Barth 
resists aey attempt to shift the focus of' the relationship between Goa and 
man from the realm of an interpersonal relationship to an antic relationship, 
arul is therefore unwilling to countenance the shift of' the centre of theology 
from the resurrection to a consideration of ontology or creatione Consequently 
for Barth, religion, far from emphasising the ontic continuity between God 
and man, and being a ltfeeling and taste for ihe infini te 11 , ( 3) is the final 
possibili~ of' a lost humanity Which serves only to emphasise the personal 
discontinuity and the gravity of sin. If Gcii encounters man in this manner 
in religion, then he will do so in no other manner in nature or culture. (4 ) 
Nature, culture and religion offer no certainty of' God's presence, nor 
of his nercy. 
"True statements about God can only be made at all where one knows he 
is placed not on some height of' culture or of religion, but before 
revelation and therefore under judgement •••• 11' (5) 
The cro~s and the resurrection are the tokens of' judgement on all aspects of 
human life, including culture. Ollture is merely man's self-expression and 
as such, stands not in ibpposition to religion but with it, capable only of 
( 1) Acts 1 728 
(2) ~ p.258 
(3) Barth uses Schleiermacher's own phrase - ~ p.260 
(4) ~~ p.244, of also Humani~, p.54; W.G.W.~ p.107 
(5) F~u.A, p.11 (E.T. in Beginnings, vol. I, p.168) 
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leading to a Sharpened awareness or human incapacity to reach God. 
To regard religion as a means or apologetic is, them, rundamental~ 
mistaken, ror to attempt to draw conclusions about divine truth on the basis 
of a penetration of culture, or on the basis of the religious afrections is 
not to speak or God at all, but, as Feuerbach charged, so speak or man. ( 1) 
Thererore, Barth, pronounc:ing judgem:mt on Sahleiermacher, observes: 
"With all due respect to the genius shown in his work, I can not 
consider Schleiermacher a good teacher in the realm or1heoloF, 
because, so rar as I can see, he is disastrously di~sighted in 
regard to the fact that man as man is not only in need, but 
beyond all hope of saving himselr; that the whole-or-so-called 
religion, and not least the Christian religion, shares in this 
need; and that one can not speak or God simply by speald.ng of 
man in a loud voice."' -c2) 
It may be that Bar-th tends to view Schleiermacher throljgh Feuerbach 's -
and also Overbeck's - spectacles, so that his view of 11 religion'' is rather 
that of Feuerbach than of Sdlleiermacher, but it was Schleiermacher 1 s view 
that Jm de possible the view that Feuerbach attacked .. 
Barth summarises his criticism of Schleiermacher's concept of 
religion in Die Christliche Dogmatik (3) under the heading 11The Subjective 
Possibility of Revelation" and maintains that Schleiermacher 1s identification 
of the subjective possibility of revelation with the ooroept of religion 
is deficient at four points. 
(i) Instead or representing man as naked and destitute before God, 
Schleiermacher represents religion as the pride and crown of humanity: 
religion is the "l:lense and taste for the universe", a part of the soul in 
which divinity lives pre-eminent am reveals itself in its immediate 
effects. All that is required to experience the eternal is to bring 
together the right view of the universe with the right feeling ror it. 
(1) ~' p.236; !£, pp.217-237; F.u.A. p.9f 
(2) W.G.W.~t'M. p.195f 
(3) QP cit. pp.301ff 
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(ii) It is impossible f'or Schleiermacher to speak of' a "certain 
personal presence of' God which is, as such, unambiguously distinguishable"'; 
f'or Schleiermacher the subjective possibility of' revelation consists in 
ascribing the divme subjectivity to man, so that he can say 
"I lie in the bosom of' the inf'inite world, I am its soul at this 
moment, f'or I f'eel all its pov ers and its inf'ini te lif'e as my own, 
at this moment it is rey body, f'or JPenetrate its muscles and limbs 
as rcy own and its innermost nerves' move according to nw sense and 
idea as my own.~ (1) 
There is no world over against the religious man, only one world of' which 
he is a part; consequently, religion has no object to which obedience and 
f'aith are the appropriate re~onse. Pie~ is a sense of' absolute depend-
ence, which is a sense of' relation or relatedness to Goa, which is in turn 
the name f'or the origin of' our existence, a pure symbol denoting no object 
at all. 
(iii) Religion cannot be a knowing and a doing, since it has no 
object: it can only be joy. It cannot understand f'aith as risk or 
obedience as duty. 
(iv~ Schleiermacher 1 s concept of' religion does not take account 
of the f'act that our relationship with God, viewed f'rom our side, is a 
drama, a struggle, a conversation, the constancy of which rests in God 
alone. Schleiermaoher's use of' the assertions that we alive and move and 
have our being" in God is a misuse. It is wrong to view alJL things as 
revelation, all events as miracles, f'or Go4 ''appointed some vessels to 
honour and some to dishonour". All these objections point to a f'ailure 
on Schleiermacher' s part to take sin seriously. 
Since Barth rejects Schleiermacher's view of rehgion and the 
view of' the relationship of man and God associated with it, it is not 
surprising to find that he also rejects the mysticism which is their 
correlate. In spite of his own admission that Schleiermacher's mysticism 
( 1) Chr.D, p.,308t' 
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has a posJ.ti ve character inasnuch as it seekS to engage with culture instead 
of fleeing the concrete world by a radical negation o£ the whole of realit.1~i) 
Barth £inds that the chief characteristic of Schleiermacher' s zeysticiam is 
its passivity. (2 ) Consequently he maintains that the interests in culture 
and in mysticism are two separate tendencies, which, despite all attempts 
by Schleiermacher, cannot be brought together in a synthesis. Although 
Barth's own argument is not very clear - he does not explain precisely 
why it is that the two tendencies are incompatible - it appears that his real 
objection is that if the feeling of absolute dependence is purely passive, 
and the interest in culture is directed at seeking the infinite within the 
finite, mysticism cannot be e:J<p ected to have any positive effect on culture, 
since it can neither offer any criterion by which to recognise the 
infinite within the fmite nor, consequently, show how culture is to be 
a more adequate e::~p ression of the infinite. 
If Sdhleiermacher's zeysticism founders on the rock of epistemology, 
the true mysticism, with its whol1-y negative character with respect to 
the material world, can fare no better, for it can give validity neither 
to the world of concrete objects nor to historical events. 
In the section in the Church Dogll8tics (3) parallel to the 
section in Die Christliche Dogmatik, Barth once again takes up the attack 
on religion, but at this po.int his target is not primarily Schleiermacher, 
as is the case in the first edition. Re]gion is here conceived of as any 
form of human piet.1, whether Christian, Muslim, Buddhist or any other • 
.As human piety, an attenpt to reach God, it assumes that the gap between 
man and God is bridgeable. It is therefore, unbelief, because it ignores 
the fact that the gap has been bridged by God in C hrist. 
(1) .!.Q,p.176 
(2) ~~ p.197 
(3) _9B,I:2:pp 280-361 
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"Revelation does not link up with a human religion which is already 
present and practised. It contradicts it •••. ttr ( 1) 
Nevertheless, Barth makes a concession that he would not have made earlier: ( 2) 
there is such a thing as true religion. But we can only speak or true 
religion in the sense in which we ~eak of a 'justified sinner"(3) It is 
never a human possibility of reachi."lg God, but rather a response to Goa 
itself 
which must never leave behind / the revelation of God. 
Religion, neither as human piety, nor as Schleiermacher1 s "feeling 
and taste for the infinite" can be admitted by Bar:fh to ber relevant to 
theology, not simply because they ignore, or treat as insignificant the 
discontinuity between God and man, but because they undervalue the 
revelation of God, and, indeed seek to leave it behind .. 
The point which we have been attempting to make in this section 
has been largely negative. We have sought to focus attention on certain 
key points at which .:j3arth thinks it necessary to dispense with attitudes 
which he regards as :inimical to the real task of theology. But it has been 
not merely a survey of the jetsam cast off in the lightening of Barth 1 s 
load; it has also been an attempt to reveal the position Which he adopts, 
as a foundation stone of his theological method, concerning the relationship 
of human and divine reality. 
Many of the theological trends which he rejects are built on 
cosmological and ontological a sw mptions which he finds to be in conflict 
with the fundamental proposition of theology, namely that God has spoken. 
What is at stake in theology is not, in his view, an ontological relationship 
between God and man, but an inter-personal type of relationship. But he 
(1) ~, p. 303 
(2) Except in his exposition of religion as a parallel to circumcision 
(3) ~, p.325f 
-209-
cannot escape altogether the ontological question. Even though he believes 
ontology to be ~ncapable of furnishing a foundation for theology, there 
still remains the <pestion of the ontological relationship between God and 
man.. This is not, however, a question which interests Barth. 
.Again, 
granted that the separation from fellowship with God which man suffers has 
been overcome solely by the gracious activity of Goa in Christ, and granted 
that theology lmows an;thing of God solely because of God 1 s own self-revel-
ation, there remains the <pestion of why it should be that the language which 
theology uses to conceptualise its knowledge of God is inadequate. Does its 
inadequacy stem from the sinfulness of man or from his finitude and his 
ontolog~cal dependence on God?( 1 )Barth is reluctant to reply. He regards 
the positing of an analogia entia, between man and God, a canmm concept 
of Being, as irrelevant to theology and appears to suggest that the answer 
is that the reality of God ~ so different from that of man that the concepts 
which man uses to grapp the reality of his own world are, of necessity, 
bound to be inadequate when applied to the divine reality. 
"The divine and creatureilly subjects are not like or similar, but 
unlike. They are unlike because their basis and constitution as 
subjects are quite different and therefore unlike, that is, there 
is not even the slightest similarity between them. • (2) 
Whether Barth is indulging in hyperbole here is difficult to be certain, 
but it is the kind of staterrent that prompts Bouil]ard to conment 
"One would be tempted to say that(Barth) superimposes upon a 
natural equivocity an univocity lent by grace.~ (3) 
Barth Is main contention, however, is that neither the concept of 
analogia entis, nor the romantic idealist view of history, nature or 
( 1) cf Henning Schr6er; Die Denkform der Parado:x:ali tMt als Theolo isch& ProbleJH 
(Gattingen, Vandenhoek & Ruprecht 1960 1 p.52 1 Theology]nust .... ask 
whether it regards its thought form as more adequate than others. When 
that happens, it has a particular ontological concepti~n o: phe~menality. 
Secondly it must a~ whether this inadequacy is based ~n SJ.n or J.Il created-
ness. That is a CjJ.lestion which dialectical theology, for example, has 
seldom answered with precision." 
(2) .9£,III:3:103 
(3) Bouillard, Karl Barth, vol. 3, p.210; Knowledge of God, p.118 
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religion are relevant to theology, because theology takes its cue f'rom the 
actuali~ of the divine revelation in Christ. No ontological continuity 
that may exist between Goa and man is of any relevance to theology, for 
to treat it as such is a token of the pride that ignores God's gift of his 
self-revelation.(1) The doctrine of justification is relevant, therefore, 
not only to man's status as a sinner, but to his status as ignorant of 
God's truth. His language can only be spoken af as adequate to divine 
tnuth by the grace of God in the same way as that he can be regarded as 
rigHBous only by God's grace. 
The significant aspect of the relationship between God and man, is 
for Barth, its personal quality, and the dependence of that relationship 
upon God 1 s will and a cti vi ty. We may say that his concept of God is, 
to this extent, nominalistic. But it cannot be said that Barth 1 s concept 
is nominalistic in the same way as is that of Oakham, for whom God's will 
is such that he can dispense vd th all order to achieve his purpose. 
God is not subjectto his own caprice, and therefore unknowable.(2) 
Rather, it is Barth 1 s belief that God has revealed himself in order to 
be known by man. It is the task of theology, therefore, tor eflect on 
that revelation and to deitelop its comept of God from that reflection. ( 3 ) 
( 1) In "The HUill811i ty of God" he cpalifies what he said ~n the passage quoted 
about from CD,IIla3s103, cautiously admitting that the concept of 
analogy maycome into its right in the idea of the humanity of God, 
but he observes at the same time; 11Maif.i,s not elected to intercourse with 
God because, by virtue of his humanity, he deserved such preference. 
He is elected through God's grace alone. He is elected, however, as 
the being especially endowed by God" (Humanity, p. 53) 
(2) cf Gordon Leff; Medieval Thou ht: St.Au ustine to Oakham (H8I1ilondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1958 pp.255ff1 290. strictly speaking, Nominalism Should 
not be applied to Ockham, since the philosophical debate of the 14th 
century was not a contmuation of the battle between realism and nominalism. 
We use the term, however, since it is popularly emplo:yed as a term of 
abuse (directed particularly by Tillich against Barth) to underline 
the primaa:y of the Divine wilJl. 
(3) cf Eli.O, p.38 
eli .APTER 
THE STRUCTURE OF TH:EOI.OGIC.AL MElli:OD 
1. The Possibility and Rationality of' Tileology 
(a) Introduction 
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Much of' Barth 1 s discussion of' the nature of theological method is 
taken up with a polemic directed against the main trends of Protestant 
theology since the Ref'o!'liiation. It is not however, a matter of' mere 
padding, f'or, as we suggested in our last chapter, it is ~ntended not simply 
as a catalogue of' mistakes, but as an attempt to e~ose the correct way f'or 
theology. The main reason f'or the various mistaken paths taken by theology, 
is, in Barth's view, the inf'luence of' rationalism on theology, and in 
particular the inf'luence of' Descartes and Kant. 
Vilen Descartes asked himself' whether it is possible to escape f'rom 
doubt about the reality of the external world, he answered in the af'f'irmative, 
on the ground of' the subject's own self'-certainty. llie subject knows that 
he exists because he is able to think (cogito ergo sum). The guarantee, 
theref'ore, of' the external world is our idea of' it. Simllarly the existence 
of' God is guaranteed by our possessing an idea of' God. Theology, theref'ore, 
takes as its task, the exposition of' our idea of' God: in short, for knowledge 
of God 1 t looks not to a Word of' God given to man and mediated through 
Scripture, but to the idea that man himself has of' GOO. 
Kant, in contrast, denied the possibility of the rational proof' of' 
God's ex1stence of'f'ered by Descartes. There can be neither a rational nor 
an empirical proof' of the existence of' God. Never-theless, Kant was no 
atheist: his dismissal of' attempts to prove the existence of God is not 
to be taken as a denial of' the validity of' the concept of' God. His oont ention, 
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rather, was that it lS impossible to dl$cUss the existence of a thing which 
has no phenomenon. God cannot, therefore, be regarded as a constitutive 
idea,but he is necessary as a regulative idea, for without him, there can 
be no explanation of the universe. (1 ) The concept of God is also necessary 
to the work of practlcal reason, as t~e necessary postulate of moral thinking. 
Nevertheless, it is always impossible, in Kant's view, to assert that God 
exists. Howe~, despite the difrerences between Kant and Descartes, the 
effect o~heology is, at one point, the same: far its data, theology must 
look inwards, to the heart of man. 
In Barth's opinion, the tendency towards rationalism in theology 
becomes discernible soon after the Reformation, with the introduction dmto 
theological writing of prolegomena, which gradually became extended 
discussions of Scripture, natural theology and religioh. fut the influence 
nin€j.teenth 
of rationalism reached its height in the 1 century, with Descartes' self-
certainty becoming the foundation of theology and Kant's discussion of practical 
reason having the effect of reducing theology to morals. The chief error 
nineteenth 
of the rationalist tendency was also the main characteristic of 7 century 
theology, namely, its methodologlcal error of looking inwards for its data. 
A further eletn:lnt of Kantian philosophy retnforced this trends 
his doctrine of phenomenon and noumenon made it impossible to regard God as 
an object. God, argued Kant, has no phenomenon, no form in which he appears 
to man. He has, or, at least, may be thought to have, a nownenon, but 
since the noumenon or thing-in-itself cannot be known, God, lacking also a 
phenomenon ani therefore lacking objectivity, cannot be known at all. 
While Schleiermacher rejected Kant's rationalism, he was unable to 
deny entire~ the force of his argument, for what Kant had done was, apparently, 
(1) Kant; Critique of Pure Reason B710:"••• this transcendental thing is only 
the schema of the regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in 
its power, extends systematic unity over the whole field of experience." 
C:r also F.Qopleston, A History of :Ehilosophy, vol. VII; H.Gollwii:zer, 
The Existence of Goa as Confessed by FaitlJ, pp.67-71 
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to make it impossible, through his doctrine of knowledge, to approach "the 
reality of the Word of God". The theory of knowledge constructed in advance 
of the work of theology rendered a theology of the Word of God impossible. 
''What cognitive method (Erkenntnisweg) leads us to the reality of the 
Word of God and gives us the right to do what we intend to do here? 
In the ligj:lt of the almost insuperable difficulty of this <pestion 
we must regard the procedure of neqprotestant theology as classically 
represented by Schleiermacher as at least understandable.'" ( 1) 
Nevertheless, understandable as his (IJOUrse of action may have been, it 
remained true that Schleiermacher had substituted for an investigation of 
the Word of God an examination of the hwnan religious affections. ( 2) 
n~neteenth 
Not only did Schleiei'Ill8cher and / century theology in general 
coroo under the influence of rationalism; so also did Harnack, with his 
attempts to create a scientific theology, sUpplementing historical knowledge 
and ari tical reflection with "a higp regard for morali ty 111• (3) The 
Religionsgeschichtliche Schule, with its phenomenology of religion, was in 
no better case. 
Having rejected as alternatives to Schleiermacher 1 s method the 
possibilities of a return to a "dead, impossible orthodox belief in authority"' 
an "Uncritical and unchristian metaphysics" or a "subjectively deter!IIJ.ned 
irrational intui tion"'(4) Barth deter!IIJ.ned to make a new attempt to approach 
the Word of God instead of the human rel~gious awareness as the object of 
theology. Crucial to an understanding of tlus attenpt is a recognition 
that the chief characteristic of knowledge of God is its personal character, 
produced in the encounter between man and God in his revelation of himself. 
,, 
It ls, we may say, not only savoir, but connaitre. Correlatively, the 
Word of God is to be construed as God's speaking to man, not as a simple 
(1) ~~, p.92 
(2) ~' p.92ff, cf also CD,I:1:240ff 
(3) ~· PP• 7ff (E. T. Bliginnings, vol. I, PP'- 1 6 5 ff) 
(4) Chr.D,, pp. 91,95 
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dBclosure of inforrrwtion to fill an 1ntellectual vacuum,(1 ) but as God's 
revelation of himself designed to restore and promote fellowship with man. 
Since theology 1s concerned with the Worrfof God, it follows that 
the introduction of prolegomena to dogmatics should consist in a doctrine 
of the Word of God. Consequently Barth devotes the first section in both 
editions of his lbgmatics, to an account of this doctrine, beginning with 
the concept itself, and then proceeding to a closer examination of revelation 
as the revelation of the triune God, and of the concept of Holy Scripture. 
There are, however, certain differences between the two editions, which 
have been seen as significant for an understanding of Barth's nethod. 
In the first edition, Barth announces that, having treated the 
concept of the Word of God "phenomenologically" - that is to say, having 
discussed the various aspects of the Word of God by which it is to be 
understood( 2) - he proposes to examine it existentially 
11\'.e can no longer, [in the quesiJ for a closer definition of the sermon 
as the starting point and goal of dogmatics, pass over the fact that 
it is man who speaks and hears, and with respect to the closer 
def:ini tion of the Word of' God as the meaning ami closer definition 
of dog~Wtics, no longer pass over the fact that it is also ihe 
relation of God to man which speaks for itself. If we posit man 
as a factor 1n our reckoning, then it stops being a merely apparent 
reckoning. The speech will no longer be, as it was, what we 
asserted and promised, a play, and we its spectators. Then we 
must understand everything up to now as a concrete situation, as an 
act in which we are invol.ved. He only thinks truly of humanity 
when he thinks of himself ••••• 11 
11
'It can be no more truly a case of the human than here, where human 
speech and hearing of God, where the Word of God ••• is in question. 
And therefore we speak in what follows, no longer of Christian speech 
and preaching but of preacher and hearer •••• Only thus can it become 
clear ••• what we mean by the Word of God. 11 (3) 
There follow two sections, entitled respectively "The Word of God and Man 
as Preacher11 (4) and 11The Word of God and Man as Hearer 11 ~ 5) in which he 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
of Gustav Wingen, Theology in Conf'lict,(trans. E.H.Wahlstrom, Edinburgh, 
Oliver and Boyu, 1958). Wingren argues, on the basis of this conception of 
knowledge, that Barth founds his theology on an anthropological presupp-
osition, namely, man's lack of knowledge of God. 
As sermon, as canon (Scripture) and as revelation. 
Chr.ll>• p.48f 
Ibid' pp· .. 4 7£f (5) Ibid, pp.65f'f 
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apparently contends that an understanding of the Word of God involves an 
understanding of' man to whom it is directed, as though an analysis of' the 
situation of' the preacher and the hearer can lead to a closer definition 
of' the Word of' God. At the end of' each of' the two sections is a discussion 
entitled "Closer definition of the Word of God~.( 1 ) Their content, however, 
is not dependent upon the material ~n the rest of' the sections. They are 
not conclusions drawn strictly on the basis of' the analyses, but rather on 
the basis of' further (implicit) "phenomenological" investigation. His 
conclusions, which he still draws in the Church Dogrmtics, are that the 
Word of' God is rational; that, in the Word of' Goa, God always rema:ins 
subject; and that the Word of God, as that which becomes clear in revelation, 
is always event, and therefore is marked both by hiddenness and revealedness. ( 2) 
As a result, the discussion of' the concrete situation of' man, 
appears as quite irrelevant to the argument of' the book, and it is therefore 
dif'f'~cul t to understand how Sieg:t'ried could have made the m:is take which he 
did in asserting that Barth intended to build his dogmatics on the existential 
thinking he has introduced. (3) Barth was right to omit the off'endi.ng 
passages in the second edition, although one may wonder whether he did 
perhaps over-react. He had not intended to give the impression that was 
received by Siegfried. In view of' this and of' the generally irrelevant 
char~cter of' the analyses which do not contribute to the overall intention, 
it is hardly fair to suggest that Barth was guilty of' methodological error 
at this point.(4 ) Even his assertion that the fact that the Word of' God 
is not simply word but address, implying that man is included in the com ept 
( 1) Ibid, pp.62-64, 79-81 
(2) Barth himself' later acknowledged that the conclusions drawn in these two 
discussions and in a further simi.la r discussion (pp.110-112) are not 
drawn on the basis of' the preceding analysis. ''Between the analyses and 
the closer determinations stood certain thought associations, but, take 
them all in all, the latter were proved elsewhere •••• n CD,I:1:143 
(3) ~' p.142, cp.oting Th.Siegf'ried, .;;;;Da;;:;;.;:;.s_Wt;.;.;o;.;r;..;t;.,.._ __ un_d_dJ.;..... e.;.._Exi_._s_t_enz_ 
Vol.I, p.36 
(4) pace Torrance (Introduction, pp·.140f'f') and Parker (Karl Barth, p.67) 
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of' the Word of' God, and that there can be no speaking of the Ward of God if 
nothing is said of' its recept~oTJ. by man(1 ~ does not significantly influence 
the overall disrussion of the whole volume. 
(b) The Possibility of Theolog,y 
At the begirming of the sections in Die Christliche Dogmatik on 
"The Incarnation of the Word 11 ' and "The Outpouring of ihe Holy Spirit 11 , Barth 
places paragraphs entitled respectively 11The ~jecti ve Possibility of 
Revelation" and "The Subjective Possibility of Revelation", in the course of 
which he discusses the reality of the incarnation and of grace.( 2) It thus 
appears that he discusses the question of possibility first, so that the 
reality seems to be dependent on the possibility. furrance comments: 
"'•.. the theologian [ III.lst] raise and establish the question as to 
the possibility of fue object on the actual ground on v.hich knowledge 
of the object arises, and then proceed critically from within its 
actuality outwards to its possibility. The CJJ.lestion as to the 
possibility, therefore, cannot scientifically be posed a priori1 
but only a posteriorio 11 (3) 
He adds, therefore, in a footnote, 
'~ence in his discussion of the subjective reality and possibility of 
Revelation, and its corresponding subjective reality and possibility, 
Barth revers!i)d in his CD 1:2 pp.1ff and 203ff the arder he had 
adopted in his Chr.B. ,pp. 214ft and 284ff. w (9.) 
In the second edition of the dogmat~cs Barth did in fact include separate 
sub-paragraphs on the objective reality, objective possibility, the 
subjective reality and subjective possibility under the paragraphs entitled 
"God's Freedom for Man 11 ' and "Man 1 s Freedom for God"l instead of treating 
reality under the heading of possibility. Furthermre, he treats of reality 
( 1) Chr.D2 p.111 
(2) Ohr.D, p. 214f'f', 284ff 
(3) Introduction, p.193 
(4) Ibid 
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before possibi~ty. These alterations, however, are not to be taken as 
. d' t' h;ls m ~ca lllg any fund amen tal change intmethodology, for the whole of Die 
Christliche Dogmatik presupposes the methodological priority of the reality 
of revelati~ over the cpestion of its possibil~ty. 
says of the first edi tiona 
Indeed, Barth himself 
mr knew that in all enquiries ~nto the possibility of God's revelation 
we had first to reckon with the reality of it ••• I was aware thet I 
had to express this if only in the form of numerous 'reservations•. 
But I did it only in the form of 'reservations' within an investigation, 
in which, by pointing to grace confirmed by baptism, I aimed to advance 
from a description of the subjective possibility to revelation to 
the description and valuation of its reality, or, as it were, from 
the problems raise<}'by this com ept to their actual solution." ( 1) 
The actual structure of the argument was in conflict with his own pre-
suppositions and yet, in spite of the mistake, the result was the one 
intended by the presupposition and not that intended by the strucillre of 
the argument. 
The burden of Barth's argum:mt so far is that theology cannot 
proceed by discussing first the possibility of theological knowledge, on 
the basis of a preconceived method of obtaining knowledge. ]br theology, 
knowledge (Erkenntnis), is to be understood prim8rily as aclmowledgement 
(Anerkenntnis)( 2) The possibility of revelation, therefore, can be 
discussed only after the cpestion of the reality of revelation. 
'lhere remains, however, the question "Roo do we know the Word of 
Godf!' To this Barth answers that we know by being known. If this appears 
to involve theology in a peti to principii, taking for granted the premise 
winch depends on the conclusions, then theology must not be a shamed of it, 
for to be ashamed of it is to be ashamed of the Gospel itself • It is 
dishonest to seek some way out, as does Schleiermacher, or Schl:lder, by 
investigating the religious affections, because the question still remains: 
"Who can ••• investigate his consciousness for its God-content, 
without knowing from somewhere else what he is looking for. 11' (3) 
(1) ~,I,:2:205f 
(2) Chr.D~ p.102; CD,I:1:233ff. (3) Chr.D, ;p.107 
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In the lmowledge of' God, God himself is sovereign. The possibility of' man~s 
knowledge of' God resides, therefore, not in a religious a Eriori, but in the 
work of' the Holy Spirit. 
"Subjective revelation can consist only in the fact that objective 
rewlation, the one truth which cannot be added to or bypassed, 
comes to man and is recognised or acknowledged by man. .And that 
is the work of' the Holy Spirit." (1) 
The eertainty of' theology, therefor~ ~s not based upon a Cartesian self'-
certainty~ but upon the certainty of' God given by the Holy Spirit. (2) 
In complete defiance of' Kant, Barth asserts that God is an object 
of' knowledge. But it is important to note that when we spEak of' God as an 
object of' knowledge, we do so in a very special sense, for God is never under 
our control. In the relationship of' knowledge between God and man, God 
always remains subject, active and sovereign, for knowledge of God is God's 
own gift to man. 
In mrder to signif,y God's sovereignty in the knowledge, Barth $Peaks 
of him as Gegenstand rather than as Objekt, apparently because of the 
connotations or Objekt, which suggest the disinterestedness of the empirical 
method and the scepticism of :positivism. (3) If God is the object of our 
knowledge, he is so in a unique sense: he cannot be treated as one object 
among others. 
( 1) CD,Ia 2:239 
(2) Chr.E, p.108. "The procedure in iheology is to base self' certainty upon 
God - certainty and to measure it by God-certainty and so to begin with 
God-certainty wi ihout waiting for this beginning to be legitimised by self-
certainty11 (cf' ao,I:1:223), cf also 110ff'enbarung, Kirche und Theologie 11 
lfu.A, p.166 "Descartes was wrong: our own existence is •• less certain than 
this event, the existence of' God for us. 11' 11 God for us 11 refers not to our 
subjective apprehension of' God 11what he is for us" but to the objective 
activity of' God on our behalf. 
(3) cf'CD,II:1:13. \Ve cannot agree with James Brown's argument( 11Subject & Object 
in~odern Theology pp.140-67) that Barth uses Gegenstand in preference to 
Objekt on account of its more active connotations as against the passivity 
implied in the etymological derivation or Objekt. The point which Barth 
wishes to make is primarily a matter of' denying the possibility of' 
11objectif'ying11 God. Gegenstand lacks the verbal connection with "Objekt-
ivisn:us"cf' 110Cf'enbarung, Kirche, nnd Theologie 11 , lll1Ap.166: "It is precisely 
in the Church that one knows God 1 s truth is not an object (Ge~nstand) and 
not a 1 supernatural' object either - but the eternal subjectich ~s 
known to us only in its secrecy, only to faith"~ (continued at the foot of' 
the nex:t page) 
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"If they (i.e. SchHder et~) shake their heads and say to us that an 
object (Objekt), which is not reality ih our awareness, is not as 
such a knowable object (Objekt)., thenwe repl.v, shaking our heads 
just as much, that we are not speaking of an 1 bbject' (Objekt) when 
we refer to God's WOrd{ but of the subject which, if it is turned 
into an object (Ob,ekt), is not v.hat it is; we are speaking of' an 
object (Gegenstand which can become an object (Gegenstand) for us 
only in strict 'non-objectivity' (Nicht-Gegenstllndllchkeit)" (1) 
Not only does Barth wish to avoid the kind af objectivism involved 
in e~iricism but also the kind involved in philosophical realism, which., 
he con tends, treats God as the "ont~c and noetic fate" of man, which man 
cannot avoid by reason of his participation in the orders of being and 
knowing, and as an object to be fb und in the external world or within 
human awareness. ( 2) 
It is not simply that Barth wishes to emphasise that knowledge of 
God is the result of an act of gracea a kind of theological realism, or 
idealism even, might inco~oratm such an assert~on., admitting that were it 
not for God's grace we could not know anything of him, but asserting that 
the act of grace being compJe ted, revelation is everywhere and at all times 
available to man. Barth., in contrast wishes to emphasise the contiuing 
subjectivity of God in revelations revelation is never at ihe disposal of 
man. He therefore refuses to designate it as 111he given"' 
''We find i:h at by 1 the Word of God 1 we are, in all oircums tance s 1 to 
understand a speaking of God, an act, whose subject J.S God and God 
alone ••• As such, this reality clearly cannot be the content of 
our human awareness. It is really in God's awareness, not elsewhere. 
As such it may then, in f' ai th, be believed, but in tru'* not, as it 
were, thereby given to man in faith as its object-content (Objerkt.gehalt) 
But it is precisely as that which is not-given (Niohtgegeben) as Goa's 
own and as remaining God's own, that faith believes it. We are led 
to the same conclusion by the memory that the Vk>rd of God occurs, is 
spmken,,in the diacrisis., in the decision between revelation and 
hiddenness, and so as a giving, not as a given-ness 11 • ( 3) 
(Note (3) continued from previous page) In a similar sentence wr1tten five 
years earlier he used the word ')bjekt 1 inst~ad of' Gegenstand (SdhiCksal und 
Idee in der Th.eologie11 ' FuA, p.56 It should be added that his preference 
for Gegenstand may also-reflect his Kantian heritage. 
(1) Chr.D,p.96 
(2) 11Schicksal und Idee"', ~~ pp.62-72 
(3) Chr.D, p.95f; cf' also ~~ p.65 
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The poss1bility of theology, therefore, resides entirely in the 
actuality of revelation whidl, as a dynamic ooncept,always remains in the 
control of God himself. The actuality of revelation focusses upon the act 
of reconciliation in Jesus Christ, f'rom which it can never be separated. 
"Reconciliation is not a truth which must first be made lmown to 
us througjl revelation, but the truth of God himself, which he 
himsel:(gives us in his revelation ••• Revelation is reconciliation, 
as certainly as it is God himself: GQd beside us, God with us, 
and, decisively and above al~, GQd for us•. (1) 
In view of this, there is no place in Barth 1 s view for a natural 
theology, and he engages upon a vigorous attack on all talk of a point of 
contact,(2) whether conceived as positive, residing in a capacity for words, 
or some other anthropological point such as the intellect, the unconscious 
or sub-conscious, (3) or some special religious capacity, (4 ) or whether it 
is conceived as negative, residing in the ability of man to despair.(5) 
All discussion of these points is irrelevant to dogi119tics, since the concern 
of dogmatics is not with questions of whether and how far man is able to 
grasp the content of the divine revelation on the basis of h1s own 
capacities, but with the question of the actual content of revelation, 
which is the "act of the free love of God."' (6) 
(1) ~~ p.164 
(2) The chief target of his attack in CD and in "No~ 11 was Brunner. His 
attack was sharpened by the beliefthat Brunner was undermining the stand 
of the Confessing Church against the German Chr:is tians (Parker, Karl Ba'!'tb 
p.99; Torrance "Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth111 R.S. 
vol. 6 (1970), p.125 -
(3) ~,I:1:231 ff; cf also pp. 28-30 
(4) ~~ 220,232 (5) ~~ 271; Natural Theology, p.114t' 
(6) CD,I:1 :221. There are moments when Barth appears, in seeking to combat 
n;tural theology, to enter the anthropological ground of Brunner in order 
to argue that man has no capacity for God. But that it is not his intention 
to do so is clear from his own methodological principle that theology must 
begin with the reality of revelation and expound that. '~arth does not 
reject the possibility of a natural knowledge of God through agnosticism, 
nor in the name of a critique of knowledge. He does so in the nare of 
biblical revelation." (Bouillard, Knowledge of God, p.17) 
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11 Ut is not that we have to regard the Word of God] as if man who is 
addressed and listens belonged by any essential necessity to the 
concept of the Wat'd of God. That man is the addressee of the Word 
of God is a fact, so far as it is true, and not derivable from something 
else of which w; mi~t previously be aware conceming the nature of 
God. Still less ••• from something of which we might previously be 
aware concerning the nature of man; God 1 a Word ceases to be grace 
or grace itself' ceases to be grace when we ascribe to man a disposition 
tovrards th~s Word, a possibility of lmoWledge independent of it and 
peculiar in itself' over against this Word.P (1) 
Theology is built upon the actuality of revelation and a doctrine of' 
revelation, therefore, is an account of and investigation into the actuality 
of revelation in Jesus Christ. 
(c) The Rationality of Theology 
It is not only the possibility of dogmatics which is of inportance 
for theology, but also its rationality, but before we discuss Barth's part-
icular approach to the subject, and in view of the various accusations of 
irrationalism that have been made against Barth, we must d~scuss briefly the 
ways in which the group of words "rational", "irrational", "rationality'', 
"irrationality", "rationalism" and '1irre,tionalism11 may be used. 
There are, broadly speaking, three types of rationalism. The first 
is that of D3scartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, in which it is asserted that 
certain ideas are purely the product of reason and not dependent upon sense 
experience for verification. The opponent af this kind of rationalism 
is empiricism (Locke and Hume) in which all ideas are derived from sense 
experience. Secondly, there is nineteenth century rationalism, which, in 
contrast to that af Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, was atheistic and 
secularistic. More comnonly spoken of in this century as humanism, it is, 
seve~teenth . . . 
at least in part, a marriage of 1 century rationalism with emp~r~c~sm, 
~ng the methodological scepticism of Descartes with a real scepticism about 
(1) .9]2,!:1:221 
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the possibility of the existence of supernatural or other non-empirical 
entities. Finally, there is religious rationalism, which itself has two 
manifestations. On the one hand there is the rationalism of Aquinas, f'or 
whom reason and revelation are complementary in theology, revelation 
supplying that whid:l reason l.s unable to provide. On the other hand, 
there is the rationalism of the Deists, who proposed to dispense with 
revetation altogether, and who insisted on the possibility of' preaching an 
edecpa te lmowledge of God by means of rational inf'erence. Although it 
was Kant's intention to release religion from this kind of rationalism, 
he did in fact bolster it, so that reason came to be regarded as supremely 
aampetent in all matters of faith and morals. 
Barth is attacked as an irrationalist on the one hand because of his 
rejection of s belief in the capacity of the human reason to achieve know-
ledge of God, or indeed to make an;y significant contribution to theology by 
itself. He l.S thus accused of irrationalism on account of his rejection 
of the religious rationalism of Aquinas and the religious rationalism of 
the Deists. ( 1 ) 
ID'l the other hand he is also 'attacked as irrationalist because 
of his ref'usal to accept the case of non-rell.gious rationalists. One of 
his IDJst severe critics is w. W. Bartley III, who accuses not only Barth, 
but most rationalists, of a "retreat to conmitment 11 • He argues that 
Popper or Ayer are every bit as irrationalist as Barth because of their 
claim that a minimum concession to l.rrationalism is necessary in the form 
of a commitment to, or faith in, reason, which is unjustifiable. Their 
kind of rationalism is as authoritarian in character as Barth's theology. 
Bartley argues that a consistent rationalism is possible if every commitment 
is open to criticism and is accepted only on a rational basis.(2) 
( 1) 
(2) 
Criticism of this sort is usually made in the form of an attack on his 
adoption of revelation as furniShing the sole data of theology. of Brand 
Blenshard's criticism in Faith & the Philosophers, ed J.Hick, pp.159ff 
W.W.Bartley III:"Karl Barth": Encounter,March 1970, p.49; The Retreat to 
Qommitment (London' Chatto & Windus,1964), pp.126ff, 1?4f'f• .Neither Barth 
nor Kierkegaard, in fact, believe the commitment to be l.rratl.onal, nor that 
it is the product of' pure sUbjectivism. 
The Chief criticism of the non-religious ratiohalists is that Barth's 
kihd of theology lS irrational because it ~s authorita~ian or because ~t ~s 
non-empirical. However, if it ~s authoritarian, it is so on the bais of a 
conmitment which Barth does not believe to be irratiohal, but to have been 
made under the iii¥?act of the W~rd of Goa through the agency of the Holy 
Spirit. 
He rejects, then, not only relig~ous rationalism, but also humanistic 
rationalism and what we might term a neutral rationalism: that ~s to say 
he rejects theistic, a-theistic and agnostic (in the popular sense rather 
than Huxley's) rationalism. His reason is that all are based on the 
Cartesian faux pas, that unaided human reason can construct a concept of 
God, and ignore the actuality of the revelation of God in Christ. He 
does not, however, reject the rationali~ of theology or the rationality 
of the object of theology. Theology ~s rational, in the sense that it 
seeks to conform itself to the rationality of ~ts object and can be 
articulated in a logical fashion. Nevertheless, the final criterion of 
the truth of theological statements cannot be a system of formal logic, 
particularly if that system is governed by metaphyslcal asaumptions.( 1 ) 
We have already seen that when Barth wrote Die Christlidle Dogmatik 
he had a considerable understanding of Anselm's theological method, and in 
particular had grasped from him the fact that theology is only possible 
from within faith, that its essential nature is fides guaerens intellectum. 
It was the task of lecturing ln theology first at Gattingen and later at 
Mfinster that compelled Barth to consider the question of the rationality 
of theology: it was certainly not a matter of concern in the writing of 
Romans, with its focus on the Word of Goa as the paradoxical judgerrent of' 
( 1) V{e have in mind the ap:r;B rent logical contradiction involved m the 
assertion that Jesus is both God and man. The statement lS paradoxical 
in that it confounds customary expectation,,but it is only a logical 
contradiction if one holds certain beliefs about the nature of God 
and of man which preclude the possibility of the incarnation. 
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the guilt and the justification of men. Having decided to devote his 
lecturing entirely to the history of dogma, Barth found himself repeatedly 
facing questions that raised the problem of the rational basis of theology~( 1 ) 
There can be little doubt that in his emphasis, at an early stage, 
on the fact that preaching is a declaring of the Word of Goa, that the 
preacher speaks because God has spoken, he was also aware of the implication 
of speaking of the Word of Goa, namely that revelation has a rational content, 
and is not simply a matter of a feeling of absolute dependence or of awe 
before the numinous. But that awareness did not come to the fore immediately. 
In Romans, the Word of God is thought of primar~~y in terms of a message, 
rather than of the message having a rational character. ( 2) B,y contrast, 
his lecture, given in Cardiff on the task of the Reforned Churches»displays 
a growing awareness of the importance of rationality,(3) 'While his two 
lectures on Schleiermacher and on the Word in Theology are quite e:x;plici to (4) 
He criticises Schleiermacher sharply, because it seems that, for him, the 
essence of theology is more akin to music than to a strictly rational 
(i.e. conceptual) science. 
(1) of Rev.Theol. pp.96, 167, 176, 182f, 185, 202f 
(2) 
(3) 
In Romans it appears that Barth believes the prinl8 :::haracteristic of 
the message to be its contradictoriness, even for believers. Alastair 
McKinnon maintains that in representing Chr~stianity in this manner, 
Barth was under the influence of a popular German misconception of 
Kierkegaard and that later, when he thought he had gone beyond Kierkegaard 
he was in fact reflecting Kierkegaard mare accurately. '~arth's Relation 
to Kierkegaard: Some further Light" (Canadian Journal of Theology, vol.13 
( 1967). PP• 34,36 
Where he says, for example "At their very beginning the Reformed 
churches saw that truth is contained only in the Word of God, that 
the Word of Goa for them lay only in the Old and New Testaments, 
and that every doctrine llllst therefore be measured against an 
unchangeable and impassable standard discovered ~~he Scriptures." 
W.G.W.M. p.240f. 
(4) ~. pp.136-158, 159-199, 200-216. 
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"We could ask 'why music precisely? 1 .And we should be answered a 
because words stand opposed to all that Schleiermacher understands 
as the genuine miracle c£ Christmas. Words are hostile to it 
detrimental, always powerless to justif'y it. 'llie man who und~rtakes 
to celebrate in words his own 1 elevated humanity 1 becomes all too 
easily con:f'using and incredible to himself. 'All patterns are too 
stiff for me and all speech is too tedious and cold.' How fortunate 
that when we are disturbed and oppressed by the problem of words 
we can flee to the realm of music, to Christian music and a musical 
Christianity! ~ctly because of its lack of concepts, music 
is the true and legitimate bearer of the message of Christmas •••• "' (1) 
Barth's rejection of the reduction of theology to a Cartesian 
rationalism, to a non-conceptual subjectivism or to a mixture of both is 
clear also in Die Christliche Ihgmatik, where he explicitly speaks of the 
Word of God, God's act of speech to man, as pointing to the rationality of 
revelation, in sharp contrast to the irrationality of such concepts of 
revelation as those involved in "the numinous• or in 11 life 11 , ( 2) but it was 
not until his study on Anselm that he articulated fully hli:s understanding of 
the rationality of theology. 
In the second edJ.tion of Romans he was still prepared to make use 
of the Extra Calvinisticum (finitum non capa: infiniti ) to support the 
assertion that man cannot understand the truth of God, because of the 
metaphysical assertion that sine e man is by definition finite and God 
infinite, man cannot understand God. ( 3) By 1923, however, he saw the 
(1) Ibid, p.157; cf p.202. When he wrote The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher 
abandoned his original plan to place the Christological-Soteriological 
section at the beginning, and replaced it with the section that was to have 
been at the end, concerning universal religious assumptions, in order not 
to contribute to "the forcing out of our church community of those 
worthy men who are called rationalists" (cited by Barth !Q,p.166 from 
Mulert's edition of Schleiermacher's Sendschreiben an Lfk:ke,p.31f) by 
appearing as 11one of the privileged few who possessed the 'precious 
jewel' of the,,idea 1 of God and man and who enjoyed therefore a secure 
basis for their faith ••• 111 (R.R.Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and 
Religion, p.242). Barth comments ironical]y: "Schleiermadler was 
very right when he warned against driving away from the church 'the 
estimable men who are called 'rationalists'; for he himself would have 
had to leavel" (!Q, p.203). Schleiermacher was to Barth a rationalist, 
inasmuch as he adopted the rationalist's anti-revelation stance, but 
irrationalist in his romanticism and his non-conceptual approach to 
the divine. 
(2) Chr .n, p.63 
(3) 2R, p.212 
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Ex:tra Cal vinisticum not so much as a uetaphys~cal assertion but as a 
foi'IIlllation of the truth that revelation is always a concealment; that ~s 
to say, God's revelation remains God's act and is never under human control. (1 ) 
In Die Christliche Dogmatik and Church Doep:?tics, it is used not with reference 
to any human capacity for revelation, but only in its original context in 
the discussion of Christology.( 2) Instead of speaking of man's finitude 
as the reason for his inability to know God, he speaks of man's sin as the 
reason. He replaces the formula fini tum non capax infini ti with the 
fonru.la homo peccator non capax verbi Deip) It would, however, have been 
better if he had spoken simply of sinful man as not knowing Goa, since there 
is no <Pestion of discussing man's capacities. Sinful man is deprived not 
of a capacity to know God, but of actual knowledge r5f Goa, and ihis is so 
because knowledge of God is primarily personal in character and therefore 
cannot exist where conmunion is lacking. 
At the same time, it is true that within faith man's lmowledge of 
God has certain limits: it is man's knowledge of God, not God's lmowledge 
of himself, even though it comes about through the activity of the Holy Spirit. 
God's truth is adapted to man's understanding~ but at the same time, man's 
understanding is oonstantly being broadened. His status as a created being 
does have some implications for the extent of his understanding. His 
language has its origin in his relation to created reality and therefore 
is not of itself adequate to the truth of God. Knowledge r5f Goa, strictly 
speaking, is an eschatological concept, genuinely present, but awaiting 
fulfi l~ren t.-
The aoooumt which Barth gives of the rationality of theology in 
Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum is appl:in able in principle not only to 
theology but to every scientific discipline. 
( 1) W.G. W.M .. , p.257 
(2) Chr.D, pp.269f'f', 
(3) ~,I: 1:252 
.Q£,Ia2:168f 
Even in the complex argument 
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of the book, it can be reduced to the comparatively simple statement that 
human reason seeks to conform itself to the rationality of the object it 
wishes to understand. Not only does it seek to select the most appropriate 
method of approach to the object, which can be dictated only by the 
characteristics of the object itself, whether it be a concrete object, or 
a non-concrete force, a series of events or aeything else, but it also seeks 
to understand and lay bare the intelligibility of the object itself. fue 
theologian is as much corimitted to the intelligibility of the object of his 
study as is the Physicist to that of the object of his study. The theol-
ogian is committed to the intelligibility of the object of his study because 
revelation is,as the Word of Goa, both speech and intelligible action.(1) 
These correspond, then, to the noetic rationality of the subject, that is, 
to the rational thought of man as he knows the object of his study, an ontic 
rationality in the object. In the case of the objective world of nature, 
there is conferfed upon it in the act of creation a rationality, which even 
Heisenberg's principle of indetermi.nat!JY cannot undermine, and man has an 
ontic ratio as has every other object of study in the created world. But 
man also possesses a noetic ratio, active in the knowl@dge of objects outside 
itself, although both the ontic and noetic rationes are created.( 2) 
God, however, is not a part of the created order, but the Creator 
himself, and is therefore the ultimate ratio or ratio veritatis or ratio 
summae naturae. While, therefore, ~e ontic ratio and its corresponding 
necessi tas, the necessity of ~ts being what it is and not something else, 
precede the noetic ratio and its necessitas, both the ont~c and the noetic 
ratio are preceded by the divine ratio, and are dependent upon it. The 
noetic ratio cannot, in consequence,be regarded as creative or normative, 
but rather strives to understand the ontic ratio of the natural order and 
also to understand the ratio fidei, the truth conferred upon the Credo and 
(1) Barth argues, similarly, that theological anthropology establishes that 
man :ia a rational being because he is addressed as such by and because it 
isthus presupposed that he was created a rational being by God. 
CD,III:2:42Z 
(2) F.'Q. I., p.W 
the Bible as witnesses to t.h.e truth of' GOO. If' the recognition of' the antic 
ratio of the created world is "a matter of' decision that has to be made from 
time to t:une 11 that ~s, the noetic ratio does not of' necessity grasp am hold 
the noetic ratio, but the recogni ticn of' it is an act - it is especially true 
of' the recognition of the ratio f'idei, and that because God, 1ho is the object 
of' faith, is subject and not merely object: man never has the truth of God 
in his grasp in such a way that he can ignore the God whose truth it is, 
by withdrawing h~s obedience. 
"In the Credo and in the Bible (the ratio veri tatis J is hidden and 
must reveal itself' in order to make itself' lmown to us. It does 
this, however, only if' and insofar as the Trut~, God himself', does 
it. Thus: from time to tJ.me, in the event of' lmowing,itpappens 
that the noetic ratio of the veritas conforms to the ontic and to 
that extent ~s or is not vera ratio - or (and this is nominally the 
case in praxi) is to sc•re extent (ali9).18tenus). ( 1) 
There must be, in all disciplines, an attitude which may be described 
as faith, a commitment to both the existence and the rationality of the 
object.( 2 ) Theology does not exist to prove the existence of God f'rom a 
position of faith - or for a position of scepticism- but to understand. 
So, when .Anselm announces his proposal to undertake his Christolog~cal 
investigations 11reroto Christo ••• quasi nihil sciatur de Christo" Barth is 
bound to argue that Anselm does not mean that he proposes a ratiohalistic 
proof and solution of Christology, suspending Scripture completely "as 
source and norm of his thinking 111 and so 
11 to reconstruct the Credo, apart :finm the cant en ts of Scripture, 
tabula rasa, from elem:mts of knowledge obtained elsewhere." (3) 
In all its enterprise theology seeks a deeper understanding of that to 
which it is committed by seeking to penetrate the inner rationality of the 
object of faith. 
Clearly, an analogy may be drawn between theology and other 
(1} ~ p.47 (2) of' Torrance, God and Rationality, p.8 
(3) !:Qbp43, Barth admits however in _Q!?,I:1a17 that t~e phrase ~s ,''not quite 
unobjectionable" and we may wonder, without prejud~ce to Barth s own ca~e, 
whether .Anselm was illl fact as certain of' his own purpose and method as ~s 
Barth. Barth argues that we must understand Anselm's ~dea of proof on th~ 
basis of Anselm's own theological scheme: hence proof ~s not a demonstrat~on (cont~nued at the foot r£ the next page) 
disciplines in respect of this attitude of falth. But equally clearly, a 
distinction must be drawn, for the faith of theology is not the same as the 
11fai th 11 of natural science. It has a personal character. It must, therefore, 
also be admitted that the distinctive mark of theological knowledge is its 
personal character; it is, as we have said, not only savoir but connaltre. 
A further distinction must also be drawn. The objectlvity enjoyed 
by theology is entirely different from that of other disciplines, not only 
because it deals with an object Who is personal, but because its object remains 
"'indissolubly subject" o Our knowledge of God is therefore dependent not 
simply upon our determination to discover the truth, but upon the activity 
of the Holy Spirit in opening the mind to receive the truth. For this 
reason theological investigation is to be understood as prayer. Even the 
discovery of the non-objectifiability of the physicist's knowledge, its 
inseparability from the human observer, can~ot alter the distinction that 
must be made in comparing the faith of the theologian with respect to his 
object with the faith of the scientist with respect to his, for it remains 
true that they work with very different kinds of objectivity. 
Following the leaQbf Anselm, Barth distinguishes between the antic 
ratio on the one hand, and the noetic ratio on the other. In order to 
understand the object of his investigation, the scientist seeks to develqp 
those means and methods available to him by which he is to conform his own 
ratio to that of the object. The same is true of the historian, and of the 
theologian. The ontic ratio to which the theologian seeks to conform his 
ratio is the ratio fldei, which ls not itself the truth of' God, but the truth 
conferred by God upon the Gredo and upon the Bible. It is only in these 
(continued from previous page) (3) of the existence of God but the e:lp osition 
of the nature of God. To support this, he points out that GaUnilo is not an 
lUlbeliever but a monk. Bouillard, however replies that the monks for whom 
Anselm writes '~ave been bitten by a taste for dialectic; they demand rigorous 
proofs valid in the eyes of one who, through lgnorance, does not bel:ie ve. 11 
(Knowkdge of God, p.82). That however lS a position which only the fool 
could hold, according to Barth. 
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created ~orms, and so through their ontic ratio that truth is mediated to 
us, and then only "f'rom time to time"', that is, by the continuous action 
o~ the grace o~ God. 
While Barth does not wish to deny that God himsell is the ultimate 
object o~ faith, neither revelation nor faith exists without conceptuality, 
a conceptuality which comes to fruit primarJ.ly in the Bible and in the 
Creed. (1 ) Just as we know God as he is in himself not immediately but 
mediately, through his revelation of himself in Jesus Christ, neither do we 
grasp the rationality of God immediately, but mediately, by means of the 
human language and core epts through which he has, in his grace, perrn:i tted 
himself to be known and adopted ~or use with refererme to himsell. Hence 
the ratio o~ the object of faith is conferred upon it, being that which is 
contained 1n the Bible and the Creeds. So he says: 
111 
••• it has been said about the ontic ratio that truth is conferred 
upon it, with the creation of the object of which it is the ratio. 
This is of course specially true of the ratio fidei, with Which 
Anselm deals. For him, it J.S without CJ!.lestion identical in the 
proper and strict sense with the ratio veritatis. And even here 
decision enters into it, not as to whether it is ratio veritatis, but 
whether it can be recognised as such. In the Credo and in the 
Bible it is hidden and must reveal itself in order to make itself 
known to us."' (2) 
This last passage also brings us back aga:in to the status of God 
as subject J.n theological knowledge, for the "decision" character of 
knowledge, in the case of theology, is not simply a matter of acknowledgment 
of the truth of the object by man, but of God's revealing himsell, making 
himself known in the "object of' ~ai th "• Although Hamer charges Barth with 
oocasionalism,(3) and indeed the extent to which Barth emphasises that it J.S 
because GJ6 enables man to lrnow him that there is a lrnowledge of God seems to 
(1) We have already argued that Barth has in mind primarily the lq>ostles 
Creed, althougp he recognises that •credo' for Anselm may refer to 
any of the Creeds of the Cr!urch (~, p.23f) 
(2) ~. p.4'7 
(3) J. Hamer, Karl Barth, p. vi 
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give substance till fue accusation, nevertheless the problem is that which 
Augustine articulated J.n speaking of faith itself as God's gift and not as 
man's contribution. Not only does man know nothing of God, apart from God's 
own revelation of himself; it is by God's own grace that man is able to 
acknowledge the truth and recognise J.ts inner rationality. 
11 0nly God Himself can be the subJect of the knowledge of God: the 
Spirit which God gives1 and which 1 as the Spirit of God, seardheth 
the 'deep 1hings1 of God, which it alone can know •••• As those who 
have received fue Spirit of God we know what is sent us from God 
in Christ the crucified. 11 --ri) 
Barth 1 s sense of the grace of God, of the relevance of the Holy Spirit and 
of the logic of revelation is so strong that his insistence that faith is 
a genuinely human act seems to some critics to be unconvincing, if not hollow, 
so that he is accused on the one hand of fideism (2) or on the other hand of 
reducing everything to grace.( 3) Man's lack of knowledge of God is due to 
the sin which separates him from God and his actual knowledge of God is con-
trolled by the revelation of God and thtPeculiar character of the objectivity 
of God. Since the understanding that Barth has of the Word of God comes 
to be concentrated increasingly on the revelation of God in Christ, it is fair 
to speak of Christ, in O'Grady's words1 as both the sole noetic basis and 
the sole ontio content of theology.(4) In this sense theology is christology, 
an e)\position of the revelation of God in Christ, by which all of the Bible 
is to be understood. Since God has chosen to reveal himself in word and act, 
( 1) 
(2) 
The Resurrection of the Dead, p.26. Bouillard is quite right to stress 
that although knowledge of God J.S due to God's act of grace, it is never-
theless man who knows God, but it is diffJ.cult to see how it is that he 
is able, on this foundation, to assert that there is a natural knowledge 
of Goa capable of being demonstrated in a '"proof". (Knowledge of God, 
p.127; of Torrance, ''Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth 11 , 
R.S. vol. 6 (1970) p.134f. 
M.J.Charlesworth: St. Anselm's Proslogion (Oxford University Press 1965), 
pp.41 :t'.f'. 
(3) c. O'Grady, 
(4) COT, p.51; 
P• 75 
The Church in Catholic Theology (hereafter~)~ p.11f. 
The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth (hereafter ~) 
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and in act interpreted by and also interpreting word, it ~s for theology to 
seek to understand the rationality, the rational content, of the Word. Reason, 
presented with the rational revelation of God, must week to grasp its content. 
2. The Sources of Theology 
We have repeatedly asserted that from early in the period after the 
signing of the declaration of support for the Kaiser by the 93 intellectuals, 
Barth came to see the task of the preacher as the declaration of the Word 
of God, and that that task was first seen as the declaring of the message 
concerning God's righteousness and man's unrighteousness. His early work 
is primarily concerned with an attempt to rediscover the "veri table gospel"', 
the core of the message. God's Word, however, is not simply a message, as 
becomes increasingly clear in Barth's work, but a revelation of Himself, a 
revelation which comes as Word, not as propositional revelation, nor yet 
solely in the form of a "thus says the Lord", but pre-eminently in the 
incarnate Word of God, Jesus Christ. In his mterpretation of Christ as the 
Word of God, Barth opts for the Hebrew conception of Word, as God's speech 
and his declarative act, __ as the controlling factor, rather than the Greek 
F 
understanding of "Word" as expressed in the concept of the Logos. If Logos 
is to be used, it is interpreted by Chr~st, rather than Christ being inter-
preted by Logos. We have observed, too, the increasing concentration of 
the idea of the Word of God on the Incarnation. 
We rust add to this, however, some cpalifying remarks. In the 
first place ~t is important that we recall that in his later works, in 
particular, Barth emphasises that it is impossible to drive a wedge betwwen 
word and act;( 1) the act of incarnation and the act of reconciliation are 
(1) In response to Goethe's attell!Pt, by the mouth of Faust, to rewrite the 
opening words of the fourth gospel as "In the beginning was the Deed"', 
Barth comments "· •• in contrast to all mere words and all empty deeds, 
revelation in the Christian sense is both Word and Deed at one and the 
same time"'• The Christian Understanding of Revelation, "Against the Stream", 
p.215 
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themselves revelation, revealing God's love for his creation. They are not 
irrational but acts with their own rationality, and therefore secondly, 
''Word' refers not simply to God's revelation as speech, but as rational speech 
addressed to man. Thirdly, God's Word is God's adaptation of himself to 
human reception, h~s adoption for the purpose of revelation of human language, 
or rather his permitting of human language to apply to him. In order to 
become the object ct' human knowledge, God eJ!P resses himself in terms of human 
conceptuahty, but that is not to say that God is contained by human 
conceptuality. God is, in any case, known only mediately, not directly, 
for the language used does not cease to be human language, even though it is 
used under the impact of divine self-revelation, and by divine permission. 
The divine self-revelation is for Barth very specifically the 
revelation of God in Christ: he views the incarnation quite literally as 
God's becoming man: 
a [The 1 oontent [of the Gospel] ••• is God 1 s grace. It means 
and is Jesus Christ. Fbr God's grace is just this: that the eternal 
Word of God became flesh. 11' 
"This means that, without ceasing to be God, it added ou::b humanity 
to its divinity and received it into union with itself- a union winch 
is not an interm:ixture but which is indissoluble. 11' (1) 
If the one indivisible God reveals himself decisively in Christ, then theology 
can be content to find its material in the person of Christa indeed to do 
anything else is to accept a worthless substitute for the real thing. Other 
so-called sources of revelation are of no interest, or if they can be 
discussed, it is only in the hght of Christ himself. 
At this point, however, theology has its own problem of sources, 
since it cannot make a direct appeal to the revelatior/of God in Christ; it 
IIUst therefore approach the Bible for its testimony to Christ, as the testimony 
of primary witnesses. ( 2) Several points must be made on this topic. 
(1) "Gospel and Law"' in God Grace and Gospel, p.4£ 
(2) cf Ev.Theol. pp. 26ff, 37 
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F:ir st, as we have already seen, Barth does indeed speak of' the Bible 
as the Word of' God, but only in a mediate and indirect sense. It is the 
Word of' God, not the words of' God, not the ipissima verba, but God 1s 
revelation, in the sense that 1t is the means which God Chooses to reveal 
himself' to those who are not primary witnesses of the events of' revelation. 
The Bible is not identlcal with revelation. 
'~en the old f'ormula, 'Thus saith the Lord ••• •, was not intended to 
imply that the prophet was about to utter words he had received 
f'rom God verbatim, but rather that he was commanded to speak these 
words by God. ''' ( 1) 
Secondly, theref'ore, the Bible is and remains a human document, 
not verbally inspired, but the product of' human agency: 
"The Bible contains the human but authoritative, the authorati tive 
but human, documents of' the f'act •••• "' (2) 
The problematical nature of' the Bible compels this conclusion, but it does 
not remove the aufuori ty with which it speaks. Barth is theref'ore abJe to 
recognise not only the f'al+ibility of' the human agency but also the f'lex-
ibility of' language. The Bible was written under the impact of' divine revel-
ation but 1s nevertheless a product or human conceptuality. Theology must, 
theref'ore, investigate the conceptuality of' the Bible in order to be able to 
examine its own language in the modern age. 
lli.irdly, it is not simply the Gospels, not yet the whole of' the 
New Testament but the mole of' the Bible that is testinnny to Christ, since 
Christ is God incarnate. Barth rejects the view that the Old Testament 
S1 auld be treated as distinct f'rom the New Testament, to be understood 
solely on its own context. On the contrary, it is to be regarded as a 
witness to the one indivisible God and theref'ore to Christ who. as God 
incarnate is the self'-revelation of' God and theref'ore the gpal and 
(1) Against the Stream, p.217 
(2) Ibid, P• 218 
f'ulf'ilment of 1h e Old Testament. ( 1 ) The whole Bible 1 1heref'ore 1 is to be 
understood in the light of' the revelation of' God in Christ. To treat it 
simply as an historical document or as a document on which historical 
criticism can make final judgements, is to fail to take it seriously, to 
fail to take it as it intends itself' to be taken. To treat the revelation 
of' God simply on a chronological basis is equal~y mistaken, since the 
Christian Church cannot ignore the fact that it w s the revelation of Chr1st 
presented to it: we are not to treat law and Gospel in their chronological 
order, but in their theological order, as Gospel and law;(2) we are not 
to treat Jesus im his chronological progress, from the rabbi of' Nazareth 
to the risen Lord, but as the risen Lord who is also the rabbi of' Nazareth. 
Fourthly, the Bible is not simply testimony, an objective account 
of' revelation, but reflection on revelation: it is, therefore, also theology, 
as reflection about the content of the revelation, as the Ob.urch 1 s measuring 
of' its language against the reality of' revelation. As reflection the Bible 
is similar to the Creeds ana the writings of the Fathers, and the Creeds and 
Fathers can, therefore, together with the rest of the theological thinking 
of' the Church, be treated as relevant for the continuing theological task, 
but as primary witnesses the Biblical writers must be given precedence. 
Not Wlilaturally, Barth 1 s view of' Scripture has its problems. In 
the first place, the assertion that Scripture furnishes the data of theology 
by pointing back to events in which God has revealed hmself appears to gloss 
over the critlcal ~estions raised by the Bible. We tm.1st know how to 
penetrate beyond the records to the events that lie behind them. W e l!Dlst 
know how to disentangle the witness from the later accretions or distortions. 
D:>ubtless this is part of the work of exegesis& Barth does not wish to discount 
the work of biblical criticism. What Barth is concerned with, however, is 
(1) 
(2) 
e.g. Ev.Theol. p.28 
cf' "Gospel and lew" God Grace and Gos;ee,1, pp.3-27 Wingren displays a 
lamentable failure to grasp the point when he criticises Barth for 
his reversal of the two concepts (Theology in Conflict, p.115 passim) 
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not exegesis but dogmatics, and dogmatics cannot await the final results of 
exegesis before beginning its own work. It must proceed about its work 
with caution, engaging in a continuing dialogue with exegesis. 
But secondly there is a tension between the Bible as God 1 s Word and 
as a human document which is reflected in the language of the Bible. Because 
it ~s a human record, it is liable to certain infelicities of e:xpression over 
and above the natural inadequacy of the language to its object. To this 
must be added the textual corruptions due to the process of transmission. 
At the same time, however·, the Bible is said to become the Word of God by 
God's grace. 
Again, we have referred to the Bible as both testimony and reflection, 
both record and theology, but J. t J.S difficult to be sure whether Barth ack-
nowledges this, or indeed, whether he acknowledges the great complexity of 
the Bible at all. He is apt to describe it somewhat vaguely as 11what the 
prophets and apostles have said"', without making any further distinctions. 
Thus, instead of suggesting how we are to approach those large portions of 
the Old Testament, especially in the poetical books, which seem to make no 
special claim to be witness to the Word of God, he assumes that the whole of 
the Bible may be treated as testimony to the Word of God. It seems there-
fore, that there is no room to regard the Bible both as testimony and as 
theology, beyond the perfectly simp~ assertion that it is theology to the 
extent that it is human language used with reference to God. In short, by 
simplitying his conception of the nr,tu:"'e of the Bible, he ~s able to invest 
it with just that degree of au-thority that is essential to his theology. 
There is, of course, no external guarantee of the authority of the 
Bible: it cannot appeal to rationalist argument, because to do so would be 
to replace the absolute au~hori ty which stands behind the Bible with a 
relative authority establ~shed apart from the self-authentication of the 
Bible it self'. The statement that the Bible is the Word of God cannot 
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therefore, be regarded as synthetic, but analytic.(1 ) 
If' the Bible is the source of the data of theology, the place at 
which theology must listen for the Word of God, the Creeds and the 'Writings 
of the ~urch Fathers, hold a secondary, but nevertheless important place 
for theology. They are not primary sources of data, but sources of theolog-
ical reflection whidh are indi~ensable to theology because they are part of 
activity of the Church in reflecting u~bn the Word of Gmd. The Creeds and 
Fathers are of particular impelt'tance, Barth believes, because they are the 
product of the Church prior to its division between east and west, and set 
certain boundary posts within which theological investigation may develop. 
or lesser authority, though still of great interest, because they also 
reflect the dogmatic thinking of the church, are the later Fathers and 
indeed all the doctors of the Church, ,including Aquinas, Luther and Calvin. 
But theology cannot be a simple repristination, repeating the 
fornulae and e:lp osi tions of past generations. It must work out for itselr 
the fundamental insights of the faith in dialogue with the Bible. No amount 
of appeal to the dogmatics of th~ast can substitute for this one task. 
(1)CD,I:2:537, Barth has it seems no answer for a criticism such as that made 
by Hans Conzelmann: "What the Gospels want to be dows not finally determine how 
I dlould employ them today. The cpestion is not whether they were intended to be 
source material but whether ... they are" (Z.~-~~ vol._ 54 (1959), qu(oted)by 
Joseph c. Weber, "Karl Barth and the Histories esus" JBR, vol. 32 1964 
p.352) 
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3. Sbme Specific Considerations 
(a) The Early Period 
In his account of Barth's theological development, von Balthasar 
describes his work as consisting of three periods which he entitled 
"dialectical theology", "shift to analogy" and "analogy in full bloom." ( 1 ) 
The first cover~e period surrounding the production of the oommentary on 
Romans, the second the period surrounding Die Christliche Dogmatik and the 
third the period from the beginning of Church Dogmatics. He views the second 
period as transitional between what he regards as two very different methods, 
characterised respectively by dialectics and by analogy: indeed, he regards 
them as antithetical. 
Another critic, however, while distinguishing the same three periods 
finds that there is a fundamental continuity between them. He regards the 
limitation of the impact of the dialectical method to 11bnly a small segment 
o£ [Barth 1 s J work"' as wholly mistaken. 
" ..... the interpretation of Hans Urs von Balthasar is dictated by the 
desire to synthesise Barth 1 s theology with the general Roman Catholic 
theology and philosophy that is ruled by the principle of analogia entis. 
Shah an attempt must fail ••• It is not a 'misunderstanding' on the 
side of Karl Barth when he considers the principle of analogia entis 
es the 'invention of the .Antichrist' which stands as a stumbling block 
betwQ.en him and Roman Catholic philosophy and theology • • • The 
difference between the principle of analogia entis and the method of 
dialectics is neither in the realm of doctrine nor in the domain of 
method. It reaches IIUOh deeper into the foundation of schematism"'• {2) 
Taubes' division, of the corpus of Barth's writings is made on the basis of 
his thesis that a dialectic may be traced throughout his work: (i) the period 
of a "liberal", synthetic dialectic (up until the first editiot;lbf Romans in 
1919), (ii) the period of negative antithetic dialectic (from the second 
edition of Romans to the first edition of the Dogmatics- 1923-1928), and 
(iii) the period of an "orthodox" synthetic dialectic from the beginning of 
the Church Dogmatics(3) 
(1) H.U.von Balthasar, Karl Barth:Darstel und Deut seiner Theola ie (E.T. 
The Theola of Karl Barth .Other Catholic critics follow him, e.g. O'Grady 
(CTKB,CCT)and K!ng (Justification) but not, according to Grover Foley ("~e 
Catholic Critics of Karl Barth"'~~ vol. 14 (1961), p.1~0)( :Emmanuele Ri.verso 
(La Teolo ia Existenzialistica di Karl Barth , Naples, 1955)1 
Nni:A!'l ? and the foot of the next page. 
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It is perhaps, somewhat ~ronical that Barth's early theology 
Should have been described as dialectical. He did not, so far as I am 
aware, use fue word to describe his own theology, but preferred to speak of 
it as a theology of crisis, or better, a theology or the Word. Pannenberg, 
indeed, suggests that the description was fortuitous: it was, he says, 
"attached by some spectator or other"( 1 ) to the circle associated with the 
journal Zwischen den Zei ten, of which Barth was a founder member. Never-
theless the description has often been used, and ha~~rsputed almost as 
frequently, and it is, therefore, our task to seek to know in what way the 
term may justifiably be used. The task however, is not made any easier by 
the bewildering variety of ways in which it is used, and it may he~p, 
therefore, if at the outset, we attempt some classification of the possible 
uses of the term. 
The Socratic dialectic was a did a otic method eiiY?loyed to uncover 
false assumptions and so to lead a pupil towards the tr-uth. To the monks 
of Anselm's time dialectic meant simply the process of rational argument, 
leading to proof, as ~osed to mere dog~tic assertion. Kant used the term 
to stand for that branch or philosophy which refuted the sophistries and 
removed the illusions to which philosophers were most addicted. ( 2) Hegel 
used it to describe both the IZ'OCess of thought by which contradictions are 
seen to merge in a higher truth that comprehends them, and also to describe 
)contit)ued from previous page) (2 Jacob Taubes,·Theodiqy and Theology: A Ehilosophical Analy~s 
Barth's Dialectical Theology; JR, vol. 34 (1954), p.234 
of Karl 
(3) ~~ p~5 
(1) w. Pannenberg, art, 11Dialektische Theologie 11 , R.G.G. (3rd edition), vol. 2 
col. 169. The description is in the form of a quotation, but Pannenberg 
does not cite his source. 
(2) A. C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
(University of Chicago Press, 1938,) p.200 
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the world process whioh 1s the objective side of the thought process. 
Kierkegaard took it to refer only to the antitheses whioh resist synthesis 
either in thought or in reality. ( 1) 
On the basis of' this far from exhaustive list, we may discemJ. 
several different concepts of dialectic which we may classify as follows: 
1 • a didactic tool 
2 ti 1 t •t• . (2) • ra ona argum:m or en 1c1sm 
3. a "real" d1alectio, resolving itself in synthesis or remaining antithetical 
4. a process of thought designed either to resolve antitheses or to sustain 
them. 
When we examine the commentary on Romans we find that in the second 
and subsequent editions it is used in two ways, as a concept to describe a 
"real" dialectic and as the method employed by theology to speak of' God in 
re~onse to the real dialectic. This is not to say, hibwever, that dialectic 
is entirely absent from the first edition. Indeed, Taubes maintains that 
it is characterised by a synthetic dialectic, which is represented, chiefly, 
we may suppose, by the platonic flavour of his e:JqJosi tion of' reconciliation, 
with its talk of man's memory or recollection of what he is supposed to be, 
and of' his yearning for his lost origin. But if it is justifiable to speak 
of' a synthetic dialectic, it is so because of' Barth's awareness of' the main 
thrust of the epistle as an expositioQbf reconciliation. Even if it is 
admitted that Barth's exposition does have a strong platonic flavour, it 
must also be admitted that he does not lose sight of divine activity which 
is responsible for reconciliation. (3) 
(1) H.Diem distinguishes four uses of' "dialectic" in Kierkegaard's writing 
(Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence (Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1959), 
pp. 7-10; of review by J~~gd SJT, vo&. 13 (1960) pp. 315ff') 
(2) Brand Blanshard's criticism of Barth's dialectical method appears to 
turn on a concept of dialectic which is a variant of' this second type. 
Dialectic, he says, is a process of' thought which "takes us slowly 
nearer the goal through a series of zig-zag steps" (Faith and the 
Ehilosophers, p.180) He therefore concludes that since Barth's dialectic 
does not conform to this pattern his theology is not dialect1ca~. 
(3) of', for example, 1R, pp.18, 26, 60, 190, 290, 343. 
Certainly the atmosphere of the second edition of Romans is very 
different. It is characterised by the use of Kierkegaard 's "inf'ini te 
qualitative distinction" to mark the contrast between man and God. Barth 
Shares Kierkegaard's opposition to Hegel, insisting that there is no 
continuity between man and God but that man is set over aga:inst God. 'lhis 
is the real, antithetical dialectic of man and God in which the "Yes" of 
God to man is not simply the obverse of his "No". 
11 I have heard that crisis is a dialectical conception which not only 
allows but calls for its opposite - tlil.at this negation, which removes 
from human conduct all false val\14s may restore it to a new value, 
may return it to its original vaJue - that the question may be its own 
answer, and the argument against man may be the argument£.£!. him.w (1) 
The opposition between man and God, however, is not resol.ved into synthesis 
by a process either in reality or in thougpt, nor is the negative paradox 
transcended by the greater truth of a positive paradox, in which it appeared 
that God"·s "No"' is, after all, preceded by and therefore also superceded 
by his 11Yes 11 • ( 2) There remains always, the dialectic of God and man and 
of judgement and justification.(3 ) 
In re~onse to this dialectic, theology must adopt a dialectical 
method in the way in which it ~eaks about God. This dialectic is not 
that of Hegel: 
11I .•. warn you against taking refuge in dialectic, for all that it 
would seem to make for logical symmetry and completeness. I silli.Ply 
ask whether the process actually corresponds with reality.'* (4) 
Theological method is dialectical not simply because the ~deas w~ch it 
uses are incomplete and raise further questions, but because they involve 
(1) W.G.W.M., p.151 
(2) k; Tillioh suggested in 11Kri tisches und Positives Paradox" GW, VII, 
pp. 216-225 (E.T. in Beginnings, vol. I, PP• 133-141) ---
(3) 
(4) 
But of'. Bouillard, K.a:Ii Barth, vol. I, p.93f: 11We hesitate ••• to oppose the 
first and second editions to eaCh other as a theology of ident~ty to a 
theology of contrafiiction. It is an idea common to both works that the 
original and final condition of man is an 'immediacy with God"' • 
W.G.W.M., p.151 
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contradictions and antitheses which are not to be held in tension or compre-
hended in one word, but which are to be recognised as ~rreconcilable and 
mutually exclusive and yet still to be held at the same time. 
"To take the revelation seriously in the sphere of conceptual thinking 
means to walk with entire definiteness and determination on the 
double path marie d out for us by the necessity we are under to speak 
as men, but about ..9£!. We IIUst, for example, in order to recognise 
realistical~y the essential relation between God and man which is made 
known in revellktion, speak of God's judgexoont and God's grace. In 
order to define God's relation to all that is not himself, we IIUst speak 
of creation and providence; to sta:t:e fully what the Church ~s, of its 
visibility and invisibil~ty. To speak rightly of grace we must talk 
of justification and salvation, of faith and obedience on man's side. 11 ' (1) 
What is remark! ble is Barth's insistence that these anti theses are 
irreconcilable and, apparently as contradictory to the believer as they are 
to the unbeliever. Eut the dialectical method, more suitable as ~t may be 
than any other way of speak~ng about God, can itself offer no guarantee that 
it is about God that it speaks. There is no reason that it 
"should be specially capable of leading on up to a gate which can be 
opened only from ~ ihin. 111 (2) 
The words of the dialectical theologian can only become the Word of God and 
therefore be genuinely about God as God himself claims them and speaks 
through them to man. 
~1e essential point, however, cmncerning the dialectical method 
is that it arises from the real dialectic of the antithesis of man and God 
and the reconciliation of man and God through divine grace. 
Before we nnve on to the per~od associated with the writing of Die 
Christliche Dogmatik, it will be in order to make soxoo comments on Barth's 
treatment of Scripture during his earl¥ period. This is so because of the 
very heavy criticism which he suffered, which focusses chiefly around the 
accusation that ~t is 1'pne~tic exegesis. It 
first 
The description originates ~ JUlicher 1s critical review of the 
edition of Romans(3) where it was ~nt~ded to classify Barth aoong the 
(1) T.c., p.3oo (2) W.G.W.M., p.212 (3) at foot of next page 
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gnost:ilcs who laid claim to estoeric knowledge concerning the understanding 
of revelation and despised culture: 
"Marcion ••• held the same position as Karl Barth in his exegesis of 
Paul. He proceeded with the saiOO sovereign arbi trai":i.ness and assurance 
of victory, with the same one-sided dualistic approach of enmity to all 
that comes from the world, culture, or tradition, and never tired of 
tossing a few pet ideas in front of us. 11 ( 1) 
Jtllioher grudgingly admitted that Barth was right to engage in 
practical exegesis, but objected stmngly to his claim to have understocd 
Paul, mich was, clearly, not at all the way in which JW.ioher himself would 
have understood him. Because Barth's understanding was so different from 
that of Jalioher and the mainstream of liberal theology, Jdlicher felt at 
liberty to describe it as 11pneumatic11'. 
The description was taken up and used again of the second edition: 
indeed, it is normally of the second that it is still used, but it is, at 
best, a rather vague description and therefore rather unhelpful. CUllmann 
is more explicit when he observes that the danger of the exegetical method of 
Romans is not so much that it is in itself false, but that it may lead to 
allegorisation.(2) At times ~tis very difficult to see the connection 
between the text and Barth's commentary and Barth conse~ently invites the 
accusation of arbitrariness. 
Clearly, What Barth wished to do was to speak the Word of God to his 
generation and saw, as the only means of discovering that Word, that a new 
engageroont with Scripture was necessary, in order to allow the Holy Spirit 
to apply ~ t. There were, however, two mista:&es in his method. In the first 
place, despite his affirmation of the value of histor~cal criticism, -there 
was inadequate lise of it or of the other tools of biblical exegesis. Secondly, 
(from previous page) 
(3) 1~e does not oppose the historical, but passes through it to the Spirit. This 
is exactly the standpoint of Origen, except that Barth declares the former's 
spirit to be unspiri tJ it ~s exactly the standpoint of the Gnostics, except 
that they, to be sure, were not concerned at all with the historical"' (E. T. 
Beginnings, vol. I, p. 78). 11When has a pneumatic ever let himself be 
instructed by a psychic or a hylic? 11' (Ibid, P• 79) 
(1) Ibid, p. 78 "" , ...... (2) O.QUllmann 11Les Problemes pos6es par la methode exeg~tique de 1 ecole de 
Karl Barth" Revue d 'Histdre et de :Ehilosophie Religieuses vol. 8( 1928) • P • 83' 
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he appears to aim at short-circuiting the theological process, roving directly 
rrom the text to practical exegesis V2a a critical assessment or his own age. 
In short, he neglects the work both or exegesis and or dogtl18tics and consequently 
uses the text ror pu~oses which appear to have no immediate justirication. 
Nevertheless, in ~ite or the criticism made or his method both by 
others and by Barth himself, the roundation stone of his method J.S as rirmly 
laid in lbnans as it is in Church Dogmatics. We may describe it as the 
a priori character or theological method~ but in doing so we are clearly 
using the term in a dirrerent sense fiom that given to it by Bartll. He denies 
that theology can be conducted a priori,contending that it can be conducted 
on~ a posteriori. By this he means that it is not a deeuctive science, 
arguing rrom principles and concepts conceived a priori but that it is 
inductive, proceeding on the basis or the data or revelation. OJr description, 
however, rerers to the assumption or his theology that God has spoken and 
reveqled himself' an~its procedure in the light or this, as it goes on to 
attempt to understand the content or revelation. It does not work towards 
a concept or revelation but fiom the actuality of the revelation in Christ. 
The impact or the encounter or God with man com.pels man to undertake a 
descriptive examination or the phenomenon or the Word or God. But if' we 
describe this as a phenomenological method, we must be clear that we are not 
do!ng so in the sense or Husserl 1 s phenomenology which seeks, by a suspension 
of' judgement on the actual existence or an object of thought~ to determine 
what is necessary and essential to the concept, but to describe the process 
or analysing the concept of the Ward of God, at ihe heart of wh.J.ch lies the 
actuality or the phenomenon, concerning the existence or whJ.ch there can be 
no suspension of JUdgement. 
-2JJ>.-
(b) Die Christliche Doptik 
While there is no great emphasis in Die Christliche Dogmatik on the 
need f'or theology to attempt to walk the tightrope of' the "Yes" and the 11Nolll 
it is nevertheless clear that Barth still considers that it ~s necessary f'or 
theology to attempt to do justice to the dialectic of its subject matter. 
It must recognise the existential or real dialectic or lif'e, consisting in 
the f'act that man bef'ore God is in question, and that the distance of' man 
f'rom God, whatever the contribution of' man's createdness, is also man's f'aultf1 ) 
Further it IIUlst recognise the existence of what appear to be logical contra-
dictions in the content of' divine revelation. Its task IIUlSt be to trace out 
the dialectic of' lif'e and of' its own subject matter, without reducing them to 
S,Yntheses Which are purely the products of' logic. 
Only three f'orms of dialectic are memtioned specificalhy, the f'irst 
of' which is the real dialectic of' God and man to which we have ref'erred 
above, The second is contained in the point which he also made in his 
discussion of' ~terson, namely that theology is dialectical in a sense in 
which revelation is not,in the sense that it is incomplete, temp6ral and 
f'allible truth - it is theologia viatorum- while at the same time being God's 
eternal, unalterable, :i.nf'alllible, complete truth in that it is related to 
God's truth. (2) In other words, theology has a double aspect: inasmuch 
as it genuinely seeks to eJg?ress God 1s tru~h it partakes of' the nature of 
God 1 s truth, but inasmuch as it is man 1 s language it is subject to the 
f'allibility of' human language. 
This dialectical concept of dogma leads to the thira use of' dialectic 
in Ide dhristliche Dogmatik, which is genuinely concerned with method. (3) 
Barth bfings us close to a Socratic concept of' dialectic at this point, f'or 
he speaks of' the dialogical nature of' theology. 
(1) Chr.~ p.71f'f 
(2) ~, p.122 f' 
(3) Ibid, pp.453f'f' 
It is dialectical or 
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d1alogical in the sense that it is a conversation and it is a conversation 
for two reasons. In the first place theology seeks to think about God, but 
whereas thinking is customarily thinking about objects, God is indissolU~ 
subject. fheology is therefore a conversation conducted wifu God, a putting 
of questions to God arrl an attenpting to articulam the answers. Secondly, 
it is dialectical because we are men and must constantly strive for a more 
precise understanding of God: it is therefore a continuing conversation. 
"Dialectical thinking is a thinking in speech and reply, in question 
and answer, so that the conversation does not break off, that the 
answer is always also question, which then finds its answer precisely 
in the form of the first question put more exactly and so that there 
is at base no last word, that would eliminate this movement of question 
and answer. "1 ( 1 ) 
Friedrich Traub objects that this dialogical form is not essential to 
theology: it has only a didactic and not an objective meaning, and therefore, 
while it may be used, there is no necessity for theology to take this form: 
11It can also be undertaken in a monological form, and in scientific 
theology that is the rule. 111 (2) 
For Barth, however, it is precisely when theology is dialogJ.cal that it is 
genuinely theology and not otherwise. The form of theolog; is dictated by 
its object. Form J.S itself a part of method. 
In practice the dialogical method of theology means that it is an 
attenpt undertaken in prayer, to confront again God's self-revelation by means 
of a listening to the Bible and to the past theology of the Church, in Drder 
to understand more precisely the truth of the fai ttr. 
There is stilL the unresolved question, however, of the reason for 
the inadequacy of human language to eJP ress the truth of God. Is it due to 
the sinfulness of man, to his createdness or to both? It is easy to confuse 
two questions when we attempt to offer an answer, namely, the question of the 
adequacy of human language and that of the reality of man's knowledge of God. 
It should be clear, however, that man 1 s lack of knowledge of God is due to 
(1) ~~ p.456 
(2) "~ Begrif£ des Dialektischen~, Z.Th.K. vol. 37 (1929), p.387 
his sinfulness. 
.As we have already suggested, it is because the primary 
characteristic of knowledge of God J.s its personal nature, that lmowledge 
is absent where the relationship is broken by sin. Revelation does not yield 
if 
knowledge purely in the form of savoir, for lit is not accompanied by the 
establishment of communion, it is not lmowledge at all. The inadequacy cif 
human language, however, is a dJ.fferent matter altogethere ~ it may be 
that man's knowledge of God J.S articulated poorly because of the marring of 
his communion with God by sin, the permanent inadequacy of lan~age is due 
solely to man's created status: it is because he J.S surrounded by a reality 
which is so different from the reality cif God that when he comes to use the 
language that takes its origin in his encounter with the realit,y of the created 
world, that J.t inevitably falls short of the goal of expressing divine truth. 
There is, moreover, one further factor, which does not relate to man's being 
at all: man's language is inadequate because it can never claim to have 
captured the divine truth. God is not under human control and cannot therefore 
be subjected to the kind of questioning which is involved in scientific 
experimentation.(1) He is concealed as well as revealed and laaguage about 
him is therefore ade~te only to the extent that God himself allows his 
truth to be media ted through it. 
In view of this, the only method which~ it appears, theology can 
adopt, is the dialogical method, couplEd wJ.th the kind of phenomenology that 
we have already described, so that the method adopted by theology is a re-
examnation of its own understanding of the phenomena of the revelation of 
God in Christ, characterised by prayer, and carried out with constant reference 
to the Bible as supplying the data of revelation and to the theological reflect-
ion of the church in the pages of its dogmatics and its creeds aril confessions. 
It is our contention that J.n 1927 Barth already had a firm grasp of 
the major elements of his theological method, and we have already seen that in 
~e Christliche Dogmatik he displays an understanding of the main contribution 
(1) cf Torrance, Theological Sciamqe~p.98 
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to his work of' his reading of' Anselm. That is not to say, however, that 
1!?es Qqaerens Intellectum is not signif'icant, f'Dr as has already been 
pointed out, it sets out in a complete f'orm his understanding of' Anselm and 
his conclusions concerning theological method on the basis of' that understanding. 
Furthermore, it expounds more f'ully than any of' his previous writings the 
nature of' theological rationality. 
There remained, however, one problem which Barth had to attempt to 
solve before he re-wrote the first volume of' his Ibgmatics: he still had to 
make clear the relationSijip of' philosophy to theology. It was already clear 
that he regarded the method of' theology as more akin to that of' natural science-
with the reservations regarding the character of' the divine objectivity which 
we have already spoken of'- than to that of' philosophy. (1 ) Fhilosophy to 
Barth meant essentially a process of' speculative reasani~g, entirely unable 
to lead the thinker to the reality of God, but subst~tuting f'or the free, 
active personal God of' the Bible either a pos:tulate recpired only for the 
purposes of' a moral philosophy (Kant) or an impersonal, naturalistic f'orce 
(romanticism) or the absolute idea to resolve the antinomies of' spirit and 
matter (Hegelh It is true that in some respects he has nuch in common with 
Hegel. Hegel placed the Trinity at the f'ound ation of' his thinking; he laid 
great emphasis on the assertion that God is God only in actu; he roundly 
contradicted Iessing's dictum that accidental truths of history can never become 
necessary truths of' reason by breaking down the dualism between reason and 
history through his doctrine of' history as the self-objectification of' spirit. 
Nevertheless, Barth f'~nds Hegel's view, sub specie aeterni,( 2 ) as repugnant 
as did Kierkegaard. The theologian views his object as a man and f'rom a man 1 s 
point of' view, as the recipient of grace. He does not view his object as 
though he were himself' God. He does not, the ref' ore, seEk to dispense with 
(1) cf' Torrance, Introduction, p.178; TO, (Introduction by Torrance) p.39 
(2) Hegel's phrase was sub specie aeternitatis; Kierkegaard ~ always 
substituted f'or it sub :pecie aeterni. 11Kierkegaard suggests in f'act that 
the metaphysician is really claiming_ to be in the. same situation as God." 
J. Heyvmod 'lhomas, Subjectivity and 1:'aradox, P• 6tln 
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revelation,(1) for his business is with revelation, not to seek by bypass it 
and to achieve the same results by a process of reasoning. Even if reason 
claims that it is necessary to postulate a concept of God, it cannot prove 
hJ.s existence, nor is the God to whom it leads the God who reveals himself' 
as trinitarian. 
" ••• Christian theology can and must differ from a general philosophy 
of God and the wo1·ld in the fact that 1o ChrJ.stian theology the factor 
upon which everything depends, the activity of God which becanes ~vent, 
is not an unknown but a known factor •••• 111 (2) 
The first edition of the Dogmatics had given the impression that 
Barth proposed to employ a philosophical method in order to analyse the 
concept of the word of Goa - mdeed to built his whole dogmatics on that 
existential methoaS3) Now, even though the endeavour ought to have been seen 
to be false, both by the failure of the endeavour itself and by its entireJ,y 
superfluous character in a work in which h-e otherwise pursued a phenomenal-
ogical method, yet he set himself to make quite clear that theology can never 
be subdect to philosophy. 
That is not, however, to say that theology can afford to ignore 
philosophy, or that it can dispense with it, for every kind of language of' 
which theology may make use is imbued with a certain outlook on life and the 
world. Secretly or openly it professes a WeltanschauHA&• Barth does not 
make the mista~e, as Tillich wishes us to believe he does, or supposing that 
a return to the language of the Bible guarantees freedom from a Weltanschauung~4) 
The aim of theology is not to resuscitate the language of the Bible as though 
it were a celestial language, but to understand it, since in it is contained 
the primary witness to Goa's revelation. Thus.,. at a later date, Barth is 
able to say: 
( 1) Not that Hegel did, but Hegel 1 s concept of revelation was very dJ.fferent f'rom Barth's: Barth conplains that Hegel makes it irqpossible for revelation 
to be a free act of God or for God to reveal any new Word. 
cf From Rousseau to Ri tschl, p. 303f 
(2) ~.nr:3:141 
(3) It is important to note that the method is existential,not existentialist. 
(4) In fairness to Tillich it must be admitted that he recognises that Barth is 
aware of the inevitability of using philosophical language and methods in 
some degree.(~, p.84) 
".A free theologian does not deny, nor is ashamed of, his indebtedness to 
a particular philosophy or ontology, to ways of thought and speech. 
These may be traditional or a bit original, old or new 1 coherent or 
incoherent. N{one speaks exclusively in Biblical terms. At least 
the combinatiOJ;lbf these terms, if not the meaning they assume in his 
mind and in his mouth, are, willingly or not, of his own making. 
The Biblical authors .... far from speaking a celestial language, 
spoke in many eartllily languages."' ( 1) 
tl;l.e 
But because/theologian lS free, 
"· •• he stands ready to submit the coherence of his conc~ts and 
formulations to the coherence of the divine revelation and not conversely." 
11
' ••• he l.S a philosopher 1as though he were not' 1 and he has his 
ontology 'as though he had it not'. A free theologian will not be 
hindered by traditional conceptions from thinking and speaking in the 
direction from God to man • • • His ontology will be subject to criticism 
and control by his theology and not conversely. He will not necessarily 
feel obligated to the ph~losophical kairos, the latest prevailing 
philosophy."' (2) 
The freedom of theology means in the first place that it is able to make use 
of any language, any human capaci~ for perception, and any human judgement 
11m thout being bound to any presupposed epistemolibgy .. 11 It can never be the 
slave to any particular philosophy, but can use current ideas, concepts, 
images and expressions.( 3 ) But in the second place theology enjoys- or 
suffers - a certain isolation: it cannot be lntegrated with the other 
sciences or''wi th culture as represented b;j' philosophy" (the progralllm9 which 
Barth believes Tillich to have undertaken), for 
,('1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
11This and similar attenpts to do away wi fu the soli tude of theology 
cannot possibly ••• be carried to completion, for they are based on 
impossible presuppositions. Every such attempt supposes that it can 
understand and co~t itself as either paradisiac, or perfected, or 
divine theology. It considers itself to be paradisiac in a bold resum-
ption of the state before the fall; perfected in a bold presumption that 
transcends the tlffie still remaining between the first and second coming 
of Jesus Christ; or divine and archetypal in a bold assumption (4) 
rejecting the distinction between cneator and creature. .A theology 
that was still sinless or already J:.lerr'ectea, not to speak of God's very 
own theology, could self evidently only be the philosophy and the 
"The Gift of Freedom"' (1953), Humanityp.92, cf also CD,III:3:99 "Every 
terminology is a possible source of error. From this truth not even 
terminologies based on the vocabulary of the Bible are absolutely exempt. 11 
Humanity, P! 92f 
Ev.Theol.,p.91f, Barth's employment of the term "epistemology11 leaves some-
thing to be desired, for what he evidently means is not a theory of knowledge, 
an attempt to e:xplain how we know what we know, but a doctrinaire insistence 
that every science must use the same method. 
(4) The Words used by Barth for "presumptiibn" and 11assumption" are "Rfickgriff'' 
and "Vorgriff 11 both of which appear to be hl.s own invention. 
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science. It could not be a special science distinct from philosophy 
or the rest of the sciences, and still less could it be relegated to 
a dusty corner by these. It would be the philosophy either because 
the light of God ~lluminates it or because it is identical with the 
light. However, all that men may here and now lmow and undertake 
is human theology. As such, it can be neither paradisiac ••• nor 
perfected ••• nor by any means divine. 11 ( 1) 
In view of all this, theology cannot undertake a translation of its 
material ~nto another language: ~t can..not, for example, be translated into 
the terms of existentialist philosophy, or of idealist philosophy, because, 
in the first place, no philosophy can be sufficiently comprehens~ve to 
embrace the whole scope of theology, and in the second place, its concepts and 
terms must be allowed to expand if' they are used for theolog~cal purposes, 
so that the philosophy may be transfdrmed beyond recognition. If philosophy 
is used by theology - and it must be - its language mst be controlled by the 
object to which it is applied. Likewise, if philosophical methods are 
adopted by theology they too rnust be adapted so that they are appropriate 
for the purposes of theology. Furltfuermore, not only mst c=osr it be recognised 
that it may be necessary to adapt them, but that no one method on its own can 
be a de qua te. 
This last point was worked out by Barth in the essay 11Schicksal 
und Idee 11 ( 2) in which he saw the two methods basic to philosophy as realism 
and idealism. Theology can comni t itself to neither position, but at the 
same time nust draw on the resources and acknowledge the truth of both. 
However, while realism recognises the importance of experience, both of the 
external world and the inner experience, theology cannot submit to the realism 
which produces rationalism from the exp3rience of the external world, or 
Fietism from the inner experience. It is not that they fail to reckon with 
revelation, but that they treat revelation as given instead of being that 
which God gives and of which he is always in control. Off'enbarung mst not 
be reduced to Offenbartheit. (3) Theology concerns itself not so much with 
(1) Ev.Theol, p.113. The German is difficult and the translation not altogether 
satisfactory. 
(2) Fu.A, PP• 54-92 
(3) Ibid, p. 70 
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reality, which makes God our f'ate, but with actuality - the actuality of 
lod 1 s dealings with man. It is theref'ore - and remained f'or Barth throughout 
the rest of' his career -a f'undamental axiom of' theology that God's Being 
~s known im his act. (1 ) 
Idealism on the other hand, has as its merit the recognition that 
the "naive conf'idence" of' realism is unjustif'ied, and the raising of the 
question of something not given over against the given object and subject. 
It recognises the hiddenness and otherness of' Goa, but none the less may f'all 
~nto the same trap as realism, that of' supposing that it has a way to Goa 
which is open to all men at all t~me. Once again, it must recognise that 
the criterion of truth is the self-revelation of God, that the revelation of 
God is always in God's own control and thst 1t cannot be separated f'rom his act. 
''Genuine ~dealism describes an hyperbola: although it moves- from reality 
into the sphere of' the truth which does not necessarily coincide with 
it, yet it also leads back f'rom there into reality which is now 
understood as the sphere of' truth."' (2) 
:Ehilosophy is necessary to theology inaswch as it f'urnishes com epts and 
to some extent methods, but theology is always on its own inas!ID.lch as the 
concepts it uses are referred to God; not to Goa in himself' (an sich) but 
to God as he is for us, acting in reconciliation towards us who are therefore 
11 begraced malef'actors"'• (3) 
Theology is not the practice of the art of synthesis, the resolution 
of the tension of opposites, if by that is meant that it presupposes the 
logical possibility of' the resolution of the tens1on. That kind of dialectic 
is not open to theology, because the resolution of the polarity between God 
ar:il man is not achieved by thinking away the tension in a synthesis, but of 
resolving opposing wills, of restoring communion. Thus: 
"Whether ~ t is good theology depends on the ~~ in which it 
accomplishes the ( dialectical] reconciliation t of the respective 
opposites,] not in the fact itself. 11' (4) 
(1) ~~ p.66 cf CD,II:1:81ff' 
(2) FuA, p. 76 
(3) ~~ p.55, 71, cf'bffenbarung, Kirche, Theologie1t :EUA, pp.16l.jf'f 
4), ~~ p.B3 
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(c) Church Do€Platics 
We are brought, then, back to the problem o~ dialectics in theology, 
and there~ore to his understanding o~ dialectics in the Church Dogmatics. 
We discover, however, that he abandons the use ~ the term and are hard 
pressed to ~ind examples of the word or its cognates.(1) The re~son is 
not hard to guess: it is, in the vrords o~ Torrance, due to his seeking to 
expunge every trace o~ a Kierkegaardian vocabulary that might suggest, as 
it had done to some, that he intended to build his theology on a philosophy. 
Nevertheless, a suppression o~ certain words or phrases does not imply that 
the reality to which they re~er are absent. Indeed we may still speak o~ 
a d~alect~c ~n the Church Dogmatics, although the term will again require 
carefUl de~inition. 
~ the ~irst place there ~s the kind o~ dialectic suggested by the 
passage just quoted fi:!om the essay "Schicksal und Idee", 11the d:Lslect~cal 
reconciliation o~ opposites". In the Church Ibptics as in his earlier 
works, Barth emphasises the opposition of Goa and man. Even though he does 
not use the phrase "the i~inite qualitative distinction between time and 
eternity'' it is ~ite clear that Goa and man are in opposition. The point 
however, is not that Barth wishes to maintain the axiom ~initum non capax 
~ini ti but that he wishes to dwell on the ~act that sinful man does not 
enjoy conmunion with, and there~ore true knowledge of', God. What is at 
stake is not whether the finite is or is not capable of' receiving the infinite, 
nor the overcoming of' the subject-object structure of' reality and of' man's 
relationship to Godt but the restoration of' communion between Goa and man. 
Consequently Hegel's solution of' the dialectic cannot be ente~ined& the 
suggestion that the material world ~s the se~-objecti~ication of' the spirit, 
necessary ~or God (Spirit) to know himself', wh~oh will there~ore resolve 
itsel~ into a synthesis is not viable for theology, ~or what is to be 
established with God is not union but comnunion. Man is created not as an 
act o~ self'-objecti~icatio~y God, but as a free act of' his luve: he is 
(1) ''Dialectician" is used in~1I:2:817, but evidently with disapproval. 
therefore different from God, and communion is only possible where there ~s 
a difference. Man has his existence only from God, but in that existence 
he possesses autonorey, an autonom;y which m s issued in a bre&k in comnunion 
occasioned by his s~n. Restoration of communion is brought about not by 
a dialectical dissolution of the oppos~tion between Goa and man, but by 
the reconciling act of Goa in Christ, in whom he adopted human~ty. If 
therefore we find in the Church Dogmatics a new synthetic dialectic, (1 ) 
it must at once be recognised as a dialectic which is the soverei~~ act of 
God, the pattern of which it is the task of theology to trace out. 
still be said that theology is dialectical in this sense.(2) 
It may 
Secondly there is the dialectic of the situation in which the work 
of theology is done, vmich means that theology is provisional in its results. 
This kind of dialectic, again, is carried over from his earlier work. On 
the one hand there is the quite undialectical certainty aar the realisation 
of the true knowledge of God, 11 which rests on Goa's good-pleasure to be 
among men and to be known by them. On the other hand there is the "dialectic 
of certainty~ and uncertainty"' on the human side - the dialectic involved in 
the see-saw of certainty and uncertainty as to whether we really know God. 
"When we are really unsettled by the dialectic of cer:tainty and 
uncertainty which is our part in this event, we are really sununoned 
and compelled to look out to its other side. .And then we always 
stand before the good pleasure which is its divine side. In this 
good pleasure the decision as to God's knowability has already been 
taken before and beyond the decision of our faith and cognition. 
It has not been taken only in a being and 118ture of God which could 
perhaps be closed to us. In virtue of that encroachment it has been 
(1) J. Taubes 11Theodicy and Theology"' p.239ff. We can agree with Taubes 1 
description of a movement from synthetic (tB: to antithetic (~) to synthetic 
(CD) dialectic only in terms of Barth's early emphasis on reconciliation, 
followed by an emphasis on crisis and ~n Chr.D & CD a renewed emphasis on 
reconciliation. These may to some extent be linked with the external circum= 
stances of the times in which they were written, but it is difficult to trace 
any deep or lasting influence on his work, except perhaps for a few 
significant events. 
(2) TiDich objected that Barth's method was not dialectical because he maint-
ained dialectics means that "yes" and "no 11 are held "in~parably together", 
whereas Barth he believes, holds them "irreconcilably separated"· The only 
true dialectic therefore in Tillich 1 s view is a synthetic dialectic in 
which every concept requires its opposite for its completion. He appears 
however to object more strongly to what he regards as the "supernatural" 
character of Barth 1 s theology than its false dialectic ("What is Wrong with 
the Dialectic Theology?" !lli• vol. 15 (1935), p.127ff) 
taken among us and for us. The result ~s that the truth of the being 
and nature of God stands actually and perceptibly before us in all 
its divine certainty and it can genuinely be apprehended by us. The 
dialectic still remains on our part: yet not in such a way that we 
are still in the grip of the dialectic, rather in such a way that the 
dialectic is duected and controlled from the side of the event which 
is G~ 1 s part. For us the event of our lmowlelige of God shows i tsihlf 
to be a contimual winning and losing winning again and losing again. 
But through it all the wil:j/of God is there as the preponderant force, 
so that we are not lost in that ascending and descending movement, 
but held as by the mercy of God, but for that reason really held."' ( 1) 
Finally, we find a continuation of the concept of d~alectic as 
dialogic, even though Barth ceases to use the word in this way and makes some 
modifications to the position he adopted in 1927. The "formal task11 of 
dogmatics is to recall the Church to be a hearing Church. Hence dogma tics 
itself seeks to listen to the Word of God as it cpestions itself abru t the 
language used in Church proclamation. It does so in the confidence that 
the Church is not forsaken by the Holy Spirit but is genuinely 
11 the society which already belongs to Jesus Christ and which will 
listen to Him when it is addressed in His name." (2) 
J:bgmatics ~s therefore carried out in obedience and in prayer, and to that 
extent dialogical~y. It does so not in order to proscribe heresy, but 
that it should not itself fall into heresy, which is itself a lapse from 
obedience. Its task is always an examination of the language of the Church 
whivh is accomplished by an analysis and closer understandmg of the 
phenomena of revelation as centred in Christ. 
The method of theology involves a ldnd of +inguistic analysis, 
or to be more exact, an analysis of the language of the Church and an attenpt 
to improve u:pOn it. It is one of Barth's most insistent assertions that 
dogmatics is necessary because the language of proclamation is human language, 
and that as human language, it is ina de qua te. It is therefore, necessa~ 
that dogmatics should constantly re-investigate the meaning of the language 
iJ{lses. But this programme raises two questions; first, what is the 
(1) _QE,ll:1:74 f 
(2) .QE,I :2:810 
relationship between the language and the object to V'hich it refers; second1y 
how are we to go about an examination of the language? 
1. Barth answers the first question by means of the doctrine of 
analogy~ (1 ) but he does not wish to resurrect the scholastic debate on its 
nature. He certainly does not wish to invoke .Aquinas, Suarez or Cajetan; 
indeed to discuss his notion of ab.alogy, with ref'erence to theirs1 is not an 
altogether helpful exercise, for Barth uses the concept in a minimal way. 
What he wishes to point to is that human language is neither univocal no:t 
yet equivocal when used with reference to the divine truth, but analogous in 
the sense that it is in part able to represent it 1 but incapable of containing 
or con trolling it. It is always, in the f'irst place, dependent upon the 
adoption by God of human language as a vehicle for his revelation of himself. 
It is therefore possible £or the content of the revelation to be absent from 
the words themselves. They must be constantly reinvested with God's own 
power. Secondly, the words cannot express the full scope of the divine 
truth smce it is ~ tself beyond human comprehension. Thirdly, the words 
themselves are human words with their original reference to the world of 
e~ernal experience. 
Granted even that there may be a partial correspondence betweEn 
human language and divine truth, still Barth finds it necessa:cy to part 
company with Quenstedt, as well as ~th Aquinas and the Catholic Scholastics. 
He does Sill on account of what he perceives to be a false understanding of 
the nature of the knowledge of God 1 namely the belief that it can be founded 
on the basis ar a common order of being to vmich both divine and human 
rea ll ty belong. This theory 1 he believes, suggests that the common order 
of being involves the possib~lity of a reversal of the relationSh~p of 
divine and human truth and so a readingteck into the realm of d~vine truth 
from the realm of human truth. In consequence he ~jects the idea of the 
intrinsic analogy, which finds that the attril:utes of God are to be found 
(1) 2! 1 II:1:237ff 
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properly not only in God but also in man, in £avour o£ the idea o£ extrinsic 
analogy,. where the attribute l.S £ound properly only in Gcod and only by 
analogy in man through God's grace. He £ears that the assertion o£ an 
analogia attributionis intrinsecae involves not only the ass~rtion o£ an 
analogia entis but with this a dispensing with revelation. 
''We added at once that God's truth is not our truth, and we had to do 
so, because £rom the very outset we understood Goa's tru~h as the 
truth o£ his grace. But in this context at an~ rate, Quenstedt 
understands by God's truth God's being, and by od 1s being the absolute 
being to which ours can be related only as relative being. On the 
basis o£ this material definition the statement in Q~enstedt is clearly 
to be understood as reversible. Our truth, i.e. our being, which as 
ours can certainly be only relative, is God's truth in so £ar as God 
is absolutely what we are relative~. But relatively we are the 
same as God is absolutely. Thus God's truth is also our truth. 
If being and not grace is the criterion o£ truth, this reversal 
is inevitable. In Quenstedt revelation is not necessary to make us 
participants in the truth o£ God. We are so already, to the extent 
that we are, i£ only relatively, what God is absolutely. 111 (1) 
~e assertion o£ an analogia attributionis intrfnsecae, then, appears to make 
revelation irrelevant by removing the need £or it. But it is precisely 
because God has made known his truth to us in Chrlst that all other claims 
to a route to knowledge o£ God are made redundant. Barth bars the way to 
the drawing o£ theological conclusions on the basis o£ ontological assumptions. 
2. Nevertheless, words are applied to God and their meaning requires 
there£ore to be understood. How then are we to go about an investigation 
of the language of proclamation? 
It is important to grasp the £aot that when a word lS used in 
proclamation its meanlllg is to be determined by the object ltsel£ to which 
it re£ers ln the particular instance, not on the basis o£ a general discussion 
o£ the meamng o£ the word ln its normal use. In the first place the normal 
use, i.e. the way in which it is used to describe the phenomena o£ human 
experience, may be so varied as to make such an exercise lmpossible and, 
(1) CD,II:1:240£ 
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in the second place, it reduces the neaning of a word to the conmon factor 
in the vsrious usages, instead of explicating the peculiar features of the 
particular objects to wh~ch it is applied. 
W::3 may recognise here a fundamental canon of linguistic analysis, 
namely that words are understood not by their meaning but by the:ir context, 
that is by the way that they are usedo In his later works, Wittgenstein 
conceived of language as a cmllection ar word-games instead of a picture of 
facts and postulates that knowing the names in a language is less than learning 
how to speak it, just as learning the names of chess pieces is not learning 
how to play chess. In the same way, a name without a criterion for its 
proper use (i.e. for which there are no rules) has no meaning unless it has 
a context. The meaning of a sentence depends on the way in which it is used, 
rather than on what it refers to. It is misleading to talk of words "standing 
for things" or "havmg meanings'', since everything depends, not on the words 
themselves, but on the way in which we use them. 
Now it is clear that Barth subscribes to the view that words cannot 
be treated as counters, as it were, each with a defmite content. Nor would 
he sympathise with a view of language that seeks, by a phenomenological 
analysis, to mscover the essence of an idea or concept. He recognises the 
flexibility of language and the consequent importance of acknowledging the 
need to work on the basis of a recogni tio:r/of the type of language with which 
we are faced. It is~ for Barth, especial1.y important that we recognise the 
uniqueness of the referent of theological languageo However, it is doubtful 
whether he woljld be prepared to go so far as to suggest that theological 
language could be described as a language game in which everything depends 
not on what the words refer to but on the way in which they are used. Nor 
is Barth 1 ooncerned to make the point which Wittgenstein does, namely, that, 
in contrast to the assertions of logical positivism, a word can have a meaning 
even if there is some dispute about the existence of the object. But both 
represent an advance on logical positivism inasmuch as they both-recognise the 
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poss~bili~ of the mean~ngfuJness of non-empirically verifiable assertions, 
and inasmuch as they recognise that the logic of an assertion must be 
understood from the way in which it is used, and not from the presupposition 
that there is only one kind of logic to wh1ch all meaningful statements may 
be reduced. 
The language of proclamation is examined and understood not on the 
basis of treating the words as counters and thereby attempting to construct 
some kind of meaning, but by a closer examination of the reality and the 
events to Which they refer. Thus it is that we do not understand an 
assertion such as "God is father" on the basis of an analysis of the concept 
of a father, for that could lead to all kinds of misapprehensions, not least 
in respect of the possible connotations of progenitorship. Bather we must 
seek to analyse more closely the nature and activi~ of God, and understand 
1
'Tather 11 as applied to God, from God himself. 
What Barth is concerned to deny here is the possibility of 
conce1ving of God as a collection of human ideals or as conceivable as 
characterised by a series of human concepts raised to an infinite degree.(1) 
So he says: 
''We possess no analogy on the basis of which the nature and being of 
God as the Lord can be accessible to us. We certainly think we 
are acquainted with other lords and lordships. But it is not the 
case that we only have to extend our idea of lord and lordship into 
the infinite and absolute and we will finalJly arrive at God the 
Lord and hJ.s lordship. 11' (2) 
No anaJ;ysis of the concept of lordship will yield a doctrine of God apart 
from Goa•s own revelation of himself. 
"No idea that we can have of 'lord' or 'lordship 1 will ever lead us 
to this idea, even though we extend it infJ.nitely. Outside the ideas 
that we can have, there is a lordship over our soul, a lordship even 
over our being in death, a genuinely effective lordship. Only as we 
(1) We find repeated echoes in Barth's work of his early struggles with 
Feuerbach's assertions, that theology is merely anthropology collecting 
the ideals of humanity and projecting them upon an imaginary deity. 
(2) CD,II:1 :75 
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know God's lordship will our own ideas o-r lordship have content and 
within their limits, existence. But i-r an analogy o-r God -rail; at 
this decisive point, i-r God himsel-r has to be added to give content 
and substance to what is supposed to be analogous to Him it is 
obviously useless as an analogw o-r God. Can the idea of lords and 
lordships even help us to lrno.v God? or themselves they can only 
hinder. 11 • ( 1) 
Barth goes on to argue that, in a similar way, we can have no analogy on 
the basis of which the being of Goo as creator, as reconciler or as redeemer 
can be known to us. However we nust recognise that two s eparate points 
are at issue here. The main point that Barth apPears to be making at 
this juncture, is that speculative thought working on the basis of human 
concepts,does not yield a doctrine o-r God. It is another form of the 
natural theology/revelation argument; what we genuinely know about God, 
we know on account of his revelation of h1mself to us: 
"'· •• the relationship must not be reversed. In themselves and as 
such the expectations of red~tion that we can cherish will always 
obscure and cover up the e~ectation of Jesus Christ, or resurrection 
and eternal life, just as definitely as in themselves and as such the 
supposed analogies of God the ~restor and the Reconciler will always 
obscure and cover up the truth of these concepts. Again, therefore, 
if this does not happen, if' we know about GQrl the Redeemer, neither 
wholly nor partially is it -rrom what we know elsewhere about 
redemption. It is only through the revelation of fus future."· (2) 
The secondary point, however, which is made implicitly, is that the content 
of words such as Creator, when used with reference to God, can only be 
grasped by an investigation of the reality to which they r e-rer, and not on 
the basis of an etymological analysis of the word itself or of an analysis 
of 1ts general use. 
Barth's position does, however, raise certain problems, just as 
Wittgenstein's does. If the language of theology has its own ruJe s, which 
are dictated by the context of the language, are not its rules therefore 
opaque to the outsider? Does not theology therefore run the risk of being 
charged with a Wittgensteinian fideism?( 3) Certainly Barth bel~ves that 
(1) ~' p. 75f 
(2) ~' P• 78r 
(3) c~ T. Penelhum, Problems o-r Religious Knowledge lLondon Macmi.lJ:.an, 1971 ), 
~ p p.3ff 
the truth o~ theological language is, strictly ~eaking, accessible only 
to the believer, but he is not necessarily committed thereby to a denial 
that it has any meaning at all to the unbeliever. Clearly there must be 
sone connection with other 11 language-games 11 since they have a collDllOn ~actor 
in language it sel~. Rather, what appears to be in Barth 1 s mind is that 
theological language is language about God only because God has chosen it 
and permitted it to carry his truth. But this ~act does not permit the 
removal o~ the language ~rom its context. Believer and unbeliever alile 
are obliged, i~ they wish to understand it, to return to an eXlJllllina tion ~ 
the context 1n which it is used. 
There is, then, some analogy or point o~ comparison between the 
notion o~ lordship as applioo to God, as there is also between the use of 
"cause" Wlth reference to man and to Goa. ( 1 ) There lS in this case what 
he calls an analogia operationis between the two; but human causality does 
not provide an understanding of d1 vine causality. 
"If' the causal concept is to be applied legitimately, its con tent and 
interpretatioh must be determined by the ~act that what it describes 
is the operation o~ the F.:lther o~ Jesus Christ in relation to that 
o~ the creature." (2) 
CUr understanding o~ the divine causality can only be achieved on the basis 
o~ the divine activity itseU and there~ore "bnly by revelation and in ~aith. 11 (3 ) 
fut Barth goes ~urther to argue that a true understanding o~ such concepts 
as causality, Fatherhood and so on can only be grapped by an understanding o~ 
the words as applied to God, for in God they have their original truth. 
The creaturely causa owes its Character not to 1tseU but to Goa and is 
there~ore cause only in a secondary sense. In revels tion God claims our 
words ~or h1s own, so that: 
"the use to which they are put is not • • • an improper and merely 
pictorial one, but their proper use.n (4) 
(1) CD,ni:3:9B:r~ 
(2) ~. 105 
(3) ~. p.107 
(4) _9B,n: 1:229 
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Thus, when applied to Goa, our words are not alienated from their original 
object, and so from their truth, but on the contrary, restored to it. 
"For example, the words "father" and 11 son 11• do not first and properly 
have their truth at the point of reference to the underlYJ.ng views 
and concepts in our thought and language, i.e. in· their application 
to the two nearest male members in the succession of physical 
generation of man or of animal creation generally. They have it 
first and properly at a point to which, as our words, th~ cannot 
refer at all, but to wlnch, on the basis of the grace of the 
revelation of God, they may refer, and on the basis of the lawful 
claim of God the Creator they even must refer, and therefore, on 
the basis of this permission and compulsion, they can actually 
refer •••• 11 ' ( 1) 
Barth has taken a quite startling step, because he denies quite 
categorically the possibility of moving forward to a provisional meaning and 
understanding of the use of words with reference to God on the basis of the 
classification of their meaning in human hsage. A proper understanding 
of their human usage is only to be gained, he asserts, on the basis of their 
divine usage. But we are,of ourselves, quite unable to restore them to 
the1r "proper" use: that can only be achieved by God himself in his 
revelation. ( 2 ) 
The implication for the proclamation of the church would seem to be, 
then, that in its preaching it cannot be permitted to adopt a technique 
that relies on a "repmt~ tion of the story" until "the penny drops" when a 
disclosure takes place and the "characteristically different situation" 
unfolds itself, for true proclamation focusses on the contrast between 
human and divine reality and must therefore present the distinctive qualities 
of the d~vine nature in contrast to all human analogies. At first sight 
this seems to make all talk of analogy meaningless. It is as though Barth 
wishes to have it both ways. l~vertheless, the point may well be that the 
"analogy" may conjure up the "characteristically different situation" but 
it must not ihen be allowed to be the ~nterpretati ve tool. 
Thus, for example, we have to see the prologue to the fourth gospel not as 
an attempt to ~nterpret Christ to Hellenistic readers by means of the Logos, 
( 1) :rbid (2) Ibid, p.230 
but to interpret the Logos by means of' the Christ. The point 1s not that 
Christ is the Logos but that the Logos is Christ and theref'ore it is not 
possible to understand Cllr1st by an analysis of' the ooncept of' the Logos. 
We detect, however, a certain ambiguity in Barth's understand1ng of 
the language of' theology, f'or, although 1t is quite clear that he regards 
the method of' theology as an analysis of' the language of' theology in relation 
to 1ts object, yet, in h1s use of 8 analogy• to designate the relationship 
between the object of the language and the language itself', it is not 
entirely clear how he understands the word analogy. He does, indeed, express 
dissatisfaction with it, but nevertheless continues to use 1t. At times, 
however, he seems to ascribe the inadequacy, and so the analogical nature, 
of' human language to the f'act that it is human language, but at other times 
to the f'act that it is partial because God's self'-revelation is a veiling 
as well as an unveiling. 
"That God also veils Hl.Illself in H1s revelation certainly excludes 
the concept of parity as a designation of the relationship between 
our word and God's being. And that God also unveils Himself' in 
His revelation excludes the concept of' disparity. We are theref'ore 
forced to a vail ourselves of the concept of analogy by the fact that 
in God's revelation both His veiling and His unveiling are true.• (1) 
We may suppose that, since Barth's major emphasis in his d1scussion 
of' the knowability of' God lies on our dependence ~n God's decision to 
make himself known, the task of theology 1s not so much to improve on the 
language of the Churcll, but to reach out towardsitls content. The words 
themselves do not express the divine truth - theology must, in faith and 
prayer, allow the Holy Spirit to reveal God through the words as they are 
brought again into contact, as 1t were, with the events to which they are 
witness. Here again we f'ind ourselves brought back to the dialectic 
element in theological method: the dialectic of the event of knowing God, 
which is our dependence upon God's decision. 
(1) ~,II:1:235f 
=2~-
What we have called Barth's a priori method, and his view or theol-
ogical language, are very closely related ~he structure or his dogmatic 
writing. He does not work towards a doctrine of revelation, but connnences 
with it, andf:Pecifioal]W with the revelation or God in Jesus ChrJ.st. The 
taSk or theology with respect to the language used with rererence to this 
revelation, is to unrold the logic and meaning or the revelation or God 
in Christ, to call the Church to hsten to God's own Word in the event 
or the Incarnation, so that it should then become again the teaching Church. 
The theologian cannot h1mself restore to the word •revel a tion ° its proper 
meanJ.ng, but he can draw it back into contact with the witness ot: the 
events or revelation. Similarly, he cannot restore the word "covenant• 
to its proper meanJ.ng, but he can attempt to e~licate and investigate 
the logic or the divine covenant made with man in Christ. He can also 
examine the meaning or evil in the ligpt or the revelation or Gods it 
becomes the possJ.bih ty which Ck>d bypassed, and so "Nothingness". 
A genuinely theological understanding or all these things cannot proceed 
unless preceded by a knowledge of God in hJ.s self-revelation. All 
theology is therefore Christology since it places at the centre the divine 
revelation in Christ, as its presupposition, norm and source of illumination. 
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4. ~e Structure of Dogna tics 
Barth displays what may seem to some an almost pathological fear 
of systems. What, i¢'act, he does fear, is the subjection of the 
material of dogmatics to a system imported from outside. It would be 
possible for example, for an attenpt to be In9de to structure dognatics 
in accord with an Hegelian dialectic; but even 1f it were possible to 
avoid subjecting 1 t to the presuppositions of the dialectic itself, so 
obscuring the character of the divine revelation as a free act of grace,(1) 
there would remain the danger of the structure becoming fixed and so 
dominating the content, instead of allowing the content to be the 
controlling factor. 
Nevertheless, it has been Charged that Barth, having rejected all 
systems, does ultina tely produce a systematic theology. The charge, 
however, may ignore the meaning which Barth attaches to system. "Systemn 
is not a synonym for "structure 11 but means 
"'• •• a structu~e of principles and their consequences, founded on 
the presupposition of a basic view of things, constructed with 
the help of var1ous sources of knowled~e and axioms, and self-
contained and complete in itself."' (2) 
It JS an architectonic, relating the whole structure together by means of 
basic principles. But more than th1s, system for Barth means something 
which does not spring directly from theology itself and consequently is a 
violation of the sui generis character of theology, reru 1 ting in a 
"The subject of ti;is dogmatic ~ercise wil:J/have to attend. to this 
analysis and so 1n that way bU1ld up the system, thus bemg 
reliev~ of the duty of obedience in other re~ects. Will this 
be the obedience v.hich corre~onds to the Ylord c:£ God? The instrusion 
of the t;ype of law by which alone a dogmatic system of this kind is 
possible will clearly contradict the objectivity (Sachlidikeit) 
reCJl,lir ed of dogmatics by the mere fact that in consequence the 
-autononw of do gin) tic work will be eliminated and therefore the 
completeness of the obedience owed will be inperilled."' (3) 
(1) cf From Rousseau to Ritsahl, p.304 
(2) ~I:2:861 (3) ~ 
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Barth 1 s f'ear is that the Ward of Goa as the norm of theology will be 
replaced by the system - and indeed, he even suggests that the system 
will become the object of dogmatics, whether the system be an idealist 
philosophy or a conception of' the "essence of Christ~ani ty'''· A sys tern affords 
an a priori principle or basic view which becomes a secure platform for 
thinking or speald.ng, and which theref'ore usurps the place that can be 
occupied solely by the Word of' God, on which man ~s dependent and to which 
he can only listen, never having it in his control. 
It may be thought that Barth's contentions about the lack of room 
for system undercut h~s own a priori method, that his "presupposition" of' 
the revelation of God in Christ assumes the role of a systematic principle. 
To that, however, he might give the same answer as Socrates gaVQ to Hegel 
in Kierkegaard's Journal entry.(1 ) In other words, it is impossible to 
attell!Pt an investigation of the content of revelation without first 
assuming the existence of revelation. Indeed Barth goes on to add that 
the Word of Goa cannot itself' be a system, in the sense of a presuppored 
view point, since it is to be submitted to by the theologian: it cannot 
be wielded by him. Thus he concludes: 
"· •• the unfolding and presentation of the content of the Word of God 
rust take place fundamentally in such a way that the Word of: God is 
understood as the centre and foundation of dogmatics and of Church 
proclamat~on, like a circle whose periphery forms the starting 
point for a limited nun:ber of lines which in dogmatics are drawn 
to a certain distance in all directions. The fundamental lack of 
principle in the dogmatic method is clear from the fadt that it 
does not proceedfrom the centre but from the periphery of the 
circle or, metaphor apart, it will refrain from presenting the 
whole as a whole. 11' (2) 
There can, then, be no attempt to present dogmatics as an 
architectonic and Barth would claim that his presentation is not architectonic, 
(1) "Socrates: With what assumpt~ons do you begin 
Hegel: From none at al:L 
Socrates: That is quite possiblel perhaps you do not be$in at all."' 
(QUoted by J. Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, p.91n) 
(2) .QE,I: 2:869 
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~or all the alleged beauty of its structure. His reply 1 ~or example, to von 
Balthasar's charge o~ 110hristological constriction11 ,( 1) reveals that for him 
a Christolog~cal stance does not represent a constriction at all, but rather 
the very opposite, for to be genuinely theological is precisely to be 
Christological. (2) 
Dogmatics is Christological, and must run the risk of being accused 
of making C hristology a systematic principle, because it is ~n Christ that 
God makes mmself known. That revelation is the norm for all other 
theological thinking and for the understanding of the rest of the Bible. 
Christological thinking is not a matter of deduction from a given principle; 
like an Hegelian secret of the universe 
"It is ••• q_uite out of the q_uestion of start with certain prior 
decisions (e.g. concerning God, man,- sin, grace, etc.) and then 
to support these chr~stologically. 
"The only decisions which can have any place are those which follow 
after, which are consistent with thinld.ng which follows Him, whioh 
arises in the course of christological thinking and the related 
investigations, definitions and conclusions. The obligationto 
give to christological thinking this uncona~tional precedence, this 
function of a basis in the strict sense, seems to me to be imposed 
q_uite simply by the Character of the living person Jesus Christ as 
the almighty Mediator whom it must follow.w. (3) 
Christological thinking as a principle for dogmatic investigat~on, and 
therefore for the st~ucture of dogmatic wr~ting, means Christology in a 
broad sense rather than a narrow one. (4) Even though Barth presents 
revelation as identical in some sense with the act of reconciliation, it 
is not exhausted by the concept of reconciliation or atonement and Barth 
conseq_uently rejects the Reformation tendency to subordinate all other 
(1) Karl Barth: Darstelling und Deutung seiner Theologie, pp.201ff. 
( 2) 
Von Balthasar does concede that while it is a Dehkform, ~t is not a 
philosophical Denkf'orm. 
of CD,IV: 1 :768 
( 3) _QQ,IV: 3:175 
(4) .Altho\;igh von Balthasar prefers to use the word 11Christocentric 11 to 
11Christological11', de Senerclens points out that it "seems to indicate that th4 
theologian, established on the ground of a given Christian thought, be it 
catholic, protestant or whatever, strives to centre his thought on Christ. 11' 
This however ~s not the mean~g of 11Christologica111 which is rather that the 
theologian opens h~mself to the revelation of the Word of God incarnate in 
(continued at the foot of the next page) 
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insigpts to the account or reconciliation as submission to a system. We 
migpt say that it is a constantly recurring theme of dogm9tics, but 1 t J.s not 
its organising principle; for theology gas no other organising principle 
than the Word or GOO it sell, God's freedom to speak through the events of 
revelation in the person ihf Jesus Christ. 
It is this arrirmetJ.on which leads critJ.cs to contimue to speak of 
Barth as engaging in pneumatic exegesis. The theologian can rely solely 
on the Holy Spui t as he seeks to " lis ten" again to the Word of Goa , but 
this seems to open the gates to pure subjectivism with no interpretative 
standard. 'flus, however, is 
the first place, the position 
to mJ.sread Barth, to rail to recognJ.se, in 
occupied by the ChurCh, ( 1 ) and, secondly, to 
read "subject:i. vism fl for the Holy Spirit. Even though appeal to the doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit may have rrequently been camourlage for subjectivism, 
that fact alone does not authorise the exclusio~rom dogmatics of the Holy Spirit. 
None of the traditional~ of dogmahcs can be permitted to become 
an organising prJ.nciple, whether it be the d.oc,trine of reconciliation, or 
of creation, or rede~tion, or of God. For Barth all must be subordinated 
to the one indispensable factor - the revelation of God as the Word of Goa. 
Hence there is no ~ecJ.al order required for the structure of dogmatics. 
Indeed, any order J.s liable to gJ.ve the iiiY?ression that it is the product 
of the adoption of a "key posit1on 11 rather than of purely didactic intentions. 
(contJ.nued from previous page) (3) Jesus Christ. De Senerclens therefore 
prefers the word christologJ.cal, because it establishes a link with the 
narrower sense of the Word ("La Concentration Ch:!!'istologJ.que 11 Antwort, p.191) 
( 1) Barth appears to believe that the dJ.fference between himself and Kierkegaard 
J.s to be found in theJ.r respectJ.ve views of the Church with respect to theology. 
He speaks of KJ.erkegaard's •pronounced holy individualism• (Fragments Grave and 
Gay, p.99) but while 1 t is true that Barth diminished his own stress on sub-
jectivity (of J. Heywood Thomas 8 The Christology of S¢'r811 Kierkegaard and Karl 
Barth• Hibbert Journal, vol.53 (1954-55), p.281) it is not necessurily the case 
that for Kierkegaard a stress on sub jeoti vi ty means a corresponding absence or 
room for the Church. Indeed, Kierkegaard had a lively doctrine of the Church 
and this may be another case of Barth freeing himself from the inrluenoe not 
or the real, but of the "phantom" Kierkegaard. (of P. Sponheim Kierkegaard on 
Christ and Christian Coherence (London, s.c.M. Press, 1968), p.208ff; 
A. McKinnon, art.cit. 
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• 
So he concludes: 
tt ••• to begin with the doctrine of' God can easily arouse the susp~cion 
that the characterisation of the subject of the divine work and 
act~vity ~nvolves the construction of a kind of key-position, ·whereas, 
if this doctrine forms the aim and end of the whole, gathering up the 
results of the three other parts, it will have a position Vwhich is 
unpretentious but at the same time significant. But the danger of 
systematising one of the other three, which ~11 have to be given the 
precedence, is greater than the danger of systematising the doctrine of 
God, because the really pres5i.ng temptations to make dogmatics the 
development of a basic view find far stronger weapons of attack in the 
various aspects of the concrete work and activity of Goa. 11' (1) 
The least pretentious way to start dogmatics, then, is to commence with 
the doctrine of Goa, for that will arouse least sus~oion. Moreover, 
"'• •• it is easier to speak about creation, atonement and redemption 
if there is an existing understanding concerning the One about whom 
it has all to be said ••.• " (2) 
The actual arrangement of dogmatics, once the prolegomena have been stated, 
is a ~mtter of practical convenience, but the loci themselves are intended 
to reflect the loci of revelation, that is to say, the polnts on whiCh 
revelation focusses. The one principle which is supreme is that the 
whole dogmatic enterprise takes its cue from the bmaef that God has 
revealed himself: this principle controls the whole of the work of 
dogmatics. 
(1) CD,I:2:800 
(2) Ibid 
P.ART 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EV .AWATION 
1. Im.troduction 
In the ccurse of a discussion with Daniel Day Williams and others, 
Tillich is reported to have made the follow:ing observation : 
"After [Karl Barth 1 sJ daughter-in-law heard my lecture in ~icago 
She said& 'Now I understand what the dir.terence is between Barth 
and you. You start from below, namely, from the human situation 
and go up; and he starts from above, he starts with the Trinity 
immediately in the first volume ( of Church Dogmatic~ and then 
goes down as DDlCh as possible'," I was very IIUch impressed' by this 
description because I felt there was a basic truth in it. When I 
told thJ.S to Karl Barth he was equally struck. He was absolutely 
excited about it and said, 'Yes, I start from above, I have a vision 
as if a light came from above and there I start' ••• I think its 
unsound theology but certainly its religiously possible.~ (1) 
It is a pity that Tillich did not go on to relate \'hether Barth thought 
his daughter-in-law's assessment of Tillich was as accurate as that ar his 
own approach. There can be little doubt, however, that Barth's reaction 
to Tillich's approach would have bem much the same as Tillich 1s to Barth's, 
namely that it is 11\msound theology". It might be added that it would be 
unlikely that he would have added any coll1Uent about it being "religiously 
possible 11 : 
llmbtless there is truth in 'this assessment, and vre shall take up 
the point again later, but it is too facile to be accepted as any more than 
an outline statement and certainly cannot be thought of as an exhaustive 
account of the difference in methodology between Barth andTillich. It is 
by no means the case that a simple comparison may be made between them. 
Not only must we take into consideration a degree of development in both 
(a far greater degree in Barth than in Tillich) but also the peculiar 
(1) H.R.Landon (ed), Reinhold Niebuhr : a Fro hetic Voice in 
of also P. Tillich Per§Pectives on Nineteenth and Twentie 
Protestant Theology, p.242 
-271-
obscurities o£ each. Both are apt to make unde£ended assertions, but 
whereas Barth dlsplays a passion £or prec~sion which leads, at times, to 
such extensive de£inition that ~tis di£f~cult to determine exactly what 
he has said, Tillich tends to be deliberately ambiguous and to exploit this 
ambigui t}.1) Nevertheless, it is our belie£ that the preceding chapters 
have eJP osed the outlines and the principle moti£s of their respective 
views on theological method. In this final chapter we shall atte!I§?t 
some evaluation, in the course of which we shall seek to relate them to 
their Kantian heritage. 
At the outset,hawever, it maybe helpful to clarify the ways in 
which the concept o£ methodology may be used, in order to draw oertain 
:important distinctions. It may be used, first, much in the way that it 
would be used, £or example, in the discipline of physics, that is to say, 
it may be used to describe the series of operations in which the subject 
engagew with his material. These operations may, indeed, be reduced to 
the pattern of What may be described as a transcendental method, a series of 
operations which are corrmon to all d~sciplines. ( 2) In each discipline 
they take on forms appropriate to the material at hand. Thus, in the case 
of theology, the operations will refer to the material avai:S ble in the form 
of biblical literature and of the documents of church h~story and theology. 
( 1) cf Howard W. Hintz who remarks that Tillioh 'a weakness centres in the 
'~agueness and circularity of the definition of the original terms~, an 
assertion he illustrates by demonstrating the circularity of Tillich's 
argument in "The Religious Symbol". He maintains that Tillich 's coroept 
of' God and of' concern are empty of meaning since no precise definition 
can be given to either. ("On Defining the Term God 11 , :Be ligious Ex;perience 
and Truth, ed. s. Hook p.260) cf' also the account by Nels Ferr~ of' a 
conversation between himself, Frederick Ferr~ and Tillich 
(2) 
(SJT, vol. 21 ( 1968) p.159£) 
cf' Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology: Lonergan finds that there 
are four activities which together make up the transcendental method. 
They are attending, understanding, judging and deciding. 
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However, at just this point, theology meets a formidable problem, 
for an atte~t to describe the series of operations it performs with respect 
to the materials available to it necessarily reqJ.ires that certain assumptions 
should be made about the nature of the object of theology. Whereas the 
Reformers displayed no uncertainty at all on this cpestion, it became a 
matter of increasing concern to theology in later generations, and it is 
clear that there is no general concensus of opinion. 
-
Indeed, it has been --< 
a fundamental aim aQbur stuqy to illustrate the way in which the different 
conclusions of Barfu and Tillich on this cpestion lead them to very 
different conclusions on other aspects of theological method. Dif'fering 
conclusions concerning the nature of the object of theology are reflected 
in differing conclus~ons about the way in which the material should be 
treated and indeed, about the range of material relevant to theology. 
Our chief concern, therefore, is not to ~educe a purely descriptive 
accamt of the technical processes by which theologians engagw with the 
material of the Bible or of systematic theology, even though the point is 
relevant to our study. It is, rather, to give an account of' the ptinciple 
features of theological method in a second sense, at fue point at which 
theologians seek to a ceo mplish a constructive task on the basis of' the 
data furnished by the technical processes. Here he must decide what is fue 
precise object of theology and seek to show what methods are relevant to 
approach it. Is the object of theology a divine referent, or the religious 
activity of man, or something yet unnamed? It is insufficient to assert 
that the object of theology is the truth of the documents, because the asser-
tion does nothing to tell us what documents are relevant to the search for 
the truth, nor does it tell us what methods are appropriate for the search. 
llie second sense, therefore, in which we rrust speak of method is the sense 
in which theology seeks its ultimate object; we may, perhaps describe this 
as the vertical direction of theological method. 
In addition theological method has a third aspect which derlVes from 
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its role as a ~unction of the church, directed tcw1ards proclamation. We 
may describe this third sense as the horizontal direction of theological 
method, by which we rrean the intention of theology to serve the concrete 
needs of the church as .Lt engages upon its task of proclamation. 
It may well be that theology nn.lst exist in a state of permanent 
tension between the horizontal and the vertical directions, between the 
ultimate goal and the proper objeoto We must, therefore, consider the 
relationship between the two factors and in particular, consider the 
extent to which the procedures involved in achieving the goal must infJuence 
those involved in approaching the object. 
2. The Concept of God 
When Kant sought to show that the arguments for the existence or 
God were untenable, 1-rt was not his intention to create a case for the sceptic 
or for the atheist. On the contrary, he bel~eved that his c ri ticisrn of 
the arguments strengthened the case of the theist by removing unnecessary 
and confusing encumbrances. He argued that the mode characteristic of 
netaphysics is not knowlrlge but faith and so concluded 
"I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order 
to male room for faith."' (1) 
To deny knowlEilge, however, was not to deny the existence of God nor ;p t to 
cast doubt on it. Indeed, he argued that the concept of Goe is necessary 
to pure reason, not as a constitutive but as a regulative principle, required 
in order that reason should extend, as far as it is able, a systematic unity 
to all experience. On the other hand, practical reason requires the 
concept as a necessary postulate of ethical thinking. 
( 1) Critique of .fure Reason, Bxxx 
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So much Kant will allow: for pure reason God is a regulative 
principle, for practical reason a necessary postu~ te. An investigation 
of' the concept must therefore restrict itself' to the limits prescribed 
by these tv.o. The outcorre was the reduction of' theology by liberalism 
to ethics. But liberalism was not the only response to Kant. 
Schleiermacher, for example, rejected Kant's rat1onalism and substituted 
for it a romanticismwhich sought to reverse the trend tow~rds a Sharp 
diChotomy between science and culture which Kant's views encouraged. 
Both Barth and Till1ch are in conscious opposition to the liberal 
tradition a:rrl seek to find anibther way for theology, which involves a 
f'undamental decision about the concept of' God which they espouse. But 
the conclusions to whHlh they come are very different. 
On the one hand, Tillich appears to accept the Challenge of Kant's 
rejection of the classical arguments, of the Cartesian type of rationalism, 
and of the Ref'ormation tradition, and attempts to find a viable alternat1ve 
to Kent's concept of God. In so doing he draws heavily on Schelling and 
Schlmiermacher and, indeed on the whole of -what he describes as the classical 
tradition of ontology. 11 God 11 is therefore conceived in ontological terms, 
but Tillich seeks to a void falling into naturalism or pantheism by means 
of what he calls a 0self-transcending natu%1ill.ism119 The natural order 
points beyond itself, not to a supernatural being but to the ground or 
depth or power of its own being. 
Barth on the other hand, rejects not only the Kantian concept of 
God, but also the ontolog1cal interpretation which Tillich adopts. 
~fying all accusations of repristination, he insists that the only possible 
concept of God is the personal conception demanded by the revelation of 
God himself in Christ. If' theology is involved in a "supernaturalistic" 
concept of' God, it must accept it as a consequence of its dependence upon 
revelation, however uncongenial it may be to contEmporary attitudes, for 
"God .. ' is the naroo of' the divine person who has revealed himself in Christ. 
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When we turn to the question of faith and knowledge, we find that 
Tillich rejects the sharp distinction made by Kant, as restricting too 
greatly the scope of the concept of knowledge and creating unnecessary 
barriers between disciplines. He argues that the basic element of 
knowledge is union: Knowledge~therefore,~ppropriate not only to science 
but also to theology, because the knowledge of God 1s a kind of mYStical 
un1on, involving both intuition of, and apprehension by, the Unconditional. 
It is union with ihe grrond of being. 
Tillich expounds is 1 tself ambiguous. 
fut the concept of union which 
Without adequate definition and 
e:lp lanation it blurs the d1stinctions that have to be made between 
different disciplines. 
Like Tillich, Barth rejects the sharp distinchon between faith and 
knowledge, but he understands the knowledge of God in a different way from 
Tillich. It is, rather, the kind of knowledge that is commensurate with a 
personal relationship: it is communion rather than union. 
~fuile Tillich's view dan only with difficulty be construed as 
orthodox, the more obviously orthodox view of Barth scarcely seems to 
display an understanding of theology as a discipline which is constantly 
pushing forward. If we find that the categories of Scholasticism are 
inadequate or inappropr1ate, ~ay we not also find that elements ~ich had 
been thought to be fundamental to the con:::: ept of God may also be inappropriate 
or inadequate? Is there any reason why an ontological concept of God 
should not be the most ade~ate yet constructed? Or are there certain fixed 
points for theology? Clearly, Barth believes that there are such f1xed 
points, one of which 1s the fundamentally personal character of the divine 
self-revelation in Christ. For Barth, to abandon this point would be to 
abandon theology to existence upon a qu1cksand. 
Equally clearly, Tillich is uncertain. While on the one hand he 
wishes to affirm his allegiance to traditional Christian theology, he also 
wishes to maintain that theology should consider the religious experience 
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not simply of Christians but of mankind in general. But this is not to 
say that he believes there are no fixed points. He would regard the 
divine revelation in Christ as personal (albeit in a very different sense 
from Barth) but he is inconsistent about its precise place. Similarly, the 
kerygma is a fixed point, in respect of its content, but its form will 
change according to the situation. 
Thils the concept of God which each produces is controlled by the 
kind of framework within which they think - in Barth 1 s case this f'ramework 
is a tradliltional biblical one, whJ.le Tillich 1 s is an eq_ually traditional, 
but ontological framework. 
3. The Object of Theology 
As we have seen, Kant denied the possibility of' knowledge of God 
because, as he argued, God has no phenomenon. The object of' theology, 
therefore, is not the revelation of God or the Word of God, but the concept 
re~ired by pure reason or the p~stulate of practical reason. Thus in his 
Opus Postunum he defined God in terms of the moral law: 
"God is not a being outside me, but merely a th01;ight in roo. 
God is the morally practical reason legislating for itself'. 
Therefore there is ooly one God in me, a bout me, above me"'• ( 1 ) 
Now whether theology takes as its object the concept of God required by 
pure or practical reason or whether it takes the ChrJ.stian relJ.gious soul-
states, as Schleiermacher supposed, it seems to fall under the accusation 
of Feuerbach that it is in fact not concerned with God at all, but with 
( 1) Kant's Opus Postulllllll ed Erich Adickes (Berlin, Reuther and Reichard, 1920) 
p.B19, cited by Lewis white Beck in his introduction to Kant's Criti~e 
of Practical Re~son (UniversJ.ty of' Chicago Press, 1949), p.48 
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man and is therefore nothing but a thinly disguised anthropology. 
There can be no doubt that Barth felt the force of Feuerbach's 
critique and its application to the ma1nstream of nineteenth century theology 
and felt keenly the need for theology to take Cbd as its object or pe~sh. 
For this reason he felt himself compelled to press back behind Kant tore-
discover the true nature of divine objectivi tyo 
In his conclusions there is one point at least at which he is ~n 
agreement with Tillich, albeit a negative point. They agree that if 
objectivity is to be predicated of God, it cannot be of the kind that treats 
God as one object among others, as a member of the natural order: God muf>t 
be distinguished from all other objects of h~n perception. 
Fbr Barth, this means, in the first place, that there is no question 
of objectification with respect to God. It ~s for this reason, we have 
argued, that he uses the word Gegenstand of God, rather than Objekt. God 
cannot be s:iibjected to the kind of scrutiny to which objects in the natural 
world may be subjected. Some other approach must be adopted because although 
God gives himself in revelation to be known by man, he does not put himself 
at man's disposal or under man's control. Knowledge of God is the product 
of the act~ ve corrmunion of man with God • The hallmark, therefore, of 
theological method is faith and obedience. 
It means, secondly, then, that knowledge of God is ultimately 
dependent upon God himself and h~s ~11 to be known by man. It is God 
himself who initiates knowledge of himself, and always remains active ~n 
the process by which man comes to know him: 
"indissolubly subject." 
he is, in Barth's own -rords, 
It me~s, finally, that the kind of knowledge which is involved in 
theology is markedly different from that, for example, of physics, since the 
~ind of interchange which takes place between the theologian and his object 
is quite different from the interchange between the physicist and the object 
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of his 1nvestigation. We have attempted to point to the difference by 
drawing attention to the d~fference between savoir and connaftre. 
Theological knowledge ~nvolves a personal relationship: indeed, that is its 
primary characteristic. 
Tillich agrees with Barth to the extent that he, too, rejects the 
possibility of predicating of God the k1nd of objectivity that is predicated 
of the objects of the natural or the physical sciencesa He ls, however, 
undecided as to whether it is in fact possible to ~edicate objectivity of 
GQd at all. He argues that God is beyond the cleav,age of the subject-object 
view of the vrorld proposed by Kant. Consequently, if God ~s bra ught into 
the subject-object structure of being, he ceases to be the Ground of being 
and becomes one being among others. (1) However, this view appears to assume 
that only one kind of objectivity can be predicated of anything. He does 
adm~t that the- theologian cannot avoid making GQd an object "in the logical 
sense of the word", but adds that the danger of logical objectification is 
that it is never merelylogical. To think of God or to speak: of him, it seems 
automatically involves the mistake of treating him as one object among others. 
There is a distinct difference of emphasis between Barth and Tillich: 
whereas Tillich places greater emphasis upon the activity of the subject in 
making God an object of his cognition, Barth stresses the primacy of the 
activity of God in becaning an object for mane Moreover, there ~s a difference 
in the kind of knowledge which they conceive as appropriate to theology. 
Whereas Barth stresses its personal nature, Tillich thinks in terms of a 
~stical and romant~c view of knowledge as union, adding the veryHegelian-
sound~ng assertion that by knowledge of God we should understand that God 
knows lu.mself through man. 
(1) ST,I,p.191 
(2)~ 
(2) 
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Part of the difficulty felt by Tillich is due, no doubt, to his 
adoption of a position similar to that of Nicholaus Cusanus and Giordano 
Bruno with respect to the problem of the split between subject and object 
in the relationship of knowledge. The1r fear of a dualistic conception of 
reality drove them to hold that there is no f1nal antithesis between subject 
and object, finite and infinite, God and man, but a basic identity Which is 
due to the common ground of all things. (1 ) Tillich, similarly, fears a 
dualistic view of reality but the monistic view which he adopts appears to 
prevent him from acknowledg1ng any real diversity within reality and any 
real d1Stinction, therefore, between subject ang'object. Moreover, his fear 
lest God should be viewed as less than the wholqbf reality means that 1t is 
difficult ~or him to avoid some k1nd of pantheism. 
In addition, we must challenge Tillich 1 s aSBertion that making an 
object of God "in the logical sense of the word" is n~ver merely logical. 
T o think or speak about God by no means implies that he is one object among 
others, for 1t is surely possible 1n the thinking process to hold firmly 
the understanding that this object is unique. Tillich appears to allow a 
very narrow range of meaning to the word 11'object 11 • At best he will allow 
himself to speak of God being made a logical object; his primarily 
ontolog1cal conception of God prevents him fran speaking as Barth does, of 
God becoming an object for man.( 2) 
Vhen Barth speaks in this WE13, of God becaning an object for man, 
he makes a careful distincti~n betweEn v.nat he calls 11 primary 11 and "secondary" 
objectivity, a distinction which may be very useful for theology. By 
primary objectivity he means God's object1vity for himself, the kind of 
objectivity which is involved in God 1s knowledge of himself within the 
(1) of A.J.MCKelway, gp cit, p.62 
{2) Hartshorne comments: 11To be aware of a subject is to have it as an tobject 1 
but this has in principle nothing to do with changing it into an inferior 
mode of mere 'thing', or with rendering it relative to oneself. 
1Being-knovna 1 (by a part1cular subject) is only verbally a relation. It 
is knowing that relates, and subJects that are relative."' (TPT, p.185) 
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triune life of the Godhead. In contrast, the objecti~ty which God has 
for us in his revelatJ.on is secondary object~vity: 
"That is to say, [God J is not objective directly but indirectly, 
not in the naked sense but clothed under the sign and veil of other 
objects different from Himself." (1) 
God makes himself lmown in his works and, supremely, in the person of Jesus 
Christ, but even in Christ we are still presented only with secondary object-
ivi ty, s~nce in Chr~st God appears not as he ~s in himself, but as man, 
11 the Word made flesh." ( 2) 
There ~s, however, a certain d~fflculty inherent in speaking of God 
as made known in h~s works and Barth has to guard against possible mis-inter-
pretation. He makes it abundantly clear that he doew not think that the 
assertion makes possible any kind of natural theology. If God ~s made 
known in his works, it ~s to the eye of f'ai th. Moreover, while it may be 
argued that the eye of faith may recognise God's self-revelation in any of 
his works (used in the widest possible sense) it is clearly not Barth's 
intention that he should be understood in this way. There are specific 
objects (which may include events, visions, etc.) which are chosen by God for 
the purpose of his self-revelation and when Barth describes them as chosen 
by God, it is clear that he does not think that it is simply another way 
of saying that man tends to recognise some objects, but not others, as 
revelatory media: his sense of the divine initiative is too pcwerful to admit 
any equation between the two. 
Kant began with the contention that Goa has no phenomenon and cannot 
therefore be an object. Barth rejects the assertion roundly, for God has 
indeed a phenomenon: he is Deus pro nobis in his secondary objectivity. 
Theology has therefore an object, namely God's phenomenon. It ~s therefore, 
phenomenological in its method to the extent that it concerns itself with 
the phenomena of the divine self-revelstion. 
( 1) ~,II:1 :16 
(2) ~~ pp.16ff 
But it must never lose sight 
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of the secondary nature of the objectivity of God's revelation and ascribe 
to God •s works a primary character. At the same time it knows that it 
cannot know God as he is in himself. It is therefore an attempt to under-
stand the faith to which 1t 1s committed on the basis of the phenomena of 
secondary object1vity. 
While Barth insists, in opposition to Kant, that God does have a 
phenomenon, it must be admitted that h1s usage is new. It was the notion 
that God 1s known through revelation that led Kant to reject the idea that 
he has a phenomenon. In other words, God is not a :mart of the phenomenal 
world. Barth v.ould not challenge this assertion, but he wishes to under-
line the fact that God uses the phenomenal world in order to make himself 
known. 
Till1ch is rather less certain than Barth, although he 1s far more 
orthodox than he appears at first sight. His denial that God is an object 
is somewhat trivial, and says little about the task and method of theology, 
which is to' explicate the symbols used by religious tradition. Thus the 
object of theology is not so much an engagement with God, as with the symbols 
produced by the Christian faith. These symbols are the spontaneous product 
of a response to the impact of the Unconditional, and are therefore to be 
treated paenomenologically in order that their essence may be perceived. 
Thus Christ, considered phenomenologically, is the uniting effect of the 
impact of the New Being, and the Spirit i.e its transforming power. But 
the purpose of the exercise is to unlock the symbols so that the power of 
the ground of being may pour forth. 
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4. Subject and Object 
The chief ~estion to which Kant addressed himself in the Critique 
of fure Reason was the question "how is a priori lmowledge possible?" 
There is no doubt, it seemed, that all knowledge begins with experience. 
Knowledge of supersensible objects cannot be said to spring out of empirical 
experience; therefore if metaphysics can lay claim to knoWledge of super-
sensible objects it must be e:JI) lained how such knowledge is poss:ible. 
To Kant the clue seemed to lle in the procedure adopted by Copernicus in 
his attempt to solve the prmblems presented by astronomical observation: 
just as Copernicus adopted a different way of looking at the universe, so 
KBnt thought it necessary to adopt a different way of looking at the process 
of knowing. He proposed that in metaphysics we shoul6 suppose that objects 
conform to our knowledge rather than that knowledge conforms to objects. 
He argued that if our empirical knowledge conforms to objects as things in 
themselves, it is impossible to think the Uncondltioned without contradiction. 
The contradiction vanishes, however, when we suppose not that our represent-
ation of things conforms to things as they are in themselves, but that the 
objects as appearances conform to our mode of representation. 
he believed, a priori knowledge is possible.(1) 
On this basis, 
It is difficult to say how Kant envisaged the extent of the applic-
ation of his thesis,( 2) but he does bring to our attention the question of 
the relationship between subject arll)'object in the act of knowing. It draws 
attention to the active participation of the knowing subject in every act of 
perception. Thus whereas it was once possible to attribute to natural or 
physical science or even to historical studies, an objectivity absent from 
such subjects as philosophy or theology, Kant's discovery of the interpretative 
( 1) 
(2) 
Cfi tique of Pure Reason, B xvi ff 
i.e. Whether 1t is applicable simply to the categories of time and 
space, or Whether 1t has a wider application. 
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activity of the subject makes it necessary to acknowledge that1his activity 
1s also present in the e~irical sciences.(1 ) 
The great value of this thesis 1s that it breaks down some of the 
rigid d1atinctions between various d1sciplines and reveals common ground 
between them. ( 2) At the same time, however, it ra1ses the ~estion as 
to how far the subjective factor may d1stort the results of 1nvestigation, 
and may perhaps lead to despair at the apparent impossibility of reaching 
lneyond subject1ve irnpressi. ons to the true nature of the object. 
With respect to theology, both Barth and Tillid:l are aware of the 
role of the subject. Both recognise that it 1s impossible to practice 
theology without presuppositions,( 3) or to engage upon it from outside the 
theological circle. But that 1s not to say that they are in agreement: 
as we have already souftlt to show, their ap::preciation of the theological 
circle is by no means the same. They differ, moreover, in their evaluation 
of the extent of the 1nfluence of the subject1 ve factor. 
In his early work, Tillich laid great emphasis upon the "individual 
standpoint" and, even in Systematic Theology draws attention to what he 
calls subject1ve reason, by which he means the structure of the mind which 
enables it to "grasp and shapett reality, penetrating to its depth and 
transforming the given material into a Gestalt. (4) In the case of theology, 
however, knowledge is less an interaction between subject and object and more 
a mystical union, in which conceptual knowledge plays a minimal role. 
SiYJnbols are the product of the rel1gious group unconscious, but they are 
nevertheless thrown up as the respons1ve action of the "group subject" as 
we may call it. It is this stress on the subject, an aspect of his idealist 
(1) o~T. F. Torrance, Theological Sc1ence, pp. 92ff 
(2) cf.the discussion by Torrance of the need for a re-integration of the 
concepts of Verstehen and ErklMren, rigid distinction between Which has 
contributed towards a "'split cul1ure 11 (God and Rationality, pp.104ff) 
(3) CD,I:2:728 ST,I,pp.83f:f 
(4) ST,I, p.84 f 
epistemology, which compels him to adopt the posi t:ion he does .on ihe concrete 
religious traditions. Theology is concerned with the symbols of religion 
and so may be seen as related more to the subject in his re~onse than to 
the object to which he responds. Even though Tillich is not content with 
an account of the concrete rel~gious traditions, nor yet with a philosophy 
of religion (in the sense used in the System of Sc~ences or Religions-
philosophie) yet the normative concept builds on the philosophy of religion 
and is still marked as an indlvidual standpoint. 
Barth, on the other hand, shifts the focus of emphasis from the 
subject to the object. That is not to say that he is unaware of Kant's 
insight into the interpretatlve activity of the mind nor that he is unaware 
of the possibility that human subjectivity may dlstort the appreciation of 
the object to which lt ~s directed. It ~s, rather, to affirm the sovereignty 
of God ~r the way in whim he is perceived by man and the reality of the 
d~vine revelation. It is ,moreover, to affirm the normative character of 
the divine revelation in Christ. In this peculiar sense them, God is an 
object of man's knowledge and has, therefore, a phenomenon, a form of secondary 
object~ vi ty by which he chooses to make himself known to man. It is, 
therefore, th4 task of theology to conform itself ever more closely to this 
object, to the revelation of God in Christ. Knowledge of God 1.s the product 
of the interaction of the obedient subject, man, with the object, God, and 
theology seeks constantly to question whether it has understood its object 
correctly, or whether it has distorted it. Accordingly, he can accept 
nei ther;ilure realism nor pure idealism as the method r:£ theology: both 
must play their part as aspects of the total obedience of theological method ... 
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5. Christology 
A God who 1.s pre-eminently person may be thought of' !IX)I'e read1.ly 
as becoming incarnate in the person of' Jesus Christ, but a God who is 
conce1. ved primariljy' in ontological terms does not perm1. t the idea vn. thout 
great dif'ficulty, f'or 1. t appears to require that the inf'inite should become 
finite, whiCh is taken to be a contradiction in terms. Consequently, when 
theology opts f'or an ontological f'oundation, it can do little mdre than, 
as in the case of' Tillich, treat Christ as simply one man among man. It 
is true that he treats Chr1.st as the paradox, but he means by that not the 
paradoxical, apparently contradictory, appearance of' God in the form of 
man, but the paradoxical (contrary to opinion) appearance of New Being under 
the conditions of existence. Chr.utpossesses to a remarkable degree an 
openness to the Ground of Being and, on account of the perspicuity of t..h.e 
fact, makes possible the vision of the Ground of Being to others, ef'f'ecting 
in them the reunion of the person with the Grrund of Beingo This re-united 
status is, as the overcoming of' the conditions of ex1.stence, the New Being. 
Fbr Barth the central point of' Christology 1.s the belief in the 
genuine incarnatio~f God in Jesus Christ, although there 1.s good reason to 
believe that his understanding of' the paradox diff'ers in his later writings 
f'rom that of Romans. In Romans he seems to VleW 1. t as that which is actualJ..y 
contradictory, whereas later he came closer to Kierkegaard 1 s view, namely, 
that it appears contradictory to the non-bel1.ever, but logical to the 
believer. Barth, however, goes further than the statement of an 
orthodox belief in Chtist as the 1.ncarnate Son of God, to give Chr1.stology 
a certain methodological s1.gnificance, which has lead to descriptions of 
his work as 11 Christomonist 11 , 11 Christocentric11 and "Christofugal". Barth 
himself recogn1.ses the danger that Christo logy may be elevated to the position 
of a systematic or organising principle, and urges strongly that this 
should not be :J?3rmitted to happen, but rather that the only organising 
prmc1.ple should be the Word of Goa, by which he means the f'reedoqtof God 
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to speak through the eventiof reveletion in the person of Jesus Christ. 
However.., if the revelation of Goa in th!3 person of Christ 1s given a normahve 
status, there will always be the danger that Chr istology will become an 
Hegelian secret of the universe. Certainly Barth's insistence on seeing 
the doctrine of man 1n the light r£ Christology, with his strong anphasis 
on a Hebrew notion of corporate solidarity, appears to bear marks of a 
process of this sort. 
The problem, however, for orthodox ChrJStian belief, is that 
having declared a conviction that in Christ God is incarnate and manifest 
to man, it is faced with the question as to how it is possible to recognise 
this fact. Whet kind of evidence is there to warrant such a conclusion? 
Theology may have a difficult time in e.xp lainlng its answer,. It may never 
provide eVldence of the kind re~ired by the empiricist. But this is 
not to say that it is 1nvolved in an irrational commitment, even though it 
may find difficulty in seeking to trace out the path, post eventu, by wh1ch 
the conclusion was reached and the commitment ~de. Evasion of the question 
by abandoning what has been called the "scandal of particularity11 and 
shifting ground to a belief in the universal, although paradoxical, 
immanence of the transcendent 1s scarcely a solut1on to the problem, since 
it still retains the problem of recogn1sing the transcendent, as well as 
requiring widespread redefinition of the sort we have already indicated 
if any claim to be conduct1ng Christian theology is to be sustained. 
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6. Objectivity and History 
As soon as theoiliogy claims for ltself the kind of objectivity that 
involves concrete objects, hlstorical events and records, it lS e~osed to 
attack not only from rival theologies but also from historical research • 
.Although it J.S necessary to remember that history is not itself imnnme from 
the distortions caused by the presuppositions whJ.ch affect interpre~ative 
activity, it still remains true that there is a possibility that researCh 
might undermine the supposed historical foundation of theology. In view 
of thJ.s possibilJ.ty it may seem necessary for theology to take refuge in 
some posJ.tion that vall guarantee its valJ.dity in the face of every attack. 
But there seems little likelihood of such a secure position being found and 
the very spectacle of the discipline constantly chang2ng ground in search 
of invulnerability ought to be sufficient to discredit it. The alternative, 
however, is not necessarily a refusal to change ground at all, since it may 
become clear that one position is false and another at least an improvement. 
Nevertheless, the task of theology is not to seek invulnerability, but to 
thke the risks its tenets requJ.re. Clearly, it is with respect to its 
histor2cal foundatJ.on that theology is most likely to be vulnerable. 
In Romans, Barth adopted an ambiguous p()si tion which is susceptible 
of interpretation in such a way that the events of Urgeschichte are made to 
appear entirely separate from h2storical reality and invulnerable from 
attack. We have contended, however, that the position he wished to maintain 
was not in fact this, but another. He wished to claim, first, that the 
events of the incarnation, life, death and resurrection of Jesus are not 
products of ordinary h2stor2cal causality but special acts of God. 
Moreover, he was challenging the canons of positivistic hlstoriography, 
with its preconceived notion of the possible. It is clear from his later 
work, with its gradual abandonment of the distJ.nction between GeschJ.chte and 
Urgeschichte, that he is committed to taking the risk involved in opting 
for a real incarnation by God among men as a means of revelation, rejecting 
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not only the view that concrete events can have only a contingent and 
relative significance, but also the romanticism that wishes to view all 
things as revelatory. 
Barth's position is not without its difficulties, for it introduces 
a distinction between events which may be spoken of as chosen by God on the 
one hand and the rest of' histor1cal actuality on tae other. It poses the 
question how such events are to be recognised. It introduces the 
apParently ~estionable procedure of ascribing special significance to 
some events without accoonting for the significance of others. At the 
same time, however, it places a quest1on mark against the view that historical 
events can have only contingent status and so challenges historical science 
to a re-appraisal of its understanding of causality.(1) 
As might be expected, Tillich st~ds 1n stark contrast to Barth. 
We have noticed that from an early point in his career he came to the 
conclusion that it was necessary to ask how Christ1ani ty might be understood 
if the non-existence of the historical Jesus were to become historically 
probable. This gave added impetus to the drive to find an ontological 
interpretation of Christian doctrine, which in turn seems to preclude the 
possibility of a reconsiderat1on of the historical problem, except to the 
extent that it may allow a highly symbolical sense to the 1dea of incarnation, 
and regards all events and all objects as potentially transparent to the 
Ground of Being. For T1llich the truth of Christianity exists apart from 
histor1cal events, although he is als0 firmly convinced that the truth could 
not have been perceived except through events of' the sort reflected by the 
New Testament. 
If Christian theology is to be true to its historical character, 
(1) While Barth 1s committed to the importance of history, he stops short 
of describing historical events or persons as revelation, since 
that would remove them from God's control. 
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then it appears that it must be willing to take the risk involved in 
committing itselr to certain historical events. Certainly it may be 
true that the authors of the New Testament place false interpretations 
on the events they record, but it is irresponsible to adsmiss them without 
very carefUl scrutiny. 1~reover, to introduce not only a new interpretation 
but also to set aside the histor1cal foundation of Christian theology 
would appear to necessitate a re-definition or the Church, or at least a 
new understanding of its continuity. 
7. Authority and the Bible. 
A fUrther key area or discussion for theological method is to be 
located in the question of authority in theology. At the one extreme there 
has been the rationalist insistence on the essential~y rational nature of 
the Christian raith. +t has borne fruit in the Deists' emphasis on natural 
religion as well as in the Kantian interpretation of ethics as the self-
le.gislating activity of the autonomous reason. At the other ext rene, we 
find the fundamentalist insistence upon the verbal inerrancy of Scripture, 
and its absolute authority. Between the two extremes, however, lies a 
vast area of variation or emphasis. 
Nevertheless, it 1s clear that for Cl~ist1an theology, the Bible 
must figure largely in the question of authority, since it has traditionally 
furnished the data of theology. But while neither Barth nor Tillich wish 
to dlscard the Bible they hold widely differing views on its place in 
theological authority. 
Tillich displays considerable sympathy with Kant, which is connected 
with his view of the relat~onship between God and the wGrld. Thus he observes: 
"Ra.tJ.onalism and Enlightenment elllPhasise human autonomy. '.Autonomy' 
is not used in the sense of arbitrariness, of man mak~ng himself or 
deciding about hJ.mself in terms of h~s individual desires and arbitrar,y 
wilfulness. Autonomy is derived from autos and nomos (self-law) in 
Greek. It does not say 'I am a law unte teyself 1 but that the universal 
law of reason which is the structure of reality, is within me. 
This concept of autonomy is often falsified by theologians who say 
this is the misery of man, that he wants to be autonomous rather 
than dependent on God. This is poor theology and poor philosophy. 
Autonomy is the natural law given by God, present in the human mind 
and in the structure of the world. Natural law usual1.y means in 
classical philosophy and theology the law of reason, and th1s is 
the divine law. Autonomy ~s follow~ this law as we find it in 
ourselves. It J.s always connected with a strong obedience to the 
laws of reason, stronger than any rel1gious idea that seems to be~ 
arbitrary. The adherents of autonomy in the Enlightenment were 
opposed to anything so arbitrary as divine grace. They wanted to 
emphasise man's obedience to the law of h~s own nature and the 
nature of the world. 
11The opposite of autonomy is the concept of heteronomy. Herteronomy 
is precisely arbitrariness. ArbitrarJ.ness shows up as soon as fear 
or desire deter~es our actJ.ons, whether th~s fear be produced by 
God or society or our own weakness. For Kant the au thori tar ian 
attitude of the churches, or even of God if he is seen in a heter-
onomous light, is arbitrariness. Arbitrariness 1s subjection to 
authority if this authority is not confirmed by reason itself, for 
otherwise one is subjecting oneself on the basis of fear, anxiety 
or desire."' (1) 
Thus the author1ty of the Bible or whatever other authority theology 
may profess to acknowledge, must be confirn:ed by reason. But "reason"' 
itself, is a hJ.ghly ambiguous term, for the reason of the empir~cist or 
the radical sceptic conflicts violently WJ.th the reason of the mystic, for 
example. It ~s this conflict which has driven Tillich to seek to unite 
the very proper autonomous reason of man with its ground and so to re-est-
ablish a theonotey. Reason is reunited v.ri th its ground or depth, from which 
it has become estranged, by revel~tion; or, rather, when reason becomes 
ecstatic reason, grasped by an ultimate concern, revelation has taken place. 
Thus TJ.llich proposes his solution to the "reason or revelation" debate 
in theology. 
(1) A H~story or Chr~stian Thought, p.289 
Theonomy is not established by proclaiming the author1ty of a divinely 
inspired revelation, for revelation is not a divine depositum but the 
"convulsion and re-orientation" of all things including reason. ( 1 ) 
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What, then, is the authority of theology and what part is played by 
the Bible? Tillich is no sllnple rationalist. The mistake of the ration-
alists he argues, was their faiihure to recmgnise the estranged state of 
reason. Hence theology cannot be purely rationalistic. The authority of 
theology is "convulsed 11 reasmn, rea son under the impact of the Uncond 1tional. 
This means, in effect, that there can be no authoritative message from which 
theology takes its standards. Everything is subject in the ''1-r.otestant 
pr1nciple", which means that nothing 1s allowed a final or absolute authority, 
because final authority br1ngs heteronomy 1n its train. The Protestant 
principle rebels against any form of imposed authority, submittL~g only to 
that authority which is the sp:mtaneous product of "convulsed" reason. 
Thus any concrete religion may have 1nsights to offer, but none, Christiani~ 
included, can claim exclus1 ve authority. Simlarly, the Bible 1s to be 
viewed as one exarrq;>le among others of a response to the encounter with the 
Unconditional. It has no definitive authority. 
Nevertheless, at the same time, Tillich does speak of the appearance 
of the New Being in Jesus Christ as the fiDal revelation, a:rrl, in spite of 
his principles, does select Chr1stian1ty as, in some sense, a cr1tical norm. 
He is, in short, very IIUlch more orthodox than at first sight would appear 
to be the case. It is evident that he has a very deep attachment to 
Christianity and to the Bible. 
There l.S, however, another problem for theology concerning authority. 
There 1s not only the authority under which it operates in selecting and 
treating its n~terial but also the authority it exercises in vihat we have 
( 1) Twentieth Century Theology J.n the Making, vel. 2, PP• 46-56 
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described as the horizontal d~rection. If' theology works with an author-
itanve message proclaimed by an authoritative book - that ~s to say, if' 
it recog~ses the authority of' the message and the book - then ~t cannot 
~gnore that authority ~n proclaiming its message to the Church and to those 
who are outside the Church. Yet ~f' theology is to come to terms with the 
"situation" of' secular society, ~t f'~nds an increasing rejection of' 
authority. Thus, to theology, as to other d~sciplines, appeal to some 
indisputable authority f'or f'~nal decisions is barred, because every 
authority may be suspect. Indeed, authority is permitted to reside in any 
one place, be ~t legal, judicial, moral or theological authority, only by 
common oonsent. ~1en common consent ~s withdrawn, the authority collapses.( 1 ) 
This is not to say that there may not be any f'inal and objective authority 
at all, but only to say that without the corlitesponding element of' common 
consent, it cannot exercise ef'f'ective control, It ~ s the ''heteronomy", 
as lt is seen, of' the appeal to an external authority which Tillich's 
11 theonomous 11 thlnking is designed to overcome, but it :ilgnores certain 
aspects of' the question of' authority. 
In the f'lrst place, it must be adffiltted that past ages also disputed 
authorlty; nor was Judaism in the New Testament era f'ree f'rom such disputes. 
Besides the rlf't between the rabbinic schools of' Hillel and Shammai, and 
between the Pharisees and Sadducees, there were also various other f'actions 
and sects. Jesus was recognised by some as speaking with authority, but 
others ~estloned or 1~jected lt. It could equally be argued that the 
contemporary mood is as much a. matter of' the dispute of' authority as of' its 
rejection. The absence or general consent does not lnvalidate authority. 
But secondly, even granting that the ttpresent age" rejects authority, 
there is no reason f'or theology to hasten af'ter the current f'ashion, since 
(1) cf A. 1fucintyre, Secularisation and ~fural Change (London, O.U,P., 
1967), f'or an account of the process in mo~s. 
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this annunts to the recognition of the very bad authority of fashion. 
Vox populi is not necessarily vox Dei. Theology can scarcely abandon its 
authority or altermdically the forus of its authority, without making other 
equally radical changes, even to the point of leaving Christianity as an 
historical faith behind. 
A fUrther appect, however, of the problem of authority in dogmatic 
theology arises f'rom the very complexity of the theological discipline, 
which leads to a breakdown in communication among those who are engaged 
and 
~pon the critical and exegetical tasks of biblical research/upon the 
histor1cal and the systematic taslG of dogiWtics. Increasing specialisation 
produces divisions not solely between the biblical and dogmatic disciplines, 
but even within the separate disciplines themselves, cutting of'f the 
histor1cal researcher f'rom the systematic theologian within the field of 
do@Il8 tics. ]furthermore, it undermines the overall authority of ihe 
Church. It 1s understandable, but far f'rom flattering, to find it said 
of Tillich that he evaded issues of historical theology for fear of being 
judged by the strict canons of scient1fic historiography{1) or that he 
displayed a disregard for, or ignorance of, modern research on the 
Chalcedonian formula. ( 2) 
Barth holds very different views from Tillich on the question of 
authority. Their origin can be traced to the influence upon him of 
Herrmann and of the revolution in his thinking during the First World War, 
when he determined to come to grips with the Bible. It seemed to him 
impossible to do theology without basing it fjrmly on God 1 s revelation of 
himself. But theology is not a repetition, parrot-fashion, of the words 
and phrases of the Bible. Even though he goes back behind Kant and the 
Enlightenment to reinstate the Bible in a position similar to that given to 
(1) of c. E. Braaten's Introduction to Perspectives on Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century Protestant Theology:, P• xvi 
(2) cf K. Osborne, New Being, PP• 147 ff 
it by the Ref'onnation, Barth neverthel~ss makes some concessions to the 
Enlightenment. It should be remerribered that at the time of' writing the 
f'irst edJ. tion of' Romans he asserted that if he were forced to choose between 
the historJ.cal-critical method and the doctrine of inspiration, he wuld 
unhesJ.tatingly choose the latter, but that he did not believe that any 
such choice was necessary. It is hJ.s insistent claim that while the 
Bible can and must be subjected to critical examination, it nevertheless 
remains the wrJ. tten Word of God, authoritative for theology. lliis admission 
of' the proprie~ of critical research, however, amounts to an important 
concession, f'or it recognises not only the inescapable demands of' textual 
criticism, but also of other forms of' criticism which may impugn the 
reliability of certain passages or radically alter their interpretation. 
Thus there should be a constant interchange between the critical, exegetical 
and dogmatic functions of theology. It is true that some of the discoveries 
concerning biblical reliability have been made by sceptics rather than by 
believers, but there is nothing, in principle, to prevent the believer f'rom 
adopting an honestly critical attitude together with an urgent desire to 
understand the Word of God for his own age. The process, however, is complex 
and Barth's appreciation of this seems to deepen with time; f'or whereas, 
in Bomans, he appears to seek to short-circuit the process, passing directly 
from exegesis to preaching, in his later work he introduces ihe intermediate 
and, for him, most J.mportant, stage of' dogmatic encpiry. (1) Nevertheless 
even Barth is unequal to the task of' maintaining a grasp on the vh ole f'ield 
of' theological research. 
The authority of theology resides and remains with the Ward of God. 
Consequently, the theologian cannot adopt a disinterested attitude towards 
( 1) A commendable feature of Lonergan's Method in Theology is his attempt 
to trace the pattern of f'unctions or operations in theology. Even 
if his list of eight functions appears rather too highly schematised, 
it nevertheless J.llustrates the complexity of the process involved 
in the attenpt by theology to bring together the datq of' theology 
and the Church 1 s tasl;'of preaching. 
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the material he handles. Re is, and remains, a committed member or the 
Church and his work, there£ore, is characterised by £aith and obedience. 
Nevertheless, there remains a degree of ambigu~ty in Barth's 
understanding o£ the place or the Bible it/theology. It ~s not clear to 
what extent he regards it as datum £or theology and to what extent as itsel£ 
theology. Nor is it clear bow this ~estion re£lects on the authority 
o£ theology. Perhaps no £~nal answer is possible, in the nature o£ the 
case, but as we suggested earlier, Barth would have done well to have 
examined the question more thoroughly. He is very far from suggesting 
that we ought to believe 11beoause the Bible says so"'• The Bible is not 
itsel£ the Word o£ God, except in a derivative sense. It is a hur~n response 
tp the divine Word already heard and,there£ore, subject to the distortions 
involved in the process o£ human understanding. The Ward of God is heard 
within the Bible by the understanding enlightened theologically by the 
Holy Spiri te 
It is true that Barth adopts Kantian terminology,(1) speaking df 
theonoll\Y in theology, but the resemblance with Tillich, or indeed with Kant, 
is superficial. In the first place he argues, the theonoll\Y of theology 
quite proper:cy takes heteronom:>us forms, which are represented by the 
biblical, con£essional and ecclesiastical character of dogmatics. These 
forms are not bad, since they are, like God's secondary objectivity, forms 
appropriate to the situation. But, secondly, theonomy has as its pre-
supposition a prior commitment to Goa specifically in and through Jesus 
Christ. It is not a generalised commitment to "truth". Conse~ently 
theology cannot interpret i tsel£ as a 
11'finely detached enquiry into the ontic and noetic suggestions 
opened up by the Bible and dogma."' (2) 
(1) CD 1I:2:815 fi 
(2) ~' p.84t 
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Dogmatics is not concerned with the question of the ultimate relations of 
God, man and the world, however legitimate the issue may be. It is, 
rathez; concerned with the divine reconciliation wrought in Olrist and 
must, therefore, seek its authority through the record of the event of 
reeonciliation. 
Similarly, when theology directs itself to the communication of 
its conclusions to the Church and to those outside, through the proclamation 
of the Word, it cannot abandon the authority on Which it is dependent 
for its existence. A general failure among listeners to aclmowledge the 
authority lying behind the message does not undermine the truth of the 
message. 
8. Theology as a Science 
How, then, shall we understand the method of theology? It has 
been remarked that Barth shows little real interest in the question of 
whether theology should be classified among the sciences or with philosophy(1 ) 
and this judgement is true to the extent that he is not preoccupied with 
the question. At the same time, however, he does insist, at the beginning 
9f Churdl Dogmatics that theolihgy has certain points in common with natural 
science, in that it is, first, a human endeavour after a definite object of 
lmowledge; secondly, in that it follows a "definite, self-consistent path 
( 1) O.Brown, A Critical Examination of Xarl Barth 1 s Theolofcal Method 
with ~ecial Reference to His Doctrine of the Word of od, p.11 
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knowledge"; finally, in that it is accountable for this path to everyone 
who is capable of following it. ( 1 ) But when all this has been said, 
theology cannot be integrated with the other sciences by submission to the 
canons which are valid for them: it must always remain in a certain 
isolation, being allowed to pursue its own path. ( 2 ) 
Barth 1 s greatest concern is to deny that the~nogy is akin to 
philosophy. He has nothing but scorn for attempts to make theology 
academically respectable by including it within the framework of a unified 
view of knowihedge. Such attempts normally involve the classification of 
theology, methodologically, with philosophy. (3) While there is no reason 
to suppose that Barth wculd later have retracted his assertion that theology 
makes use of the methods of both realism and idealism, this is not to say 
that there is a fundamental s1milarity of method between philosophy and 
theology ·which enables them to be classified together. 'lheology makes use 
of these methods 1n developing the method which is peculiar and appropriate 
to its own object. The two d1sciplines differ radically because philosophy 
attempts to develop a world view 1ndependent of divine revelation, and seeks 
to reach the unknown and the absolute solely by rational means. Theology 
by contrast, works towards that wh1ch is known, working thl:Jough the given 
data of revelation. The task of theology is therefore to understand the 
data, not to develop a world view. Its method, therefore, is more akin to 
that of natural science. The sheer fact of the given-ness of revelation, 
then, means for Barth tl1at his theology can begin at no other point than at 
revelation, in order to achieve a deeper understanding of it. The rethod 
of his theology is, therefore, essentially a prioristic in the sense wh1ch 
(1) Ol!I:I:1:7 
(2) Ibid, p.9; also Ev.Theol p.112 
(3) Lonergan however appears to envisage a pattern of operations common 
to all disciplines which he summarises under the four axioms 
''Be attentive, be 1ntelligent, be reasonable, be responsible". 
This he calls the transcendental method (Method in Theology 
pp. 6f:f', passim.) 
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we have suggested earlier. It does not work towards a concept o~ God, 
revelation or the Trinity, but ~rom the givenness ~ these data. 
This kind o~ procedure Tillich opposes vigorously~ describing it 
as m thre quotation at the beginning o~ th~s chapter,as "religiously 
possible" but as "unsound theology". He says o~ Barth's doctrine of the 
Trinity, ~or example: 
"It was a mistake o~ Barth to start his Prolegomena with what, 
so to speak, are the Postlegomena, the doctrine o~ the Trinity. 
It could be said that in h~s system this doctrine falls from 
heaven, the heaven of an unmediated biblical and ecclesiastical 
authority. 11 (1) 
In complete contrast to Barth's view that the Trinity and, indeed, all 
Christian doctrine, is fUndamentally analytic in character, Tillich defends 
the v~ew that the doctrine of the Trinity, at least, is synthetic. We may 
suppose that it is h~s opinion that Christian theology has a generally 
synthetic character. We have already defended the view that his method 
may be described as a posteriori on the basis of the way in which he moves 
towards a normative account of religion. It is entirely in keeping with 
such an approach that the doctrine o~ tl1e Trinity should be regarded as 
synthetic. 
It is our belie~, however, that theological method ~s rather more 
complex in character than either Barth or Tillich is prepared to admit. 
Thidoctrine of the Trinity, for example, is both analytic and synthetic; 
it is indeed a fundamental aspect of divine revelation, for, as Barth 
himself asserts, God in his revelation is trinitarian. At the same time, 
however, as the theologian approaches his data he is compelled to conclude 
t.'IJ.at a doctrine of the Trii..ni ty is required to draw together those aspects 
o~ Christ~an theology vmich are expounded under the titles of the Father, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit. Similarly, Barth tr4ats the assertion 
(1) ST,III , p.303f 
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"God ~s LJrd" as a purely analytic judgement, because the revelation of 
God is a revelation of his lordship. Bui: the very word 11Lord 11 is used in 
other contexts; when it ~s applied to Goa, therefore, it-is to some extent 
at least, part of a synthetic judgement. Not only does the theologian 
recognise that a concept of God which excludes his lordShip is no concept 
of God at all, but also that the assertion that Gi!il is Lord is a conf'ession 
of faith, a recognition of the lordship of God, elements of the understanding 
of which, ih making the judgement, are drawn from elsewhere in human experience. 
Ultimately, to understand the concept of divine lordship we must examine 
the concept ~n its context, but in the original judgement at least, there 
is a synthetic element involved. 
We may ask aga m, then, whether theologica 1 method has more in 
common with natural science, or with philosophy. Cle~rly, some of the 
distinctions once made between theology and natural science can no longer 
be made. We have already referred to the discovery that the method of 
natural science is not immune to subjective factors. That, however, does 
not break down entirely the distinction between the two. Neither is the 
distinction removed by insisting on the givenness of the data in both, for 
the kind of givenness is very d~ferent.( 1 ) MOreover, the empirical 
method of natural science, employing what Tarrance describew as 11coercive 11 
quest~oning, is not relevant to theology. It remains true that both operate 
with data and seek to understand their data and that both are, or should be, 
characterised by a passionate pursuit of the truth, but these are slender 
grounds on Which to compare the two methods. It may equally be said that 
philosophy also engages upon a pass~onate search for the truth. 
The point at issue between Barth and Tillich is the mode of approach 
to the truth. It is this ~uestion that makes Tillich conclude that 
(1) As Torrance admits, in his discussion of the question 
(Theological Science, P• 37 ) 
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theology is more akin to philosophy than to natural science, ~or the data 
philosophy treats are no d:i.f'~erenlY?\11 those o~ theology in their non-
empirical character. The truth is intuited by a process which is d~~erent 
~rom the evidential, inductive reasoning o~ the natural sciences. It is 
characterised by conviction and by what we have called the mystical approach. 
Whereas ph2losophy seeks to bri11g to light the structure of reality, 
theology seeks to reach and realise the power o~ being in the dimension 
that gives meaning and purpose to human activity by e~~ecting in him an 
awareness o~ his essential relatedness to the whole o~ reality. In other 
words, theological method dif'~ers ~om philosoph1cal method ch2e~ly in its 
existential re~erence and in its attachment to a concrete rel2gious tradition. 
This leaves it ~ree to be likephilosophy in its synthetic dialectic, as it 
seeks to reconcile or to hold in tension the antitheses o~ human existence. 
It is just this synthetic dialectic, however, which seems to involve the 
asrumption that God is not known and that we must there~ore, work towards 
a concept o~ Qx1 which will sa tis~y the questions raised. 
Mediaeval theology was assimilated to philosophy by the method it 
ad~pted to achieve its apologetic purposes. It placed ~irst in the 
theological treatise the question o~ the existence of the object o~ theology. 
It sought to establish the existence o~ God and that it is God that is known. 
Now, while Tillich does not think that it is possible to discuss the existence 
o~ God, since God is not a supreme being and since existence, in his view, 
cannot be predicated o~ God, yet he does think that 2t is possible to 
dem:mstrate the reality o~ the Ground o~ Being on the basis o~ man 1 s 
awareness o~ an Ultimate Concern. Barth, on the other hand, sweeps this 
away altogether, not so much because it is in his view, an impossi. ble 
procedure, but rather because 2t 2s entirely unnecessary. Moreover, it 
is it sel~ a token o~ human pride because it s corns the plain ~act ~ God 1 s 
actual se~-revelation. Thus he argues that theology should not concern 
i tsel~ with questions such as "Is God known?" or "Is God knowable?" but 
with auch g)lestions as "How :far is God knovm?" and ''How :fqr is God 
lmowable?" ( 1) 
9. Theology and the Proclamation of the ClJ.Urch 
There still remains, however, the insistent g)lestion o:f how :far 
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the concern o:f the Church to make known its message, must af:fect its method, 
which brings us back to our starting point, namely, the relation o:r 
proclamation to theology, and to the question o:f the method o:f theology 
with respect to its goal (i.e. its "horizontal"' direction). 'Ihe question 
still remains as to whether Barth and Tillich 1 s respective positions are 
mutually exclusive o:f each other. 
Tillich expresses the view in several places that kerygmatic 
theology and apologetic theology should be regarded as complementary. 
In kerygmatic theology, one may suppose, the theologian turns, as it were, 
to :face God, and in apologetic theology he turns towards the enqu~rer or 
the sceptic in the attempt to address to him the content of his kerygmatic 
exercise. H~vever, he uses the term kerygmatic theology to describe 
Barth's theology, and makes it clear that he regards Barth's approach as 
unsound because it is supernaturalistic. 'Jlus view appears to be in 
( 1) .9_!2,ll: 1 :4f Torrance draws attention to Calvin 1 s precedent :for Barth 1 s 
approach, in his re~ersal of the questions o:f mediaeval science, quid sit? 
an sit?, quale sit?, making primary in theological activity the question 
q_ualis est? (Theological Science, p. xiii) It should be added that 
Barth's mode of operation is not ent~rely different from that o:f 
philos~y, :for we have already drawn attention to the similarity 
between his work and that of linguistic analysis. 
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complete contradiction to the view that kerygrwtic theology has a oomplementary 
and even a necessary role to rulfil. Elsewhere he describes kerygrwtic 
theology as reproducing, interpreting and organisJ.ng "the message" in 
predominantly bJ.blical terms(i) and as seeking to preserve theanchangea~le 
truth or the message, ( 2) but ir this suggests that he thinks that 1t J.s 
possible to do kerygmatic theology in some way other than Barth's, he gives 
little indication or where that way may be sought. We are left to suppose 
that it may be a VJ.ab~ undertaking provided it can d1spose of its super-
naturalistic element, to express the message in biblical terms instead of 
in thoseor modern man. Nevertheless, it seems that Tillich has considerably 
less sympathy for kerygrwtic theology than appeared to be the case at first 
sight. Not only does it appear to be rorbidden because of the J.ntolerable 
arrogance it is thought to display, but also because of its inability to 
connect with "the situation". Furthermore, the ontological outlook which 
Tillich adopts in order to further the proclamation of the Church a~pears 
to preclude the kind of encounter presupposed by Barth and, indeed, to cut 
o:ff the Church from the very roots fromwhich it received its message. 
At the same time, however, it must be saJ.d that Tillich does not wish to 
do that. 
On the other side, it is quite clear that Barth regards Tillich's 
method as J.llegitimate, for the same basic reason as he regards 
SchleierllL3 cher 1 s as illegitimate. Despite theJ.r common concern for the 
message of the Church, their method ignores God's revelation of himself 
in Christ and turns instead to anthropological considerations. This is 
not to say that Berth is not concerned about proclamation; on the contrary, 
he takes very seriously the ,resp::msJ.bili ty or the Church to make known its 
message. Dogmatic theology exists preciselyin order to inform the thinking 
of the preacher, whether hJ.s preaching is done in the form of the Sunday 
(1) "The Problem of TheologJ.cal Method 11 , JR, vol. 27 (1947), P• 24 
(2) ST,I,p.4f' 
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sermon or in some other way. Indeed dogmatic theology exists to inform 
the thinking of' the whole Church, to deepen its faith and understanding, 
so that 1t should understand what 1t proclaims. But he 1s unwilhng to 
believe that the problems of proclamation are as severe as they are painted. 
It 1s unjust to dism1ss Barth as thlnk1ng that the message must simply be 
tossed l1ke a stone to the outsider,(1) for the preacher, in all humility 
knows h1mself' to be a sinner too, and that he, too, may have once stood 
outside the Church and, therefore, sympathises with the outsider, while 
yet being unable to agree with h1m. 
It is easy, however, to gain the impression that Barth believes the 
message Should be tossed like a stone to the unbeliever, and that he holds 
that there 1s no place in proclamatJDn for "apologetics"'• But he does, 1n 
fact, engage upon his own type of apologetic, which seeks, not to disguise 
his Christian assunptions, but to demonstrate their own internal rationalit,y. 
He recognises that there is no rationality without assumptions, and that it 
is the task of ~~e preacher both to expose his assumptions, and also to defend 
their rationality, not by subjecting them to the canons of rationalism but by 
expos~g their own self-justifying nature. Thus he speaks to the atheist 
Max Bense, not as an opponent tgbe refuted, but as one whose impression of 
the Christian faith is mistaken.( 2) 
There is no doubt that both Barth and Tillich are concerned to 
further the proclamation of the Church, but it is also clear that they 
differ widely in their understanding of the nature and scope of the task. 
On the one hand, Barth believes that 1t can be achieved only by a radical 
reassertion~of the truth of the Gospel, very much in its traditional terms, 
placed Wlthin the exclusive framework of the Chr1stian revelation. From 
this will spring, through the deeper understanding of the gospel and through 
the work of the Holy Spirit, the transformation of society and of scientific 
thinking. Tillich, on the other hand, seeks to reconnect culture WJ.. th its 
(1) of ST,I,p.7; A.G.N.Flew, God and Fhilosgphy (London, HutChinson, 1955),1:1 
(2) Fragments Grave and Gay, PP• 40-47 
-304-
~iritual roots and sees it as the task o£ proclamation to speak directly 
to the situat1on, to connect with man's sel£-understand1ng as it is expressed 
in cultural £orms. Thus a part o£ its task is to contribute to the 
construction o£ a un1£ied view o£ science. In other re~ects 1t is an 
adjunct to psychotherapy. Indeed it can be argued that the role a£ theology 
closely resembles that o£ psychotherapy: as psychotherapy seelcs to e££ect 
the reintegrstion of personality, so theology seeks the reintegration o£ 
culture as well as of the individual. 
However, even when we recognise the profound differences o£ 
approach between Bnrth and Tillich, there remain other factors which make 
it diff1cul t to come to a final decision on the extent to which they may 
be compatible with one another. One factor is related to the difficulty 
involved in deciding upon the precise purpose of apologetics, £or in splte 
of his unceasing championship of the cause of apologet1cs, it 1s not easy 
to decide exactly what Tillich means by the term. When we ask vrhat is the 
goal of apologetics, vre find it difficult to know whether he sees it as a 
tool of proselytising or not. We have already drawn attention to his 
pre£erence £or d1alogue rather than proselytisation, but his conv1ction 
that theology is related to matters o£ ultimate concern indicates that he 
desires that the apologetic exercise should 1ssue in some form o£ cowmitment. 
Because o£ his own commitment, culturally, to the Chr1stian symbolism of 
ultimate concern, he expounds that form, but there seems to be no reason 
to suppose that the Christian symbolism alone is acceptable. He may wish 
to assert that lt 1s super1or, because it 1s more ade~ate, but he cannot 
and does not claim exclusiveness £or it. 
Again, in the pre£ace to the £irst volume of Systematic Theology, 
he describes as the purpose of the system that 1t should be "a help in 
answer1ng questions", ( 1 ) but we have discovered that he uses the word 
( 1) _§!,I, p .. x 
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11 q!.lestion 11 in a very ambiguous way. It appears from this preface that he 
is content that apologetic theology should fulfil the office he described 
in 1947 as answering the questions asked of, and the criticisms directed 
against, a concrete religion. (1) A Wlder view of his work,however, makes 
it clear that he has a far more ambitious purpose. We have aJready 
commented on his tendency to transform question and answer into quest and 
fulfilment. In his view, every question or criticism directed to 
religious faith 1s prompted by a q!.lest within the cr1ti~ h1mself. It 1S, 
then, reasonable to suppose that what the critic needs is not simply an 
answer to his question, but an answer which will at the same time be the 
fulfilment of h1s c:pest. 
Even now, however, we have by no means exhausted the scope of 
Tillich 1 s intention, for while he does wish to address himself to the vocal 
critics of rel1g1on, yet he also wishes to address himself to the non-vocal 
critics, or rather to those critics who do not address themselves directly 
to religion, but who e:xpress their quest1ons and so the1r quest in every 
kind of cultural form. Inasruch as these cultural forms are the product 
of contemporary society, they are the e:J!P ression of the quest of the whole 
of society. Thus his 11apology 11 is directed to the general cultural situation, 
but it 1s by no means obvious that this is so. It is at times very difficult 
to judge what its purpose or its target is. 
The ambiguity of his use of the terms question and answer is 
paralleled by the ambiguity of his use of the terms philosophy and theology. 
Both words have a considerable range of meaning and reflect the d1fficulty 
that we have in deciding vmether apologetic theology should be regarded as 
an attempt to reply to the criticisms made by philosophers, whether 
idealists or logical positivists or linguistic analysts, who do not claim 
allegiance to a concrete faith, or whether it should be regarded as an 
( 1) "The Problem of Theological Method", ~~ vol. 27 ( 1947), P• 24 
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attempt to provide the solution to the passionate search ( 11the philosophical 
question") of' human existence articulated in part by cultural forms and 
implicit in the very fact of' human "existence". (1 ) 
One of' the problems of' apologetics is that 1t has to identify its 
audience. Having done so, however, it is likely to produce forms of' an 
extremely trans1tory nature. Thus an apologetic system is in danger of' 
being out of' date almost before it is completed. Tillich counters this by 
producing his own assessment of' the human si tuationp wluch draws upon the 
material provided by the broad spectrum of' culture,( 2) increasingly inf'luenced 
f'rom about 1930 by what he regards as the good f'ortnne of' theology, 
namely, existentialist philosophy. He does so, however, at the risk of' 
failing to rooet his audience at all. Moreover, while it may be the good 
fortune of' theology in one age to discover in cultural forms a measure of 
agreement in the assessment of' man, in other ages there may be violent 
disagreement. In itself', this is no objection to apologetic theology, 
but it does mean that it is beset with difficulties. 
While Tillich gives the impression of' a broader understanding of', 
and sympathy with, contemporary cultural forms, yet it would be wrong to 
suggest that Barth is without understanding. Indeed, there is much evidence, 
not least from his published sermons, of' a deep understanding of' his audience. 
But, struck as he is by the otherness of' the gospel and of' the revelation 
of' God, he refuses to ~ld to the demands of' apologetic theology, preferring 
that the approach to an audience should be determined by the occasion itself. 
( 1) 
"If' modern man is earnestly interested m the Bible, he certainly does 
not wish for its translation into transitory jargon. Instead, he 
himself would like to part1cipate in the effort to draw nearer to 
what stands there. 11 (3) 
of Tillich 1 s assertion that apologetlc theology "answers the questions 
inplied in the 'situation' in the power of the eternal message." 
(§!,I,p.6) 
(2) of The Relisious Situation 
(3) Ev. Theol. p.35 
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llie question however, that Barth begs is whether modern man is interested 
in the Bible as such. It is just this belief, that the Bible as such does 
not interest modern man, that has seemed to many to make the need for 
effective apologetic so urgent. 
Nevertheless, whether or not there ~s a need far apolqgetic, there 
is certainly no reason :Cor the requirements of apologetic to d~ctate to 
theology 1ts method of approach to its own proper object, smce to be honest 
science, theology must allow its method to be dictated by its object, as in 
any other field of enquiry. It is not ent1rely true to say that Tillich 
a~1s h~s apologetic interests to dictate his message, since he has deeply 
held ontolog1cal convictions which are closely related to his conception 
of theology. At the same t1me, however, it does appear that those 
convictions are themselves, in part, influenced by his beliefs about the 
kind of' theology that is demanded by the contemporary situation. It is, 
to him, no longer possible to do theology in thm way adopted by the Reform3tlon, 
since nineteenth and twentieth century man thinks in onto~ogical rather than 
theological terms. It is necessary, theref'ore, that theology should work 
towards an ontological study of religious symbols. Whether this is, in 
fact, a viable undertaking, is questionable, as we have suggested, and appears 
to involve i~orting into theology assumptions and methods ·which are f'oreign to 
the object of theology, without drastic changes in the conception of' God. 
In this case, it is difficult to a void the conclusion t..h.at theology must 
forfe~t the name Chr.Lstian and also its associatlon with the Christian Church. 
It 1s always the danger of apologetic theology that it appears to 
produce answers as tl1ough from a magician's hat, and f'or that reason, it must 
be constantly on guard. Moreover, theology must be on constant guard against 
the tendency of apologetic ~nterests to d~ctate the method of approach to 
l ts proper object. Interesting as a questit:bn such as "Is theism a viable 
option?" may be, 1 t is not a question for theology which springs from an 
encounter with God, :for Christian theology rests upon the conviction, not 
that theism is possible, but that J.n Jesus Christ, God has made himself 
known. While the Church seeks to understand its audience better, it 
cannot dJ.vorce J.tself from this its :fundamental convJ.ction. 
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